Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
and
and
Hi HJ Tulp, ArtosStark and Mark1878, lesson learnt for me too!, It was very much used in the English sense, but in my own ignorance, I could have insulted someone, apologies.
Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Parma, that's a very interesting question. Unquestionably, British individuals did settle down in the colonies, raise families and consider their houses as home, but Britain was always the motherland. However, there was always a steady flow of new British moving to the colonies, to make their fortune, before returning home. And the real difference between the British in all their colonies and the Dutch in the East Indies was in governance, where a strict racial line was held, meaning only whites could hold effective power. That isn't to say natives couldn't hold power, all the Sultans of the Malaya State's were Malays, but with a white British advisor or minister in the background. There were exceptions, but the British system was riddled with class, racism, sexism, homophobia, you name, we were up to our boots in it. So I don't think there was such a collective movement of the ruling class regarding the colony as 'Home' like in the DEI.
Possibly a lack of white Dutch not wanting to go to the East Indies, probably due to a lack of population size meant inter marriage was far more acceptable in the Dutch East Indies, and Eurasians could progress much better up the chain of command.
But would the British fight as hard for their colony, as the Dutch would for the East Indies, well you only have to look at Hong Kong to see that they could and did!
MWI 41093011 It’s All Coming Together
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Tuesday 30 September;
It was the ending of a good September for him, even better than the one last year in some ways. It had all started, with the arrival in late August of convoy WS 9BX from the UK which had carried a RAF fighter wing of two RAF fighter squadrons, 81 and 134, along with some other newly trained pilots, and a large RAF draft.
Also, on that troopship was Wing Commander Norman Cave, a replacement for WC Pearce, who had been invalided back to the UK earlier, as Air Headquarters, Far East, Command Radio Officer. It all sounded very innocent until you found out he was a Radar specialist. And in keeping with his arrival, at the end of that first week saw the RIMU (Radio Installation & Maintenance Unit) move from Seletar to Ponggol, about 3 miles away in newly built accommodation. The site wasn’t complete yet, would need another four weeks, but provided much better accommodation, storage room and workshops.
The steady arrival of crated Hurricanes from Canada, and Merlin XX engines, from UK shipping, along with a continuing flow of newly trained pilots from the BCATP (British Commonwealth Air Training Plan), had allowed the forming of many new squadrons and consequently Air Commodore Vincent had created two new fighter wings, 2 RNZAF and 5 RAAF, making three fighter wings in total, with the arrival of RAF 151 Wing, the Dominion pilots forming Article XV squadrons in Australian, Canadian and New Zealand colours, and providing Park with a fighter force of nine squadrons. And he’d taken the opportunity to reorganise the basic fighter unit, the squadron, into three flights of four aircraft, each flight containing two sections of two aircraft. It gave him a total of 12 operational aircraft in each squadron, he’d have liked to have gone to 16 aircraft, but didn’t have enough planes or pilots for that. However, it was working well for the pilots, who were enjoying the freedom of flying in pairs.
Furthermore, Archie Wann, up in Kuala Lumpur, had been singing the praises of the two newly raised Blenheim squadrons, RCAF 407 and RAAF 454, both based at Taiping, who along with RAF 34 and 62 squadrons, had formed RAF 44 Wing. The training in both squadrons had progressed really well, and he was optimistic about declaring them operational by early November. Taiping airfield wasn’t anywhere near finished, but it was operational, however the development of Sungai Petani into a two-bomber squadron airfield with a hard runway and protected facilities was now complete. This wing, together with the three Fairey Battle squadrons of RCAF 7 Wing provided all of Wann’s strike force.
Next on the 16th of the month, Park had formed RAF 4 (Singapore) PRU (Photo Reconnaissance Unit) of 4 plus 2 reserve Hurricane Mk IIA’s, which had followed the Middle East practice of stripping them down of all unnecessary equipment, including all their guns and some armour, installing extra fuel tanks, and three F24 cameras, and based them at Seletar. In the same week, on the Friday he’d created the RAF 81 Repair & Salvage Unit, formed of two sections, from RAF 151 Maintenance Unit. One was based at Seletar, while the second was at Kuala Lumpur. Each section was equipped with Coles cranes, 4x4 tractors and flatbed semi-trailers.
