AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
@X Oristos
@Lascaris
Your thoughts?
My thoughts are that without a British presence on the ground the Greek forces may be more willing to move at least a portion of their strength back to cover the Monastir Gap. Or, if the lack of British forces in Greece butterflies the Yugoslavian coup, then the OTL decision to push into Albania along with Yugoslavian forces is likely not taken. This could lead to a good chunk of the forces in Albania pulling back and the Metaxas line is either reinforced or abandoned (probably reinforced. Assuming reinforcements can get there in time they might hold the Germans for some time. After that, it depends on how willing the Greeks are to pull back before the Germans break through and how fast they can do so.
I think there is a sgnificant possiblity of the Greeks capitulating barring british ground commitment. The Yugoslav coup is butterflied and possibly Yugoslav troops take part in the invasion of Greece. If Greece is not capitulating, then they may try to hold the Pindus-Aliakmon-Olympus Line. Without a mechanized force to cover their retreat, amost all the units will be destroyed.
There is no reason for an evacuation of Western Thrace. It had only seven battalions which by that point had been moved via rairoad west.
There is no reason for an evacuation of Western Thrace. It had only seven battalions which by that point had been moved via rairoad west.
To summarise:
RAF coverage, no destruction of ports, and no need to evacuate British/Australian/NZ troops provide a greater capacity.
However there will be less willingness, initially, for greek soldiers to get on the ships, except for cretans (and, presumably, jews).
Unless ordered by the government, which will itself go to crete.
If crete holds (highly likely with a more organised defence), more greeks will make the trip to join them over the months, as the axis grip tightens.
Because crete will be a rallying point, and the trip is much easier than all the way to egypt.
I dont think the greek government will go to London, because it isn't a government in exile - the centre of government is temporarily outside the capital, but still in greece, on crete.
I can see greek troops getting trained in egypt, but not fighting in north africa - the british didn't fight in greece, so why should the greeks aid the british fight in north africa?
But they can replace all the garrison on crete, and over time tie down and then attack/take back greece as the war turns.
RAF coverage, no destruction of ports, and no need to evacuate British/Australian/NZ troops provide a greater capacity.
However there will be less willingness, initially, for greek soldiers to get on the ships, except for cretans (and, presumably, jews).
Unless ordered by the government, which will itself go to crete.
If crete holds (highly likely with a more organised defence), more greeks will make the trip to join them over the months, as the axis grip tightens.
Because crete will be a rallying point, and the trip is much easier than all the way to egypt.
I dont think the greek government will go to London, because it isn't a government in exile - the centre of government is temporarily outside the capital, but still in greece, on crete.
I can see greek troops getting trained in egypt, but not fighting in north africa - the british didn't fight in greece, so why should the greeks aid the british fight in north africa?
But they can replace all the garrison on crete, and over time tie down and then attack/take back greece as the war turns.
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I'm sure they'll keep a presence in Crete but the practical pressure to go to London or Washington will be overwhelming, bluntly the road from Crete to Athens runs through London are present having their voice heard Greek concerns will be ignored.
Apart from a token presence they won't really be needed in Africa. With Rommel dead and the sea route increasingly closed to Axis supply convoys Libya should be wrapped up far sooner than OTL. But Crete has neither the industry nor revenue to support a significant military force so while the Greeks will be unhappy with the British the Greek Army will fight where they are told to fight. I suspect with Crete as a base and Churchill's historic inclinations that will mostly consist of a succession of fairly pointless attacks on Italian held islands culminating in taking part in the invasion of Italy.
Who said Rommel was dead? last heard of he was seriously injured in post 2625!
Thank you for the feed back and thoughts, they well sum up the possibilities and the probabilities.
in OTL at this time the Middle East Command were fighting on two fronts one in North Africa and one in Greece. Here they are on the ground fighting a single campaign. The Air War and Naval War is still coping with multiple threats and fronts but that is nothing new for them.
ITTL is it really possible that the Greek campaign could be any more disastrous for the Greeks than OTL. That is what I an working out at the moment and it is a very mute point. Personally I am thinking that Greek casualties will be a little higher but conversely more Greeks will actually get out to fight again. RAF Losses will be higher but at a cost to the Luftwaffe and axis ground forces. For the RN I think about on par at least till the OTL invasion of Crete.
