The Unwanted Clairvoyant. A different French strategy in WW1

[jeandebueil]

15th July 1911

General Victor-Constant Michel, Vice-President of the Supreme War Council, was in a precarious position. The Minister of War, Adolphe Messimy, had strongly advised him to resign three days ago. His rather tempestuous argument with the Colonel Grandmaison, the flamboyant chief of the Third Bureau and a brilliant teacher in the Center for Higher Military Studies, had badly weakened both his position and credibility. The meeting of the Council was scheduled for July the 19th. If Michel wanted to see his plan accepted, he would need support. That’s why he had decided to invite some acquaintances to dinner that evening. The first to arrive was General Augustin Dubail, Chief-of-Staff of the French Army. The man partially shared Michel’s views and was quite courteous. Then came General Joseph Joffre, commander of the Second Corps and a respected member of the War Council. And finally, Grandmaison himself appeared. The charismatic officer was surprised by Michel’s invitation, whose vision about the French army was the exact opposite of his. He was even more surprised by the polite welcome of the Vice-President.

The meal was both copious and delicate and the wine both plentiful and excellent. Soon the atmosphere lost some of its tension and Michel began to guide the conversation towards military matters. He stated right away that it was his firmest belief that, in case of war in the Reich, the German Army would go through Belgium in order to try to encircle the French Army in a vast pincer movement. General Joffre didn’t try to contest that statement but nonetheless claimed that, in case of such of move, the Germans would probably stay East of the river Meuse. He then asserted that the main thrust of the German Army would be against the French borders in Alsace and Moselle, as it was known that the German Army would almost certainly only use its active Army Corps and not the reserve units. The Germans simply hadn’t enough trained troops to perform a large offensive throughout western Belgium. Colonel Grandmaison gave his approval to Joffre’s theory.

At this moment General Michel decided to play his trump card and divulged the contents of a recent report of the Second Bureau ( the Intelligence branch of the Army): the said report established that the German Staff was seriously considering the idea to deploy Reserve Corps in the frontline in case of war. The revelation seemed to confuse Grandmaison a bit, but the man nonetheless claimed that this report was only one among many. Then General Michel asked him the following question: “Can you guarantee me, with the utmost certainty, that the German Army won’t use his reserve units and thus won’t try an attack through Belgium west of the river Sambre?”

Grandmaison answered that he couldn’t provide such a guarantee. A rather lengthy conversation followed and General Dubail finally concluded that the possibility of a German movement west of the river Sambre couldn’t be ignored and that the Army should at least prepare for such a case. Grandmaison then asked two questions: First: what about about a possible offensive against the French borders in the East? Second: in such case, how General Michel intended to find enough men to defend the homeland both in Alsace and Belgium?

General Michel knew that almost everyone in the Supreme War Council was aware of his report delivered to the Minister of War in February. He knew that his idea to amalgamate reserve regiments with active ones, thus creating 30 000 strong Infantry divisions, was received with scepticism at best. That’s why he had secretly chosen to give up this option. He was ready to make concessions to the “Offensive at the utmost” faction in exchange for the acceptation of his plan. As a consequence, he answered that it was never his intention to leave the Eastern border completely defenceless and that he agreed to the idea of limited and carefully designed offensives (as he had accepted the importance of attacking in Lorraine for a long time in the first place). By an astute choice of words, he didn’t describe his plan as a “defensive” one, but as a “counter-offensive” one.

He then proposed his ideas for a future strategy, specifying each time that it was only rough drafts and that he would accept advices to improve them. The conversation went into the late hours of the night and remained courteous, with concessions on both sides.

 

[jeandebueil]

- What's that?
-"That" is General Victor-Constant Michel trying to gain the approval of the War Council for his War Plan.

-So it's "a Plan XVI" TL?
-Not quite. The Plan XVI was good but utterly lacked flexibility. Here Michel realized that and tries to compromise.

-Don't you have other current stories to write?
-Yes I do. And I won't leave my dear Maid to her fate. In fact Joan is still a priority for me. This WW1 TL will enjoy regular but quite small update. Consider this prologue as a trailer. The others updates will come later.

-Why that TL? Why now?
-Because there is a TON of CP's threads (many of them being quite interesting TBF) and I intend to correct the balance a bit. I do not intend to write a French Wank or a German Screw. Both sides will have their share of victories and bloody noses. France's fate in 1914 will be different though.

-Which literary style have you chosen for this TL?
-The most lazy and easy one. Each update will describe a situation in a rather neutral tone. I will add to this that I took some inspiration from the truly delightful TLs of PDF27, Zheng He and Galveston Bay. So my updates will focus on important days or weeks. The pre-war years will only have a handful of updates.

-Thank you.
-Thank you. It has been a real pleasure to speak to myself. Now I have to feed the dragon. Have a nice day.

 

[jeandebueil]

19th July 1911

The meeting of the Supreme War Council was quite a lengthy affair. It was attended by Adolphe Messimy, Minister of War; General Michel, Vice-President of the Supreme War Council. General Dubail, Chief-of-Staff of the French Army. Generals Joffre, Pau, Durand and Gallieni, members of the War Council. Were also invited: Colonel Grandmaison, chief of the Third Bureau (responsible for Military Operations), Colonel Philippe Pétain, professor at the Ecole Militaire, General Lanzerac (deputy leader of the Ecole Militaire), General de Castelnau, General Foch. There was finally a newcomer: Colonel Mangin, a man who had recently written a remarked book about the necessity of recruiting colonial troops en masse and named The Black Force.

There were rumours that General Michel had recently gained the firm support of Generals Dubail and Joffre and at least the neutrality of Grandmaison. General Lanzerac and Colonel Pétain, both being vocal opponents of the “Offensive at the utmost” doctrine, were quite benevolent towards General Michel, although they had their doubts about Michel’s capacity to preside the Council, since his position seemed still fragile.

General Michel began his briefing by a presentation of the current state French Army. Upon mobilization, the Army would numbered roughly 120 active infantry regiments and 250 reserve regiments for 30 active Infantry Divisions and 40 reserve Infantry Divisions. That figure didn’t include the 11 Territorial Divisions, the 10 Cavalry Divisions, the 3 active Colonial Infantry Divisions (Marine Troops) and the 2 reserve Colonial Infantry Divisions.

In North Africa and the Colonies, the forces were the following: 25 Zouave battalions (European Infantry), 38 Algerian Riflemen battalions (Arab Infantry from Algeria and Tunisia), 2 Foreign Legion Infantry regiments (with three battalions per regiment), 34 Senegalese Riflemen battalions, 12 Tonkinese battalions, 3 Annamite battalions, 9 Magalasy battalions, 6 Colonial Infantry regiments (with three battalions per regiment).

