Eviction Notice: The Drive to the Frontiers
SS-Volksmarschall Josef Dietrich had taken command of Army Group North following the failure of Operation Wotan. He had some six-hundred thousand men at his disposal, 1,950 armored fighting vehicles, twelve thousand artillery pieces, and three hundred aircraft of Luftflotte 3. But as much as a quarter of this number were poorly trained Baltic conscripts, spared from the genocidal excess of Generalplan Ost in 1941 and now forced to fight for their oppressors by the Nazi puppet regimes in the Baltics.
Further north, a coalition force of 110,000 Swedish and 250,000 Finnish soldiers were locked in battle north of Leningrad. Their frontlines, extending from the ramparts near Lenin’s city, wound north through the rough taiga of Karelia onwards towards Murmansk.
The Comintern had was steadily building up a force nearly twice their number, reaching nearly 1.8 million men by the outset of Operation Spanner on 21 November. Four fronts were arrayed against Army Group North and Finland: the Karelian Front, the Leningrad Front, and the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts, commanded respectively by General of the Army Aleksandr Vasilevsky, General Aleksandr Novikov, General Harry Haywood, and Marshal Semyon Timoshenko.
Ending the Siege of Leningrad had been a major war aim since for nearly three years. On three prior occasions, operational plans were scrapped by changing conditions. But now the German invaders were exhausted and on the backfoot.
The initial overture began with one of the largest strategic bombing campaigns of the war. The American 4th Air Army and the Soviet 8th Air Army began a three month long campaign of destruction over Sweden and Finland. The long-range B-23 Superfortresses delivered large payloads to the centers of Swedish industry and iron export. B-18 twin-engine bombers struck railroad hubs and supply dumps in the Finnish country side.
The campaign was intense enough to concern the inner circles of the Nazi government. Swedish iron exports began dropping precipitously under the combined weight of bombing and sea mine deployment. At Hitler’s insistence, several squadrons worth of new high altitude Ta 190D fighters were loaned to the Swedish Air Force, along with personnel to assist in training and maintenance.
The diluting of the Luftwaffe’s air defense capabilities proved deeply unpopular in the service itself. Already pressed by the Anglo-American bombing campaign of the Rhineland industrial areas, some were finally coming to the all too late realization that the war was not progressing exactly according to Germany’s favor.
While discontent simmered on the home front and in the military establishment of Germany, Comintern preparations for Operation Luna continued. In the early morning hours of 12 December 1943, pioneer teams cleared paths through minefields. In the bitter cold, Revolutionary Army commandos began infiltration attacks. By the time the thundering mass of guns and screeching rockets startled the Axis defenders awake, the attack had already been under way for hours.
Three days later, the Karelian Front joined the offensive, spoiling counterattack preparations by the Finnish Second Army. While the Finnish/Swedish coalition was somewhat better prepared strategically, they suffered from severe deficiencies in armor support and anti-tank capability, which General Vasilevsky mercilessly exploited.
After three and a half long years of suffering, the Comintern had finally achieved mastery of the battlefield, made possible by earnest, effective cooperation between Soviet and American forces. The Comintern military achieved proficiency in both the operational art as well as the tactical battlefield. For the first time in the war, they achieved multi Front cooperation in a decisive offensive posture, enabled by the smooth cooperation of combined arms elements in the multi-national coalition army.
The German Heer and even the Waffen-SS remained tactically proficient, but as in previous campaigns they were paralyzed by a lack of appreciation for the operational art. The readiness of German formations, to say nothing of their allies, had depreciated considerably from the high watermark of the previous year. Shortages of experienced officers and NCOs were combined by shortages in war materiel. And in the case of Operation Spanner, Volksmarschall Dietrich’s leadership proved to be clumsy and foolhardy.
Dietrich owed his position to his political zeal and reliability, not his military acumen. A common rumor among the recalcitrant brass of the Wehrmacht was that Dietrich didn’t even know how to read a map. This was an exaggeration; Dietrich was certainly promoted well above his level of competency, and had enjoyed some reputation for ability due to his nature for adventurism and risk-taking. But in the defensive campaign against a determined foe that held the advantage in military intelligence, it lead to Army Group North being led around by the nose by Stavka representative General of the Army Georgy Zhukov.
On Christmas Day, the 1st Baltic Front cleared the last of the German occupiers from the Moscow-Leningrad railway. At last, the Germans had been pushed from their stranglehold around the city. Comintern forces continued to press onwards against Army Group North. While Dietrich yielded ground stubbornly, he could not resist the relentless mass of offensive firepower bring brought to bear. On 5 January 1944, the first Soviet units crossed the border into Reichskommisariat Ostland, formerly the Republic of Estonia.
