The Japanese were well aware of radar and had a general idea how it had worked in the Battle of Britain. If the British had a radar network in Malaya the Japanese would know about it from there extensive spy network. Just like the Germans could've used low level attacks on radar stations to damage the network. Flying down the spine of Malaya to use terrain to mask radar is an effective tactic. Having a radar net doesn't mean you have fighters on call to shootdown CAS aircraft. There couldn't be constant fighter cover for frontline troops. Having follow on fighters to chase down retreating Japanese air strikes isn't realistic. You'd almost have to have an AWACS capability to do that. If things worked that way the Japanese air forces would've been destroyed in the first few months of the war, as soon as radar sites were set up.
Singapore island had radar OTL ( no coverage in the North ) and the Japanese did not do any special tactics due to it. The Japanese just did not rate radar, hence the low status of officers and men operating it ( and the admirals ignoring it half the time ) which undermined its effectiveness.
 
Singapore island had radar OTL ( no coverage in the North ) and the Japanese did not do any special tactics due to it. The Japanese just did not rate radar, hence the low status of officers and men operating it ( and the admirals ignoring it half the time ) which undermined its effectiveness.
In the situation Singapore Island was in it didn't make any difference. It seems what we're talking about is a IADS for the whole of Malaya. I really don't think the British could achieve this under the circumstances. The Japanese would be aware of such a massive project and have to take it into account. This isn't Britian where the RAF is waiting for massive bomber formations to form up over Calais. Against smaller attack groups at medium to low level attacks such a defense is less effective than in the BoB.
 
A very capable, sucseesor would be Hubertus van Mook.
Agreed. Though his views on dealing with Indonesian nationalism make him unlikely to be accepted. Hell, even after the war when he was chosen as the successor of Tjarda Etc., the hardliners made it so that Van Mooks title would only be Luitenant Governor General.
Again an example of the Dutch/European/Indo colonials living and ruling the Dutch East Indies, like the KNIL and Royal Nehterlands Navy officers G.J. Berenschot, H.J. Ter Poorten and C.E.L. Helfrich who had a stronger connection with Indonesia than with the Netherlands.
I think this is what you meant but I must stress that this segment of DEI society didn't have a strong connection with Indonesia but with the Dutch East Indies. They didn't like Indonesian nationalism one bit.
Hi Parma, that's a very interesting question. Unquestionably, British individuals did settle down in the colonies, raise families and consider their houses as home, but Britain was always the motherland. However, there was always a steady flow of new British moving to the colonies, to make their fortune, before returning home. And the real difference between the British in all their colonies and the Dutch in the East Indies was in governance, where a strict racial line was held, meaning only whites could hold effective power. That isn't to say natives couldn't hold power, all the Sultans of the Malaya State's were Malays, but with a white British advisor or minister in the background. There were exceptions, but the British system was riddled with class, racism, sexism, homophobia, you name, we were up to our boots in it. So I don't think there was such a collective movement of the ruling class regarding the colony as 'Home' like in the DEI.
Possibly a lack of white Dutch not wanting to go to the East Indies, probably due to a lack of population size meant inter marriage was far more acceptable in the Dutch East Indies, and Eurasians could progress much better up the chain of command.
Interesting! The DEI was also a deeply racist society though, not much less compared with the British colonies. Indo's (people of mixed descent) were still seen as 'less' and as a group their loyalty was suspect. It is true that Indo's still had a chance on a career in public or military service (as the example of Berenschot, who's father had been an Indo and not a native, shows) but that was offset by the fact that this was totally out of reach for the native population. The KNIL only had a single native officer when the war broke out, unlike that situation in the British/Indian military.
 
The Japanese were well aware of radar and had a general idea how it had worked in the Battle of Britain. If the British had a radar network in Malaya the Japanese would know about it from there extensive spy network. Just like the Germans could've used low level attacks on radar stations to damage the network. Flying down the spine of Malaya to use terrain to mask radar is an effective tactic. Having a radar net doesn't mean you have fighters on call to shootdown CAS aircraft. There couldn't be constant fighter cover for frontline troops. Having follow on fighters to chase down retreating Japanese air strikes isn't realistic. You'd almost have to have an AWACS capability to do that. If things worked that way the Japanese air forces would've been destroyed in the first few months of the war, as soon as radar sites were set up.
If memory serves the Japanese were aware of radar and had some fairly sharp people working on it like Yagi but early on the IJA and IJN paid little attention. I think they started to really look into it around 1940 when the IJA got a look at some captured British sets that were taken at Dunkirk and Yoji Ito, who lead the Navy delegation, was able to obtain information from the germans so they could start to develop their own sets. The German also sent them some set by U-Boat in 1941 I think as well when they declared war on the W-Allies they also captured both British and US sets which aided in their development in early 1942.