After this statement, the Vice-President presented his strategy. After a thorough research about the recent German railway building and the reading of numerous Intelligence reports, he had come to the conclusion that a German attack through western Belgium constituted a serious possibility. Nevertheless, there was no denying that an offensive against the French fortresses in Lorraine was likely as well. As a consequence, General Michel called for a War Plan which could frustrate these two possibilities. The Plan XVI would require three Masses of Manoeuver, each with two Armies. The first mass would protect the Northern Border between Sambre and Meuse, the Second would defend a line between Nancy and Belfort. The third would protect the space between the two formers masses of manoeuver between Nancy and Sedan. Finally, a Seventh Army would be kept as a strategic reserve North East of Paris. In case of a German attack in the East, the third mass of manoeuver and the Seventh Army could reinforce and assist the first mass of manoeuver.

Michel insisted on the flexibility of his plan, claiming that the dense railway system in Northern France, particularly the lines parallel to the Belgian border, would allow the quick transfer of troops to the theatre of war which would seem to be the most important. Finally, he agreed on the principle that initial offensives should be launch in Lorraine and the Northern Vosges to unsettle the Germans and reinforce the morale of the French troops.

The plan was welcomed by a deafening silence but it appeared that the most hostile generals (like Paul Pau) weren’t trying to interrupt him. Nevertheless, a still concerned M. Messimy asked him just how big would be this army after Mobilization. Michel answered with a simple number: around 1 800 000 strong, including the support units. The Vice-President then seized the opportunity of a stunned assembly to quickly propose his solutions to have such an enormous mass of men on the battlefield.

First of all, thanks to General Joffre and Colonel Grandmaison’s valuable advices (the two men nodded in response), Michel recognized that the backbone of this plan would be the active Infantry divisions. Each army belonging to the three masses of manoeuver would number eight active Infantry Divisions (two per corps), excluding the Army defending the Vosges, which would only number 5 Divisions. Each of these six armies would be reinforced by a “Reserve Divisions Group” (a Reserve Army Corps with three reserve divisions). As for the Seventh Army, it would only have reserve divisions. Each army would have eleven Infantry divisions (excluding the Vosges Army, which would number eight). The remaining reserve divisions and the territorial divisions would serve in the Alps and along the Spanish border.

To achieve this result, General Michel had two courses of action. The first was to proceed to an energetic recruitment policy in the Colonies. By doing so, he intended to create at least twelve active Infantry Divisions. The Divisions raised in North Africa would have two European regiments (Zouave or Foreign Legion) and two Algerian Riflemen regiments. The others would have one Colonial regiment and three Indigenous regiments (Senegalese, Malagasy, Indochinese etc.). General Michel concluded that he had taken inspiration from Colonel Mangin’s book (which seemed flattered and nodded in response).

The second solution was to send at least 33 Reserve divisions at the front. If General Michel recognized that the reserve units often lacked in cadres, the quality of its troops was often equal to the active ones (he then mentioned an Inspection of the reserve regiments performed by himself in 1907 when he held the position of Inspector of Reserve Regiments). That’s why he agreed that serious efforts should be undertaken to give competent cadres to the reserve units. This policy would have several methods.

First, the most competent reserve officers should be regularly sent to active regiments for training periods. Secondly, young active officers (from mere lieutenant to general) should be sent to command reserve companies, battalions, regiments and divisions. Those officers would be convinced to do so with the promise of accelerated advancements. This idea, which came from Generals Dubail and Joffre, would develop the cohesiveness and the offensive spirit of the reserve units.

Thirdly, those reserve units and the Colonial active divisions would need a significant number of Non Commissioned Officers, a rare species within the French Army. To that effect, General Michel intended to create a Military School dedicated to the recruitment and formation of NCOs. He also wished to recruit simple soldiers perceived as talented by their commanding officers at the end of their military service and to turn them into trained NCOs (with the prospect of a rapid advancement and recruitment bonuses). Finally, a limited number of natives in the colonies, coming from the local elites (like the sons of tribal chieftain in Black Africa), should be formed as NCOs. This policy, he outlined, was in line with the French Policy of civilizing and integrating the people which didn’t enjoy the light of civilization yet. General Michel also added that the native NCOs would never exceed a quarter of the entire NCO corps in the Colonial Divisions.

Overall, after heated but nonetheless polite debates, the plan was accepted as an acceptable compromise. Even General Paul Pau, one of the most zealous supporters of the Offensive at the utmost doctrine, recognized that the plan wasn’t without its merits. Alfred Messimy looked relieved. Indeed the Minister of War wanted an united War Council first and foremost and, until now, had feared that General Michel was a man who lack both the flexibility and the diplomatic skills for that purpose. But it would appear that the Vice-President was finally becoming less stubborn. As a consequence, Messimy described the plan as an “ambitious yet solid one” in front of the entire assembly. The Plan XVI, for better or for worse, was adopted.

 

[jeandebueil]

the red lines show the positions of the French Armies in case of a war with Germany.

 

[jeandebueil]

Late July 1911

The structure of the French Staff had drawn criticism for a long time. Indeed, in case of war, General Michel would be the supreme commander of the French Army (“Generalissimo”) but General Dubail would remain chief-of-staff. That’s why, for the sake of efficiency, M. Messimy decided to combine the two functions. As a consequence, General Michel became the new Chief-of-Staff of the French Army with General Dubail as his deputy. At Michel’s request, General Joffre became the Major-General of the French Staff with Colonel Henri Berthelot as his deputy.

General Victor Constant Michel. Chief-of-Staff and supreme Commander of the French Army.

General Augustin Dubail. Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the French Army

General Joseph Joffre. Major-General of the French Staff ( and de facto number three of the French Army)

Colonel Henri Berthelot, Second Major-General of the French Army and Joffre's deputy. A "bon vivant" (weighing 105 kilograms), who enjoys working with a simple shirt and slippers during warm summers.

 

[jeandebueil]

August 1911

The Agadir Crisis had put a great deal of pressure on the French army and the government. The President of the Council notably asked General Michel if, in case of a war against Germany, the French army would be able to prevail. Michel bluntly answered him in private that it was possible but not likely. On a tactical level, he added that the German Army was simply better, with well-equipped and well-trained troops led by a corps of well-formed and competent commanders. On the top of that, the French army had begun to plan a partial reorganization. Michel concluded that he needed at least two years to build an army which could hold the Germans at bay. This statement was one of the reasons which pushed M. Joseph Caillaux to support a negociated solution with Germany.

As for the army, its financial needs were becoming greater and greater. This led the President of the Council to renew one more time his proposal to introduce a direct tax system to the Parliament. The idea was vastly impopular within the conservative parties and many politicians, just like in 1909, denounced it as an “intolerable fiscal inquisition”. The debate was fierce in the two Chambers but M. Caillaux had the total support of the War Council. Many officers with connections with the right and even the far right gathered support. Eventually, it led to the curious following paradox: the newspapers L’Humanité (belonging to the socialist Jean Jaurès, who had a decent if not friendly relationship with Michel) and l’Action Française both defended the introduction of the new fiscal system, the former defending a tax which constituted an important step towards social equality, the latter claiming that every good patriot should contribute to the defence of his Motherland by supporting the proposal. The debate at the Parliament lasted for weeks and in September 1911, the law was adopted by a narrow margin. The new fiscal system was planned to be implemented for the next year.

