6 December 1941. London, England.
allanpcameron
Donor
6 December 1941. London, England.
The bells of churches throughout the land pealed in response to the Italian surrender of Libya. Silenced at the beginning of the war, except to be used to warn of parachute attacks, now they rang for victory in Africa. The end of both Italian North and East Africa had been a victory of the Empire’s arms. British, Australian, New Zealanders, South Africans, Indians, Kenyans, Nigerians, Sudanese, men from Gold Coast, Somaliland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Uganda and Nysaland had all played a part in the victory.
Generals Wavell and O’Connor were hailed in the newspapers and newsreels as the heroes of the hour. A nation which had seen its armed forces forced to withdraw from Norway, France, Belgium and Greece now had an unquestionable victory. Prime Minister Churchill’s speech to the House of Commons was recorded later to be broadcast on the BBC.
In private, the telephone conversation offering congratulations from President Roosevelt, was for the Prime Minister a great boost. After the fall of France, the possibility of a British capitulation had been greatly feared in Washington DC, and almost expected by some. The Lend Lease agreement, the bases for destroyers, the Tizzard Mission had all been matters of desperation. The fact that, not only had Britain stood firm, but knocked the Italians (and Germans) out of Africa had changed quite a few minds in Washington DC.
The Soviet Union was still holding the line at Moscow and Leningrad. Not just holding the line, word of a counterattack beginning would hopefully push the Germans back. Getting British and American support to Stalin would be a major headache, but so far, the first few Arctic convoys had been successful, without loss.
The situation in North Africa was still tense. General De Gaulle was up in arms about the American ‘interference’ in French affairs. Catroux’s negotiations with Weygand, which the Americans had enabled, included the idea that Weygand, not De Gaulle would be the face of Free France, especially as Governor-General of Algeria. Both Churchill and Roosevelt weren’t unhappy that De Gaulle wasn’t happy. So far, with the failure at Dakar and the lack of enthusiasm from most French colonies to switch sides, perhaps he wasn’t really the right man for the job.
Weyand and de Lattre had managed to successfully solve the problem with the Italian and German units crossing the border. The Italian troops had been detained as deserters until clarification could be obtained from Rome. The Germans, with their personal arms, were immediately being taken to the port of Sfax. There they would been loaded onto ships supplied by the French, and with British collusion, sail for Marseille unmolested. Weygand asked that no British or ‘Free French’ troops enter Tunisia. He hoped to persuade Vichy that, like Syria, French North Africa would remain non-belligerent in the ongoing conflict. That was something that Roosevelt and Churchill could live with, at least in the meantime. Whether Hitler could live with it remained to be seen.
The discussion turned to the situation in the Pacific. The intelligence that a Japanese attack to gain the oil reserves of the Dutch East Indies was becoming increasingly undeniable. Churchill alerted Roosevelt that the War Office had ordered all British and Empire forces in the Far East to the highest state of alert. It was becoming clear that Japan wouldn’t need another Marco Polo Bridge incident to take action. Churchill also informed Roosevelt of what ACM Brooke-Popham’s instructions were. If he had information of a Japanese expedition approaching with the apparent intention on landing on the Kra Isthmus, or if the Japanese violated any other part of Thailand, then, without reference to the War Office, he could implement Operation Matador (the invasion of Thailand). He had also been made aware that this would certainly mean war with Japan, and therefore to tread carefully.
The Admiralty had since informed the War Cabinet that they knew that at least one Japanese convoy was sailing towards the Kra Isthmus. Brooke-Popham had expressed to Admiral Philips that he had no authority to order attack on a Japanese expedition at sea until the Japanese had committed some definite hostile act. Philips understood Brooke-Popham’s hesitation, he didn’t want to be remembered as the man who started a war with Japan. Philip’s had been informed that one of the Catalinas on a reconnaissance mission had failed to return to base. This could be the result of a hostile act, or just bad luck. An Australian crewed Hudson had reported being fired upon by Japanese ships, and that for Philips was evidence enough.
Admiral Philips informed the Admiralty, and Churchill informed Roosevelt, that he had given orders to all China Station assets, including the Dutch submarine shadowing one of the convoys, that if the Japanese approached within 30 miles of the coast, then they were to be considered hostile and to initiate action against them. Roosevelt expressed surprise that Philips had done this without the explicit consent of Brooke-Popham, his Commander-in-Chief. Churchill made some remark about the Nelson legacy. He also thanked Roosevelt that Admiral Hart had ordered four of his destroyers at Balikpapan in Borneo to join Philip’s force. Roosevelt already knew that the meeting between Hart and Philips had ended abruptly, as American reconnaissance aircraft had sighted a large Japanese convoy on its way from Camranh Bay towards the Gulf of Siam. War seemed inevitable, it was just a question of where and when it would start.
