Nasser never recognized Israel IRL. He was certainly quite pragmatic regarding alliances however.
The Footprint of Mussolini - TL
In a future Middle Eastern War, I would think the RA would not drop atomics on a city but possibly military targets like units in the field, marshalling areas and so on. If it hits civilians...oh well. I would think they would reach for chemical and other weapons first however.
I doubt that RA is using nukes against military formations. It would be quiet impractical when them can be destroyed by conventional weapons. And there would be same problem as nuking of cities. Too close of Turkey, Israel and British controlled areas. Not sure if even Italians are willingful to use chemical or biological weapons soon after WW2. Italian fascists are ruthless and sometimes do really horrible things but they are not Nazi level maniacs. But Aflaq in other hand... He won't hesistate use any weapons what him has.
That's really the crux of the matter. All the debate here so far has been with an implied "Italian First Use" in mind. When in truth what Italy and it's Allies are:
a) Willing to do in the upcoming war against the Arabs
b) Able to get away with without becoming Persona non Grata in the West and other neutral countries
hinges a lot what Aflaq does.
If the Arabs start the war by unleashing a Rocket Chemical Weapons barrage against Israeli cities (and against some Turkish "Faith-Traitors" cities for good measure) that will bring about a massive shifting of the "acceptable response" goalposts, than if they keep it conventional.
The one line they wont cross is nuking Mecca and Medina. No practical reason to do so when millions of non-Arab Muslim have no dog in this fight unless you do so. What I could see is the Sauds loosing Mecca and Medina to an insert diplo-speak for indefinite Turkish occupation.
When and if Alfac gets and uses nuclear weaponry is the day TTL realizes why in OTL the cold war stayed cold. You can"t unring the bell and once one side starts using nukes the other will feel perfectly justified using their own which is only going to see the Middle east bathed in nuclear fire.
Alfaq hardly has nukes and I haven't even claim that him would has nukes. But surely him has tons of biological and chemical weapons.
Sorry misread your post. But the point still stands even if its "just" chemical/biological weapons Aflac can't unring a bell.
I doubt he really does. The Arab Alliance has not that much of the structures needed to produce those in really massive ways, and almost no one except maybe the Soviets is going to be willing to sell them the needed hardware.
Some gas (like phosgene for instance)?. Well, perhaps. Massive WMD reserves and ability to use them ? Probably not.
The Soviets did not give Mao nukes, I can't see them giving Aflaq any support in that department either. Trust issues aside any nukes they gave him would weaken their arsenal by that much in the bargain. As for investing the USSR is climbing out of a deep hole, they aren't going to give Aflaq more than they have too.
No sure what bio weapons were available in this time and what the UAR could make or buy.
Chemical weapons though? I could see that. It would certainly be a way for him to rake up civilian body counts even if his offenses are stopped short. Propaganda wise it would be simplicity for his allies to cast him as the next Himmler. Building on peoples fears that he has worse in store so they must "...crush him with all possible haste, before he can ready and unleash still greater terror weapons upon our allies!"
No sure what bio weapons were available in this time and what the UAR could make or buy.
Chemical weapons though? I could see that. It would certainly be a way for him to rake up civilian body counts even if his offenses are stopped short. Propaganda wise it would be simplicity for his allies to cast him as the next Himmler. Building on peoples fears that he has worse in store so they must "...crush him with all possible haste, before he can ready and unleash still greater terror weapons upon our allies!"
Intermission - Korea
Hello again, today we will give a look over what is going to happen in an unified, Red Korea. As usual contribution of Sorairo was essential. Enjoy!
When the Soviet armies crossed the Yalu river in early March of 1945 after obliterating the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, the Japanese administration collapsed without noticeable opposition. Flocks of Korean rebels secured their cities alongside the Red Army in their homeland. At the end of the month, Pusan was freed, ending Japanese dominion over the peninsula - the island of Cheju would be evacuated after the Japanese unconditional surrender.
Now, at the time of liberation, the Korean resistance wasn’t entirely compact. While Socialist and Communist ideals were prominent, not everyone was buoyed by them. At the same time, there was divergence between the same Korean Communists, especially between the more rural ones of the North, more influenced by the USSR, and the more urbanized ones in the South that were more autonomous from the Soviets.
