With the death of Metaxas the Greek reluctance for aid changed. OTL there were agreements between the British and the Greek Government that the Greeks would with draw from Thrace and Albania to shorten the line, neither of these conditions were met when the Allied units deployed. The Greek campaign was a ship that sank in a sea of good intentions. ITL things may pan out differently.
OTL the Greeks never kept any of their promises to proactively withdraw to more defensible positions
only retreating when routed but expecting the British to hold the agreed line alone

Good luck changing that (in a plausible manner even iYTL .. ( it is a perfect AM not a perfect Greek Military Dictatorship)

BTW The British had examples of that attitude even before the Nazis got involved
and should have simply have withdrawn as necessary for their survival leaving the Greeks to fend for themselves
 
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Errolwi

Monthly Donor
Britain had signed a treaty with Greece in 1939 pledging to defend it, some sort of commitment had to be made. Obviously the larger the force the "better" but a division strength unit that has a clear line of retreat prepared is the sweet spot in my opinion. 1st Armoured Brigade definitely needs to stay in North Africa, both to fight in Libya and because they were completely inappropriate for Greek terrain. A Brigade of Kiwi's, one of Australians plus a British infantry brigade is a meaningful force that preserves British honour but is small enough that it can be quickly evacuated.
There will be huge resistance to breaking up AU or NZ divisions from their commanders (who have the backing of their governments)
 

perfectgeneral

Donor
Monthly Donor
Tympaki Airstrip Mole 2.jpg

Tympaki Harbour proposal. Wall and airstrip mole marked in orange. Water depths (pre-dredging and infilling) marked in metres.
  1. Initial beach airstrip
  2. Machinery and stores from shallow water harbour and/or over beach
  3. Inland cross strip to 1.5km
  4. First 500m cargo mole out to deep water
  5. Heavier machinery and stores landed
  6. Extension of mole to 1km and widening for airstrip
  7. Doubling of inland strip to 3km (plus mole)
  8. Harbour wall to enclose for deep water port and land reclamation
 
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ITTL the initial airstrip will be parallel to the coast. As you can sea the original harbour is shallow and limits the size of vessel that can deliver materials. On wartime Crete getting heavy equipment to the southern side is a major logistical problem.
Thanks for the posted picture PG.
 
It actually might be enough. For all of Churchill's foolishness when it came to escapades, the man definitely wasn't an idiot. He had a bad habit of overestimating British forces and underestimating the enemy and the charisma to convince others of it but if all his service leaders tell him it's a bad idea I do think he'd accept it. Not necessarily gracefully, not without a lot of talking, but I do think he would accept it.
Churchill gets scapegoated quite a bit over poor military decisions, AFAIK, he never overrode his advisors when they had coherent arguments (and especially when they agreed with each other). Greece in OTL was being pushed by a lot more people than just Churchill.
 

Driftless

Donor
Churchill gets scapegoated quite a bit over poor military decisions, AFAIK, he never overrode his advisors when they had coherent arguments (and especially when they agreed with each other). Greece in OTL was being pushed by a lot more people than just Churchill.
Wasn't that more for political/diplomat reasons, with a less realistic evaluation of the military limitations across the Med and Middle East? There was some wishful thinking about how much the military could do - even with what they knew at that time. "Too little butter spread over too much bread"
 
Wasn't that more for political/diplomat reasons, with a less realistic evaluation of the military limitations across the Med and Middle East? There was some wishful thinking about how much the military could do - even with what they knew at that time. "Too little butter spread over too much bread"
Probably. The Foreign Office has a long history of incompetance...
While Churchill did favour action over inaction, he actually told the people looking at the OTK Greek operation that if they decided it wasnt on, he'd back that decision
 
Amazingly it would seam that Wavell was a major supporter of sending the army to Greece!!!

It's considered unclear. Up until recently the consensus was that he was pushed into it, now it's being challenged by the idea he was a supporter. I do not think there is clear evidence either way, other than him being one of the group supporting it if 8-10 divisions could be found for the Aliaknon Line
 
One thing is clear, Churchill gave Eden an assurance that if Eden decided to decide against sending the divisions to Greece Churchill would back him up.
Also the British Ambassador to Greece in Athens was nor conforming to the instructions from London and was advancing his own agenda.
 