Time will tell.
Thank you for the feed back and thoughts, they well sum up the possibilities and the probabilities.
in OTL at this time the Middle East Command were fighting on two fronts one in North Africa and one in Greece. Here they are on the ground fighting a single campaign. The Air War and Naval War is still coping with multiple threats and fronts but that is nothing new for them.
ITTL is it really possible that the Greek campaign could be any more disastrous for the Greeks than OTL. That is what I an working out at the moment and it is a very mute point. Personally I am thinking that Greek casualties will be a little higher but conversely more Greeks will actually get out to fight again. RAF Losses will be higher but at a cost to the Luftwaffe and axis ground forces. For the RN I think about on par at least till the OTL invasion of Crete.
Time will tell.
Ok lets take a look at this from a bit of a distance? What is our situation here if I understand things right?
1. The Greeks know from some time at least in early February that no aid is coming.
2. The political decision to fight no matter what still stands, after all the Greek end game is that in the end Britain always wins.
3. No British land forces so Yugoslav intervention is exceedingly unlikely.
Actually under the circumstances there is a reasonable case to be made that Papagos is forced to accept his generals opinion for a pull back on the Olympus as soon as the Germans cross the Danube which is in February. What is his case not to do so? No British aid is on the way and the Yugoslav position is pretty clear after all...
So two possibilities. First the Greeks do pull back in February-March to the Olympus-Venetikos line and dig in there. Much bragging by Mussolini, at least ten Greek divisions still facing the Italians... you have roughly 10 more dug in in the Olympus. Presumably no Yugoslav coup, which is a good thing for the Greeks as the Germans cannot move forces via Yugoslavia. So the Germans break through the Metaxas line, defended only by the forts garrisons and token forces, then advance about 250 km over blown up roads to make contact with the main Greek position. How many divisions are they able to keep supplied by way of Bulgaria in this scenario? All of 1st Panzer group plus XVIII, XXX and XL corps would be 4 panzer and 10 infantry divisions probably too much to sustain. Without 1st panzer group you are at 2 panzer and 6 infantry divisions which look about right. Can you breach the Olympus with 8 divisions? Possibly. After all you can have reinforcements covering casualties, the Greeks not so much. Can you do it in a timely fashion without excessive casualties? Isn't this an interesting question?
Second Papagos remains boneheaded. The Germans break the Metaxas line but it takes rather more than 4 days with Yugoslavia out of the pcture. Then advance to the Olympus without much or any opposition. Did the Greeks retreat from Albania in time? No Yugoslavia so no offensive into Albania the logical thing will be for a retreat from Albania to be ordered as early as 7th or even 6th April. So best case scenario for the Greeks the Germans have to fight the WMFAS divisions on the Oplympus right after they walked a couple kp to reach it. Not much question about the result, only if any parts of the army make it away...
IIRC the use of Yugoslav Railways for the transit of German troops had been agreed prior to the coup. Likely for their supply as well. Assuming that is true, it seems like a similar amount of German troops would be available in TTL as IOTL.
Thanks for the suggestions guys, they are very useful. Now I just have to decide on an option and think it through. Knowing how pig headed Greeks can be I fear the worst!!
IIRC, the British had the RAF in Greece in late 1940, just after the Italians invaded Greece. There were a few LAA batteries as well to protect the airfields. In Nov 1940, Hitler actually ordered the Wehrmacht to plan in invading Greece, as he did not want the British on his flank as he invaded Russia, even just a few squadrons. So Greece was always going to be invaded, regardless of the numbers of British troops. And I also recall that the Yugoslav government was being pushed to agree to transit rights well before the British land forces arrived.
No Insult was intended, That comment can be made about most peoples especially Monarchs and politicians, just look at British History for some shining examples.