The Agadir Crisis also resulted in an unofficial declaration of support from Great Britain. Already in July, Henry Wilson, the new director of Military Operations for the War Office had met M. Messimy and General Dubail. The meeting had resulted in the promise that England would send in France an Expeditionary Force with 6 Infantry Divisions and 1 Cavalry Division, a Force called the “Wilson Army” by the French. Wilson was personally convinced that the Germans would attack through Belgium in a future war against France. This belief led him to establish a good working relationship with General Michel, later depicted by Wilson as a “discreet but nevertheless tenacious man with an immense working capacity and two vital virtues for any commander: lucidity and patience”.

In late August, the two men met for the first time. Wilson was impressed by the French War Plan even if he complained about its “lack of imagination and audacity”. The plan was to be divided into two phases: the Malplaquet phase, an active defence of the French borders with limited and very detailed offensives in Lorraine to provoke the Germans and reduce their fighting capacity in a succession of costly battles, and the Denain Phase, a series of Offensives in Western Belgium and Southern Alsace which would keep the pressure on the Germans while the Russians armies would attack in the East. After discovering the plan, Wilson joked about the names of the two phases: “If I am understanding this correctly, you’re asking to the Army of His Royal Majesty to repeat the feat of Blenheim”. To what General Michel answered with humour: “the people of France would be immensely grateful if England decides to do so”. After this quip, Michel recalled to Wilson how vital the participation of the British Army in case of a war was. Indeed, the “Wilson Army” would be the only force able to protect the French left wing and to flank the German right one, thus triggering the Denain Phase. “At the end of the day, said the French Chief-of-Staff, Marlborough will have to save Villars”.

 

[jeandebueil]

Late 1911. The New Recruitment Policy

After the successful introduction of the Direct Tax in the French fiscal system, the Army partially had the financial means of its ambitions. Nevertheless, the Supreme War Council agreed on the principle that it had to take measures which would be both cost-effective and easy to implement.

About the recruitment policy in the Colonies, General Michel decided to appoint Charles Mangin, recently promoted to Brigadier and made High Commissioner For the Recruitment of African Troops. Mangin was seconded by a civilian: Blaise Diagne. The man was a French citizen of Senegalese descent. An able administrator and a freemason, he was familiar with the territories in French West and Equatorial Africa. The two men had the mission to raise four Senegalese, one Malagasy and one Indochinese active Infantry Divisions within two years as well as enough battalions to protect the Colonies against the German forces in Togo and Cameroun in case of a war. To achieve this result, several concessions would be made made to the natives who would volunteer. Besides the promise of good meals and good pays, the natives who would join the Army would not be governed by the Code of the Indiginate anymore (this measure would concern their wives and children as well). The soldiers’ children would be immediately accepted in public schools. Finally, the sons of the tribe chieftains who would volunteer would become French citizens at the end of their contract. The same policy would be conducted in North Africa by General Hubert Lyautey, who would become the first Resident-General in Morocco in April 1912 and had to raise 7 North African Divisions. In order to avoid turmoil with the European population in Algeria and Tunisia, the French citizenship wouldn’t be given to any Arab recruit.

About the reserve regiments, in order to resolve the acute shortage of trained cadres, it was decided that the said regiments would number three battalions from now on instead of two. As a consequence, the number of reserve Infantry regiments dropped from 250 to 166.

A Military Academy for Non Commissioned Officers was also created in the small town of Saint-Maixent (where an Infantry Military School had already been established). Also, remarked professional soldiers who had spent at least five years in the Army would be formed as NCOs.

The program was expected to be completed in Fall of 1913. It would give to the French Army 30 active Infantry Divisions, 3 active Colonial Divisions, 7 active North Africa Divisions, 4 active Senegalese Divisions, 1 active Malagasy Division, 1 active Indochinese Division, 41 reserve Infantry Divisions and 2 reserve Colonial Divisions for a total of 46 active Infantry Divisions and 43 reserve Divisions.

 

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Brigadier General Charles Mangin. High Commissioner for the Recruitment of African Troops

Blaise Diagne. Charles Mangin's Deputy.

General Henri Lyautey. Resident-General in Morocco and responsible for the recruitment of Indigenous Troops in French North Africa.

 

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Late 1911. New Armament Program

Like the Recruitment Policy, the New Armament Program, drafted in the last months of the year 1911 for an implementation in 1912, was intended to be both an effective and cheap plan. The program concerned the partial reorganization of the French artillery and the possible introduction of new infantry weapons.

The reform of the artillery was the brainchild of Adolphe Messimy, Minister of War, and General Dubail. Both were worried about the uncontested superiority of the German artillery and wanted to expand the use of heavy artillery in the Army. Generals Michel and Joffre supported the idea but insisted that the Army lacked both the time and the money to adopt new designs. They also added that it was impossible for the Army to create new artillery regiments due to manpower issues. As a result, the widespread adoption of heavy artillery pieces would only be possible by converting field artillery regiments into heavy artillery units. This led to the decision to turn 34 artillery regiments equipped with 48 75mm field guns each into 68 heavy artillery regiments with 24 guns each. Thirty-four of these regiments would use 105mm field guns and the others would be equipped with 155mm howitzers. The idea was to create 34 artillery brigades (one per Infantry Corps), each of them with one field artillery regiment and one howitzer regiment. In order to rationalise the production and limit the expenses, it was decided that the army would adopt only one model of 105mm field gun and one model of 155mm howitzer. In late 1911, there were three candidates for the 155mm Howitzer: the first was the Rimailho Model 1904TR. The gun was already in use in the French Army and had an impressive rate of fire of 6 rounds per minute. But it was also expensive and its effective range was limited to 6000 m (less than the 75mm Model 1897). The second was the howitzer produced by Saint-Chamond. The gun had a range of 9000 m but had been rejected by the Mexican Army. On the top of that, the Supreme War Council doubted that the factory would be able to deliver 800 howitzers. The last option was the gun designed by Schneider. Possessing an impressive range of 11000 m, the howitzer had been adopted by the Russian army in 1910. On the top of that, the company offered a significant discount on the total price and guaranteed a monthly production of fifty guns. These advantageous conditions convinced the War Council and the 155C model 1912 Schneider was chosen as the standard heavy howitzer of the French Army, with production and delivery due to start in February 1912.

This very choice also influenced the Council to adopt a variant of the Russian 107mm gun model 1910, also made by Schneider: the 105mm gun model 1911 Schneider, with a range of 12 000 m.

