Mr bad, as they say. Thank you for the correction, I am a great admirer of what the RNZE achieved in the Western desert. so in future posts the correct designation will be used!
AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
12.17 Middle East Mission
Chapter 12.17 Middle East Mission.
Initially the insistence by Sir Hugh Dowding that he joined the diplomatic and fact finding mission to the Middle East that Sir Antony Eden and Sir John Dill amongst others were going on was rebuffed by the prime Minister and the War Cabinet. Persistent pressure from the AM and Dowding, reminding Churchill that as the Prime Minister had been a consistent critic of the use of manpower by the RAF in the Middle East as CAS Dowding had a duty to go and investigate for himself the actual situation in theatre. This insistence that he actually see the evidence and the reality for himself was wholly consistent with Sir Peter Cunlffe-Owen’s understanding of what made Sir Hugh such a valuable and astute leader. Sir Peter had finally got Churchill and the War Cabinet to agree that Sir Hugh Dowding should join the mission to the Middle East.
One restriction put on Sir Hugh joining the mission to the Middle East was imposed by the War Cabinet and that was that Sir Hugh would have to travel separately so as not to have all of Britain’s eggs in a single basket or aircraft so to speak.
Sir Hugh being Sir Hugh of course did things differently, whilst Dill and Eden flew out to Gibraltar via Lisbon on the Imperial Airways Flight, Sir Hugh had departed for an RAF Maritime Command air station in Cornwall.
Not one to waste an opportunity Sir Hugh had arranged to join the crew of a Maritime Command VLR Stirling on the very long duration great southern loop patrol. This would take the aircraft in a long flight path from the Western Approaches out along the convoy routes as far as the Azores before heading south and east to cover the straits of Gibraltar with the aircraft eventually landing on the now extended runway at Gibraltar. After a days rest the aircraft and crew would fly the reverse route back to the UK.
Sir Hugh had joined this patrol to see for himself the problems and the benefits of these long range patrols. As a super-numery he had time to observe all the crew at work and even flew the aircraft himself for a time. It gave Sir Hugh a chance to understand how the myriad new equipment being deployed on the aircraft was used and whether it actually worked. It also gave Sir Hugh a chance to experience and appreciate the conditions generated for the crew by these very long patrols.
As they landed in the late afternoon on Gibraltar after nearly eighteen hours in the air Sir Hugh had nothing but admiration for the aircraft crew. As he left the aircraft Sir Hugh was met by the station commander and Sir Hugh’s ADC who had flown out to Gibraltar on a Blackburn B20 Buccaneer seaplane earlier that day. As they walked away from the aircraft on the Apron tucked under the looming heights of the northern face the rock Sir Hugh noticed six bulldozers parked neatly in a row. Asking the Station AOC what they were doing there he was informed that they had been used in extending the stations runway and since that work had been completed they had just sat there, Ostensibly they were being kept ready to carry out repairs if or when necessary. The AOC had added that he had asked the Ministry of Supply if the bulldozers could be used for other work required on the Rock and was told in no uncertain terms that the machines were the property of the Ministry of Supply and could not be used by any other organisation. In His book written about his time as ADC to Sir Hugh Dowding Sir Max Aitkin had commented that Sir Hugh had simply told him to make a note of the bulldozers location and numbers,
After a night on the Rock and meetings with senior commanders Sir Hugh and his entourage flew on in the Blackburn B20 Buccaneer to Malta. The high cruising speed of the B20 made it a very useful courier and VIP transport aircraft. Arriving at RAF Kalafrana Sir Hugh carried out the usual obligatory inspection before heading off to Valetta to await the arrival of Eden and Dill. Sir Hugh was concerned to see as he walked around the base that most of the critical maintenance equipment and stores were in Un protected sheds and in close proximate to each other. A single stick of bombs could cripple all aircraft maintenance on the island, another note went into Max Aitkin’s note book.
Having travelled on to the Air field at Hal Far Sir Hugh had proceeded on to Valetta and a series of meeting with the Military Governor and senior service officers.
When Sir Hugh Dowding had arrived at Government House he met the Governor and military commander of the island lieutenant-general Sir William Dobbie Royal Engineers, Sir Hugh renewed an old acquaintance and confirmed for himself how influential Dobbie had been in ensuring that the RAF had the resources to construct and prepare for the defence of the islands airfields. It also explained why the Matilda tank based bulldozer based at Hal Far sported the name ‘Dobbie’.
One of the priorities for Sir Hugh during his visit to Malta was to review the operational command arrangements for the RAF. Due to the size of the Island and the RAF forces deployed to it there was no distinct or separate Maritime Command element on the island just Squadrons on detachment to the Islands RAF AOC. Whilst coordination and cooperation was working to some extents there had been a string of vaguely concealed muttering about failings in cooperation by the Admiralty when requesting reconnaissance and strike assets.
The increasing attacks on Malta was also causing losses particularly to the flying boats that were exposed and vulnerable on their moorings. This was a problem that would need to be addressed. Sir Hugh whilst not the most diplomatic of people was at least pragmatic and could see the merit in a well argued case. One benefit of the capture of Beghazi was that the airfields there were close enough for Hurricanes to fly in to reinforce the island. Contingency plans had been made to temperedly evacuate the flying boats and the bombers if the island airfields and flying boat moorings became untenable during daylight hours. Both bombers and flying boats could stage in for operations although this would incur increased crew fatigue and flying time. Sir Hugh was impressed by the underground control centre and even more so when told that all the GCI stations were similarly protected and provide with appropriate communications system so that any CGI station could take over as primary control if the Central control was disabled. Having experienced a heavy air raid shortly after his arrival Sir Hugh could well understand the veracity of all the effort put into protecting as well as defending the island defence assets.
