Sir John Valentine Carden survives.

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In know that plan was OTL but unless Britain seriously cuts back on the RAF, imports a load of slaves to free manpower from industry or drops all standards and starts conscripting everything with a pulse they are not capable of maintaining that sized force.
I seem to recall that Montgomery said each division needed 60k men to support it. So 55 div is only 3.3 million under arms. This is bigger than OTL but with out the wastage in Greece the Middle East and Far East it may have been achieved.
 
There is a chance that America builds Victors ITTL, though it is a slim one.

OTL there were Three main reasons America never built tanks for Britain.
  1. When Britain first asked it was after the fall of France and most people in America thought Britain was about to loose the war. They weren't prepared to go to the expense of setting up production for a bunch of British tanks only to have it all be a waste when the war ended.
  2. British tanks were a bit rubbish. We all know this so no point dwelling on it.
  3. By the time Britain has a tank worth building America is well on the ascendancy and is churning out Sherman's faster than they can be shipped around the world. No way was America building a British tank at this point.
Now ITTL Point 1 still stands, though Britain's better performance during the war means there will be more belief in British ability. How much more belief is up for debate but it will be there. Point 2 though is not present ITTL, we already saw the Americans take an interest in the Valiant I* so they recognise a good tank when they see it. That by itself negates some of point 3 though not all of it. While the M4 is a good tank it is only comparable to the Valiant, not demonstrably better. The Victor however is a better tank than the M4 and that gives a small, and I do mean very small, window for the Victor to come along and wow the Americans. If that window is hit early enough American production is a possibility, Early on in America's participation in WW2 they were very willing to accept British help and advice as Britain was the senior partner. In a scenario where Britain has kicked the Axis out of North Africa before Pearl Harbour and the Victor is about ready to enter production it isn't an impossibility that America adapts the design to use a home grown engine (engines in reality) etc and adopts the tank.
 
It might be worth noting that the Nuffield Liberty engine was not a bad engine. Outdated and labour intensive yes but not bad. IOTL it was pushed too far and poorly served by ancillaries. It had similar power to the Churchill’s engine but that too was underpowered but, as an Infantry tank, it could get away with low gearing. In a speedy Cruiser tank it was underpowered to carry the weight at the desired speed. Once wound back a bit as in the Cavalier or with a turret free use in the Crusader 17 Pounder tractor, it worked fine right to the end of the war. In summary or was not that the engine was poor but that too much was asked of it, but then more tank was necessary. However, it was available unlike the Meteor at that time which had to scrabble around for cast off aero Merlin bits to gain even OTL output times and levels. Thus the need was a slower lower geared ‘medium’ tank. Given the utility of the OTL Valentine a longer and wider 3 man turret AH Valentine could work with a Liberty engine. But all this was worked through much earlier in the thread and the decisions have been made.
 
I seem to recall that Montgomery said each division needed 60k men to support it. So 55 div is only 3.3 million under arms. This is bigger than OTL but with out the wastage in Greece the Middle East and Far East it may have been achieved.
I think that was in Africa. IIRC, it was less (around 40,000) in Europe as a lot more infrastructure was available. Trouble is they are still out in NA.
 
In know that plan was OTL but unless Britain seriously cuts back on the RAF, imports a load of slaves to free manpower from industry or drops all standards and starts conscripting everything with a pulse they are not capable of maintaining that sized force.
The 55 divisions is OTL, but the UK was only to supply 36 of them - the other 19 would be from the Dominions & India. OTL, the UK reached its 36-division target in 1941-2, but was unable to maintain it when heavy fighting resumed in 1943-44, finishing the war with only about 24-25 divisions, some of them severely under strength. (In 1918 the British Army had fielded 70 divisions).

There's a puzzle here I've never seen resolved - the manpower strength of the British Army continued to grow even as the front-line forces declined , exceeding 2.5 million in 1945. 25 divisions from 2.5 million men is a tail-to-teeth ratio that exceeds even the US (who managed 91 divisions on a peak strength of 8.2 million men) , yet contemporary accounts insist it was impossible to keep up with the demand for replacements.