12 25 Mad March, begins
12 25 Mad March, begins
As March started the situation in East Africa was improving the southern thrust by the East Africa, Southern force starting from Kenya, consisting of the First South African division, with Brigade units from Rhodesia, East Africa and the Gold Coast attached had. Captured the Port of Kismayu and it was receiving supply convoys by twenty first of February. Mogadishu captured on February twenty fifth with its port easing the supply position even more. With the capture of Mogadishu the Southern force were now to head north on the long road to Addis Abada. To shorten the supply line that this advance would entail the British prepared a sea landing at Berbera in British Somaliland, This would be staged from Aden from where the landing would receive constant air support.
In the Sudan the Northern force consisting of the Fourth and Fifth Indian divisions were also making good progress as they advanced. General Wavell was pushing hard to get this campaign concluded as rapidly as possible to free up troops for operations in other theatres. Two lines of advance were approaching the all important port of Massawa on the Red sea. The Indian divisions from the west and a further force staging out of port Sudan coming down the coast. Frequent bombing of the Italian navy in Massawa had reduced the force there to virtual stagnation. Once again this campaign was dominated by logistics and airfields as much as the set piece battles. Persuading the French in Djibouti to declare for the Allies in mid March was a political triumph for the British much aided by the constant domination of the airspace by both British bombers and fighters. The establishment of advanced air fields near the city did much to hasten the defeat of the Italian forces in both British Somaliland and Eitrea.
The domination of the air space in East Africa by the RAF and the SAAF was much facilitated by the severing of the route by which Italian aircraft were getting from Tripoli to Italian East Africa. This was done by the capture and occupation of the airfield at Oweinat also known as Ain Doua situated some two hundred miles south east of Kufra oasis in the corner where the borders of Egypt, Sudan and Libya met at Mount Uwaynat or Gabal El Uweinat massive depending on who was asked. This had been the last refuelling stop on the Italian Trans Saharan flight route to the Sudan and Italian East Africa. Visited by Ralph Alger Bagnold in the interwar period it was considered important enough for the LRDG and to the Italians that it was taken over and occupied by the Allies in late 1940. It possessed a rocky firm landing ground comprising a square a thousand yards on each side and had the benefit of water from an oasis in the wadis of the mountain massive. Being three hundred and fifty miles due west of the British bases at Wadi Halfa made it a strategically import base for controlling the southern Sahara desert.
With the collapse of the Italian defence of Amba Alagi and its surrender by the Duke of Acosta in late march, once the mountain stronghold had been surrounded by allied troops and subjected to a continued bombardment by the RAF and SAAF the major campaign in east Africa drew to a conclusion. Though some Italian units would continue a guerrilla campaign until nineteen forty three.
With the final clearance of Italian naval forces from the Red Sea President Roosevelt of America was able to remove the restriction on American ships from entering what had been previously declared a war zone.
By mid April all the ports were functioning and the railway line from Masawa to Addia Aada was once again hauling supplies up to the city from the coast.
The conclusion of this campaign enable the Indian and south African division to be reassigned to other areas. Also the SAAF and RAF squadrons could be relieved, refitted and sent elsewhere. With the events unfolding in the North these forces were sorely needed.
Just as Italian East Africa had been subdued two more areas of conflict erupted, in the north, Vichy controlled Syria was now being used as a staging post for Luftwaffe air attacks and this breach of the somewhat one sided neutrality of the Vichy regime was all the reason the allies required to justify invading Syria and liberating it from Vichy control. These aircraft were over flying Iraq in order to attack allied shipping and over targets. As a response to this a SAAF OTU was transferred from Nairobi to the large British airbase at Habbaniya just a few miles from Bagdad. Habbaniya was a flight some five hundred miles from the air bases in Palestine and three hundred from those in the Persian Gulf. Here again the sheer distance from the nearest other major air bases show some of the problems with supporting such an outpost, even one as large and well equipped as Habbaniya entailed. Support for the SAAF OTU was initially flown in, The Iraqi authorities were showing a belligerence stance and obstructing overland resupply in defiance of the terms of the treaty with Britain. One purpose of sending modern fighters was as a gentle reminder of the possible consequences if such actions escalated. In accordance with the treaty Terms the British Government had informed the Government in Bagdad that in accordance with the treaty a contingent of British and Commonwealth troops would be landed at Basra and passed up the agreed line of communication to the base at Habbaniya in early April.