The following week another two AMES stations were declared operational, on the Tuesday, 511 COL at Bukit Churang, SE Johore, and on the Thursday, 512 COL at Tanjong Kupang, SW Johore. Both had been challenging builds, indeed 511 was only accessible by launch, or a two-day trek across jungle to the nearest road, while 512 was built in a very bad malarial area, and strict health precautions had to be taken. Both were fed by telephone, but had alternative radio communications as a fall back. COL units used a 284 ft tower, and had been given the upgrade of a new antenna that was motorized to spin, and used a single transmit/receive antenna instead of separate ones.
They jointed a network that now included 513 COL at Bukit Huma, Penang, 250 TRU at Bukit Timah hill, Singapore, and 518 COL on Pelindung Hill, Kuantan, all completed in late August, with TRU’s 243 at Kota Bharu, 244 on Kedah Peak and 514 COL at Kampung Tok Muda, on the northern banks of the river Kaper Besar, 9 miles north of Port Swettenham.
Yes, September had been a good month, the only fly on the wall was a report from the FECB detailing the estimated performance of a new IJN carrier borne fighter coming into service. A damaged aircraft had force landed in China and been captured before it could be destroyed. Its performance, if the report was true, would mean it would out turn any Allied plane, Buffalo or Hurricane, suggesting that dog fighting it would be dangerous. Park reflected how this plane would fight his Hurricane’s, the way they had fought the German Messerschmitt 109’s a year ago. He thought he’d send a copy to Air Commodore Vincent, a veteran of that battle, for his thoughts.
It was the ending of a good September for him, even better than the one last year in some ways. It had all started, with the arrival in late August of convoy WS 9BX from the UK which had carried a RAF fighter wing of two RAF fighter squadrons, 81 and 134, along with some other newly trained pilots, and a large RAF draft.
Also, on that troopship was Wing Commander Norman Cave, a replacement for WC Pearce, who had been invalided back to the UK earlier, as Air Headquarters, Far East, Command Radio Officer. It all sounded very innocent until you found out he was a Radar specialist. And in keeping with his arrival, at the end of that first week saw the RIMU (Radio Installation & Maintenance Unit) move from Seletar to Ponggol, about 3 miles away in newly built accommodation. The site wasn’t complete yet, would need another four weeks, but provided much better accommodation, storage room and workshops.
The steady arrival of crated Hurricanes from Canada, and Merlin XX engines, from UK shipping, along with a continuing flow of newly trained pilots from the BCATP (British Commonwealth Air Training Plan), had allowed the forming of many new squadrons and consequently Air Commodore Vincent had created two new fighter wings, 2 RNZAF and 5 RAAF, making three fighter wings in total, with the arrival of RAF 151 Wing, the Dominion pilots forming Article XV squadrons in Australian, Canadian and New Zealand colours, and providing Park with a fighter force of nine squadrons. And he’d taken the opportunity to reorganise the basic fighter unit, the squadron, into three flights of four aircraft, each flight containing two sections of two aircraft. It gave him a total of 12 operational aircraft in each squadron, he’d have liked to have gone to 16 aircraft, but didn’t have enough planes or pilots for that. However, it was working well for the pilots, who were enjoying the freedom of flying in pairs.
Furthermore, Archie Wann, up in Kuala Lumpur, had been singing the praises of the two newly raised Blenheim squadrons, RCAF 407 and RAAF 454, both based at Taiping, who along with RAF 34 and 62 squadrons, had formed RAF 44 Wing. The training in both squadrons had progressed really well, and he was optimistic about declaring them operational by early November. Taiping airfield wasn’t anywhere near finished, but it was operational, however the development of Sungai Petani into a two-bomber squadron airfield with a hard runway and protected facilities was now complete. This wing, together with the three Fairey Battle squadrons of RCAF 7 Wing provided all of Wann’s strike force.
Next on the 16th of the month, Park had formed RAF 4 (Singapore) PRU (Photo Reconnaissance Unit) of 4 plus 2 reserve Hurricane Mk IIA’s, which had followed the Middle East practice of stripping them down of all unnecessary equipment, including all their guns and some armour, installing extra fuel tanks, and three F24 cameras, and based them at Seletar. In the same week, on the Friday he’d created the RAF 81 Repair & Salvage Unit, formed of two sections, from RAF 151 Maintenance Unit. One was based at Seletar, while the second was at Kuala Lumpur. Each section was equipped with Coles cranes, 4x4 tractors and flatbed semi-trailers.