Flying on to Alexandra and then Cairo the three VIP’s continued their fact finding and diplomatic tour. Sir Hugh had expressed real concerns over the Vichy French in Syria and the immerging evidence that Luftwaffe bombers stationed in Rhodes were refuelling in Syria before bombing targets in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
Discussions on operation Mandible showed that the forces allocated were not yet either proficient or sufficient to achieve the task of Capturing the Islands of Rhode. Further diluting the RN forces and logistical support was seen as not viable. The Navy were of the opinion that the ships allocated to Operation Mandible would be far more valuable in supplying the push to Tripoli and the reinforcement of Crete.
It was suggested that the Commandos and other forces destined for the invasion of Rhodes would be more profitably employed if their training was to continue on Crete where they could further bolster the defence and the landing craft allocated to them could aid the logistics of getting supplies over the beach in the face of the lack of port facilities.
One additional factor that had recently come to light was a major miscalculation by the Ministry of Supply as to the available pool of shipping tonnage. Somehow in a classic administrative cock up the figures for available shipping tonnage for all uses including the shipping of Military units and supplies to Greece had been based on figures where all the Norwegian and Greek ships already on long term charter to the British had been included in the British Merchant Marine tonnage and then counted again as part of the tonnage available via either the Norwegian or Greek Governments. As Sir Hugh had commented to Cunningham not even the civil servants at the Ministry of supply could magic the same ship in two different places at the same time. Therefore hard decisions would be needed to allocate the shipping where it was needed and movements of units or supplies would be constrained by the available sea lift capacity.
Depending on who was present at the meeting the consensus view on what the Allied priority in the Mediterranean should be would subtly shift. The situation was finally resolved when Sir Antony Aden Showed Dill and Sir Hugh a message he had received from the Prime minister that read :
“Do not consider yourselves obligated to a Greek enterprise if in your Hearts you fell it will only be another Norwegian fiasco. If no good plan can be made, please say so. But of course you know how valuable success would be.”
Sir Hugh had looked across at Admiral Cunningham and had commented that there was always a ‘but’ when talking with politicians and continued to suggest that the value of the success was far outweighed by the cost of failure, The Admiral had nodded in agreement and so it was that by the last week of February the decision had been made and a meeting held in Athens to inform the Greeks that the only British forces being sent to the Greek mainland would be further RAF squadrons and limited at that. However more troops and RAF squadrons would be sent to secure Crete.
Though this decision would not please everybody the new prime minister of Greece M. Koryzis had been pragmatic is his response, the loss of British troops was not his biggest worry the Greek Government and Army had problems that the British could not sole, Principally that the Greek Government was politically unable to make the Harsh decision to abandon the Campaign in Albania and surrender Greek soil to achieve a frontline that could possibly resist a German advance and secondly the Greek military were fast running short of all forms of arms and the ammunition to use in it. Domestic production was far below consumption and sufficient imports could not be had for love or money.
Whilst in the Middle East Sir Hugh and his party had been receiving the latest intelligence briefings from the local HQ staff as well as the coded updates from the UK. Pursuint to the decision to limit aid to Greece and continue on to Tripoli the interdiction of Italian reinforcements and what the latest signal were identifying as German units as well before thy had reached Africa had become a priority. The mining of the Libyan ports, Tracking of convoys and the bombing of the points of departure were all discussed as part of a coordinated plan with the navy to choke off the Axis forces in Italian North Africa.
Sir Hugh had had briefings in Malta with the combined Naval and Air staff and plans had been made accordingly. As an Army Liaison officer had quipped at one of these meetings it was much more effective to sink the enemy soldiers and supplies by the ship load than it would be for the Tommy to kill the enemy individually face to face.
Sir Hugh and Longmore had had Major discussions regarding the allocation of the limited resources available for as of mid February Longmore was committed to reinforcing Greece with five more squadrons, these being Eleven Squadron flying Blenheims, One One Two and Thirty Three Squadrons flying Hurricanes, with One One Thee Squadron with Blenheims and Two Zero Eight Squadron flying Hurricanes to follow on as soon as suitable airfields had been made available in Greece.
Here Sir Hugh Dowding showed a slight of hand any politician would have appreciated when he instructed Longmore not to send any of these squadrons to mainland Greece put to get them up to Benghazi and the surrounding area as quickly as possible to reinforce what was now being called the Dessert Air Force in its support of the renewed offensive into Tripolinia. As to the promised extra five squadrons that would be fulfilled by the arrival of the Polish Air Contingent in Crete. Sir Hugh had emphasised to Longmore that getting the three Hurricane Squadrons who had just completed their training in close support flying operational and @up the blue’ as it was termed locally was a priority.
The news from the RAF in Greece had at least become more positive with the Squadrons under D’Albiac now concentrating on close support of the Greek army.
28th of February Twenty eight Hurricanes engaged some fifty enemy aircraft over the Greek lines and destroyed twenty seven for the loss of one Hurricane, the pilot of which bailed out seriously wounded but was rescued by the Greek army and evacuated in a Lysander to Athens. This single action cemented the reputation of the RAF is the eyes of the Greek Army for the rest of the campaign.
Whilst on a flying visit to Crete prior to his return to the UK Sir Hugh was able to see tangible evidence of his endeavours, for moored in Suda Bay was the heavy Cruiser York which was unloading three of the Bulldozers she had carried from Gibraltar onto lighters to be taken ashore, One would go to Canea Airfield and then on to Maleme. The other two would be ferried on local craft to Heraklion and Retimo. The Last Bulldozer on board would be landed from HMS York on the south side of Crete to speed up completion of the airfield at Tympaki. Here was a good example in Sir Hugh’s opinion of inter service cooperation and ‘Action this day’ so beloved by Churchill. This visit also gave Sir Hugh a chance to have substantial discussions with Tedder over the Role tha island was to play and the RAF’s role. In the past Sir Hugh Dowding had what could be called ‘a stained service relationship’ with Air-Vice Marshall Arthur Tedder. The origin of this had been in nineteen twenty nine when Sir Hugh had tried to have Tedder court-martialled for a minor breech of RAF regulations. In the years since both men had had to work together and people such as Sir Peter as AM had done there best to achieve a reproachment between the two men. Here in Crete that objective was finally achieved as Sir Hugh emphasised the importance that the role of Crete would play in the entire Mediterranean campaign that was being fought and that Tedder was the man for the job.