If Messimy and Dubail were the main actors of the reorganisation of the French artillery. It was General Joffre who inspired the adoption of new infantry weapons. Polytechnicien, the man had been an engineer officer and a talented logistician for a long time. During the summer, Joffre had discovered that the backbone of the French infantry, the Lebel rifle, couldn’t be produced en masse anymore for the simple reason that the qualified workers in the armament industry didn’t know to make them anymore. Damaged rifles could be repaired but those permanently lost couldn’t be replaced. On the top of that, if the Lebel was a sturdy, reliable and accurate rifle, it was also heavy and plagued with a slow-to-reload tube magazine. Those shortcomings persuaded Joffre to find a replacement solution. Fortunalety, a solution already existed. The Berthier rifle model 1907 was already used by the Indochinese and Senegalese battalions. The weapon was much lighter than the Lebel and with the same performances. On the top of that, it was cheap, easy to produce and designed for three rounds en-bloc clips. The rifle was slightly modified and quickly adopted as the Berthier Rifle model 07/12. With 600 rifles produced each day (mainly in the National Manufacturing Companies at Tulle, Saint-Etienne and Chatellerault), the weapon was intended to gradually replace the Lebel in the active Infantry Divisions and the Colonial units (Foreign Legion included).

On the insistence of General Michel, General Joffre also worked to increase the provision of machine guns for the French Army. If the Saint Etienne model 1907 was the standard HMG of the French army, the Foreign Legion and some Colonial units in Africa were using the Hotchkiss model 1908. While the Saint Etienne was an accurate weapon, so was the Hotchkiss. And if the Hotchkiss had acquired a well-deserved reputation of being a sturdy and reliable weapon, the Saint Etienne was a complex and delicate machine, an “admirable and patented clockwork”, to quote an anonymous French officer. Furthermore, the Saint Etienne numbered no less than 64 components parts vs 32 for the Hotchkiss. Hence the decision to gradually stop the production of the Saint Etienne MG and to replace it with the far more cheaper Hotchkiss model 1908. Produced by the Hotchkiss Cie and by the National Manufacturing Companies under licence, 200 new machine guns were delivered each month to the French Army from March 1912 onwards. The Hotchkiss was intended to equip the majority of the French units in 1914 and to fully replace the Saint Etienne in 1917.

But perhaps the most innovative weapon delivered to the French Infantry units was the FM CSRG 12. After the invention of the Madsen LMG in 1902 and its limited use during the Russo-Japanese War, the European armies had been interested in adopting such a weapon. Louis Chauchat, an artillery officer and a Polytechnicien just like Joffre, had begun a fruitful collaboration with Charles Sutter, a gunsmith from Chatellerault. Between 1903 and 1909, the two men had elaborated no less than 7 prototypes, the last one being well received by the French Army. This very prototype showed an elegant, modern-looking and very-well finished weapon. While interested, General Joffre ordered to simplify the weapon to reduce the costs and to produce it in large quantities. This request was almost obsessively fulfilled and the weapon was accepted as a LMG designed to equip infantry companies and cavalry squadrons. One major advantage of this weapon was that it used the barrels of the new Berthier rifle, thus streamlining an already rationalized and cheap production. Barely costlier than a Berthier, over one thousand FM CSRG 12 (or simply Chauchat) were delivered to the army each month. The French staff developed a keen interest for the gun as it was perceived as an “offensive weapon”, capable to produce a significant amount of firepower for an advancing infantry, thus improving the morale of the unit and weakening the resolve of the enemy. Nonetheless, as the Supreme Council feared that others Powers could develop their own LMGs, the weapon was never officialy presented to the public and remained a (badly-kept) secret.

 

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The Rimailho model 1904TR. Brainchild of Captain Emile Rimailho, the famous designer of the "Seventy-Five". While not widely adopted by the French Army, it was nonetheless intended to be used as an heavy howitzer in mountainous war theaters.

The 155C model 1912 Schneider. A rechambered version of the howitzer produced for the Russian Army. 800 guns have been ordered by the French Army.

The 105mm gun model 1911 Schneider. Almost indentical to the 107mm field gun used by Russia. 800 guns have been ordered as well.

The Berthier rifle model 07/12. A cheap, effective and well-balanced weapon. Its main flaw is its three rounds clip. Far inferior to the German Mauser or British Enfield. Designed to fully replace the roughly 2 000 000 Lebel rifles in 1917. 600 of these rifles are produced each day, a weak figure compared to the Lebel rifle production in the early 1890's (which sometimes reached 5 rifles produced per minute).

The Saint-Etienne model 1907. An accurate but complex weapon. Production will ceased after the delivery of 2500 MGs to the French Army

The Hotchkiss model 1908. Designed to become the new standard HMG of the French Army. Note that this picture shows the OTL Hotchkiss model 1914. The Hotchkiss model 1908 was almost the same but had a sober metal butt instead of a grip

Latest prototype of the Chauchat. An elegant, high-quality and almost futuristic weapon. Note that the magazine was intended to be on the top of the gun, a little like a bren-gun.

The Chauchat. The very definition of a simple and cheap weapon. Note that this picture shows the OTL Chauchat in 1915. Since the weapon has been designed in peacetime ITTL, the design is a little less rushed. The pistol grip is a bit more comfortable and the bipod both shorter and sturdier. As for the magazine, it is fully enclosed this time and with a better spring inside. All of this turns the Chauchat into a correct weapon. Some flaws are still here nonetheless: the barrel being a Berthier barrel, it is quite thin and vunerable to overheating. After 300 shots (15 magazines), you will have to wait that the weapon cools down for often four minutes. So it's more a cheap "battle rifle" than a true LMG.

 

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December 1911

In spite of a fruitful collaboration between M. Messimy and General Dubail in the Dubail Commission, the “Reseda uniform” is finally rejected by the French Army. Actually, the French Staff had supported the initiative but conservative MPs and rightist newspapers had managed to win over public opinion in order to save the national “garance” red trousers against the bleak Reseda, a bastardized version of the German feldgrau, the colour of the enemy. Nonetheless, the manoeuvres of September, which have seen the presentation of the Reseda uniform to the public, have some positive results. The “Aubry rucksack” (invented by the Adjutant Aubry from the 124th Infantry regiment in 1907) is adopted by the French Army as the new standard military rucksack to replace the cumbersome and uncomfortable “As de Carreau” backpack.

Despite its failure, the Dubail Commission isn’t disbanded and is allowed to continue its work.

The Reseda Uniform, ultimately rejected by the French Army

the "Aubry rucksack". Lighter and more ergonomic than the previous military rucksack used by the Army.