12. 16 To Bengasi and Beyond
12. 16 To Bengasi and Beyond,

On January the twenty fourth O’Connor and the Desert Army were ready for the next phase of the capture of Italian north Africa. By sending the Australians along the coast towards Benghazi via Barce and both the seventh and fourth Armoured Brigades strait across to the bulge of Cyrene to the coast south of Benghazi to cut off the Italians line of retreat.

To say this ploy was successful would be a real understatement, by the fifth of February the coastal thrust had reached Barce and the Brigades sallying across country had capture Msus. Commencing on the night of the fifth of February a major battle was fought at Beda Fomm as the Italian tenth Army attempted to break through the units of the fourth and seventh Brigades now holding blocking positions.

In a brutally fought battle against great odds the blocking force prevailed and the bulk of the Italian tenth army were forced to surrender.

With Benghazi captured supplies could be shipped forward directly from the delta. The need to get the port up and running again and to basically completely refit the forces under O’Connor would necessitate a delay in any further advance. O’Connor was acutely aware that time was of the essence and that what units he still had capable of manoeuvring in the field needed to be pushed as far west as possible. Meanwhile the RAF were very thankfully taking ownership of the Italian air bases in and around Benghazi.

Despite O’Connor’s remonstrations the Indian forth Division had been withdrawn from his command and was even now begging to commence operations against Italian East Africa in the Sudan. Wavell was apprehensive of another pending visit from Sir Antony Eden this time accompanied by Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff which could result in all his plans and dispositions being changed at short notice. Unless or until the priorities given to Wavell were changed by his political masters the reduction of the Italians in Libya and in Italian East Africa would remain the focus of operations with the establishment of the RAF on Crete in force with an adequate garrison for defence would be the next objective.

The decision by the Polish Government in Exile for the PAC to go to Crete, whilst a logistic headache was a godsend. Since their arrival in Egypt the Polish flyers had been champing at the bit whilst they and their aircraft adapted to the new environment. The chance to punish the enemy even if it was only the Italians was welcomed with a ferocious enthusiasm familiar to those who had fought alongside the Polish squadrons in the summer battles over England. The news that the Luftwaffe were in Scilly and Italy was met with disappointment in these circles but the possibility of the Germans entering Greece was welcomed.

The advent the arrival of Luftwaffe units in Rhodes at the end of January and the laying of mines by HE 111’s of II/KG 26 on the night of the thirtieth of January had real ramifications. The defence of the Port Said and Suez Canal had become a priority for the Polish night fighters and AMES GCI units had been positioned to cover the entire canal, whilst an AMES CH unit could detect approaching enemy aircraft almost from take off on Rhodes. So whilst the attack by He111’s of II/KG 26 was unexpected, they were tracked by RDF as they approached the port and canal.
The biggest surprise of the night was undoubtedly that experienced by the HE 111 crews who found themselves being attacked by night fighters. Whilst the Polish Night fighters had had some success, in definitely destroying one aircraft, damaging another and causing a third to jettison its mine over the desert some mines did fall into the canal. The airborne Magnetic minesweeping Wellingtons managed to explode a number of these mines but a sobering discovery was made when a Naval bomb disposal office came to defuse a mine that had missed the canal and failed to explode when it landed in soft sand nearby. Upon examination it was discovered that this mine had a new combined acoustic/magnetic exploder and that relying on magnetic sweeping would not clear all the mines from the canal. So all ships in the canal were stopped, as a large ship sunk in the canal could have been catastrophic.
Closing the canal was a last resort so a hasty sweeping system was devised but still shipping was brought to a standstill for nearly a week. Mine clearing was greatly helped by the information provided by the AMES site that had tracked the attacking aircraft and could therefore indicate where they had crossed or flown along the canal. Closing the canal for any length of time would have a large negative effect on the logistics of supplying the army in the desert and the Navy in the eastern Mediterranean. Therefore the efforts of the Polish Night Fighters were given a high priority and the two squadrons of Wellingtons with the PAC were tasked to regular attacks on the airfields on Rhodes.

The insistence by the Polish Government in Exile that their RDF AI equipped Beaufighters used by their Night Fighter squadrons were sent with them to the middle east had been justified in a single night, much to the relief of Sir Hugh Dowding who had given his backing to the Polish proposal.

With Benghazi having been captured on the sixth of February, Elements of O’ Connors force pushed forward to El Agheila by the eighth of February where they were instructed to hold in place whilst logistics caught up and the tens of thousands of Italian prisoners processed and sent east.