The bells of churches throughout the land pealed in response to the Italian surrender of Libya. Silenced at the beginning of the war, except to be used to warn of parachute attacks, now they rang for victory in Africa. The end of both Italian North and East Africa had been a victory of the Empire’s arms. British, Australian, New Zealanders, South Africans, Indians, Kenyans, Nigerians, Sudanese, men from Gold Coast, Somaliland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Uganda and Nysaland had all played a part in the victory.
Generals Wavell and O’Connor were hailed in the newspapers and newsreels as the heroes of the hour. A nation which had seen its armed forces forced to withdraw from Norway, France, Belgium and Greece now had an unquestionable victory. Prime Minister Churchill’s speech to the House of Commons was recorded later to be broadcast on the BBC.
In private, the telephone conversation offering congratulations from President Roosevelt, was for the Prime Minister a great boost. After the fall of France, the possibility of a British capitulation had been greatly feared in Washington DC, and almost expected by some. The Lend Lease agreement, the bases for destroyers, the Tizzard Mission had all been matters of desperation. The fact that, not only had Britain stood firm, but knocked the Italians (and Germans) out of Africa had changed quite a few minds in Washington DC.
The Soviet Union was still holding the line at Moscow and Leningrad. Not just holding the line, word of a counterattack beginning would hopefully push the Germans back. Getting British and American support to Stalin would be a major headache, but so far, the first few Arctic convoys had been successful, without loss.
The situation in North Africa was still tense. General De Gaulle was up in arms about the American ‘interference’ in French affairs. Catroux’s negotiations with Weygand, which the Americans had enabled, included the idea that Weygand, not De Gaulle would be the face of Free France, especially as Governor-General of Algeria. Both Churchill and Roosevelt weren’t unhappy that De Gaulle wasn’t happy. So far, with the failure at Dakar and the lack of enthusiasm from most French colonies to switch sides, perhaps he wasn’t really the right man for the job.
Weyand and de Lattre had managed to successfully solve the problem with the Italian and German units crossing the border. The Italian troops had been detained as deserters until clarification could be obtained from Rome. The Germans, with their personal arms, were immediately being taken to the port of Sfax. There they would been loaded onto ships supplied by the French, and with British collusion, sail for Marseille unmolested. Weygand asked that no British or ‘Free French’ troops enter Tunisia. He hoped to persuade Vichy that, like Syria, French North Africa would remain non-belligerent in the ongoing conflict. That was something that Roosevelt and Churchill could live with, at least in the meantime. Whether Hitler could live with it remained to be seen.
The discussion turned to the situation in the Pacific. The intelligence that a Japanese attack to gain the oil reserves of the Dutch East Indies was becoming increasingly undeniable. Churchill alerted Roosevelt that the War Office had ordered all British and Empire forces in the Far East to the highest state of alert. It was becoming clear that Japan wouldn’t need another Marco Polo Bridge incident to take action. Churchill also informed Roosevelt of what ACM Brooke-Popham’s instructions were. If he had information of a Japanese expedition approaching with the apparent intention on landing on the Kra Isthmus, or if the Japanese violated any other part of Thailand, then, without reference to the War Office, he could implement Operation Matador (the invasion of Thailand). He had also been made aware that this would certainly mean war with Japan, and therefore to tread carefully.
The Admiralty had since informed the War Cabinet that they knew that at least one Japanese convoy was sailing towards the Kra Isthmus. Brooke-Popham had expressed to Admiral Philips that he had no authority to order attack on a Japanese expedition at sea until the Japanese had committed some definite hostile act. Philips understood Brooke-Popham’s hesitation, he didn’t want to be remembered as the man who started a war with Japan. Philip’s had been informed that one of the Catalinas on a reconnaissance mission had failed to return to base. This could be the result of a hostile act, or just bad luck. An Australian crewed Hudson had reported being fired upon by Japanese ships, and that for Philips was evidence enough.
Admiral Philips informed the Admiralty, and Churchill informed Roosevelt, that he had given orders to all China Station assets, including the Dutch submarine shadowing one of the convoys, that if the Japanese approached within 30 miles of the coast, then they were to be considered hostile and to initiate action against them. Roosevelt expressed surprise that Philips had done this without the explicit consent of Brooke-Popham, his Commander-in-Chief. Churchill made some remark about the Nelson legacy. He also thanked Roosevelt that Admiral Hart had ordered four of his destroyers at Balikpapan in Borneo to join Philip’s force. Roosevelt already knew that the meeting between Hart and Philips had ended abruptly, as American reconnaissance aircraft had sighted a large Japanese convoy on its way from Camranh Bay towards the Gulf of Siam. War seemed inevitable, it was just a question of where and when it would start.
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