By these measures in march Wavell and the British diplomats hoped to nip in the bud any plot against the pro-British Regent Abdulla Illah. The troops to be sent to Iraq were some of those released from East Africa that had been slated to return to India in order to provide a core of battle hardened veterans for new formations being raised there.
With the capture of Cyrenaica the Sarah desert to the south had become both a liability and an opportunity. Since the early days after the declaration of war by Italy in the summer of nineteen forty a specialised allied unit known as the Long Range Desert Patrol had been exploring and policing this vast empty area. In January a major expedition had left the Nile with the intention of establishing not only a permanent bases deep in the southern desert but to link up with French forces from Chad who wished to join the allies.
The air support and resupply systems developed for and During Operation Compass were to be fully exploited in this foray. The target of this operation was the Oasis at Murzuk, it’s air landing fields and the nearby garrison fort at Traghen, nearby being relative where distances are measured in hundreds of miles. The operation was a complete success with the occupation of the Oasis at Murzak and the capture of the airfield which was immediately used to fly in supplies and to fly out the captured Italian garrison.
Once the capture was confirmed a major supply convoy of trucks and equipment set out from Cairo on the four week trek across the dessert to deliver heavy supplies and the lorries themselves that could not be flown in. Meanwhile the LRDG had been joined at Murzuk by a free French contingent from Chad under the command of Colonel Jacques Lelerc . Their knowledge of the terrain to the south of the Sarah was of great importance to the RAF who were, amongst other possibilities looking at the viability of sending aircraft north from the Takoradi ferry route directly to Cyrenaica. Departure from the established ferry route would be from Maiduguri in northern Nigeria via Tummo thence to Murzuk. To further explore the route to the south elements of the LRDG drove south to Tummo from Murzuk and then with the aid of French guides south east around the Tibesti Mountains before reconnoitring and traversing a vast area of southern Libya , northern Sudan and southern Egypt looking for suitable landing grounds before ending their epic journey by following the Nile to Cairo. The viability of the short cut north for the air ferry and air transport route was limited as yet by the lack of a viable landing and refuelling stop on the six hundred mile trans Saharan section north of Murzuk. To the south east it was a flight of over six hundred miles over the Rabiana sand sea to reach the captured airfield at a Oweinat .
The reason that this effort was expended was twofold. One was to explore and ultimately protect the southern flank of the British and Commonwealth forces in Cyrenaica and the second was to encourage the French colonial powers in Chad and other territories of the southern Sarah to formal join the Free French Government in exile.
As March started the situation in East Africa was improving the southern thrust by the East Africa, Southern force starting from Kenya, consisting of the First South African division, with Brigade units from Rhodesia, East Africa and the Gold Coast attached had. Captured the Port of Kismayu and it was receiving supply convoys by twenty first of February. Mogadishu captured on February twenty fifth with its port easing the supply position even more. With the capture of Mogadishu the Southern force were now to head north on the long road to Addis Abada. To shorten the supply line that this advance would entail the British prepared a sea landing at Berbera in British Somaliland, This would be staged from Aden from where the landing would receive constant air support.
In the Sudan the Northern force consisting of the Fourth and Fifth Indian divisions were also making good progress as they advanced. General Wavell was pushing hard to get this campaign concluded as rapidly as possible to free up troops for operations in other theatres. Two lines of advance were approaching the all important port of Massawa on the Red sea. The Indian divisions from the west and a further force staging out of port Sudan coming down the coast. Frequent bombing of the Italian navy in Massawa had reduced the force there to virtual stagnation. Once again this campaign was dominated by logistics and airfields as much as the set piece battles. Persuading the French in Djibouti to declare for the Allies in mid March was a political triumph for the British much aided by the constant domination of the airspace by both British bombers and fighters. The establishment of advanced air fields near the city did much to hasten the defeat of the Italian forces in both British Somaliland and Eitrea.