With Wavell now confirming that no further troops would be taken from O’Connor’s command the race was on to re-equip is units and press on towards Tripoli before the Italians could recover and strengthen their defences. It was now a logistics race, who could get reinforcements and supplies in place first would have a huge advantage. The Italians had to ship everything from Italian ports either north of Scilly and via narrows with Tunisia or south of Scilly passing by Malta. For the British and their allies, first everything had to be shipped to Egypt, then moved over a thousand miles from the delta by a combination of road, rail and coastal shipping. Rail as yet could only take supplies as far as Mertha Matruth, though the New Zealand railway pioneer units were breaking records to push the track west, the rest of the way was by truck or ship. Ships were of course more efficient but only if they had secure ports to dock in. Torbruk was now running at capacity, as were Bomba and Derna for what they were worth. Getting Benghazi operational and providing it with an effective air defence both by fighters and anti aircraft guns was now to be a major priority.
 
My apologies for the recent hiatus in posts but RL intervened with an international relocation, quarantine isolation (ongoing) and other distractions. Hopefully now that I am back at base camp for a time I can pick up the pace of writing and posting.
 
My apologies for the recent hiatus in posts but RL intervened with an international relocation, quarantine isolation (ongoing) and other distractions. Hopefully now that I am back at base camp for a time I can pick up the pace of writing and posting.
I had to do quarantine twice last year once with my wife and 6 month old daughter. It was the most unpleasant and stressful experience of my life and I have been to some scary places. I don’t imagine it was any more fun for you. Loving the storyline and long may it continue.
 
nearly three years and a quarter of a million words and this tale is proceeding slower tan real time OTL!!!
Actually that is not quite true as, so far it gas covered from early 1936 through to the start of 1941, But since the DoW it has certainly slowed down.
At the moment i am sketching out as far at the end of 1941. By then the war is a rather different beast!
 

Driftless

Donor
My apologies for the recent hiatus in posts but RL intervened with an international relocation, quarantine isolation (ongoing) and other distractions. Hopefully now that I am back at base camp for a time I can pick up the pace of writing and posting.

I had to do quarantine twice last year once with my wife and 6 month old daughter. It was the most unpleasant and stressful experience of my life and I have been to some scary places. I don’t imagine it was any more fun for you. Loving the storyline and long may it continue.
I can certainly imagine the stress and heartache. To this point, I think most of us have some family or friends who've been medically impacted by the virus - and it's scary as hell for those that have been hospitalized.
 

Driftless

Donor
To say this ploy was successful would be a real understatement, by the fifth of February the coastal thrust had reached Barce and the Brigades sallying across country had capture Msus. Commencing on the night of the fifth of February a major battle was fought at Beda Fomm as the Italian tenth Army attempted to break through the units of the fourth and seventh Brigades now holding blocking positions.

In a brutally fought battle against great odds the blocking force prevailed and the bulk of the Italian tenth army were forced to surrender.

Pretty much as OTL - to this point? The real PoD is avoiding the diversion of forces and refilling the logistic pipeline so O'Connor can pick up the attack quickly. (Now keep O'Connor from being captured or worse) There's a general who could have achieved a ton, had he not spent so much of the war as a POW.

*edit*
A very secondary departure: IF O'Connor does better, then there is a different path for the LRDG and SAS too. So much of the activity they're renowned for took place after Op Compass. Plus, I believe Ralph Bagnold's personal familiarity was with the area of Western Egypt and Eastern Libya - though his knowledge set was huge.
 
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*edit*
A very secondary departure: IF O'Connor does better, then there is a different path for the LRDG and SAS too. So much of the activity they're renowned for took place after Op Compass. Plus, I believe Ralph Bagnold's personal familiarity was with the area of Western Egypt and Eastern Libya - though his knowledge set was huge.
No doubt they'll be going places in North Africa Vichy doesn't want them to, and contacting those who might consider staging a pro Free French coup.
 

Driftless

Donor
No doubt they'll be going places in North Africa Vichy doesn't want them to, and contacting those who might consider staging a pro Free French coup.
Good thought. Perhaps Colonel Phillipe LeClerc make an appearance as he did historically, after cleaning house in sub-Saharan French Africa?

(I know - off on a tangent....)
 
A small point, the NZ Railway Construction Company and the associated Railway Operating Company were units of the Corps of Royal NZ Engineers (RNZE), Pioneers were semi skilled labour units, these men were a specialist unit recruited from the NZ Railway Department. My late father was a member of 5 Field Park Coy RNZE in Greece, Crete and the Western Desert and spoke highly of the specialised units of the RNZE.
 
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