The following week another two AMES stations were declared operational, on the Tuesday, 511 COL at Bukit Churang, SE Johore, and on the Thursday, 512 COL at Tanjong Kupang, SW Johore. Both had been challenging builds, indeed 511 was only accessible by launch, or a two-day trek across jungle to the nearest road, while 512 was built in a very bad malarial area, and strict health precautions had to be taken. Both were fed by telephone, but had alternative radio communications as a fall back. COL units used a 284 ft tower, and had been given the upgrade of a new antenna that was motorized to spin, and used a single transmit/receive antenna instead of separate ones.
They jointed a network that now included 513 COL at Bukit Huma, Penang, 250 TRU at Bukit Timah hill, Singapore, and 518 COL on Pelindung Hill, Kuantan, all completed in late August, with TRU’s 243 at Kota Bharu, 244 on Kedah Peak and 514 COL at Kampung Tok Muda, on the northern banks of the river Kaper Besar, 9 miles north of Port Swettenham.
Yes, September had been a good month, the only fly on the wall was a report from the FECB detailing the estimated performance of a new IJN carrier borne fighter coming into service. A damaged aircraft had force landed in China and been captured before it could be destroyed. Its performance, if the report was true, would mean it would out turn any Allied plane, Buffalo or Hurricane, suggesting that dog fighting it would be dangerous. Park reflected how this plane would fight his Hurricane’s, the way they had fought the German Messerschmitt 109’s a year ago. He thought he’d send a copy to Air Commodore Vincent, a veteran of that battle, for his thoughts.
Doubt it, in almost 2 months it's the OTL beginning of the Malaya campaign
So with a minimum of 3 fighter wings how many fighters does that give us.
An RAF Wing from WW2 can have different numbers of squadrons and those also varying the number of aircraft per squadron also.
if we assume 3 squadrons per wing this gives us 108 Hurricane fighters.
of the 150 Buffalo's we have 20 transferred to the Navy and from OTL we also saw 20 lost in training accidents.
Any way you look at it the RAF in Malaysia now has RADAR warning, A commander with experience using said radar for bomber interception. and now a suitable mix of fighters to do interceptions. The Hurricanes being faster climbing and more likely to manage to get kills on Japanese Fighters and the Buffalo's being suitable to kill bombers with their 0.50 Cal guns. They really do need the 1200hp cyclone to be any good. However 200 plus fighters with radar support will make a difference. Being able to do single diving passes on escorted bombers will preserve forces and still attrit the Japanese.
4 Blenheim squadrons
3 Battle squadrons
provides a decent bomber force and if given air support could do well. If used as night bombers against Thai Airfields they could be decisive.
Japanese aircraft numbers are hard to pin down but 460 first line combat aircraft including naval squadrons is a hard opponent.
In OTL the fighters in Singapore literally consisted of 150 Buffalo's. I am sure I read something about those earlier so please don't mind me if I got it wrong.
An RAF Wing from WW2 can have different numbers of squadrons and those also varying the number of aircraft per squadron also.
if we assume 3 squadrons per wing this gives us 108 Hurricane fighters.
of the 150 Buffalo's we have 20 transferred to the Navy and from OTL we also saw 20 lost in training accidents.
Any way you look at it the RAF in Malaysia now has RADAR warning, A commander with experience using said radar for bomber interception. and now a suitable mix of fighters to do interceptions. The Hurricanes being faster climbing and more likely to manage to get kills on Japanese Fighters and the Buffalo's being suitable to kill bombers with their 0.50 Cal guns. They really do need the 1200hp cyclone to be any good. However 200 plus fighters with radar support will make a difference. Being able to do single diving passes on escorted bombers will preserve forces and still attrit the Japanese.
4 Blenheim squadrons
3 Battle squadrons
provides a decent bomber force and if given air support could do well. If used as night bombers against Thai Airfields they could be decisive.
Japanese aircraft numbers are hard to pin down but 460 first line combat aircraft including naval squadrons is a hard opponent.
In OTL the fighters in Singapore literally consisted of 150 Buffalo's. I am sure I read something about those earlier so please don't mind me if I got it wrong.
Double Dutch in england is incomprehensible gabbling.
In common usage when I was a boy, in the early 60s, by my parents.
ninjad.
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I think OTL the total number of Buffaloes including reserves was in the region of 89 plus a number in Singapore?
They lost 60 destroyed in air to air combat 40 destroyed on the ground 20 lost to accidents before and during the Malaya Campaign and of those 140 odd airframes only 20 survived
There was then enough left to provide No 67 Sqn RAF with 30 airframes to defend Rangoon (along with the P40s of the AVG - a superior specimen in all respects) and by the time they withdrew to Calcutta to reequip with Hurricanes in March 42 they had just 6 operational aircraft with 8 of those 30 shot down (and their pilots killed) and 27 claims vs the Japanese (mostly bombers).