The domination of the air space in East Africa by the RAF and the SAAF was much facilitated by the severing of the route by which Italian aircraft were getting from Tripoli to Italian East Africa. This was done by the capture and occupation of the airfield at Oweinat also known as Ain Doua situated some two hundred miles south east of Kufra oasis in the corner where the borders of Egypt, Sudan and Libya met at Mount Uwaynat or Gabal El Uweinat massive depending on who was asked. This had been the last refuelling stop on the Italian Trans Saharan flight route to the Sudan and Italian East Africa. Visited by Ralph Alger Bagnold in the interwar period it was considered important enough for the LRDG and to the Italians that it was taken over and occupied by the Allies in late 1940. It possessed a rocky firm landing ground comprising a square a thousand yards on each side and had the benefit of water from an oasis in the wadis of the mountain massive. Being three hundred and fifty miles due west of the British bases at Wadi Halfa made it a strategically import base for controlling the southern Sahara desert.
With the collapse of the Italian defence of Amba Alagi and its surrender by the Duke of Acosta in late march, once the mountain stronghold had been surrounded by allied troops and subjected to a continued bombardment by the RAF and SAAF the major campaign in east Africa drew to a conclusion. Though some Italian units would continue a guerrilla campaign until nineteen forty three.
With the final clearance of Italian naval forces from the Red Sea President Roosevelt of America was able to remove the restriction on American ships from entering what had been previously declared a war zone.
By mid April all the ports were functioning and the railway line from Masawa to Addia Aada was once again hauling supplies up to the city from the coast.
The conclusion of this campaign enable the Indian and south African division to be reassigned to other areas. Also the SAAF and RAF squadrons could be relieved, refitted and sent elsewhere. With the events unfolding in the North these forces were sorely needed.
Just as Italian East Africa had been subdued two more areas of conflict erupted, in the north, Vichy controlled Syria was now being used as a staging post for Luftwaffe air attacks and this breach of the somewhat one sided neutrality of the Vichy regime was all the reason the allies required to justify invading Syria and liberating it from Vichy control. These aircraft were over flying Iraq in order to attack allied shipping and over targets. As a response to this a SAAF OTU was transferred from Nairobi to the large British airbase at Habbaniya just a few miles from Bagdad. Habbaniya was a flight some five hundred miles from the air bases in Palestine and three hundred from those in the Persian Gulf. Here again the sheer distance from the nearest other major air bases show some of the problems with supporting such an outpost, even one as large and well equipped as Habbaniya entailed. Support for the SAAF OTU was initially flown in, The Iraqi authorities were showing a belligerence stance and obstructing overland resupply in defiance of the terms of the treaty with Britain. One purpose of sending modern fighters was as a gentle reminder of the possible consequences if such actions escalated. In accordance with the treaty Terms the British Government had informed the Government in Bagdad that in accordance with the treaty a contingent of British and Commonwealth troops would be landed at Basra and passed up the agreed line of communication to the base at Habbaniya in early April.
By these measures in march Wavell and the British diplomats hoped to nip in the bud any plot against the pro-British Regent Abdulla Illah. The troops to be sent to Iraq were some of those released from East Africa that had been slated to return to India in order to provide a core of battle hardened veterans for new formations being raised there.
With the capture of Cyrenaica the Sarah desert to the south had become both a liability and an opportunity. Since the early days after the declaration of war by Italy in the summer of nineteen forty a specialised allied unit known as the Long Range Desert Patrol had been exploring and policing this vast empty area. In January a major expedition had left the Nile with the intention of establishing not only a permanent bases deep in the southern desert but to link up with French forces from Chad who wished to join the allies.
The air support and resupply systems developed for and During Operation Compass were to be fully exploited in this foray. The target of this operation was the Oasis at Murzuk, it’s air landing fields and the nearby garrison fort at Traghen, nearby being relative where distances are measured in hundreds of miles. The operation was a complete success with the occupation of the Oasis at Murzak and the capture of the airfield which was immediately used to fly in supplies and to fly out the captured Italian garrison.