In the former group, there emerged the figure of Kim il-Sung. He became prominent in the Korean Communists and performed some successful guerrilla actions, though at the start of 1940 he was forced to escape to the USSR, making a career in the Red Army while refining his ideals towards mainstream Stalinism. Whether it was for true belief or convenience, historians still debate on it. Kim returned with the Soviets in Korea, hailed by Soviet propaganda as a war hero, the “Red Tiger” (Tigers being the national animals of Korea and Kim was labelled in Japanese black lists as a tiger), gaining great popularity at his return.
However, Kim’s position was far from being secure in Korea, and in all honesty he wasn’t even the a certain choice for Stalin for leading the country. The Soviet leader, who grew wary of Mao’s autonomy in China – the Soviets failing to exercise a full control on him and the Chinese Communists – considered the option of installing a more moderate leader instead to one considered more loyal to Moscow (considering that the concept of loyalty was very loose to Stalin). The Soviets were initially more interested in Cho Man-Sik, a Christian nationalist who managed to negotiate the surrender of the city of Pyongyang before the Red Army’s arrival and establishing a local People’s committee. Now, local committees would be established successful across all of Korea, speeding the transfer of authority from Japanese to Korean control and also allowing the latter to better cooperate among themselves and the Soviets. Unlike what happened in Poland, the Red Army was welcomed by the committees and ready to cooperate with them, and this would speed the construction of the new nation during the year.
Meanwhile, in the South emerged the figure of Lyuh Woon-hyung, who successfully built the Korean restoration brotherhood in 1944, an underground network which in the wake of the Japanese collapse took control of the region. Lyuh, while a firm believer in Communism and willing to cooperate with the Soviets, would position himself more on the centre-left. Cho wasn’t Communist, yet he was willing to accept Korea as a Socialist nation and govern it… on his own terms, hence keeping autonomy from Moscow. When he would oppose the Soviet proposal (in truth an imposition) to keep Korea under an UN sanctioned trust of the USSR for four years at least, Stalin would decide to totally support Kim, who was favourable to the trust.
The People’s Republic of Korea was proclaimed in Pyongyang the 15th April of 1945, after over a week of negotiations, with Kim becoming interim first minister, Lyuh vice-first minister, and Cho as acting president of the united committees, working as first, temporal legislative body. Elections for the first assembly of the Korean people would be held for the end of the year, while the acting government would represent Korea at the negotiating table.
While the formal creation of the “Worker Party of Korea” ( 조선로동당, Choson Rodongdang) would wait until after the elections, the major factions and parties waited to formalize their union to count themselves in the Assembly. Kim, while having the most important and visible role in the provisional government, and the Soviet support behind him, would face difficulties in contrasting Cho on his political right and in Pyongyang and above all Lyuh positioned in the centre and in the South.
However, Kim would soon find allies in the Korean Communists and exiled returning from China, consolidating his influence in the rural areas nationwide and in the North in general. He would win the general public opinion by handling (also to the help of the Red Army) the return of the Korean workers from Manchuria, mostly being expelled without much regards by Mao in spite of recent official declaration of friendship between China and Korea, wanting to give those jobs to Chinese people.
Kim would place those people to work in the Japanese built factories and power plants, while starting to gather Japanese settlers and officers in prisoner camps without much regards, to expel them soon as peace with Japan was settled. While more moderate factions argued to be more tolerant with the Japanese, Kim wouldn’t give much a damn, playing on the common sentiment of the Koreans against the long Japanese occupation. At the same time, he wouldn’t go farther than a simple note of complaint against Mao, preferring instead to focus over the friendship between the USSR and Korea, something that Stalin was eager to support as a balancing act against Mao. And yet, signs of distrust between Korea and the People’s Republic of China would start to emerge, as Korean-North Chinese relations would prove to be one of the most sensible and weakest points of Kim’s leadership in the Rodongdang.
In October of 1945, the Communist coalition won the elections. Kim’s supporters would claim an unnecessary success, as non-Communist forces were already irrelevant in Korea. On the outcome and what was happening in the country, the most vocal opposition came from Syngman Rhee, westernized and pro-American (living in exile in Washington) nationalist. Rhee, like other Korean anti-communists, was disgusted that his country became (in his eyes) a puppet in hands of the Soviets and was vocal in condemning Wallace for selling Korea to Stalin. Rhee would become an active pro-Patton and Republican supporter, and later would be very active in supporting the Chinese Nationalists in the hope their victory could lead to the invasion and liberation of Korea as well. Disabused of those hopes due to the Korean stance in the war, Rhee would spend the rest of his life attempting to build a democratic or nationalist (depending by the patron he attempted to get periodically, from the British to the Italians and then the Chinese Republicans) Korean government in exile and an underground network.