 

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March 1912

While the Army had finally received a sufficient financial support to go through its numerous projects, money was still lacking and some ambitions had to be scaled down for other services. That’s the reason why General Michel met Admiral Auguste Boué de Lapeyrère and M. Thomas Delcassé on several occasions. M. Thomas Delcassé was the current Minister of the Navy while Admiral de Lapeyrère was his predecessor and the current commander the First Squadron of the Line, a large unit concentrating the majority of the French pre-dreadnought battleships. Admiral de Lapeyrère had been a vocal opponent of the “Jeune Ecole” doctrine and had urged many times the French government to create a powerful and modern navy with numerous capital ships. In fact, the Naval Program of 1912, which was about to be submitted to the Parliament, was his brainchild, a brainchild accepted and supported by his successor Delcassé. This (ambitious) program planned to give to the French Navy (or “Marine Nationale”) 16 modern dreadnought battleships and 8 battlecruisers in 1920. Four Courbet-class battleships were already under construction and three Bretagne-class battleships were ordered and due to be laid down between May and November 1912.

The proposal of the Supreme War Council to the Navy was the following: the Army would not oppose to the bill in exchange for the decommissioning of several old, obsolete and costly to maintain warships. A quite tough bargaining occurred and the Navy finally obtained that the Army would also support the immediate order and construction of a fourth Bretagne-class ship for the summer 1912.

As a result, the Naval Program of 1912 was accepted by the Parliament on March the 30th. In exchange, the Navy accepted to decommission six pre-dreadnought battleships, five armoured cruisers, seven protected cruisers and three destroyers, all of them being more than 15 years old. These warships were intended to be sold to other navies or for scrap in a near future.

The same month, the Dubail Commission was continuing its work about the design and the possible adoption of a new uniform for the French Army. The new Minister of War, Alexandre Millerand, had also authorized the creation of a second Commission for the matter, presided by the famous Academic painter and military artist Edouard Détaille. The painter was proposing a bluish-grey uniform which would keep the red trousers. The new uniform was called the “Détaille outfit”. As for the Dubail Commission, it was still defending a slightly modified Reseda uniform with red trousers instead of green ones. But at the end of the month, on the personal request of General Michel, General Dubail accepted to merge his Commission with Détaille’s in order to came up with a unique design which would be presented to the public during the 14 July Parade.

Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère. Former Minister of the Navy and current commander of the powerful First Squadron of the Line.

The Courbet-class battleship. The first modern dreadnought battleship of the French Navy. The first ship of the class, the "Jean-Bart" is expected to be commissionned in June 1913 with a second one in November of the same year.

The Bretagne-class battleship. The ships are intended to be commissionned between 1915 and 1916. A fourth ship, the "Béarn" has been ordered.

The "Détaille outfit" (the left to the right, the third and last characters). You can see that the red trousers were designed to be at least partially (if not totally) hidden by the coat and the puttees in wartime. Note as well the presence of the helmet, roughly similar to a medieval burgonet.

 

[jeandebueil]

14 July 1912 (the update has been modified and completed thanks to advices provided by Lascaris).

The Parade of the French Army on the Champs-Elysées was honoured by the public presence of General Yakov Zhilinskiy, Chief-of-Staff of the Imperial Russian Army. He and his counterpart General Michel had met several times in private during the official visit of the Russian general in June and July. The two men had discussed of the land and naval plans of the two nations and General Michel had laid out his vision of the Russian participation in a war with Germany. The French chief-of-staff revealed to his Russian homologue that it was his firmest belief that the Germans would concentrate the vast majority of their military might in the opening phases of the war against the French Army, thus leaving their Eastern borders in a vulnerable position. “Our Army is strong and our plan solid”, claimed General Michel (who nonetheless preferred to hide the true defensive nature of his plan to the Russians), “We will stand our ground against the Prussians and will surprise them with multiple attacks”. Initially, Zhilinskiy had accepted the idea of a Russian offensive against Germany 14 days after the beginning of its mobilization but, impressed by the apparent preparedness and resolve of the French Army, he reconsidered the option and finally declared that the Russians would launch their own offensive three weeks after the beginning of their mobilization.

The Parade also saw the formal presentation of the new uniform designed by the Détaille and Dubail Commission to the public. The uniform was almost identical to the “Détaille outfit” but for one detail. The burgonet designed by the painter, too much visible and too much “German”, was replaced by the leather helmet of the Reseda Uniform with a bluish-grey colour instead of a green one. The reaction of the press and the public was mostly positive and, by October 1912, the “Modified Détaille outfit” was formally adopted by the French Army as its new standard uniform. It would equip all the French troops less the Colonial units which would wear mustard-khaki uniforms. For the military artist, this was a personal triumph... He would die a few weeks later.

Finally, the month of July saw negotiations for the selling of three recently decommissioned warships to foreign navies. Eventually, The Chilean Navy accepted to buy the pre-dreadnought battleship Brennus for 4 000 000 golden francs and quickly rebaptized it Almirante Riveros. The Greek Navy bought the more powerful Bouvet battleship for only 8 000 000 golden francs and renamed it Kanaris (the ship had cost 21 000 000 francs to the French Navy in 1896). Actually, the French Navy had briefly considered the idea to sell the Bouvet to the Chilean Navy instead, fearing for a moment that the move could antagonize the Ottomans, but the significant military interests that the French had in Greece convinced them to favour the Hellenic Navy in the end. On the top of that, the French Army agreed to sell 32 105mm model 1911 Schneider field guns to the Greeks. The guns would serve to form two new artillery regiments which were aimed to support the four existing Greek Infantry Divisions. The Greeks had also shown some interest for the Chauchat, whose secret was badly kept by the French Army at the very best. The French were initially reluctant but finally agreed to sell 150 LMGs (with 1 000 000 rounds) to the Greek Army. Indeed, the diplomatic tensions in the Balkans meant that the new weapon had now a good chance to reveal its true potential.
Finally, the Peruvian Navy, which had shown some interest in buying an armoured cruiser in the past, acquired the armoured cruiser Pothuau for 2 000 000 golden francs. As a result, the ship became the Commandante Aguirre. The money would serve to finance the construction of the fourth Bretagne-class battleship.

Yakov Zhilinskiy, Chief-of-Staff of the Imperial Russian Army.

The "Modified Détaille outfit", new standard uniform of the French Army with red trousers and bluish-grey puttees and coat. The black and gold burgonet has been replaced by a Reseda leather helmet.

The Reseda helmet. Its colour will be the same than coat and the puttees. Note that the copper decoration is designed to be removed in wartime and to be replaced with a far more discreet tricolor cockade.

The pre-dreadnought battleship Bouvet. Sold to Greece.

The pre-dreadnought battleship Brennus. Sold to Chile.

The armoured cruiser Pothuau. Sold to Peru.

 

[jeandebueil]

September 1912

The Castelnau Commission, presided by the General de Castelnau, is officially disbanded. Overall, the General de Castelnau is satisfied. His work has finally resulted into the creation of a Section du Chiffre, a small unit dedicated to military cryptography. The main mission of the new Section is to encode the secret messages sent by the Ministry of War and to decode the answers received. As a result, the Section is also in charge of the secret communications with its Russian and British counterparts. Finally, the small unit has the complex following mission: to break the codes of the German Army.