Once the capture was confirmed a major supply convoy of trucks and equipment set out from Cairo on the four week trek across the dessert to deliver heavy supplies and the lorries themselves that could not be flown in. Meanwhile the LRDG had been joined at Murzuk by a free French contingent from Chad under the command of Colonel Jacques Lelerc . Their knowledge of the terrain to the south of the Sarah was of great importance to the RAF who were, amongst other possibilities looking at the viability of sending aircraft north from the Takoradi ferry route directly to Cyrenaica. Departure from the established ferry route would be from Maiduguri in northern Nigeria via Tummo thence to Murzuk. To further explore the route to the south elements of the LRDG drove south to Tummo from Murzuk and then with the aid of French guides south east around the Tibesti Mountains before reconnoitring and traversing a vast area of southern Libya , northern Sudan and southern Egypt looking for suitable landing grounds before ending their epic journey by following the Nile to Cairo. The viability of the short cut north for the air ferry and air transport route was limited as yet by the lack of a viable landing and refuelling stop on the six hundred mile trans Saharan section north of Murzuk. To the south east it was a flight of over six hundred miles over the Rabiana sand sea to reach the captured airfield at a Oweinat .
The reason that this effort was expended was twofold. One was to explore and ultimately protect the southern flank of the British and Commonwealth forces in Cyrenaica and the second was to encourage the French colonial powers in Chad and other territories of the southern Sarah to formal join the Free French Government in exile.
One major change from OTL for the LRDG ITTL is that the RAF is more involved. Not only are there RAF liaison officers and radio operators with the patrols but dedicated aircraft are being used to fly in supplies, personnel etc, whilst flying out casualties, intelligence and even POW's. with the LRDG/RAF holding oasis airfields in the deep southern desert the reconnaissance cover ITTL id so much better than OTL. Each little increment of improvement builds a bigger effect.
ITTL the AM/RAF have been procuring their own light AA for the defence of airfields manned by RAF personnel. This removes this task from the local Army Command and means that there will be AA available at forward airfields. This will become more important as the push for Tripoli begins.
ITTL the AM/RAF have been procuring their own light AA for the defence of airfields manned by RAF personnel. This removes this task from the local Army Command and means that there will be AA available at forward airfields. This will become more important as the push for Tripoli begins.
12. 26 Logistics and Command, again
12. 26 logistics and command again
Getting more aircraft and getting them quicker was in Longmore’s view a crucial factor in maintaining any advantage the RAF had gained in the air war. To this end since the appointment of Sir Hugh Dowding as CAS, important strides had been made making Middle East command a more effective fighting force, more and better aircraft were now arriving. The appointment of Air Marshall Tedder as deputy to Longmore had been followed by the important addition of two other senior staff officers to the Middle East Command. The first of these was Air Commodore C.B. Cooke who arrived before Christmas to take up the post of RAF Middle East Chief Maintenance Officer. Cooke found a completely dysfunctional system principally due to there being no separate ‘Maintenance Command’ as there was in Britain. The Repair and Maintenance across the vast Middle East command was just one part of the huge task heaped on Air Vice-Marshal A.C. Maud as the Air Officer Administration based in Cairo.
Air Commodore Cooke had reported back to London that the whole organisation for maintenance in the Middle East needed to be torn apart, separated from the established command hierarchy and rebuilt as an independent command. This in itself was a huge undertaking requiring an officer of unusual talents and powerful presence to achieve. The Officer selected by Dowding with Advice from Tedder was Air Vice Marshal G.G. Dawson who was currently working in the MAP and was well known to both Tedder and Sir Hugh. Arriving in the Middle East at the turn of the new year with carte blanche from the AM and Sir Hugh to do ‘The Necessary’ Air Vice Marshal Dawson had set to his task with vim and vigour.
By the time of Sir Hugh Dowding’s visit in February Dawson’s efforts were already bearing fruit and in the face of established AM policy had appointed himself as Chief Maintenance and Supply Officer independently of the Administration Command. This self appointment had been confirmed by Dowding as CAS ensuring that Dawson had direct access to the AOC-in-C. Air Commodore C.B. Cooke was promoted and given command of a new Group that took control of all the RAF Maintenance Units in the Middle East
By the end of March the fruits of these endeavours were clearly being seen. Some two hundred combat ready Curtis Tomahawk fighters had been passed down the Takardi ferry route by the end of month. This increased supply of aircraft was fundamental in aiding the rapid conclusion of the East African Campaign where the bulk of these fighters went used by the SAAF squadrons at this time.