The big issue is they have two very hostile organizations who don't share any data between each other so it's why you see a lot of their first sets come in around 1941 if memory serves thanks to their reverse engineering and effort on their own side. In all honesty they did a pretty good job catching up heck it sums up Japan in some good ways however of all the sides they have the least experience with it so they still need to work out the best operation with their own logistics and forces for the IJN and IJA.
 
Respectfully I hope you're not going to say that by capturing a Zero in China the whole tactical doctrine of the RAF will change to a never dogfight a Japanese fighter. It took months of combat experience for the Allies to learn that lesson. Just as army doctrine is being changed to have the British fighting more like they did in 1944 changes like that take years, and don't happen without any discernable reason. Doctrine usually only changes over years, or because of traumatic experiences in combat that need to be absorbed over time. At the end of 1941 the British Army still didn't really know how to deal with German tactics and were outfought over & over again. Even in 1944 the British needed overwhelming material superiority to defeat the Japanese in the Jungle.
The Japanese were well aware of radar and had a general idea how it had worked in the Battle of Britain. If the British had a radar network in Malaya the Japanese would know about it from there extensive spy network. Just like the Germans could've used low level attacks on radar stations to damage the network. Flying down the spine of Malaya to use terrain to mask radar is an effective tactic. Having a radar net doesn't mean you have fighters on call to shootdown CAS aircraft. There couldn't be constant fighter cover for frontline troops. Having follow on fighters to chase down retreating Japanese air strikes isn't realistic. You'd almost have to have an AWACS capability to do that. If things worked that way the Japanese air forces would've been destroyed in the first few months of the war, as soon as radar sites were set up.
So do I take it that the Japanese can perfectly make use of operation data from a technology they barely understand in 1941 but the Allies cannot even a little bit?

Just checking like?
 
I think the biggest issue here is though the Japanese are aware of radar they have limited operational experience of its use and effects on the battle space. Also doesn't help that OTL the US were in the same boat to a degree and the British operators otl out in Asia didn't have the same level of experince or organisation that was present in Europe.

Though with Park running the show ITTL I expect the Malaysia and Singapore stations will be up to snuff fairly quickly.
 
Ramp-Rat, I assume you meant Buffalo rather than Boomerang? Which, IIRC, were not yet designed? Although, as an Aussie, I am rather fond of the Boomerang!
And the Hurricanes/Buffalos wont be facing Zeros in Malaya.
Zeros were Navy, and Malaya was an Army campaign.
I believe mostly KI-27 Nate (OTL 138 of these) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nakajima_Ki-27 290mph, 1hmg, 2lmg.
And Ki-43 Oscar (OTL 35 of these). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nakajima_Ki-43_Hayabusa 330mph, at most 2hmg.
The Oscars were the latest army fighters, and if the production numbers in wikipedia are about right, they didn't have many more than that to send.

It is possible that in TTL imperial fighters might outnumber Japanese, and be faster, better armed, and better protected.
 

Driftless

Donor
Another wildcard to consider: with the effective spy network the Japanese had in Malaya/Singapore, they should have some reasonably accurate assessment of the Commonwealth forces - in this altered universe. Would they/could they alter their invasion plan to adjust to a more capable Commonwealth force, or was the IJA already spread as thin as they could be? Also, given the more modest uptick in Commonwealth and Dutch naval forces in the region, would that even alter the IJN's already ambitious battle plan, spanning the Pacific? (i.e. no carriers for the Malaya invasion - at least not till early 1942)
 
Another wildcard to consider: with the effective spy network the Japanese had in Malaya/Singapore, they should have some reasonably accurate assessment of the Commonwealth forces - in this altered universe. Would they/could they alter their invasion plan to adjust to a more capable Commonwealth force, or was the IJA already spread as thin as they could be? Also, given the more modest uptick in Commonwealth and Dutch naval forces in the region, would that even alter the IJN's already ambitious battle plan, spanning the Pacific? (i.e. no carriers for the Malaya invasion - at least not till early 1942)
I think the issue through I even though they can have the information if they act on it is one thing, I mean the British and French got some warning of the original battle plan for the Germans OTL but didn't act on it. Not that it would have helped I think, same way the fact the germans during the fall of France captures a British portable RDF set but underestimated its capability.
 
