The main site listing of this is "What if the Japanese disco", which made me assume this was a much different topic. As my services are not needed, I will boogie on down.
Would an oil embargo be placed by the US? Wouldn't they choose another type of punishment for the war with China?
I mean, the Japanese war machine will be fueled by themselves, no worries anymore. Hell, they can expand.
IIRC the oil embargo was because the Japanese occupied French Indo China.Would an oil embargo be placed by the US? Wouldn't they choose another type of punishment for the war with China?
I mean, the Japanese war machine will be fueled by themselves, no worries anymore. Hell, they can expand.
But why risk a war with China when you're too busy developing Manchuria?
IIRC the oil embargo was because the Japanese occupied French Indo China.
My guess is that the Pacific War still happens. Although Japan should be self-sufficient in oil by this point it still needs other raw materials like iron ore and rubber from the East Indies.
OTOH if synthetic rubber can be made from the type of oil the Manchurian fields produce then that's another thing they don't need the East Indies for.
Because they still want to destroy the Chinese people and use China for labor, raw materials and living space?
As if Japan had any sort of coherent idea of what the goal when blundering into a continental war.
You might find it worthwhile to actually look into why that war started.
When you say the Japanese wanted to destroy the Chinese people (and to go out of their way to do it) then you would often face a much more sharp rebuttal than was given by Smith. The army and navy would still want glory though, and there are several options for them to go after. China staying United would probably be very inconvenient for imperial pretensions as China reforming would make them a big competitor to the Japanese economically and with influence over their neighboring countries.don't be condescending. I know how the mind of an imperialist works. That was the reason for their aggressive behavior towards China, the reason they took manchuria earlier and the reanof for attacking the Pacific. Tensions within the IJA sparked the fuse, but it was not the reason for the war.
don't be condescending. I know how the mind of an imperialist works.
That was the reason for their aggressive behavior towards China, the reason they took manchuria earlier and the reanof for attacking the Pacific. Tensions within the IJA sparked the fuse, but it was not the reason for the war.
Thank you for proving my point of your lack of understanding.
The origins of Japanese imperialism was fundamentally different from old European imperialism, stemming from trying to not be the prey in a predatory world that was becoming more and more savage as the Great Depression seemed to indicate the road down to economic blocs. Japan by itself would never be able to maintain any level of parity, and so a drive to claim a place in the sun was fundamental in the paranoia that drove the expansion. Any notion of Japanese superiority that arose during this process came as justification for why Japan was expanding.
If Japan suddenly found that it could essentially find everything it needed in Manchuria, then the necessity to protect the asset paradoxically means Japan must no longer expand. At that point the head honchos would do everything, even appeasing Chiang, to ensure that a line is drawn which would not be crossed. No war with China, no threat to the oil, no need to expand except possibly against the Soviets to establish buffer zones.
Thank you for proving my point of your lack of understanding.
The origins of Japanese imperialism was fundamentally different from old European imperialism, stemming from trying to not be the prey in a predatory world that was becoming more and more savage as the Great Depression seemed to indicate the road down to economic blocs. Japan by itself would never be able to maintain any level of parity, and so a drive to claim a place in the sun was fundamental in the paranoia that drove the expansion. Any notion of Japanese superiority that arose during this process came as justification for why Japan was expanding.
If Japan suddenly found that it could essentially find everything it needed in Manchuria, then the necessity to protect the asset paradoxically means Japan must no longer expand. At that point the head honchos would do everything, even appeasing Chiang, to ensure that a line is drawn which would not be crossed. No war with China, no threat to the oil, no need to expand except possibly against the Soviets to establish buffer zones.
My opinion is that finding this oil will make it even more necessary (in their eyes) to do something against the chinese and drive them as far as possible from Manchuria.
They will also be even more paranoid about USSR.
Long story short, in the militarists' mind things went to the other way. The Toseiha wanted to strike China because they saw KMT as the main threat to the Japanese domination in Manchuria. The Kodoha wanted to invade Soviet Union for same reason, in their eyes the Russians were the main threat.
But how thick is that line when the hatred for the Chinese and basically everyone is so deep? Wasn't Japan basically still at war with China since invading Manchuria? How can one cool off the IJA without becoming less fascist and imperialistic? There is no reason to do that as of now, their chances have only improved. The will to expand only grows.
You mean the racial superiority complex and hatred that was fed and fueled by the war, and never existed to that level before? Your logic is like saying the British and Americans hated the "Huns" before the Germans invaded Belgium in 1914.
Those skirmishes and impossible situations are a direct result of Japan not being able to achieve autarky even with their Manchurian-Mongolian "lifeline". Liaohe development allows Japan a road to not having to fight all the time, and we're talking pre-2.26 Japan here.It started growing rapidly since Manchuria. Enough of that is clear. I may not mean hatred, but xenophobia(or whatever you know, nationalism). So many skirmishes and impossible situations developing only adding to the powder keg. It wasn't a fire yet, but the fuel was only increasing.
Japan already had the perfect buffers in the form of the He–Umezu and Chin–Doihara agreements by 1935. At that point it doesn't make any sense to push even further if you're trying to develop oil in "peace."
The post-2.26 "Toseiha" just absorbed the radical expansionist ideas of the now-destroyed Kodoha and directed towards the weaker opponent (China). Pre-1936 Toseiha never really called for expansion into China outside maintaining the lifeline in Manchuria-Mongolia and bringing China Proper into the Yen Bloc.
Those skirmishes and impossible situations are a direct result of Japan not being able to achieve autarky even with their Manchurian-Mongolian "lifeline". Liaohe development allows Japan a road to not having to fight all the time, and we're talking pre-2.26 Japan here.
Of course, there is always a chance some radical might stir up things like how the original 1931 Manchurian Incident happened, but there was certainly no inevitable conflict like what you seem to think.
Except they didn't thought so. Never heard the the invasion of Suiyuan?
So apparently you aren't aware of Nagata's famous 'Ichigekiron'. He was the one who called for a 'striking attack' on China in June 1933.
i think you are underestimating the aggressive stance of the Japanese in that time.
the Japanese conducted small-scale oil prospecting in the immediate vicinity IOTL, in the early 1930's, and only missed finding the Liaohe Oil Field by a hundred meters or so when drilling in the area