In December of 1945, the Rodongdang was officially established. While Kim’s Stalinist faction was prominent, there were other relevant factions in the party: the returners from China (the so called Yanan faction who were more friendly towards Mao), Lyuh’s southern moderates, Cho’s Right, and the southern Soviets leaded by Pak Hon-Yong, who managed to pry away enough voters from Lyuh’s base to guarantee Kim a solid support among the Southern Koreans.
Kim during 1946 would manage to establish a Stalinist line, with the support of Pak and the Yanan faction, while planning to undermine his main adversaries, Cho and Lyuh. He would manage to neutralize him, after a heated debate over the definitive seat of the capital, between Pyongyang and Seoul. Kim favoured Pyongyang as it was closer to the USSR, Lyuh wanted Seoul as it was more centrally placed in the country and the Assembly was divided between Northerners and Southerners on the matter. In the end, Cho, despite at the time having a strong support in Pyongyang, would throw his vote on Seoul. Cho took the decision because, as a Korean Christian, he feared for the large Christian community of Pyongyang in case it would have become the effective capital, the city is still called today the “Jerusalem of the East”. He also considered the benefits of an alliance with Lyuh.
Kim considered this an act of defiance from Cho, and therefore would organize a campaign to discredit him, managing to isolate and remove him from his positions, with the tacit silent consensus of Lyuh, mollified by certain concessions and promotions for his faction. Cho attempted to organize his faction, but the right wing of the Rodongdang was soon eradicated. In the meanwhile, Kim’s supporters would gradually take control of Pyongyang, becoming soon his major political stronghold, despite growing diffidence from the Christian population of the city.
With Cho’s political defeat, the party stabilized, with Kim at the top and Lyuh and Pak as his subordinates. Korea would therefore commence its own “path to socialism”, starting by the obvious redistribution of the land to the tiller. With the expulsion of the Japanese, the Rodongdang would easily manage to overcome the resistance of the remnant agrarian elites. After an uncertain start, a more organized agrarian collectivist effort under the guidelines of the first 5 year economic plan launched in 1947 while producing initially modest efforts, would still create a more than sufficient positive agricultural effort, especially in the south. Also, with Soviet benevolence, the Chinese divisions, the Japanese impotence, and using Hokkaido as an operational base, Korean fishermen would practically dominate the surrounding waters, hence tuna and other sea based dishes would become an important part of Korean diet, so the Republic never faced real starvation issues in its early years.
Besides, Soviet help was quite consistent and welcomed, contributing to lifting the Koreans from their more urgent needs. But Kim welcomed above all weapons, tanks, fighters which would be useful for the creation of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) under the leadership of one of his most loyal allies, Choe Yong-gon, and one of the most prepared military officers the Koreans had at disposal. In a few years, with the Red Army’s assistance, the KPA would become a well-trained and powerful force, and in the aftermath of the Chinese war, the second strongest army of the Communist world, as the Chinese PLA, even if remaining numerically superior by state of necessity, never fully recovered from the last conflict.
In 1949, Korea would look into growing worry about the Chinese war, with Mao’s apparent incoming triumph, to then remaining surprised by the PRC’s halted advance due to the Italian military support of the Nationalists, and after that, the American intervention. Kim and the party establishment started to become worried, fearing an escalation and US invasion from Japan; after discussions with Moscow, the Koreans would operate on a line of neutrality in the conflict, while starting to supply the Chinese with resources. However, Mao would soon become more demanding towards the Koreans, especially when the PLA started to lose ground – when the Allied troops started to approach the Yangtze, he practically demanded a direct Korean support, in short, soldiers. In Seoul, a debate in the party over the scale of Korean intervention created new divisions and tensions. Kim, who privately started to have doubts over Mao’s capacities and the PRC’s chances to win the war and certainly not wanting to bring Korea down with him, was intrigued to test the KPA in a large scale war, and in case of success, it would cement his leadership beyond the Korean borders. But Pak and Lyuk had their own reservations and, despite the growing anti-Japanese rhetoric in the Republic, the Korean Communist elite was more wary of the Maoists than of Japan. Also, despite the war being a boon for industrial development in Korea, Mao was stingy on his payments while siphoning away resources more useful to them. In the end, also under direct request of Stalin, the Koreans would send a volunteer army, about 100,000 of their own best soldiers. The KPA’s performance in the war was considered overall satisfactory, and despite losing over a third of their committed forces (additional 50,000 soldiers arrived in a second phase) in the war, the fact to be better equipped and trained than the average PLA division would permit the PRC to get some pyrrhic victories in Central China. However, periodic disagreements with the PLA chain of command would hamper the Korean volunteer Army’s performance in more than an occasion.