In Private meetings with Longmore Sir Hugh had had wide ranging discussions regarding the difficulties, opportunities and special circumstances regarding such a wide spread and far reaching command as that given to Longmore. Longmore was much impressed with Tedder and appreciated greatly having him as a second senior officer in the area. One delicate topic covered was that of Longmore’s replacement, not that such an action was currently on the agenda but Sir Hugh was conscious that the stress of the current command could only be carried for so long and that if Longmore wished to be relieved of his command at any time Sir Hugh was determined that his replacement would be as effective and already up to speed. Therefore the natural choice unless Longmore had other thoughts was Tedder. Longmore had confirmed that Tedder would be his choice as well. As to where Longmore might go, that was an open book as the world wide commitment of the RAF and the volatile nature of wartime politics could mean that an officer of his seniority and command skill could be needed almost anywhere at short notice. Other discussions had ranged over the performance or otherwise of other officers under Longmoor’s Command, those who should be shunted aside and those who could be promoted.
Longmore expressed concern that he had had to strip Persia of all it’s Hurricanes to make up for losses in Greece and the Western desert as the supply from the UK had not kept up in the short term. Currently Persia was defended solely by Gloster Gladiators or older aircraft and with long range German aircraft staging through Vichy Syria it could be seen that a need for better fighter in that area might become urgent. Currently the few remaining Bolton and Paul Defiants were being used in East Africa and these were being replace with Tomahawks as they became available. Here Longmore expressed his approbation of the decision by the British Purchasing commission in the USA to have two of every twelve aircraft ordered delivered as parts. This in effect gave a twenty percent level of spares when the aircraft was delivered. Included with this was that tools for twelve aircraft were also delivered then attrition and loss by mechanics was also somewhat emolliated. The early aircraft had been delivered without British Equipment fitted but now sufficient parts were being provided to enable the base workshops to run what amounted to a production line process for getting the crated aircraft fit for combat and delivery to the squadrons. Longmore had again reiterated the value of large cargo aircraft within his command. Being able to fly parts and mechanics out to where they were required did much to maintain the operational availability of the squadrons.
When the discussions had got round to cooperation with the Army in the field Longmore was adamant that one of the key requirements was to have RAF officers at every Army headquarters at least down to Brigade level and forward observers attached to every battalion. This would require a vast increase in the number of personnel and radio equipment. Longmore enquired if Sir Hugh as CAS could help speed the process up as some who flew Mahogany Bombers in Whitehall seemed to have no conception of the requirements for a Forward Air Control Officers and the equipment require for them to fulfil their function. Each FACO required a dedicated vehicle suitable for the formation to which they were attached, a radio operator, and a driver and often an armed escort. These could not be provided by the host unit as they had their own manpower problems.
Initially the insistence by Sir Hugh Dowding that he joined the diplomatic and fact finding mission to the Middle East that Sir Antony Eden and Sir John Dill amongst others were going on was rebuffed by the prime Minister and the War Cabinet. Persistent pressure from the AM and Dowding, reminding Churchill that as the Prime Minister had been a consistent critic of the use of manpower by the RAF in the Middle East as CAS Dowding had a duty to go and investigate for himself the actual situation in theatre. This insistence that he actually see the evidence and the reality for himself was wholly consistent with Sir Peter Cunlffe-Owen’s understanding of what made Sir Hugh such a valuable and astute leader. Sir Peter had finally got Churchill and the War Cabinet to agree that Sir Hugh Dowding should join the mission to the Middle East.
One restriction put on Sir Hugh joining the mission to the Middle East was imposed by the War Cabinet and that was that Sir Hugh would have to travel separately so as not to have all of Britain’s eggs in a single basket or aircraft so to speak.
Sir Hugh being Sir Hugh of course did things differently, whilst Dill and Eden flew out to Gibraltar via Lisbon on the Imperial Airways Flight, Sir Hugh had departed for an RAF Maritime Command air station in Cornwall.
Not one to waste an opportunity Sir Hugh had arranged to join the crew of a Maritime Command VLR Stirling on the very long duration great southern loop patrol. This would take the aircraft in a long flight path from the Western Approaches out along the convoy routes as far as the Azores before heading south and east to cover the straits of Gibraltar with the aircraft eventually landing on the now extended runway at Gibraltar. After a days rest the aircraft and crew would fly the reverse route back to the UK.
Sir Hugh had joined this patrol to see for himself the problems and the benefits of these long range patrols. As a super-numery he had time to observe all the crew at work and even flew the aircraft himself for a time. It gave Sir Hugh a chance to understand how the myriad new equipment being deployed on the aircraft was used and whether it actually worked. It also gave Sir Hugh a chance to experience and appreciate the conditions generated for the crew by these very long patrols.
As they landed in the late afternoon on Gibraltar after nearly eighteen hours in the air Sir Hugh had nothing but admiration for the aircraft crew. As he left the aircraft Sir Hugh was met by the station commander and Sir Hugh’s ADC who had flown out to Gibraltar on a Blackburn B20 Buccaneer seaplane earlier that day. As they walked away from the aircraft on the Apron tucked under the looming heights of the northern face the rock Sir Hugh noticed six bulldozers parked neatly in a row. Asking the Station AOC what they were doing there he was informed that they had been used in extending the stations runway and since that work had been completed they had just sat there, Ostensibly they were being kept ready to carry out repairs if or when necessary. The AOC had added that he had asked the Ministry of Supply if the bulldozers could be used for other work required on the Rock and was told in no uncertain terms that the machines were the property of the Ministry of Supply and could not be used by any other organisation. In His book written about his time as ADC to Sir Hugh Dowding Sir Max Aitkin had commented that Sir Hugh had simply told him to make a note of the bulldozers location and numbers,
After a night on the Rock and meetings with senior commanders Sir Hugh and his entourage flew on in the Blackburn B20 Buccaneer to Malta. The high cruising speed of the B20 made it a very useful courier and VIP transport aircraft. Arriving at RAF Kalafrana Sir Hugh carried out the usual obligatory inspection before heading off to Valetta to await the arrival of Eden and Dill. Sir Hugh was concerned to see as he walked around the base that most of the critical maintenance equipment and stores were in Un protected sheds and in close proximate to each other. A single stick of bombs could cripple all aircraft maintenance on the island, another note went into Max Aitkin’s note book.