At the insistence of Major François Cartier -the new commander of the Section- the Ministry of War accepts to grant more funds to the unit. As a consequence, the Section du Chiffre is intended to number eight people: Major Cartier, Captain Marcel Givierge (Cartier’s deputy), one secretary, one officer in charge of the administration and four assistants. All members of the unit are coming from the Ecole Polytechnique.

November 1912

The Mittelmeer-Division of the German Kaiserliche Marine is created. Comprising the battlecruiser Geoben and the light cruiser Breslau, it reaches Constantinople on November the 15th. Several French diplomatic and intelligence services send reports to the French Army and Navy. As a war has broken out in the Balkans, the War Council concludes that Germany is probably trying to protect its interests in the region and thus doesn’t consider the news as particularly serious. Nevertheless, the diplomatic and intelligence units in the area are ordered to keep an eye on the two ships.

Author's notes: About these two events, This TL roughly follows what happened OTL but for one tiny detail: OTL, the Section du Chiffre only numbered four people instead of eight ITTL. Again, the Army, having a little more money ITTL thanks to Caillaux, is slightly more generous.

 

[jeandebueil]

March 1913 (modified and completed version)

Following the decision of the Reichstag to augment the size of the German Army, the government of Aristide Briand introduced a bill to the Parliament which would increase the standard term of service from two years to three. The “three years law” was supported by the new President of the Republic Raymond Poincaré and the majority of the Supreme War Council, notably General Joseph Joffre. As for General Michel, he was personally against the initiative but refused to denounce it in public. In a private meeting with the M. Briand, he warned him that the law would cost roughly 1,5 billion golden francs and that he would prefer to use this money to finance extensive training periods for the reserve troops. Nevertheless, for the sake of the fragile unity and dynamics he had managed to establish in the War Council, he accepted to remain neutral and to tacitly support the law.

The debate regarding the law was fierce, Jean Jaurès being among the most formidable opponents of the initiative. Favouring a National Militia instead of a professional army, the socialist MP even sent private letters to General Michel, urging him to defend “his vision of a French Army by the people and for the people”. To what Michel answered: “My dear Jaurès, you know my opinion. But you also know my duty of reserve”. In spite of this polite refusal, the two men never ceased to respect each other.

June 1913

The war in the Balkans was over and had resulted in a consequent defeat for the Ottoman Empire. But it wasn’t this result which interested the Supreme War Council. Regularly informed by the French Military Mission in Greece, the French Staff had watched the overall performance of the Greek Army during the whole conflict for a great part of the Greek modern weaponry was of French design. Both the Greek Army and Navy had performed quite well actually. At the battle of Lemnos, fought on January 18, the combined firepower of the Georgios Averof and the Kanaris (formerly known as the Bouvet), mercilessly pounded the unfortunate Ottoman Cruise Mecidiye, which quickly turned into a burning wreck, resulting in the death of 200 of its crew and the capture of the 100 or so survivors.

More importantly, the French weapons delivered to the Greek Army had proved their worth on the battlefield. The 32 105mm model 1911 Schneider field guns, with a second to none effective range during the whole war (11 000m against barely 6000m for the Ottoman 75mm Krupp field gun), contributed to crush the fierce resistance of the Ottoman Army at the battles of Giannitsa (4000 casualties on the Ottoman side for 1200 on the Greek one) and Bizani (3000 men killed and wounded and 9000 prisoners for the Ottomans against only 300 casualties for the Greeks). As for the 150 Chauchat LMGs, they had been distributed to six Light Infantry Ezvones Battalions, the elite units of the Greek Army, dramatically increasing their firepower in the process. The Chauchat, weighing exactly 9,8 kilograms with its full magazine, allowed the mobile Ezvones to harass the Ottomans during murderous raids. During those raids, the Turks, often confused by the unrivalled firepower of the Ezvones, believed that they were fighting against a full battalion while the attacks were in reality conducted by a single company.

All these informations were precious for the French War Council. Of course the Chauchat had flaws, like its strong (but not uncomfortable) recoil and and its persistent overheating issue. But its low rate of fire (around 250 rpm) and its enormous sights allowed the shooter to fire accurately up to 200 meters. It has also been noted that the curious and intimidating sound produced by the weapon while firing tended to impress if not demoralize the Ottoman troops.

All these elements convinced the French Staff that the Chauchat had to be deployed at a company level. The production of the weapon, which was gaining the reputation of being ridiculously cheap, increased as well. But the success of the Chauchat didn’t remain unnoticed for long and several others nations were becoming more and more interested by the concept.

Another good news for the French government was the significant improvement of its diplomatic relations with its Greek counterpart. For Greece, French war material was now perceived as advanced and reliable. This plays a significant role in the “Salamis affair”. Worried by the order of two dreadnoughts by the Ottoman Empire, Greece had already ordered a dreadnought to Germany in 1912. But in spite of this order, a major redesign of the ship meant thant the Salamis wasn’t intended to be lay down before July 1913. This, and more importantly, the temporary pro-French movement within several Greek political and military circles, led to negotiations for the purchase of a French dreadnought. As a consequence, the two battleships would put the Hellenic Navy on equal terms with its Ottoman counterpart.
The Greeks hesitated between two models: an improved Courbet-class battleship, which could be built rather quickly since the French naval shipyards had gained valuable experience with the Jean Bart and the Courbet; or a Bretagne-class Battleship. Finally, the promise of a generous French loan and the guarantee that the ship would be built in less than 27 months (turrets not included) convinced the Greeks to purchase an improved Courbet-class dreadnought. The ship would be equipped with eight 340 mm french-designed guns instead of twelve 305 mm ones and this speed would reach 22 knots. The armour on the deck was also intended to be slightly reinforced. The new ship, ordered in July, was laid down the next month, a bold move intended to reassure the Greeks.
However, this didn't totally reassure the Greek government as the Ottoman Navy would number two modern dreadnoughts in September 1914 while Greece would have to wait until late 1915 to receive its own battleships. As a consequence, the government decided to purchase a third dreadnought battleship which would be commissionned in late 1914 and would replace one of the two dreadnoughts currently under construction. This ultimately resulted in the acquisition of the ARA Rivadavia, launched in August 1911 and intended to be delivered in September 1914.
Finally, after careful consideration, the contract for the Salamis under construction at Hamburg was cancelled and the Courbet-class battleship ultimately received the name of its German twin. This news would delight the French nationalist newspapers for weeks to come.

The unfortunate cruiser Mecidiye, victim of the combined might of the Kanaris and the Averof.

An Evzones unit after the Battle of Bizani. Six battalions were equipped with the French Chauchat (roughly 6 to 8 LMGs per company). This astute use of the weapon in the Balkans considerably influenced the French doctrine.

Author's notes: The "27 months promise" did happen OTL. Will it be respected? Nobody knows. As for the dreadnought being laid down one month after being ordered, I took inspiration from British dreadnoughts in 1909-1911.

 

[jeandebueil]

The ARA Rivadavia. Intended to be delivered to the Hellenic Navy as the Vasilefs Konstantinos in September 1914.