In Karelia, the Finnish-Swedish coalition had the advantage of more favorable defensive terrain. But they too could not stop the massive host that had been shifted northward. As 1944 dawned, the last toe-hold on Lake Lagoda, held by the Swedish 8th Infantry Division, had been lost.
With Karelia lost and any hope of regaining it now a forgotten dream, talk of a separate peace began to stir in the Finish government. In spite of their alliance with Germany and Sweden, the country still adhered to the norms of republican government. The continuation of the alliance was becoming increasingly difficult, especially amidst the wide publicization of Axis crimes against humanity in their occupation areas of the Soviet Union.
Outcome
Operation Spanner would prove to be a major Comintern victory. As complicated as the operation was, spread along a broad front from Karelia almost to northern Byelorussia, the counteroffensive shattered the myth of German martial superiority. In spite of the considerable defensive preparations undertaken in the previous months by Army Group North, the Comintern military was able to forcibly evict them from occupied Soviet territory.
From the beginning of the offensive, the Comintern Army Air Force enjoyed aerial superiority. In most sectors, Comintern fighter aircraft achieved a 2:1 numerical superiority. Numerous German aces were lost trying to stem the tide of Su-6 “Frog” attackers, including the boy wonder Hauptmann Erich Hartmann. The Luftwaffe could do little to disrupt the sequence of Comintern attacks, with so many of their ground attackers being shot down or chased off before they could complete their sorties. Meanwhile, American and Soviet fighters and bombers could range freely, disrupting both combat units as well as the logistical support network.
Army Group North itself was savaged. Nearly a thousand armored fighting vehicles would be knocked out in two and a half months of fighting. Over one sixth of their number would be irretrievable causalities: one hundred eighteen thousand German and Baltic soldiers were killed or captured. A further eighty thousand would be wounded or sick in the campaign.
Victory was still bittersweet. Seventy-five thousand American and Soviet soldiers died in the offensive, a further twelve thousand missing or captured. One hundred fifty thousand men and women were wounded facing Army Group North.
The Finnish/Swedish coalition lost thirty thousand soldiers killed or captured, and another fifty thousand wounded, versus twenty thousand Comintern dead or captured, and thirty thousand wounded.
The lifting of the Siege of Leningrad resulted in jubilation across the entirety of the Comintern. The horror stories of death, starvation, pestilence and cannibalism brought on by the siege had filled newspapers and newsreels for the past three years
SS-Volksmarschall Josef Dietrich had taken command of Army Group North following the failure of Operation Wotan. He had some six-hundred thousand men at his disposal, 1,950 armored fighting vehicles, twelve thousand artillery pieces, and three hundred aircraft of Luftflotte 3. But as much as a quarter of this number were poorly trained Baltic conscripts, spared from the genocidal excess of Generalplan Ost in 1941 and now forced to fight for their oppressors by the Nazi puppet regimes in the Baltics.
Further north, a coalition force of 110,000 Swedish and 250,000 Finnish soldiers were locked in battle north of Leningrad. Their frontlines, extending from the ramparts near Lenin’s city, wound north through the rough taiga of Karelia onwards towards Murmansk.
The Comintern had was steadily building up a force nearly twice their number, reaching nearly 1.8 million men by the outset of Operation Spanner on 21 November. Four fronts were arrayed against Army Group North and Finland: the Karelian Front, the Leningrad Front, and the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts, commanded respectively by General of the Army Aleksandr Vasilevsky, General Aleksandr Novikov, General Harry Haywood, and Marshal Semyon Timoshenko.
Ending the Siege of Leningrad had been a major war aim since for nearly three years. On three prior occasions, operational plans were scrapped by changing conditions. But now the German invaders were exhausted and on the backfoot.
The initial overture began with one of the largest strategic bombing campaigns of the war. The American 4th Air Army and the Soviet 8th Air Army began a three month long campaign of destruction over Sweden and Finland. The long-range B-23 Superfortresses delivered large payloads to the centers of Swedish industry and iron export. B-18 twin-engine bombers struck railroad hubs and supply dumps in the Finnish country side.
The campaign was intense enough to concern the inner circles of the Nazi government. Swedish iron exports began dropping precipitously under the combined weight of bombing and sea mine deployment. At Hitler’s insistence, several squadrons worth of new high altitude Ta 190D fighters were loaned to the Swedish Air Force, along with personnel to assist in training and maintenance.
The diluting of the Luftwaffe’s air defense capabilities proved deeply unpopular in the service itself. Already pressed by the Anglo-American bombing campaign of the Rhineland industrial areas, some were finally coming to the all too late realization that the war was not progressing exactly according to Germany’s favor.