Having travelled on to the Air field at Hal Far Sir Hugh had proceeded on to Valetta and a series of meeting with the Military Governor and senior service officers.
When Sir Hugh Dowding had arrived at Government House he met the Governor and military commander of the island lieutenant-general Sir William Dobbie Royal Engineers, Sir Hugh renewed an old acquaintance and confirmed for himself how influential Dobbie had been in ensuring that the RAF had the resources to construct and prepare for the defence of the islands airfields. It also explained why the Matilda tank based bulldozer based at Hal Far sported the name ‘Dobbie’.
One of the priorities for Sir Hugh during his visit to Malta was to review the operational command arrangements for the RAF. Due to the size of the Island and the RAF forces deployed to it there was no distinct or separate Maritime Command element on the island just Squadrons on detachment to the Islands RAF AOC. Whilst coordination and cooperation was working to some extents there had been a string of vaguely concealed muttering about failings in cooperation by the Admiralty when requesting reconnaissance and strike assets.
The increasing attacks on Malta was also causing losses particularly to the flying boats that were exposed and vulnerable on their moorings. This was a problem that would need to be addressed. Sir Hugh whilst not the most diplomatic of people was at least pragmatic and could see the merit in a well argued case. One benefit of the capture of Beghazi was that the airfields there were close enough for Hurricanes to fly in to reinforce the island. Contingency plans had been made to temperedly evacuate the flying boats and the bombers if the island airfields and flying boat moorings became untenable during daylight hours. Both bombers and flying boats could stage in for operations although this would incur increased crew fatigue and flying time. Sir Hugh was impressed by the underground control centre and even more so when told that all the GCI stations were similarly protected and provide with appropriate communications system so that any CGI station could take over as primary control if the Central control was disabled. Having experienced a heavy air raid shortly after his arrival Sir Hugh could well understand the veracity of all the effort put into protecting as well as defending the island defence assets.
Flying on to Alexandra and then Cairo the three VIP’s continued their fact finding and diplomatic tour. Sir Hugh had expressed real concerns over the Vichy French in Syria and the immerging evidence that Luftwaffe bombers stationed in Rhodes were refuelling in Syria before bombing targets in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
Discussions on operation Mandible showed that the forces allocated were not yet either proficient or sufficient to achieve the task of Capturing the Islands of Rhode. Further diluting the RN forces and logistical support was seen as not viable. The Navy were of the opinion that the ships allocated to Operation Mandible would be far more valuable in supplying the push to Tripoli and the reinforcement of Crete.
It was suggested that the Commandos and other forces destined for the invasion of Rhodes would be more profitably employed if their training was to continue on Crete where they could further bolster the defence and the landing craft allocated to them could aid the logistics of getting supplies over the beach in the face of the lack of port facilities.
One additional factor that had recently come to light was a major miscalculation by the Ministry of Supply as to the available pool of shipping tonnage. Somehow in a classic administrative cock up the figures for available shipping tonnage for all uses including the shipping of Military units and supplies to Greece had been based on figures where all the Norwegian and Greek ships already on long term charter to the British had been included in the British Merchant Marine tonnage and then counted again as part of the tonnage available via either the Norwegian or Greek Governments. As Sir Hugh had commented to Cunningham not even the civil servants at the Ministry of supply could magic the same ship in two different places at the same time. Therefore hard decisions would be needed to allocate the shipping where it was needed and movements of units or supplies would be constrained by the available sea lift capacity.
Depending on who was present at the meeting the consensus view on what the Allied priority in the Mediterranean should be would subtly shift. The situation was finally resolved when Sir Antony Aden Showed Dill and Sir Hugh a message he had received from the Prime minister that read :
“Do not consider yourselves obligated to a Greek enterprise if in your Hearts you fell it will only be another Norwegian fiasco. If no good plan can be made, please say so. But of course you know how valuable success would be.”
Sir Hugh had looked across at Admiral Cunningham and had commented that there was always a ‘but’ when talking with politicians and continued to suggest that the value of the success was far outweighed by the cost of failure, The Admiral had nodded in agreement and so it was that by the last week of February the decision had been made and a meeting held in Athens to inform the Greeks that the only British forces being sent to the Greek mainland would be further RAF squadrons and limited at that. However more troops and RAF squadrons would be sent to secure Crete.
Though this decision would not please everybody the new prime minister of Greece M. Koryzis had been pragmatic is his response, the loss of British troops was not his biggest worry the Greek Government and Army had problems that the British could not sole, Principally that the Greek Government was politically unable to make the Harsh decision to abandon the Campaign in Albania and surrender Greek soil to achieve a frontline that could possibly resist a German advance and secondly the Greek military were fast running short of all forms of arms and the ammunition to use in it. Domestic production was far below consumption and sufficient imports could not be had for love or money.
Whilst in the Middle East Sir Hugh and his party had been receiving the latest intelligence briefings from the local HQ staff as well as the coded updates from the UK. Pursuint to the decision to limit aid to Greece and continue on to Tripoli the interdiction of Italian reinforcements and what the latest signal were identifying as German units as well before thy had reached Africa had become a priority. The mining of the Libyan ports, Tracking of convoys and the bombing of the points of departure were all discussed as part of a coordinated plan with the navy to choke off the Axis forces in Italian North Africa.
Sir Hugh had had briefings in Malta with the combined Naval and Air staff and plans had been made accordingly. As an Army Liaison officer had quipped at one of these meetings it was much more effective to sink the enemy soldiers and supplies by the ship load than it would be for the Tommy to kill the enemy individually face to face.