Another wildcard to consider: with the effective spy network the Japanese had in Malaya/Singapore, they should have some reasonably accurate assessment of the Commonwealth forces - in this altered universe. Would they/could they alter their invasion plan to adjust to a more capable Commonwealth force, or was the IJA already spread as thin as they could be? Also, given the more modest uptick in Commonwealth and Dutch naval forces in the region, would that even alter the IJN's already ambitious battle plan, spanning the Pacific? (i.e. no carriers for the Malaya invasion - at least not till early 1942)
I doubt this network is likely to know the difference between a radar installation and a radio installation ( 1941 remember so few even know what radar is ) and therefore report them as the later. Similarly, whilst loading/unloading and movements will be picked up, more subtle changes will not be. Japanese prejudices are as bad as the allied ones, wishful thinking meaning they will underestimate how much the allies have improved ( time and again the Japanese seem to have convinced themselves if they only have X available, it will be enough with Bushido spirit making up the difference )
 

Driftless

Donor
^^^ I wasn't even considering the radar aspect of the Commonwealth forces. I was thinking more on the improved numbers and the relative quality (both coming into theater and being trained up) of both land and air forces in Malaya. By my reading, there's more "teeth" in this force.
 
So do I take it that the Japanese can perfectly make use of operation data from a technology they barely understand in 1941 but the Allies cannot even a little bit?

Just checking like?
I don't know what you really mean. In this TL the British will have an IADS along the lines of what the RAF had in the BoB and you think that's a little thing? If I think the Japanese would know the general outlines of these developments though their extensive spy network, and might take it into account is some kind of Japanese wank? If I think the British getting an intact Zero and changing their whole tactical doctrine to defeat them in the air is a British wank I'm being unrealistic, or unfair?
 
If I think the British getting an intact Zero and changing their whole tactical doctrine to defeat them in the air is a British wank I'm being unrealistic, or unfair?
Well the British did met lighter, more manoeuvrable fighters in North Africa when facing the Italians, so dissimilar air is not new to them. Therefore its not a case of inventing stuff out of thin air, just using tactics used vs Italians rather than tactics used against heavier German aircraft. The issue OTL was initially a combination of poor kit, poor leadership and poor intel, most of which do not apply ITTL. Knowing the Japanese aircrafts weakness would quickly remove its edge, just as happened OTL once a Zero was captured and tested.
 
I doubt this network is likely to know the difference between a radar installation and a radio installation ( 1941 remember so few even know what radar is ) and therefore report them as the later. Similarly, whilst loading/unloading and movements will be picked up, more subtle changes will not be. Japanese prejudices are as bad as the allied ones, wishful thinking meaning they will underestimate how much the allies have improved ( time and again the Japanese seem to have convinced themselves if they only have X available, it will be enough with Bushido spirit making up the difference )
With the extent that the Japanese had infiltrated Allied ranks in Malaya it would be impossible for them not to know it was a radar network. They had at least 1 British air leason officer passing them intel who was briefed on procedures. The Malayans involved in construction projects hear lots of things the British think they don't have the brains to understand. Thousands of people would know what was happening. The difference between England & Malaya is many Malayans had no loyalty to England.

The Japanese Army just did things that the British thought were impossible which was why the British found themselves constantly off balance. In this TL the British will be ready for anything they do. The British had a low regard for Japanese capabilities. They were unimpressed by their performance in China because they held the Chinese in contempt. Besides the Soviets got the upper hand at Khalkhin Gol so how good could they be. Being so near sighted how could they be good pilots? Japanese aircraft were just inferior copies of Western designs, so how good could they be? An RAF pilot in an F2A Buffalo would outperform any nearsighted Japanese pilot in a Zero.
 
With the extent that the Japanese had infiltrated Allied ranks in Malaya it would be impossible for them not to know it was a radar network. They had at least 1 British air leason officer passing them intel who was briefed on procedures. The Malayans involved in construction projects hear lots of things the British think they don't have the brains to understand. Thousands of people would know what was happening. The difference between England & Malaya is many Malayans had no loyalty to England.