While discontent simmered on the home front and in the military establishment of Germany, Comintern preparations for Operation Luna continued. In the early morning hours of 12 December 1943, pioneer teams cleared paths through minefields. In the bitter cold, Revolutionary Army commandos began infiltration attacks. By the time the thundering mass of guns and screeching rockets startled the Axis defenders awake, the attack had already been under way for hours.
Three days later, the Karelian Front joined the offensive, spoiling counterattack preparations by the Finnish Second Army. While the Finnish/Swedish coalition was somewhat better prepared strategically, they suffered from severe deficiencies in armor support and anti-tank capability, which General Vasilevsky mercilessly exploited.
After three and a half long years of suffering, the Comintern had finally achieved mastery of the battlefield, made possible by earnest, effective cooperation between Soviet and American forces. The Comintern military achieved proficiency in both the operational art as well as the tactical battlefield. For the first time in the war, they achieved multi Front cooperation in a decisive offensive posture, enabled by the smooth cooperation of combined arms elements in the multi-national coalition army.
The German Heer and even the Waffen-SS remained tactically proficient, but as in previous campaigns they were paralyzed by a lack of appreciation for the operational art. The readiness of German formations, to say nothing of their allies, had depreciated considerably from the high watermark of the previous year. Shortages of experienced officers and NCOs were combined by shortages in war materiel. And in the case of Operation Spanner, Volksmarschall Dietrich’s leadership proved to be clumsy and foolhardy.
Dietrich owed his position to his political zeal and reliability, not his military acumen. A common rumor among the recalcitrant brass of the Wehrmacht was that Dietrich didn’t even know how to read a map. This was an exaggeration; Dietrich was certainly promoted well above his level of competency, and had enjoyed some reputation for ability due to his nature for adventurism and risk-taking. But in the defensive campaign against a determined foe that held the advantage in military intelligence, it lead to Army Group North being led around by the nose by Stavka representative General of the Army Georgy Zhukov.
On Christmas Day, the 1st Baltic Front cleared the last of the German occupiers from the Moscow-Leningrad railway. At last, the Germans had been pushed from their stranglehold around the city. Comintern forces continued to press onwards against Army Group North. While Dietrich yielded ground stubbornly, he could not resist the relentless mass of offensive firepower bring brought to bear. On 5 January 1944, the first Soviet units crossed the border into Reichskommisariat Ostland, formerly the Republic of Estonia.
In Karelia, the Finnish-Swedish coalition had the advantage of more favorable defensive terrain. But they too could not stop the massive host that had been shifted northward. As 1944 dawned, the last toe-hold on Lake Lagoda, held by the Swedish 8th Infantry Division, had been lost.
With Karelia lost and any hope of regaining it now a forgotten dream, talk of a separate peace began to stir in the Finish government. In spite of their alliance with Germany and Sweden, the country still adhered to the norms of republican government. The continuation of the alliance was becoming increasingly difficult, especially amidst the wide publicization of Axis crimes against humanity in their occupation areas of the Soviet Union.
Outcome
Operation Spanner would prove to be a major Comintern victory. As complicated as the operation was, spread along a broad front from Karelia almost to northern Byelorussia, the counteroffensive shattered the myth of German martial superiority. In spite of the considerable defensive preparations undertaken in the previous months by Army Group North, the Comintern military was able to forcibly evict them from occupied Soviet territory.
From the beginning of the offensive, the Comintern Army Air Force enjoyed aerial superiority. In most sectors, Comintern fighter aircraft achieved a 2:1 numerical superiority. Numerous German aces were lost trying to stem the tide of Su-6 “Frog” attackers, including the boy wonder Hauptmann Erich Hartmann. The Luftwaffe could do little to disrupt the sequence of Comintern attacks, with so many of their ground attackers being shot down or chased off before they could complete their sorties. Meanwhile, American and Soviet fighters and bombers could range freely, disrupting both combat units as well as the logistical support network.
Army Group North itself was savaged. Nearly a thousand armored fighting vehicles would be knocked out in two and a half months of fighting. Over one sixth of their number would be irretrievable causalities: one hundred eighteen thousand German and Baltic soldiers were killed or captured. A further eighty thousand would be wounded or sick in the campaign.
Victory was still bittersweet. Seventy-five thousand American and Soviet soldiers died in the offensive, a further twelve thousand missing or captured. One hundred fifty thousand men and women were wounded facing Army Group North.
The Finnish/Swedish coalition lost thirty thousand soldiers killed or captured, and another fifty thousand wounded, versus twenty thousand Comintern dead or captured, and thirty thousand wounded.
The lifting of the Siege of Leningrad resulted in jubilation across the entirety of the Comintern. The horror stories of death, starvation, pestilence and cannibalism brought on by the siege had filled newspapers and newsreels for the past three years