In both cases aside from the aircrafts poor performance, being outnumbered and relatively green pilots vs the more experienced Japanese pilots in equal or better airframes the big issue was lack of early warning and lost of aircraft were caught on the ground or still climbing to altitude.
If a working early warning system can be stood up then even a porcine underpowered B-339E Buffalo should just about be able to hold its own
Driftless
Donor
^^^ With Keith Park cracking the whip, wouldn't the number of trained pilots be notably increased, along with more and better planes than OTL? Plus, there's more pilots in the training pipeline (A lesson the BoB reinforced).
That level of generally improved skill may keep more pilots alive past the first few days. A twist of the proverbial "rising tide that floats all boats".
That level of generally improved skill may keep more pilots alive past the first few days. A twist of the proverbial "rising tide that floats all boats".
🍻If the Allied pilots, both Commonwealth and Dutch have at least some inkling of what kind of tactics they should employ against the more maneuverable Japanese planes flown by well experienced IJAAF and IJNAF pilots they may survive a little longer and be more effective then OTL. Radar and a working fighter intercept control system should be a great help. And of course the more intensive training being conducted here in this ATL using lessons learned in the Battle of Britain.
One other rather simple but important detail concerning Japanese airplanes, fighters and bombers. They completely lack any kind of self-sealing protection for the fuel tanks at this point. It would be wise to ensure there would be a sufficient supply of incendiary MG ammunition in both the 303 and .50 calibers. For the Blenheim and Battle gunners as well. The 303, becoming somewhat inadequate against the better protected German airplanes should still suffice against the Japanese airplanes especially if the 303 MGs are firing incendiary rounds.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
The changes to the Imperial Airforces, both macro and micro, and the effects it might have on on the Japanese forces, in the event of a Japanese invasion of Malaya and Singapore.
There is no question that the British have made significant changes in all of the air components related to the defence of Malaya and Singapore. These range from the micro to the macro, and involve not just more and somewhat better aircraft that were present IOTL. Take for example the deployment of Hurricanes instead of Boomerangs, while the Hurricane is a more capable aircraft than the Boomerang, it isn’t superior to the majority of Japanese fighters it will be engaged against. However while there is no doubt that in a one on one dogfight between a Hurricane and a Zero, all other factors being equal, the odds definitely favour the Zero. But the Zero does suffer from a number of disadvantages in comparison to the Hurricane, that provided the Hurricane is used intelligently will give the Hurricane the advantage. Unlike the Zero the Hurricane has self sealing fuel tanks and is fitted with armour, plus while the Hurricane eight rifle calibre machine gun armament is proving inadequate in the European theatre, it is against a Zero devastating. The Hurricane is a far more rugged aircraft and can absorb more damage than a Zero, and the British have a much better developed repair capability than the Japanese do.
The Japanese are about to enter something that they have never faced before, a developed and sophisticated air defence system. Which while not as sophisticated as that in Britain does however have some advantages over the British home system. Given the size of Malaya and in comparison to Britain the lack of targets, there is a good chance that the British defenders will have a much longer warning time, to prepare their forces. Thus a Japanese attack against Singapore will find that not only are the ground forces fully alert and prepared, but that the defending aircraft are similarly in position ready to engage the Japanese attackers. And unlike the Chinese, the British all have R/T and are able to communicate between themselves and their ground controllers. Any Japanese aircraft that is hit and suffers combat damage will not be able to disengage from the fight and sneak away, but odds on will find itself quickly the target of a fight of defending fighters. And unlike the British casualties where the is a good chance of a damaged aircraft being able to land and be repaired, or the pilot bailing out and being recovered to fight another day, all Japanese casualties are a total loss. Even the very few Japanese damaged aircraft that make it back into Japanese territory, and are able to land, will be right offs, as the Japanese do not have the spares and skilled mechanics to preform the repairs. Were as the British have established a number of recovery and repair units, filled with personnel who are skilled and will provide with spares.