Sir Hugh and Longmore had had Major discussions regarding the allocation of the limited resources available for as of mid February Longmore was committed to reinforcing Greece with five more squadrons, these being Eleven Squadron flying Blenheims, One One Two and Thirty Three Squadrons flying Hurricanes, with One One Thee Squadron with Blenheims and Two Zero Eight Squadron flying Hurricanes to follow on as soon as suitable airfields had been made available in Greece.
Here Sir Hugh Dowding showed a slight of hand any politician would have appreciated when he instructed Longmore not to send any of these squadrons to mainland Greece put to get them up to Benghazi and the surrounding area as quickly as possible to reinforce what was now being called the Dessert Air Force in its support of the renewed offensive into Tripolinia. As to the promised extra five squadrons that would be fulfilled by the arrival of the Polish Air Contingent in Crete. Sir Hugh had emphasised to Longmore that getting the three Hurricane Squadrons who had just completed their training in close support flying operational and @up the blue’ as it was termed locally was a priority.
The news from the RAF in Greece had at least become more positive with the Squadrons under D’Albiac now concentrating on close support of the Greek army.
28th of February Twenty eight Hurricanes engaged some fifty enemy aircraft over the Greek lines and destroyed twenty seven for the loss of one Hurricane, the pilot of which bailed out seriously wounded but was rescued by the Greek army and evacuated in a Lysander to Athens. This single action cemented the reputation of the RAF is the eyes of the Greek Army for the rest of the campaign.
Whilst on a flying visit to Crete prior to his return to the UK Sir Hugh was able to see tangible evidence of his endeavours, for moored in Suda Bay was the heavy Cruiser York which was unloading three of the Bulldozers she had carried from Gibraltar onto lighters to be taken ashore, One would go to Canea Airfield and then on to Maleme. The other two would be ferried on local craft to Heraklion and Retimo. The Last Bulldozer on board would be landed from HMS York on the south side of Crete to speed up completion of the airfield at Tympaki. Here was a good example in Sir Hugh’s opinion of inter service cooperation and ‘Action this day’ so beloved by Churchill. This visit also gave Sir Hugh a chance to have substantial discussions with Tedder over the Role tha island was to play and the RAF’s role. In the past Sir Hugh Dowding had what could be called ‘a stained service relationship’ with Air-Vice Marshall Arthur Tedder. The origin of this had been in nineteen twenty nine when Sir Hugh had tried to have Tedder court-martialled for a minor breech of RAF regulations. In the years since both men had had to work together and people such as Sir Peter as AM had done there best to achieve a reproachment between the two men. Here in Crete that objective was finally achieved as Sir Hugh emphasised the importance that the role of Crete would play in the entire Mediterranean campaign that was being fought and that Tedder was the man for the job.
In Private meetings with Longmore Sir Hugh had had wide ranging discussions regarding the difficulties, opportunities and special circumstances regarding such a wide spread and far reaching command as that given to Longmore. Longmore was much impressed with Tedder and appreciated greatly having him as a second senior officer in the area. One delicate topic covered was that of Longmore’s replacement, not that such an action was currently on the agenda but Sir Hugh was conscious that the stress of the current command could only be carried for so long and that if Longmore wished to be relieved of his command at any time Sir Hugh was determined that his replacement would be as effective and already up to speed. Therefore the natural choice unless Longmore had other thoughts was Tedder. Longmore had confirmed that Tedder would be his choice as well. As to where Longmore might go, that was an open book as the world wide commitment of the RAF and the volatile nature of wartime politics could mean that an officer of his seniority and command skill could be needed almost anywhere at short notice. Other discussions had ranged over the performance or otherwise of other officers under Longmoor’s Command, those who should be shunted aside and those who could be promoted.
Longmore expressed concern that he had had to strip Persia of all it’s Hurricanes to make up for losses in Greece and the Western desert as the supply from the UK had not kept up in the short term. Currently Persia was defended solely by Gloster Gladiators or older aircraft and with long range German aircraft staging through Vichy Syria it could be seen that a need for better fighter in that area might become urgent. Currently the few remaining Bolton and Paul Defiants were being used in East Africa and these were being replace with Tomahawks as they became available. Here Longmore expressed his approbation of the decision by the British Purchasing commission in the USA to have two of every twelve aircraft ordered delivered as parts. This in effect gave a twenty percent level of spares when the aircraft was delivered. Included with this was that tools for twelve aircraft were also delivered then attrition and loss by mechanics was also somewhat emolliated. The early aircraft had been delivered without British Equipment fitted but now sufficient parts were being provided to enable the base workshops to run what amounted to a production line process for getting the crated aircraft fit for combat and delivery to the squadrons. Longmore had again reiterated the value of large cargo aircraft within his command. Being able to fly parts and mechanics out to where they were required did much to maintain the operational availability of the squadrons.
When the discussions had got round to cooperation with the Army in the field Longmore was adamant that one of the key requirements was to have RAF officers at every Army headquarters at least down to Brigade level and forward observers attached to every battalion. This would require a vast increase in the number of personnel and radio equipment. Longmore enquired if Sir Hugh as CAS could help speed the process up as some who flew Mahogany Bombers in Whitehall seemed to have no conception of the requirements for a Forward Air Control Officers and the equipment require for them to fulfil their function. Each FACO required a dedicated vehicle suitable for the formation to which they were attached, a radio operator, and a driver and often an armed escort. These could not be provided by the host unit as they had their own manpower problems.
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Yup. That one missed the edit!
It should really read thus:-
It was suggested that the Commandos and other forces destined for the invasion of Rhodes would be more profitably employed if their training was to continue on Crete where they could further bolster the defence and the landing craft allocated to them could aid the logistics of getting supplies over the beach in the face of the lack of port facilities.
Thanks for pointing it out
I will now edit the post.
It should really read thus:-
It was suggested that the Commandos and other forces destined for the invasion of Rhodes would be more profitably employed if their training was to continue on Crete where they could further bolster the defence and the landing craft allocated to them could aid the logistics of getting supplies over the beach in the face of the lack of port facilities.