Elsewhere the build up was slowed by a combination of weather, distance and lack of airfield facilities.
Principal of these was Greece where despite priority de Albiac was unable to deploy more than eleven squadrons due to lack of all weather landing fields and more than half the squadrons were concentrated on airfields in the Athens area. Only with the onset of spring and dryer weather would more airfields closer to the front become available to enable Air Marshal de Albiac to disperse his squadrons.
In a daring attack on shipping in Suda bay Crete on the night of the twenty sixth of March the Regina Marina had a striking success when the RN heavy Cruiser York and the Norwegian tanker Pericles were both badly damaged and were both beached to prevent their total loss. This extremely well executed raid was undertaken by six explosive motor boats that had been launched some ten nautical miles from the harbour by their two parent destroyers. Having crossed the defensive nets the Italians had selected their targets and made their high speed attack. So unexpected was this assault that as both ships were struck and the boats exploded the AA defences commenced a barrage against a supposed air attack. All six of the Italian naval attack party were captured.
This was a very severe blow to the RN, York was a very valuable asset and had been due to sail on the twenty eighth to join the escort of as convoy taking munitions and other supplies to Greece.
The lapse in security and vigilance that enable two Italian Destroyers to approach within ten miles of a major British naval and supply base and then escaped unscathed would be the subject of a court of enquiry as would be the attack it’s self. Having two crippled and vulnerable ships aground in the harbour was certainly going to provide the Axis air forces with a target that they could not ignore. Immediate action was taken to reinforce the fighter protection for the bay by transferring one of the Polish Hurricane squadron to the FAA airfield at Chania. Salvage experts were flown in from Alexandria by Sunderland on the Afternoon of the twenty sixth of March to assess the damage to the two ships and the possibility of salvaging them.
The Sunderland carrying the salvage experts sent from Alexandria landing in Suda bay with the two damaged and grounded ships visible in the background.
The convoy leaving for Athens was due to sail on the evening of the twenty sixth and pass to the East of Crete on the night of the twenty eighth of March. In concert with this ships were scheduled to leave this convoy and run supplies to Heraklion and Suda bay. Other coastal convoys were to take supplies west to Torbruk and Bengahzi. These ships were carrying cargo to heavy or large to be handled by the smaller coastal shipping that was running a continuous shuttle up and down the coast. All these shipping movements required airborne assets to provide protective cover.
All the airfields on Crete were brought to a high state of readiness in anticipation that the damaged ships in Suda bay would be a target the Axis could not ignore and also the sailing of the convoy to Piraeus would be well known to the Axis via their intelligence assets in Alexandria and Port Said. The biggest advantage the RAF had on Crete was the now complete RDF/GCI network, whilst all the island now had radar coverage and aircraft could be detected at ranges of a hundred miles plus from the northern coast, on the island itself there were still gaps in the observation service caused by both the terrain and the lack of communications infrastructure then existing on Crete.
Getting more aircraft and getting them quicker was in Longmore’s view a crucial factor in maintaining any advantage the RAF had gained in the air war. To this end since the appointment of Sir Hugh Dowding as CAS, important strides had been made making Middle East command a more effective fighting force, more and better aircraft were now arriving. The appointment of Air Marshall Tedder as deputy to Longmore had been followed by the important addition of two other senior staff officers to the Middle East Command. The first of these was Air Commodore C.B. Cooke who arrived before Christmas to take up the post of RAF Middle East Chief Maintenance Officer. Cooke found a completely dysfunctional system principally due to there being no separate ‘Maintenance Command’ as there was in Britain. The Repair and Maintenance across the vast Middle East command was just one part of the huge task heaped on Air Vice-Marshal A.C. Maud as the Air Officer Administration based in Cairo.
Air Commodore Cooke had reported back to London that the whole organisation for maintenance in the Middle East needed to be torn apart, separated from the established command hierarchy and rebuilt as an independent command. This in itself was a huge undertaking requiring an officer of unusual talents and powerful presence to achieve. The Officer selected by Dowding with Advice from Tedder was Air Vice Marshal G.G. Dawson who was currently working in the MAP and was well known to both Tedder and Sir Hugh. Arriving in the Middle East at the turn of the new year with carte blanche from the AM and Sir Hugh to do ‘The Necessary’ Air Vice Marshal Dawson had set to his task with vim and vigour.