When Stalin fell into a coma and the Troika took power in Moscow, wanting to end the war in China they decided to dispose of Mao. They convinced him to come in Russia with the excuse of a meeting inviting also Kim as well. While the Korean leader rested in his embassy, Mao was unceremoniously arrested. The Troika would inform Kim the next day of the detention of the Chinese leader, and despite giving him all the best reassurances possible, the Korean leader would grow wary of the clique in power, asking to seeing Stalin only to receive a firm and stern refusal. It didn’t take much to realize why, when few weeks later the news of the death of the Man of Steel spread across the world. Even if Kim would fly again to Moscow to give his homages, and him being welcomed with all honours, his distrust for the new Soviet leadership was total, believing also they would distance themselves from Stalinist principles. Between 1953 and 1957, Korea slowly asserted its internal authority, including a visit to North Iran, their government suspicious of Khrushchev’s leadership. The Tudeh Party were growing apart from Moscow due to their fear and hatred of Aflaq’s UAR, fearing the Persians would be next after the Jews and European Settlers were cleansed from the region.
If anything else, the events in Moscow would push Kim in develop a proper Korean intelligence service, while wondering if he could be the new torch bearer of Stalinism in case the USSR would eventually proceed towards revisionist guidelines. He wondered too if he could create his own form of Stalinism, cult of personality included. Anyway, the outcome of the Chinese war left the Koreans quite satisfied: China will remain divided in two, and North China was exhausted and impoverished, in debt with them. Jiang’s regime would agree to pay diluted payments, and partially relent Mao’s past actions over Korean manpower working in the PRC. Also, with the Soviets pulling out of the peninsula from good in sign of good will from the Troika, Korea was now fully sovereign of its own actions and its own destinies. It’s often believed among historians that the relative success of the ‘Hermit Kingdom’ of Korea compared to the once glorious China (or rather its Communist representative) would lead to her mental decline throughout the fifties and sixties, and ultimately to her infamous eccentricities.
Kim would plan for 1955, at the plenum of the Rodongdang, an internal political offensive to secure the party’s loyalty for good, full implementation of a personal cult of personality like Stalin, and the presentation of his own branch of Socialism, the so called “Juche” (Self-reliance). But the winds of change in the Soviet Union would sweep into Korea as well. The Rodongdang August plenum of 1955 would become soon a showdown between Kim’s supporters and his main opposition, essentially Lyuk. But, during the political struggle, Pak would arrive to make an alliance with Lyuk, as becoming wary of Kim’s ambitions. Managing to convince the Yanan faction as well, they would put Kim into minority, forcing him into a session of self criticism, and in the end to resign as first minister, Pak taking his place shortly after.
While Kim would remain in the Politburo, his power was diminished by demoting several of his political supporters. But Pak and Lyuk hesitated to give him the coup of grace, to prevent a possible coup from the KPA, where the grip of Choe Yong-gon, now minister of defense, was still strong. But Choe ultimatly accepted the new party majority. Kim however was far from becoming irrelevant. Managing shortly after his defeat in the plenum to become president of the executive committee of Pyongyang (in short his mayor), he would reassert his network of influence in part of the Northern provinces, refining his Juche theory, and leave his imprint to the city, to the point even today is renown as “the realm of the Kims” in Korea. He bided his time, waiting for the events of world history to put him back on top.
‘The Rise of the Red Tiger: the History of the People’s Republic of Korea’ by Shinji Watakane
When the Soviet armies crossed the Yalu river in early March of 1945 after obliterating the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, the Japanese administration collapsed without noticeable opposition. Flocks of Korean rebels secured their cities alongside the Red Army in their homeland. At the end of the month, Pusan was freed, ending Japanese dominion over the peninsula - the island of Cheju would be evacuated after the Japanese unconditional surrender.