Thanks for pointing it out
I will now edit the post.
Driftless
Donor
Sometimes leaders go off on tours and only see what their subordinates want them to see (or not see....). It sounds like Sir Hugh got to look under the operational bonnet/hood at several stops along the way. That would be a useful trip.
With Sir Hugh being a late addition and kind of a sidecar to the overall junket, there wouldn't be the whole entourage, literally and figuratively for his segment. A "Management by Walking Around" kind of tour. Definite productive purpose at its core, but the observant pick up all kinds of useful information from casual observation. i.e. those under-utilized bulldozers in Gibraltar will be put to useful work somewhere else. That and any number of one-offs.
With Sir Hugh being a late addition and kind of a sidecar to the overall junket, there wouldn't be the whole entourage, literally and figuratively for his segment. A "Management by Walking Around" kind of tour. Definite productive purpose at its core, but the observant pick up all kinds of useful information from casual observation. i.e. those under-utilized bulldozers in Gibraltar will be put to useful work somewhere else. That and any number of one-offs.
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I was once accused of never being at my desk, so I informed the MD that I was working on MBWA, that kept him nonplussed for a short time till he worked out that I was 'Managing by walking Around'. He then kept phoning my mobile to see where I was!!!
As to Sir Hugh, In OTL he was very much an advocate of seeing it for himself. Sir Hugh like Sir Henry Tizard had the knack of understanding how new technology could be integrated into existing requirements. Sir Hugh was not infallible, he did make mistakes but of all the interwar RAF officers I have research he has the best batting average by far.
In OTL Sir Hugh after his stint in America flew back across the Atlantic in the Bomb bay of a B17, because it was the quickest way back and he wanted to see for himself the problems and conditions as well as the practicality of a trans Atlantic airbridge delivering aircraft to the UK.
This is why I thought his flight in the Stirling ATL was appropriate and realistically plausible.
As to Sir Hugh, In OTL he was very much an advocate of seeing it for himself. Sir Hugh like Sir Henry Tizard had the knack of understanding how new technology could be integrated into existing requirements. Sir Hugh was not infallible, he did make mistakes but of all the interwar RAF officers I have research he has the best batting average by far.
In OTL Sir Hugh after his stint in America flew back across the Atlantic in the Bomb bay of a B17, because it was the quickest way back and he wanted to see for himself the problems and conditions as well as the practicality of a trans Atlantic airbridge delivering aircraft to the UK.
This is why I thought his flight in the Stirling ATL was appropriate and realistically plausible.
Was their actually space on board a cruiser for bulldozers? Particularly if she was expected to fight.
At this time in early 1941 OTL York had lost her aircraft and catapults but still had the boat and aircraft crane abaft the after funnel on the starboard side.
With York's High speed and the deck space available due to the removal of the aircraft handling facilities I have assumed that four bulldozers weighing less than ten tons each could be carried. Remember this is the Med so weather is not that bad and ITTL the Navy would have checked the ballasting of HMS York (full fuel tanks and magazine) so she is sitting deep in the water. If you think this is ASB then call it out.
With York's High speed and the deck space available due to the removal of the aircraft handling facilities I have assumed that four bulldozers weighing less than ten tons each could be carried. Remember this is the Med so weather is not that bad and ITTL the Navy would have checked the ballasting of HMS York (full fuel tanks and magazine) so she is sitting deep in the water. If you think this is ASB then call it out.
If you look at a ship like the Belfast it could be done so I wouldn’t see why not. Ships are big early dozers not so much. They may have needed to add some additional deck plating to spread the load but that’s a days work.
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Gavin Stevenson not being killed in an air crash in 1942 might provide a suitable replacement for Longmore on promotion?
I am Finding very little on Gavin Stevenson?
I am certainly not promoting Air Vice-Marshal D F 'Butcher' Stevenson ITTL.
I am certainly not promoting Air Vice-Marshal D F 'Butcher' Stevenson ITTL.
Do you mean this Gavin Stevenson?:
Wing Commander M G STEVENSON (33290), Royal Air Force) [Royal Air Force WW2 Casualty ]
This is a individual page for Casualty Wing Commander M G STEVENSON (33290), Royal Air Force of the Royal Air Force. . You may find some details of his career, loss details, maybe a photograph, and whatever mention of the person that occurs in the forum.
www.rafcommands.com
If so he was 27 and only a Wing Commander when he died in November 1942. Seems like he would have to jump at least one rank to be considered as Longmore's replacement.
EDIT: and on checking the Gazette articles it looks like he was only promoted to Wing Commander in March 1942
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I wasn't thinking so much of the weight but deck space as there doesn't seem to be much clear area on most warships except maybe in front of the guns 😲 but, if as you say, York had lost it's a/c then there should be space for at least some of the dozers.
Its not just the open deck where the catapult was, she will still have the associated hanger for her seaplane to store stuff in.
As far as I am aware HMS York never had a hanger, unlike the bigger Town class. However there should have been enough spare space around the catapult plinth to put down dunnage to protect the deck and load the proposed four or five bulldozers. The First officer might be tearing his hair out over the sacrilege of carrying such a cargo but when needs must!
Although this D4 is shown in American service it gives an Idea of the size and how using simple sledges heavy supplies could be quickly disembarked from a landing craft onto a beach. For the PAM TL imagine this being done on Crete. In North Africa swap the dozer for a capture Italian tank!
Although this D4 is shown in American service it gives an Idea of the size and how using simple sledges heavy supplies could be quickly disembarked from a landing craft onto a beach. For the PAM TL imagine this being done on Crete. In North Africa swap the dozer for a capture Italian tank!
12.18 The Siege of Malta begins
Chapter 12.18 The siege of Malta begins.
What was to become known as the second siege of Malta had really started with what was now being called the ‘Illustrious Blitz’. The arrival of Luftwaffe aircraft in Sicily signalled a step change in the air assault on Malta.