By the time of Sir Hugh Dowding’s visit in February Dawson’s efforts were already bearing fruit and in the face of established AM policy had appointed himself as Chief Maintenance and Supply Officer independently of the Administration Command. This self appointment had been confirmed by Dowding as CAS ensuring that Dawson had direct access to the AOC-in-C. Air Commodore C.B. Cooke was promoted and given command of a new Group that took control of all the RAF Maintenance Units in the Middle East
By the end of March the fruits of these endeavours were clearly being seen. Some two hundred combat ready Curtis Tomahawk fighters had been passed down the Takardi ferry route by the end of month. This increased supply of aircraft was fundamental in aiding the rapid conclusion of the East African Campaign where the bulk of these fighters went used by the SAAF squadrons at this time.
Elsewhere the build up was slowed by a combination of weather, distance and lack of airfield facilities.
Principal of these was Greece where despite priority de Albiac was unable to deploy more than eleven squadrons due to lack of all weather landing fields and more than half the squadrons were concentrated on airfields in the Athens area. Only with the onset of spring and dryer weather would more airfields closer to the front become available to enable Air Marshal de Albiac to disperse his squadrons.
In a daring attack on shipping in Suda bay Crete on the night of the twenty sixth of March the Regina Marina had a striking success when the RN heavy Cruiser York and the Norwegian tanker Pericles were both badly damaged and were both beached to prevent their total loss. This extremely well executed raid was undertaken by six explosive motor boats that had been launched some ten nautical miles from the harbour by their two parent destroyers. Having crossed the defensive nets the Italians had selected their targets and made their high speed attack. So unexpected was this assault that as both ships were struck and the boats exploded the AA defences commenced a barrage against a supposed air attack. All six of the Italian naval attack party were captured.
This was a very severe blow to the RN, York was a very valuable asset and had been due to sail on the twenty eighth to join the escort of as convoy taking munitions and other supplies to Greece.
The lapse in security and vigilance that enable two Italian Destroyers to approach within ten miles of a major British naval and supply base and then escaped unscathed would be the subject of a court of enquiry as would be the attack it’s self. Having two crippled and vulnerable ships aground in the harbour was certainly going to provide the Axis air forces with a target that they could not ignore. Immediate action was taken to reinforce the fighter protection for the bay by transferring one of the Polish Hurricane squadron to the FAA airfield at Chania. Salvage experts were flown in from Alexandria by Sunderland on the Afternoon of the twenty sixth of March to assess the damage to the two ships and the possibility of salvaging them.
The Sunderland carrying the salvage experts sent from Alexandria landing in Suda bay with the two damaged and grounded ships visible in the background.
The convoy leaving for Athens was due to sail on the evening of the twenty sixth and pass to the East of Crete on the night of the twenty eighth of March. In concert with this ships were scheduled to leave this convoy and run supplies to Heraklion and Suda bay. Other coastal convoys were to take supplies west to Torbruk and Bengahzi. These ships were carrying cargo to heavy or large to be handled by the smaller coastal shipping that was running a continuous shuttle up and down the coast. All these shipping movements required airborne assets to provide protective cover.
All the airfields on Crete were brought to a high state of readiness in anticipation that the damaged ships in Suda bay would be a target the Axis could not ignore and also the sailing of the convoy to Piraeus would be well known to the Axis via their intelligence assets in Alexandria and Port Said. The biggest advantage the RAF had on Crete was the now complete RDF/GCI network, whilst all the island now had radar coverage and aircraft could be detected at ranges of a hundred miles plus from the northern coast, on the island itself there were still gaps in the observation service caused by both the terrain and the lack of communications infrastructure then existing on Crete.
Nice explanation for the picture. Communications across the island need upgrading for the air defence system, but it will also help coordinate defence on the ground.
well hopefully York can be saved and without Crete needing to evacuated the RN won't take nearly as many losses