More to the point, what's likely to affect the Victor isn't the manpower squeeze but the resources/production squeeze. By mid-war, the British are short of raw materials, refined metals, machine tools, skilled manpower, fuel and pretty much everything else. They're not the US, with Detroit's vast machine-tool industry, nor the Soviets who can devote entire cities to tank production, and they have far more competing priorities than they can hope to meet. I'd expect tank production to be de-prioritised in 1942 assuming the North Africa campaign wraps up - the air defence of the UK is still priority #1, the Navy needs every escort it can get to fight the U-Boats and the bomber offensive is incredibly resource-intensive,

When the time comes to build the Victor, US production will be ramping up, and the question won't be "is it a good tank?" or even "is it a better tank than the M4?" but "is it sufficiently better than the Shermans that the Americans are handing out like candy to be worth transferring production resources from other priorities?" It won't even be a question of saving hard currency by "building British" because if they decide to build 15,000 Victors they'll have to Lend-Lease more of something else.

[One slight wriggle that might just throw things off - suppose Tripoli falls in autumn 1941 and the British (as suggested upthread) transfer a couple of veteran Australian divisions and an armoured brigade to Malaya to deter the Japanese while they work out what to do next. The IJA observes the transfer and notes that its plans for the Southern Resource Area have just slipped from "high-stakes gamble" to "suicidal lunacy". No Pearl Harbour, no Detroit Tank Arsenal, no flood of Shermans - if US entry into the war is delayed until mid-1942 the British Army might just have to take a much bigger role in the fighting in Europe.]
 
More to the point, what's likely to affect the Victor isn't the manpower squeeze but the resources/production squeeze. By mid-war, the British are short of raw materials, refined metals, machine tools, skilled manpower, fuel and pretty much everything else. They're not the US, with Detroit's vast machine-tool industry, nor the Soviets who can devote entire cities to tank production, and they have far more competing priorities than they can hope to meet. I'd expect tank production to be de-prioritised in 1942 assuming the North Africa campaign wraps up - the air defence of the UK is still priority #1, the Navy needs every escort it can get to fight the U-Boats and the bomber offensive is incredibly resource-intensive,

When the time comes to build the Victor, US production will be ramping up, and the question won't be "is it a good tank?" or even "is it a better tank than the M4?" but "is it sufficiently better than the Shermans that the Americans are handing out like candy to be worth transferring production resources from other priorities?" It won't even be a question of saving hard currency by "building British" because if they decide to build 15,000 Victors they'll have to Lend-Lease more of something else.

[One slight wriggle that might just throw things off - suppose Tripoli falls in autumn 1941 and the British (as suggested upthread) transfer a couple of veteran Australian divisions and an armoured brigade to Malaya to deter the Japanese while they work out what to do next. The IJA observes the transfer and notes that its plans for the Southern Resource Area have just slipped from "high-stakes gamble" to "suicidal lunacy". No Pearl Harbour, no Detroit Tank Arsenal, no flood of Shermans - if US entry into the war is delayed until mid-1942 the British Army might just have to take a much bigger role in the fighting in Europe.]
One thing to remember is that Britain isn't so desperate for tanks they're willing to take anything. The Valiant replaces the Valentine, and will likely draw resources that OTL went to Matilda II, Churchill and Crusader, while the Victor will replace the Comet, and also take over from the Cavalier, Centaur and Cromwell.

Britain knows Germany won't be standing still with their tanks, so they can't afford to either.
 