Whilst the Italian and German air forces strove to reduce the defences of Malta the main object was to actually curtail the offensive capabilities of the RAF and Royal Naval units based there. It was a classic battle of logistics. The island had to be resupplied and sustained which meant that supplies had to be shipped from either the Eastern Mediterranean, which basically meant Port Saied or Alexandria, or from the Western Mediterranean via Gibraltar.
Meanwhile the same Axis air forces were also tasked with protecting the shipment of supplies and personnel from Italy to the ports of North Africa.
For the RAF the task was similar but inversed, The Maltese squadrons had to defend and secure the island whilst ensuring that the vital supplies arrived. The purpose of this effort was to enable the interdiction and destruction of the Italian supply line to north Africa.
If the Axis air forces managed to prevent the Maltese squadrons from carrying out patrols and offensive operations then North Africa might not only be held but also Cyrenaica and Egypt threatened.
So it was that the full might of the axis air forces fell upon an island of less than one hundred square miles and turned it into what was at that time the most bombed place on earth, not a day went past that the air raid sirens did not sound, often multiple times and bombs fall to destroy this ancient fortress in the sea.
With the nearest enemy airfields only seventy miles away the RDF units had precious little time to provide warning for both the fighters and the population. However the system used was well tried and had been honed in the months of the battle of Britain and many of these now charged with defending Malta had learned their trade in that campaign. The integrated defence system and the advanced GCI units on the island gave the defence an important force multiplier but even the latest Mark of Hurricane was going to struggle against the newer types of Me 109 that they now faced. The arrival of the seventh Staffel of Jagdrschader twenty six with their new Messerschmitt Bf 109 E7 under their highly experienced commander oberleutnant Joachim Muncheberg saw a definite shift in the Germans favour in the dogfights over the island,
On such a small island now with multiple airfields crammed onto its rocky soil disguising and protecting these air fields would always be difficult, in the weeks before the Illustrious Blitz much effort had been put into dispersing the aircraft and providing blast pens for every last aircraft. Since the start of the Luftwaffe attacks those efforts had redoubled and the passive defences made as good as possible,
The capture by the British of the airfields around Benghazi was a major advantage for the defence of Malta as this brought the island within the flight range from the African shore of the Hurricane fighter. This meant that reinforcements could be flown directly out to the island. The problem was keeping those aircraft supplied with fuel and ammunition. This made the convoys to the island vital to its operational value. Longmore had had long discussions with Sir Hugh Dowding during the latter’s visit to the Middle East and Sir Hugh himself had experienced the current conditions on the island. Amongst the topics discussed had been the viability and importance of an air bridge to bring in supplies and personnel and to evacuate the wounded. Sir Hugh had promised to find the aircraft for such a bridge if it was at all possible. At the moment the only practicable aircraft currently in the operational area were the Wellington Bombers. If they were being used as transports they could not be used for offensive tasks and that was a serious problem. Ideally Longmore would have a fleet of Envoys for this task, they could carry larger stores and more people than any other aircraft the RAF had. Unfortunately there just were not that many of them.
As in the battles over the south of England that had been fought only six months earlier those squadrons defending Malta were made acutely aware of the importance of their task but also of the advantage of ‘playing at home’. Fighter pilots on the island had it drummed into them that they did not go haring off in pursuit of damaged enemy aircraft, they were to stay close to the island so that if they were hit they had a chance of bringing their aircraft home and if they did bale out they were close enough to be rescued. Every fisherman on the island knew that the most valuable days catch he could land was a live pilot. Another innovation started by Sir Hugh’s arrival on his way out to Cairo was the provision of an emergency landing field on Gozo. In the short period he had been away work had commenced at hacking a strip out of the rocky terrain of the island. When he departed for Gibraltar the aircraft he was in had deliberately over flown the site of this new landing strip so that Sir Hugh could see the progress being made, Whilst at low altitude and knowing what and where he was looking for Sir Hugh was not only able to Judge how much progress had been made but how good the efforts by the RAF and the Royal Engineers were at camouflaging the works and the landing strip.
The effects of the accumulated stress that constant action and bombardment put on the young pilots was by now better understood and both the medical officers and the higher command watched the pilots like hawks so that they could intervene before a pilot became a liability or a casualty. Here just a break off of the island even as brief as a couple of days could make a very big difference. Not that many of the fighter pilots who found themselves flying an aircraft back to the base workshops that had been established at Benghazi during the months of the siege realised that it was often they who needed an overhaul as much as the aircraft they flew. Only post war would it become apparent to historians just how much effort was made under Sir Hugh’s patronage as CAS to preserve the physical and mental well being of the young men he was entrusted to put into harms way on a daily basis.
With the full backing of the CAS Longmore was empowered to move and use his forces over the vast area of his command as he saw fit to exploit every advantage in the widely diverse campaigns being fought. However in their discussions in Cairo and elsewhere during Sir Hugh’s recent whirlwind of a tour certain priorities hade been set out for Longmore in both the short terms and longer term. Sir Hugh had defined these periods as the next three months and the next six months.
In order Longmores priorities were to be:-
In the short term.
The defence of Malta and offensive operations from the island,
The support of General O’Conner’s continuing advance towards Tripoli.
Support of the Greek Army and the defence of Crete.
In the longer term.
The prosecution of the Campaigns in Italian East Africa,
The containment of hostile activity via Vichy Syria
The defence of Iran, Iraq and the Persian oilfields.
The protection of the sea trade routes in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
To say that Longmore had his hands full was an understatement. Giving Tedder responsibility for the RAF in both Crete and Greece unified those two commands and took a proportion of the weight off Longmores shoulders. Before leaving the Middle East Sir Hugh Dowding had official confirmed that Air Vice Marshall Arthur Tedder was not only Longmores deputy but his designated successor for the Middle East Command.
What was to become known as the second siege of Malta had really started with what was now being called the ‘Illustrious Blitz’. The arrival of Luftwaffe aircraft in Sicily signalled a step change in the air assault on Malta.