The Japanese Army just did things that the British thought were impossible which was why the British found themselves constantly off balance. In this TL the British will be ready for anything they do. The British had a low regard for Japanese capabilities. They were unimpressed by their performance in China because they held the Chinese in contempt. Besides the Soviets got the upper hand at Khalkhin Gol so how good could they be. Being so near sighted how could they be good pilots? Japanese aircraft were just inferior copies of Western designs, so how good could they be? An RAF pilot in an F2A Buffalo would outperform any nearsighted Japanese pilot in a Zero.
You know this is an ITTL right? A lot of what you just wrote is OTL but has already gone different ITTL, the British are more prepared, they are listening more, they have realised the Japanese are better than they thought etc. You also seem to fall into the fallacy that somehow the Japanese in 1941 were supermen and not just very lucky that an overcomplicated plan worked whilst rolling 6's vs 1's. The Japanese had just the same over confidence in OTL as the British had, their entire war plan was based on the US just giving up if the going got too rough for instance.
 
Well the British did met lighter, more manoeuvrable fighters in North Africa when facing the Italians, so dissimilar air is not new to them. Therefore its not a case of inventing stuff out of thin air, just using tactics used vs Italians rather than tactics used against heavier German aircraft. The issue OTL was initially a combination of poor kit, poor leadership and poor intel, most of which do not apply ITTL. Knowing the Japanese aircrafts weakness would quickly remove its edge, just as happened OTL once a Zero was captured and tested.
In the case of the Italians, they were fighting against know obsolete designs. How long did it take in the OTL to understand how dangerous Japanese fighters and pilots were, before they could change tactics? It wasn't until the RAF got heavier, and faster fighters in SEA like the Spitfire Mk V that they could take on the Zero, or Oscar. The P-40's was faster than the Zero, and could out dive them, but no Allied fighter at the time had a faster rate of climb or could out turn ether of them. The tropicalized Hurrican IIB in Malaya had heavy air filters which reduced performance giving them little chance unless they had an attitude advantage at the beginning of the engagement.
 
You know this is an ITTL right? A lot of what you just wrote is OTL but has already gone different ITTL, the British are more prepared, they are listening more, they have realised the Japanese are better than they thought etc. You also seem to fall into the fallacy that somehow the Japanese in 1941 were supermen and not just very lucky that an overcomplicated plan worked whilst rolling 6's vs 1's. The Japanese had just the same over confidence in OTL as the British had, their entire war plan was based on the US just giving up if the going got too rough for instance.
I've been reading the thread. How do the British know what tactics the Japanese will use against them? What would make them think the Japanese would try to do things that they considered nothing short of crazy? They never thought the Japanese could cross terrain they thought it wasn't feasible for them to cross. It's amazing that someone in a position to do something about was able to intuitively realize what the Japanese would do so that doctrine could be changed to meet it. Their physical training standards would be changed so they could operate on foot with the same level of stamina as the Japanese.

Everything we know about Malaya and why the Japanese won has been compensated for, on land sea, and air so the Japanese can be smashed in a head on clash. As the Japanese move to flank the British their forces will be blocked, and then cut off. There is no learning curve the British know in advance what it took them years to learn in brutal combat. Somehow, they know in advance just how tough Japanese soldiers were, when in the OTL they looked down on them.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
if we assume 3 squadrons per wing this gives us 108 Hurricane fighters.
of the 150 Buffalo's we have 20 transferred to the Navy and from OTL we also saw 20 lost in training accidents.
Hi alspug, very few Buffalos have been delivered, mostly its Hurricanes.

1941, Monday 31 March;

But Portel was still new to this game, and the wily old fox Pound had stolen some of his glory, when he mentioned the now redundant Buffalo’s. Portal had already outlined how the surplus Buffalos could be used for home defence squadrons in India and Australia, but Pound had suggested a few, say 20 could be donated to the FAA, converted to carrier operations, and a fighter squadron raised with newly trained Dominion pilots around a small cadre, which could be deployed on HMS Hermes, thereby giving the Eastern Fleet a protective CAP when at sea.
and
1941, Thursday 03 July;

One cargo ship in Singapore harbour was loading, preparing to sail to Rangoon tomorrow, with the ground crew and equipment of RAF 67 Squadron on board, also equipped with the Buffalo, and they would be redeploying to Mingaladon, mid Burma
, while the pilots and aircraft flew along the air route, Alor Star, Victoria Point, Mergui, Tavoy, Moulmein, and lastly Rangoon. Future deliveries of Buffalos were now being diverted to Darwin, where they would equip RAAF 21 Sqn, who would give up their Wirraway’s, and to Calcutta for the RAF, with some left in Singapore for the Fleet Air Arm.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
On a future update, is there any chance you could elaborate as to how they doing with AAA to defend air bases, radar stations, etc.?

Thanks FC! Great storyline! :cool: 🍻
Hi Matthew, thank you. Yes there will be more on AA and Radar in Malaya coming up 👍
 
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