The British have established an integrated radar network, commanded by officers who are experienced, and served by personnel who have gained experience through extensive exercises. While the Japanese having little to no knowledge of radar, are going to find themselves in a world that they don’t understand and lacking the units to provide the information they need to make sense of the situation. Without the ground and air sniffer units to track the various British radar stations and their communications links, and to monitor the air to air, air to ground VHF communications and interpret these and interpret them. The ability of the British to have aircraft in place awaiting any Japanese attack ether by day or night irrespective of the weather, will appear somewhat magical to Japanese aircrews. For example, Japanese bombers having flown out to sea out of sight of land at night, arrive at Singapore to find the city blacked out, with its anti aircraft batteries working and a few night fighters able despite the clouds to find and attack. These same bombers that three days before, flew along the spine of Malaya in eight tenths cloud and were intercepted twice on their way into Singapore, again over Singapore and once on their return trip, are going to be rapidly rendered ineffectual. And fit only for escorted missions close to the front line. Japanese troops who are used to operating without being subjected to repeated air strikes, are going to find the environment in Malaya very different to that they we7,re used to in China.
At present the various airforce units dedicated to attack missions, are going through some vigorous and realistic training. Something that was lacking IOTL, along with the shortage of aircraft, that arose from commitments elsewhere. ITTL the use of aircraft that have been relegated to the training role in various backwaters, have been consented in a potential conflict area. And while they are obsolete in the European theatre, which is a high tec environment, in Malaya against the Japanese until better aircraft are available, they will serve a useful purpose. In Malaya the Japanese invaders do not have an air defence network, so will have to fly standing patrols or react to British attacks after they have taken place. To provide adequate protection for the Japanese front line forces during daylight, would require at least six squadrons of fighters, three on the east coast and three on the west coast. Fighters that will require the use of tremendous resources, and would be much better deployed elsewhere. Sadly for the British the one redundant aircraft that was used during the Burma campaign IOTL, with excellent results, is not available in Malaya ITTL. The Vultee Vengeance dive bomber, which the British regarded as inadequate for naval use, and given the conditions in Europe a virtually death trap, was used successfully by British, Australian and Indian squadrons in Burma. Unfortunately the Vengeance wasn’t available for use in 1941, or it would have been an excellent replacement for the Battle. And while the Japanese crews especially their pilots are both well trained and have experience, that experience to date has been against Chinese pilots flying second rate aircraft, without a support system. They are about to find themselves in a very different position, and will be in for some tremendous shocks, and are going to have very little time to adjust to the new reality.
RR.
There is no question that the British have made significant changes in all of the air components related to the defence of Malaya and Singapore. These range from the micro to the macro, and involve not just more and somewhat better aircraft that were present IOTL. Take for example the deployment of Hurricanes instead of Boomerangs, while the Hurricane is a more capable aircraft than the Boomerang, it isn’t superior to the majority of Japanese fighters it will be engaged against. However while there is no doubt that in a one on one dogfight between a Hurricane and a Zero, all other factors being equal, the odds definitely favour the Zero. But the Zero does suffer from a number of disadvantages in comparison to the Hurricane, that provided the Hurricane is used intelligently will give the Hurricane the advantage. Unlike the Zero the Hurricane has self sealing fuel tanks and is fitted with armour, plus while the Hurricane eight rifle calibre machine gun armament is proving inadequate in the European theatre, it is against a Zero devastating. The Hurricane is a far more rugged aircraft and can absorb more damage than a Zero, and the British have a much better developed repair capability than the Japanese do.
The Japanese are about to enter something that they have never faced before, a developed and sophisticated air defence system. Which while not as sophisticated as that in Britain does however have some advantages over the British home system. Given the size of Malaya and in comparison to Britain the lack of targets, there is a good chance that the British defenders will have a much longer warning time, to prepare their forces. Thus a Japanese attack against Singapore will find that not only are the ground forces fully alert and prepared, but that the defending aircraft are similarly in position ready to engage the Japanese attackers. And unlike the Chinese, the British all have R/T and are able to communicate between themselves and their ground controllers. Any Japanese aircraft that is hit and suffers combat damage will not be able to disengage from the fight and sneak away, but odds on will find itself quickly the target of a fight of defending fighters. And unlike the British casualties where the is a good chance of a damaged aircraft being able to land and be repaired, or the pilot bailing out and being recovered to fight another day, all Japanese casualties are a total loss. Even the very few Japanese damaged aircraft that make it back into Japanese territory, and are able to land, will be right offs, as the Japanese do not have the spares and skilled mechanics to preform the repairs. Were as the British have established a number of recovery and repair units, filled with personnel who are skilled and will provide with spares.