More to the point, what's likely to affect the Victor isn't the manpower squeeze but the resources/production squeeze. By mid-war, the British are short of raw materials, refined metals, machine tools, skilled manpower, fuel and pretty much everything else. They're not the US, with Detroit's vast machine-tool industry, nor the Soviets who can devote entire cities to tank production, and they have far more competing priorities than they can hope to meet. I'd expect tank production to be de-prioritised in 1942 assuming the North Africa campaign wraps up - the air defence of the UK is still priority #1, the Navy needs every escort it can get to fight the U-Boats and the bomber offensive is incredibly resource-intensive,

When the time comes to build the Victor, US production will be ramping up, and the question won't be "is it a good tank?" or even "is it a better tank than the M4?" but "is it sufficiently better than the Shermans that the Americans are handing out like candy to be worth transferring production resources from other priorities?" It won't even be a question of saving hard currency by "building British" because if they decide to build 15,000 Victors they'll have to Lend-Lease more of something else.

[One slight wriggle that might just throw things off - suppose Tripoli falls in autumn 1941 and the British (as suggested upthread) transfer a couple of veteran Australian divisions and an armoured brigade to Malaya to deter the Japanese while they work out what to do next. The IJA observes the transfer and notes that its plans for the Southern Resource Area have just slipped from "high-stakes gamble" to "suicidal lunacy". No Pearl Harbour, no Detroit Tank Arsenal, no flood of Shermans - if US entry into the war is delayed until mid-1942 the British Army might just have to take a much bigger role in the fighting in Europe.]
So a discussion along those lines actually happened in OTL in 1942. Britain seriously considered stopping all tank production and just using American tanks. The big driving force for not making the switch was national pride, the British had to be seen to be contributing their own equipment. It was also around the time the discussion was being had that work was started on the 75mm HV and I think hints at the real purpose of that gun. It was intended for the Sherman to soften the blow somewhat of using an American tank. Put a British gun in it and it can be billed as an "Allied Tank". Thing is even before the 75mm HV was ready the British probably realised it was a non starter so its back to using British tanks.
That it didn't in OTL even when Britain only had the Crusader, Valentine and still buggy Churchill to use means it won't happen here. Also it is important to remember that Britain is going to be in a much better position ITTL resources wise. Just wrapping up North Africa in 1941, which I think is highly likely, will have a huge impact. That means Malta cant be besieged so shipping losses are a lot lower as is material loss in 1942 due to their being no active fighting in Europe.
 
I do wonder what date the North African campaign will be wrapped up by in 1941 ITTL. Having not to spend a year or more there like IOTL will be a godsend to the British.
 
I do wonder what date the North African campaign will be wrapped up by in 1941 ITTL. Having not to spend a year or more there like IOTL will be a godsend to the British.
It would give substantial breathing room to the British and Commonwealth forces as well as allow for some of the logistical pressure of active operations being taking off Brutush force's though I'd say this would depend on what French Algiria does though I mean a swifter victory in North Africa could force them to switch sides quicker.
 
The interesting point will come when the M3 is available. It's not going to look nearly as good as the Vickers offerings, would the Britiah actually accept it at all? Or decide they can wait and see how good the M4 is.
 
The interesting point will come when the M3 is available. It's not going to look nearly as good as the Vickers offerings, would the Britiah actually accept it at all? Or decide they can wait and see how good the M4 is.
With the M3 they will probably dish the few they get out to rear area units, exile forces and non-combat area's, heck at this point the Free French and Dutch forces would probably like some tanks just send them onto them.
 
The British Empire is the biggest beneficiary of an early end to the NA campaign and we’ve talked about where the extra forces will be used but both Italy and Germany will benefit as well.

Italy will lose maybe 50%/60%? of what they did in OTL, the Germans will lose around 30%?

That’s a lot of men and material to defend Italy/Sicily or to send to the Eastern Front. Not enough to change the outcome but enough that I don’t envy Allan trying to work it all out!

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The 55 divisions is OTL, but the UK was only to supply 36 of them - the other 19 would be from the Dominions & India. OTL, the UK reached its 36-division target in 1941-2, but was unable to maintain it when heavy fighting resumed in 1943-44, finishing the war with only about 24-25 divisions, some of them severely under strength. (In 1918 the British Army had fielded 70 divisions).