Whilst the Italian and German air forces strove to reduce the defences of Malta the main object was to actually curtail the offensive capabilities of the RAF and Royal Naval units based there. It was a classic battle of logistics. The island had to be resupplied and sustained which meant that supplies had to be shipped from either the Eastern Mediterranean, which basically meant Port Saied or Alexandria, or from the Western Mediterranean via Gibraltar.
Meanwhile the same Axis air forces were also tasked with protecting the shipment of supplies and personnel from Italy to the ports of North Africa.
For the RAF the task was similar but inversed, The Maltese squadrons had to defend and secure the island whilst ensuring that the vital supplies arrived. The purpose of this effort was to enable the interdiction and destruction of the Italian supply line to north Africa.
If the Axis air forces managed to prevent the Maltese squadrons from carrying out patrols and offensive operations then North Africa might not only be held but also Cyrenaica and Egypt threatened.
So it was that the full might of the axis air forces fell upon an island of less than one hundred square miles and turned it into what was at that time the most bombed place on earth, not a day went past that the air raid sirens did not sound, often multiple times and bombs fall to destroy this ancient fortress in the sea.
With the nearest enemy airfields only seventy miles away the RDF units had precious little time to provide warning for both the fighters and the population. However the system used was well tried and had been honed in the months of the battle of Britain and many of these now charged with defending Malta had learned their trade in that campaign. The integrated defence system and the advanced GCI units on the island gave the defence an important force multiplier but even the latest Mark of Hurricane was going to struggle against the newer types of Me 109 that they now faced. The arrival of the seventh Staffel of Jagdrschader twenty six with their new Messerschmitt Bf 109 E7 under their highly experienced commander oberleutnant Joachim Muncheberg saw a definite shift in the Germans favour in the dogfights over the island,
On such a small island now with multiple airfields crammed onto its rocky soil disguising and protecting these air fields would always be difficult, in the weeks before the Illustrious Blitz much effort had been put into dispersing the aircraft and providing blast pens for every last aircraft. Since the start of the Luftwaffe attacks those efforts had redoubled and the passive defences made as good as possible,
The capture by the British of the airfields around Benghazi was a major advantage for the defence of Malta as this brought the island within the flight range from the African shore of the Hurricane fighter. This meant that reinforcements could be flown directly out to the island. The problem was keeping those aircraft supplied with fuel and ammunition. This made the convoys to the island vital to its operational value. Longmore had had long discussions with Sir Hugh Dowding during the latter’s visit to the Middle East and Sir Hugh himself had experienced the current conditions on the island. Amongst the topics discussed had been the viability and importance of an air bridge to bring in supplies and personnel and to evacuate the wounded. Sir Hugh had promised to find the aircraft for such a bridge if it was at all possible. At the moment the only practicable aircraft currently in the operational area were the Wellington Bombers. If they were being used as transports they could not be used for offensive tasks and that was a serious problem. Ideally Longmore would have a fleet of Envoys for this task, they could carry larger stores and more people than any other aircraft the RAF had. Unfortunately there just were not that many of them.
As in the battles over the south of England that had been fought only six months earlier those squadrons defending Malta were made acutely aware of the importance of their task but also of the advantage of ‘playing at home’. Fighter pilots on the island had it drummed into them that they did not go haring off in pursuit of damaged enemy aircraft, they were to stay close to the island so that if they were hit they had a chance of bringing their aircraft home and if they did bale out they were close enough to be rescued. Every fisherman on the island knew that the most valuable days catch he could land was a live pilot. Another innovation started by Sir Hugh’s arrival on his way out to Cairo was the provision of an emergency landing field on Gozo. In the short period he had been away work had commenced at hacking a strip out of the rocky terrain of the island. When he departed for Gibraltar the aircraft he was in had deliberately over flown the site of this new landing strip so that Sir Hugh could see the progress being made, Whilst at low altitude and knowing what and where he was looking for Sir Hugh was not only able to Judge how much progress had been made but how good the efforts by the RAF and the Royal Engineers were at camouflaging the works and the landing strip.
The effects of the accumulated stress that constant action and bombardment put on the young pilots was by now better understood and both the medical officers and the higher command watched the pilots like hawks so that they could intervene before a pilot became a liability or a casualty. Here just a break off of the island even as brief as a couple of days could make a very big difference. Not that many of the fighter pilots who found themselves flying an aircraft back to the base workshops that had been established at Benghazi during the months of the siege realised that it was often they who needed an overhaul as much as the aircraft they flew. Only post war would it become apparent to historians just how much effort was made under Sir Hugh’s patronage as CAS to preserve the physical and mental well being of the young men he was entrusted to put into harms way on a daily basis.
With the full backing of the CAS Longmore was empowered to move and use his forces over the vast area of his command as he saw fit to exploit every advantage in the widely diverse campaigns being fought. However in their discussions in Cairo and elsewhere during Sir Hugh’s recent whirlwind of a tour certain priorities hade been set out for Longmore in both the short terms and longer term. Sir Hugh had defined these periods as the next three months and the next six months.
In order Longmores priorities were to be:-
In the short term.
The defence of Malta and offensive operations from the island,
The support of General O’Conner’s continuing advance towards Tripoli.
Support of the Greek Army and the defence of Crete.
In the longer term.
The prosecution of the Campaigns in Italian East Africa,
The containment of hostile activity via Vichy Syria
The defence of Iran, Iraq and the Persian oilfields.
The protection of the sea trade routes in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
To say that Longmore had his hands full was an understatement. Giving Tedder responsibility for the RAF in both Crete and Greece unified those two commands and took a proportion of the weight off Longmores shoulders. Before leaving the Middle East Sir Hugh Dowding had official confirmed that Air Vice Marshall Arthur Tedder was not only Longmores deputy but his designated successor for the Middle East Command.
Heads up! Sorry I'm slow marking these. Great update.
Benghazi sits well between Malta and Crete as a fall back and servicing area. I only hope they can secure it from ground forces.
Benghazi sits well between Malta and Crete as a fall back and servicing area. I only hope they can secure it from ground forces.
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