The British have established an integrated radar network, commanded by officers who are experienced, and served by personnel who have gained experience through extensive exercises. While the Japanese having little to no knowledge of radar, are going to find themselves in a world that they don’t understand and lacking the units to provide the information they need to make sense of the situation. Without the ground and air sniffer units to track the various British radar stations and their communications links, and to monitor the air to air, air to ground VHF communications and interpret these and interpret them. The ability of the British to have aircraft in place awaiting any Japanese attack ether by day or night irrespective of the weather, will appear somewhat magical to Japanese aircrews. For example, Japanese bombers having flown out to sea out of sight of land at night, arrive at Singapore to find the city blacked out, with its anti aircraft batteries working and a few night fighters able despite the clouds to find and attack. These same bombers that three days before, flew along the spine of Malaya in eight tenths cloud and were intercepted twice on their way into Singapore, again over Singapore and once on their return trip, are going to be rapidly rendered ineffectual. And fit only for escorted missions close to the front line. Japanese troops who are used to operating without being subjected to repeated air strikes, are going to find the environment in Malaya very different to that they we7,re used to in China.
At present the various airforce units dedicated to attack missions, are going through some vigorous and realistic training. Something that was lacking IOTL, along with the shortage of aircraft, that arose from commitments elsewhere. ITTL the use of aircraft that have been relegated to the training role in various backwaters, have been consented in a potential conflict area. And while they are obsolete in the European theatre, which is a high tec environment, in Malaya against the Japanese until better aircraft are available, they will serve a useful purpose. In Malaya the Japanese invaders do not have an air defence network, so will have to fly standing patrols or react to British attacks after they have taken place. To provide adequate protection for the Japanese front line forces during daylight, would require at least six squadrons of fighters, three on the east coast and three on the west coast. Fighters that will require the use of tremendous resources, and would be much better deployed elsewhere. Sadly for the British the one redundant aircraft that was used during the Burma campaign IOTL, with excellent results, is not available in Malaya ITTL. The Vultee Vengeance dive bomber, which the British regarded as inadequate for naval use, and given the conditions in Europe a virtually death trap, was used successfully by British, Australian and Indian squadrons in Burma. Unfortunately the Vengeance wasn’t available for use in 1941, or it would have been an excellent replacement for the Battle. And while the Japanese crews especially their pilots are both well trained and have experience, that experience to date has been against Chinese pilots flying second rate aircraft, without a support system. They are about to find themselves in a very different position, and will be in for some tremendous shocks, and are going to have very little time to adjust to the new reality.
RR.
And assuming that there's a Force Z analogue (and we can assume there is as there was that very pointed interlude with the PoW and Repulse), that either Phillips sails and coordinates with air cover and that his forces are a bit more than what he sailed with OTL to put more AA guns on targets. Or, he does not coordinate with air but the RAF opts to provide air cover regardless of the Admiral's wishes.
The presence of even 6 - 8 Hurricanes over the fleet during the attack could prove vital.
The presence of even 6 - 8 Hurricanes over the fleet during the attack could prove vital.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
My apologies sir, I was basing my comment on a poorly remembered picture of Australia fighter pilots walking through muddy grass to their fighters at Changi airfield, during the defence of Singapore. I bow to your greater knowledge, and accept that the aircraft would have been American Buffaloes, as apposed to Australian Boomerangs.
RR.
Given if memory serves they hit force z without escorts then a few fighters could do a lot to break up the attack make it so they come in piece meal or have some break off could do a lot.
Respectfully I hope you're not going to say that by capturing a Zero in China the whole tactical doctrine of the RAF will change to a never dogfight a Japanese fighter. It took months of combat experience for the Allies to learn that lesson. Just as army doctrine is being changed to have the British fighting more like they did in 1944 changes like that take years, and don't happen without any discernable reason. Doctrine usually only changes over years, or because of traumatic experiences in combat that need to be absorbed over time. At the end of 1941 the British Army still didn't really know how to deal with German tactics and were outfought over & over again. Even in 1944 the British needed overwhelming material superiority to defeat the Japanese in the Jungle.
The Japanese were well aware of radar and had a general idea how it had worked in the Battle of Britain. If the British had a radar network in Malaya the Japanese would know about it from there extensive spy network. Just like the Germans could've used low level attacks on radar stations to damage the network. Flying down the spine of Malaya to use terrain to mask radar is an effective tactic. Having a radar net doesn't mean you have fighters on call to shootdown CAS aircraft. There couldn't be constant fighter cover for frontline troops. Having follow on fighters to chase down retreating Japanese air strikes isn't realistic. You'd almost have to have an AWACS capability to do that. If things worked that way the Japanese air forces would've been destroyed in the first few months of the war, as soon as radar sites were set up.