The Salamis, a improved Courbet-class battleship. Intended to be delivered to the Hellenic Navy in December 1915 at the earliest.

 

[jeandebueil]

Late July 1913

On July the 19th, the “Three Years Law” was finally adopted by the Chamber of the Deputies. For the French Army and General Michel, it meant that the number of active Infantry Divisions would rise from 30 to 41 and that the number of Reserve Divisions would fall from 41 to 30. The Army had now 57 active Infantry Divisions (including 7 Divisions of Africa, 3 Colonial, 4 Senegalese, one Indochinese and one Malagasy Divisions) and 32 Reserve Divisions (including the 2 Reserve Colonial Divisions). But financially, it also meant that the Supreme War Council was forced to scale down some of its ambitions. General Michel, in a meeting with the new President of the Council Louis Barthou, announced that the Army now had to choose between forming new cadres and pursuing the application of the Armament Program. With the support of the War Council, General Michel chose the latter.

During the next months, three Reserve Divisions were disbanded with their Staff Officers relocated to other units and their regiments designed to be directly attached to various Army Corps. Furthermore, it was decided that the four Reserve Divisions which were intended to protect the Alps in case of war wouldn’t be reequipped as the other units. The same measure would be applied to the Territorial Divisions and isolated regiments.

Overall, General Michel was concerned that his ambitious plan for the Army wouldn’t be financed for much longer. It was his personal belief that if a war didn’t break out within two years, the French Army would be forced to reconsider its options.

However, the announcement of the Salamis contract being definitively granted to France managed to partially ease his concern. Indeed, the money provided by the contract would at least finance several minor projects.


The month of July also saw a meeting at the Prussian Ministry of War at Leipzige Strasse, Berlin. Were notably present General Moltke the Younger, Chief of the General Staff, General Falkenhayn, Minister of War for the Kingdom of Prussia, General von Lyncker, Chief of the Military Cabinet and General von Bülow, Inspector the Third Army. The main subject of the discussion was about the supposed preparedness of the French Army. The information gathered by the Intelligence services and by simply reading the French newspapers were both concerning and reassuring. Concerning because the adoption of news weapons by the French Army would surely improve its effectiveness, particularly the 105mm model 1911 Schneider field gun, which outranged every German artillery piece, including the 210mm heavy mortar. Reassuring because the news of the adoption of the “Three Years Law” confirmed that the French didn’t put much trust in their reserve troops and that their Army would be mainly an active one in case of war. As a consequence, Moltke agreed that the French would probably raise 5 field armies against Germany. As for the French artillery, the consensus was the following: nobody denied that the French artillery regiments were well-trained and well-equipped. However, recent reports suggested that the French staff didn't intend to create new artillery units, but rather seemed to replace the 75mm model 1897 in some regiments with heavier guns. Thus, the Germans were convinced that a French army corps would still number 120 guns against 160 or 176 in its German counterpart.
Nevertheless, all these elements convinced the majority of the Assembly (particularly General Falkenhayn) that the French Army would constitute the main threat in a hypothetical war and that France had to be quickly crushed in the opening phases of a conflict. A relatively brief debate followed but at the end, General Moltke came to the same conclusion and the meeting was adjourned.

However, several decisions were taken as well and a new Armament Commission was created as a result. Impressed by the performance of the Chauchat, the German Staff decided to solicit the main German Armament Factories in order to adopt a standard LMG for the Army. For the next eleven months, designs and prototypes would be proposed and tested. The production and the introduction of the weapon was intended to begin at a small scale in September 1914.

Author's notes: Falkenhayn had always been a fierce defender of the "Western Front Strategy". France was the main enemy for him and he believed that a negociated peace, some kind of "gentlemen's agreement" was possible with Russia in the East. As a consequence, he was very reluctant when it came to send additionnal corps in the East and often clashed with Hindenburg and Ludendorff. OTL, it took an Austria being on the verge of total collapse after Przemysl to convince him that maybe, a big offensive against Russia was a good idea. So here, with a French Army which seems to have flaws but somewhat improves, the Germans are even more convinced that "Schieffen-Plan" is an absolute necessity since they were obsessed with the idea of avoiding a two front war in the first place.

 

[jeandebueil]

Late October 1913

News about the Mittelmeer-Division continued to be sent to the French Staff for months. At first, the Supreme War Council hadn’t considered the threat as serious and even suspected that the Division would be disbanded and its ships sent back to Germany once the war in the Balkans would be over. This didn’t happen and the persistent presence of the Geoben and Breslau in the Adriatic waters began to concern, if not obsess, the Supreme War Council. General Michel and his deputies (and as a result the current Minister of War Eugene Estienne) had repeated meetings with their naval counterparts. For General Michel, the Goeben and Breslau constituted an intolerable peril for the success of his plan. Indeed, in case of war with Germany, the 13 Colonial Divisions raised and located in the Empire would have to be deployed in France at the 17th day of mobilization. That meant that the control and the securing of Western Mediterranean was of the utmost importance. “I cannot afford to lose one single division. I cannot afford to lose one single day”, he claimed in front of the Admirals Pierre Le Bris (Chief of Staff of the Navy) and Boué de Lapeyrère.

Michel and Lapeyrère had established a courteous collaboration since the day the Army supported the Naval Rearmament Program and Admiral Lapeyrère supported the idea that the Marine Nationale should concentrate the main bulk of its fleet and the majority of its capital ships in Western Mediterranean in case of war. Soon, a plan was drafted. Three squadrons of the line, each with one dreadnought and four modern pre-dreadnought battleships would be formed and ready for action three days after the beginning of the mobilization. Their mission was to protect at all costs the convoys between Toulon and the Algerian ports and, if possible, to hunt down and destroy any German capital ship present in the area.

But this didn’t entirely ease Michel’s concerns. First, the Supreme Council realized that the coastal defences in Algeria had been partially dismantled in March 1913. Several batteries had lost their gunners and had been placed into dormancy. Those batteries were intended to become active again three or four days after a declaration of war, when they would be manned with recalled reservists. This was a risk that General Michel wasn’t willing to take and the Supreme War Council insisted that the main Algerian harbours, namely Algiers, Oran and Philippeville, should at least be defended by several permanent coastal batteries which would be ready to repulse a naval attack at any time. While the government never denied the merit of the proposal, money was lacking to properly fund the initiative. As a consequence, each port would have only one active coastal battery. In Philippeville, it was decided that the El-Kantara battery (which protected the western outskirts of the harbour) would be reactivated.