There's a puzzle here I've never seen resolved - the manpower strength of the British Army continued to grow even as the front-line forces declined , exceeding 2.5 million in 1945. 25 divisions from 2.5 million men is a tail-to-teeth ratio that exceeds even the US (who managed 91 divisions on a peak strength of 8.2 million men) , yet contemporary accounts insist it was impossible to keep up with the demand for replacements.

More to the point, what's likely to affect the Victor isn't the manpower squeeze but the resources/production squeeze. By mid-war, the British are short of raw materials, refined metals, machine tools, skilled manpower, fuel and pretty much everything else. They're not the US, with Detroit's vast machine-tool industry, nor the Soviets who can devote entire cities to tank production, and they have far more competing priorities than they can hope to meet. I'd expect tank production to be de-prioritised in 1942 assuming the North Africa campaign wraps up - the air defence of the UK is still priority #1, the Navy needs every escort it can get to fight the U-Boats and the bomber offensive is incredibly resource-intensive,

When the time comes to build the Victor, US production will be ramping up, and the question won't be "is it a good tank?" or even "is it a better tank than the M4?" but "is it sufficiently better than the Shermans that the Americans are handing out like candy to be worth transferring production resources from other priorities?" It won't even be a question of saving hard currency by "building British" because if they decide to build 15,000 Victors they'll have to Lend-Lease more of something else.

[One slight wriggle that might just throw things off - suppose Tripoli falls in autumn 1941 and the British (as suggested upthread) transfer a couple of veteran Australian divisions and an armoured brigade to Malaya to deter the Japanese while they work out what to do next. The IJA observes the transfer and notes that its plans for the Southern Resource Area have just slipped from "high-stakes gamble" to "suicidal lunacy". No Pearl Harbour, no Detroit Tank Arsenal, no flood of Shermans - if US entry into the war is delayed until mid-1942 the British Army might just have to take a much bigger role in the fighting in Europe.]
Do anti-aircraft batteries (including ones to protect southeast England) count in the figures as 'army but not frontline troops'?
 
In know that plan was OTL but unless Britain seriously cuts back on the RAF, imports a load of slaves to free manpower from industry or drops all standards and starts conscripting everything with a pulse they are not capable of maintaining that sized force.
Possibly the figure includes other Commonwealth forces?
 
The British Empire is the biggest beneficiary of an early end to the NA campaign and we’ve talked about where the extra forces will be used but both Italy and Germany will benefit as well.

Italy will lose maybe 50%/60%? of what they did in OTL, the Germans will lose around 30%?

That’s a lot of men and material to defend Italy/Sicily or to send to the Eastern Front. Not enough to change the outcome but enough that I don’t envy Allan trying to work it all out!
I would suspect Eastern Front as well, although yeah it won't change much but maybe enough to stem the bleeding when it gets there.
 
True but on the subject of Italy they've taken a major hit in moral, men and kit.

I mean they lost so many troops and gear in Africa to say nothing of the hit which losing both Libya and their other African colonies will cause as well as the loss of their newest conquest in Ethiopia as well as the damage they took invading Grecce, they are going to be really feeling the burn right now and on top of the stories that are probably going making the rounds back there when the letters of the Italian units who are operating with German ones in is going to make for some poor reading.

Heck I wonder if we will see a breakdown in the Italian Fascist government sooner than OT.
 
Not sure if the Italian casualties will be much less, most of these will be captured when NA falls. The German losses will be much smaller (the men just wont be there). British and Free French lower as well. Of course, without NA the US Army will feed green troops into action in probably much tougher circumstances, that wont help them at all.

The impact on Barbarossa wont be the men so much as the trucks. In OTL, they really couldn't use many more men at the front due to logistic bottlenecks, but more trucks will be very useful. The men saved will likely come into play later on as available reinforcements.

Italian political effects will be fun. Would the far higher than German troop losses mean Italy doesn't contribute men to Barbarossa? Losing even more quickly than OTL would certainly cause waves in Italian politics, the result of which we'll hav eto wait and see.
 
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