The need to secure Western Mediterranean also led General Michel to get in contact with the British First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. With the help of Sir Henry Wilson, with whom Michel had developed a certain friendship, the French chief-of-staff wanted to convince the RN, undisputed queen of the seas, to lock the access of the Channel to the Kaiserliche Marine if a war had to occur between France and Germany. The idea was to establish a no-go zone, controlled by the Royal Navy, for any warship (including French ones) between Dunkerque, Oostende, Dower and Felixstowe. This initiative would at least temporarily secure the French coast on the Atlantic and would allow the French Navy to concentrate its forces in Western Mediterranean during the first decisive weeks of a hypothetical war. While the idea made sense on a strategic point of view and quickly gained the support of Churchill, His Majesty's Government had to be convinced to perform such a blatant violation of the principle of neutrality, even if the agreement was designed to remain secret until its application (like the previous Naval Agreement of 1912). Churchill and Wilson, which were aware of some parts of the French battle plan, tried to persuade Michel to reveal some elements of his plan which could entice the Prime Minister into accepting such an idea. The French general was very reluctant to do so. Indeed, the Supreme War Council had taken every possible measure for the past two years to protect the secrecy of the Plan XVI. As an example, the recruitment of new Colonial Divisions had never been made public and the Army had never recognized the creation of new Indigenous regiments, merely officially announcing that the French Army intended to raise a “limited number of Native Battalions”.

But the stakes were too great and, at the end of the day, General Michel accepted to send a handwritten letter, with his personal signature and stamp, to Herbert Asquith, Prime Minister of Great Britain. The letter, read during a special session in presence the most important ministers, confirmed that France intended to send 7 Infantry Divisions from Algeria to Toulon and 4 Infantry Divisions from the Gulf of Guinea to Normandy. This news surprised (and even shocked) the British who were astonished by the French determination to use such a massive amount of Colonial troops, nearly 23% of the total active French units. Nevertheless, Herbert Asquith was convinced that a victorious France and thus, a maintained balance of powers in Continental Europe, needed the safe transport of those troops. In December 1913, the British government finally agreed to add a secret clause to the already secret Naval Agreement of 1912. In case of war between France and Germany, England would officially establish a non-combat zone in the northernmost part of the Channel, in order to “preserve the free movement of goods and trade and to avoid possible incidents near its coastline”. Every civilian ship of every nation (Germany included) would be allowed to safely travel across the zone but no warship would be authorized to enter in the area.

Author's notes: The disarmament of the french coastal batteries in Algeria did happen in March 1913 OTL. Here, since the French are nearly paranoid about the Germans trying to disrupt their convoys from Algeria to Toulon, small measures were taken but the lack of money (thanks to the bottomless pit named "Three Years Law) means that the coastal defences will remain very weak during the first days of the war.
About the English initiative, one must give to Caesar what is Caesar's. Stenz got the idea and proposed it to me. I think that it would constitute a plausible reaction from the French since the securing of Western Mediterranean is now vital for them. Will this measure help the French when the time comes? Nobody knows.

 

[jeandebueil]

December 1913. Philippeville, Algeria.

The El-Kantara battery was in poor condition. Usually numbering four 190mm model 1878 guns, two cannons were damaged and unable to fire and one had lost its bodies of aiming. Overall, the guns were obsolete and intended to be replaced within a few years. With a maximum range of 9500 meters but an effective range of only 6000, they could shot one round per minute. But while the shells weren’t designed to pierce the armour of a modern dreadnought, their specific shape allowed them to rectify their trajectory once they penetrated in the water. As a consequence, the shells could hit a ship under its waterline, where their 16 kilograms of explosive could provoke serious damages.

In a short amount of time, orders were given to repair the three damaged guns. Since the French Army in Algeria lacked experienced artillerymen to man its coastal batteries, Lieutenant Cardot, a reservist and a lawyer in Sétif from the Sixth Foot Artillery Regiment of Africa, was chosen to command the newly recreated unit. The man was promptly promoted to full captain and in exchange, could be recalled at any moment by the Army.

A 190mm model 1878 gun at the El Kantara Battery.

The El Kantara Battery and the harbour of Philippeville, Eastern Algeria. In blue: the location of the battery and its effective range. In green: the location of the harbour.

 

[jeandebueil]

April 1914 (Modified and completed update)

During the Spring Manoeuvers of the French Army, the Section du Chiffre organized a codebreaking exercise between the Blue Team led by Major Cartier himself and the Red Team commanded by his deputy Captain Givierge. The Red Team won partially thanks to the invention a new code which was particularly difficult to break for its opponent. Captain Givierge had decided to use a Caesar’s Code combined with the Zuberoan dialect (a branch of the Basque language). This gave the Red Team plenty of time to decode the encrypted information invented by its Blue homologue. However, while the use of Zuberoean dialect had confused the blue team for a few hours, Major Cartier and Captain Givierge agreed that the code had a quite short life expectancy since a talented cryptologist could break it after a few days. As a result the two officers would try to improve the code over the next few months.

The exercise also saw the formal introduction of a workable system of direction-finding invented by Major Cartier himself. The technology greatly interested the French Staff and the authorization was given to create two radio direction-finding stations which would be ready operational for summer.

The manoeuvers also saw the taking of the following decision about automatic weapons. While the Chauchat LMG was deployed at a company level (and even at a half-section level to be more accurate), it was decided that the number of Heavy Machine Guns (mainly the Hotchkiss model 1908) for each battalion would be expanded. Each battalion would receive a second machine gun section, thus giving to the unit four weapons manned by 40 men. As a result, each division would number 48 HMGs. This decision was partially inspired by the example offered by the Greek Army during the Balkans Wars, the said army having decided to equip each battalion with four MGs, a pratice which was showing interesting results.

Generals Michel, Dubail and Joffre also had a rather lengthy conversation with the recently promoted Brigadier General Jean Estienne. Jean Estienne had been the founder of the “Aéronautique Militaire” (Military Aviation Corps) in 1909 and supported the massive use of aviation for reconnaissance and artillery spotting. Currently the Corps numbered 25 flights with 6 planes each and 3 flights with 4 planes each. The Army had also 15 dirigibles divided between 4 fortress companies. Jean Estienne was hoping that the Aviation Corps would be expanded to 32 flights with 6 planes each but General Michel, while interested by the possibilities of this new weapon, informed him that the Army currently hadn’t the necessary funds to finance such a project. Nevertheless, he accepted to increase the size of the 3 flights current having four airplanes. In case of war, these units would be allocated to the six armies deployed along the frontline.

Author's notes: The codebreaking exercise did happen OTL and Major Cartier did invent a system of direction-finding OTL in 1913 but it was sadly refused thanks to petty jealousy from his superior. Here, since the Section du Chiffre is bigger and has a direct relationship with the Supreme War Council, this didn't happen and Cartier will have his stations.
The Ceasar's Code combined with Basque language idea comes from DracoLazarus and Ramontxo (and many others). Consider this as an attempt from Captain Givierge to have some fun.
France was indeed very advanced when it comes to military aviation in 1914 and surprised the Germans during the Battles in Belgium with their accurate artillery fire guided by planes. Sadly, the French stupid infantry charges against German MGs cancelled that initial advantage.

Brigadier General Jean Estienne. Founder of the French Aviation Corps.