Now, at the time of liberation, the Korean resistance wasn’t entirely compact. While Socialist and Communist ideals were prominent, not everyone was buoyed by them. At the same time, there was divergence between the same Korean Communists, especially between the more rural ones of the North, more influenced by the USSR, and the more urbanized ones in the South that were more autonomous from the Soviets.
In the former group, there emerged the figure of Kim il-Sung. He became prominent in the Korean Communists and performed some successful guerrilla actions, though at the start of 1940 he was forced to escape to the USSR, making a career in the Red Army while refining his ideals towards mainstream Stalinism. Whether it was for true belief or convenience, historians still debate on it. Kim returned with the Soviets in Korea, hailed by Soviet propaganda as a war hero, the “Red Tiger” (Tigers being the national animals of Korea and Kim was labelled in Japanese black lists as a tiger), gaining great popularity at his return.
However, Kim’s position was far from being secure in Korea, and in all honesty he wasn’t even the a certain choice for Stalin for leading the country. The Soviet leader, who grew wary of Mao’s autonomy in China – the Soviets failing to exercise a full control on him and the Chinese Communists – considered the option of installing a more moderate leader instead to one considered more loyal to Moscow (considering that the concept of loyalty was very loose to Stalin). The Soviets were initially more interested in Cho Man-Sik, a Christian nationalist who managed to negotiate the surrender of the city of Pyongyang before the Red Army’s arrival and establishing a local People’s committee. Now, local committees would be established successful across all of Korea, speeding the transfer of authority from Japanese to Korean control and also allowing the latter to better cooperate among themselves and the Soviets. Unlike what happened in Poland, the Red Army was welcomed by the committees and ready to cooperate with them, and this would speed the construction of the new nation during the year.
Meanwhile, in the South emerged the figure of Lyuh Woon-hyung, who successfully built the Korean restoration brotherhood in 1944, an underground network which in the wake of the Japanese collapse took control of the region. Lyuh, while a firm believer in Communism and willing to cooperate with the Soviets, would position himself more on the centre-left. Cho wasn’t Communist, yet he was willing to accept Korea as a Socialist nation and govern it… on his own terms, hence keeping autonomy from Moscow. When he would oppose the Soviet proposal (in truth an imposition) to keep Korea under an UN sanctioned trust of the USSR for four years at least, Stalin would decide to totally support Kim, who was favourable to the trust.
The People’s Republic of Korea was proclaimed in Pyongyang the 15th April of 1945, after over a week of negotiations, with Kim becoming interim first minister, Lyuh vice-first minister, and Cho as acting president of the united committees, working as first, temporal legislative body. Elections for the first assembly of the Korean people would be held for the end of the year, while the acting government would represent Korea at the negotiating table.
While the formal creation of the “Worker Party of Korea” ( 조선로동당, Choson Rodongdang) would wait until after the elections, the major factions and parties waited to formalize their union to count themselves in the Assembly. Kim, while having the most important and visible role in the provisional government, and the Soviet support behind him, would face difficulties in contrasting Cho on his political right and in Pyongyang and above all Lyuh positioned in the centre and in the South.
However, Kim would soon find allies in the Korean Communists and exiled returning from China, consolidating his influence in the rural areas nationwide and in the North in general. He would win the general public opinion by handling (also to the help of the Red Army) the return of the Korean workers from Manchuria, mostly being expelled without much regards by Mao in spite of recent official declaration of friendship between China and Korea, wanting to give those jobs to Chinese people.
Kim would place those people to work in the Japanese built factories and power plants, while starting to gather Japanese settlers and officers in prisoner camps without much regards, to expel them soon as peace with Japan was settled. While more moderate factions argued to be more tolerant with the Japanese, Kim wouldn’t give much a damn, playing on the common sentiment of the Koreans against the long Japanese occupation. At the same time, he wouldn’t go farther than a simple note of complaint against Mao, preferring instead to focus over the friendship between the USSR and Korea, something that Stalin was eager to support as a balancing act against Mao. And yet, signs of distrust between Korea and the People’s Republic of China would start to emerge, as Korean-North Chinese relations would prove to be one of the most sensible and weakest points of Kim’s leadership in the Rodongdang.
In October of 1945, the Communist coalition won the elections. Kim’s supporters would claim an unnecessary success, as non-Communist forces were already irrelevant in Korea. On the outcome and what was happening in the country, the most vocal opposition came from Syngman Rhee, westernized and pro-American (living in exile in Washington) nationalist. Rhee, like other Korean anti-communists, was disgusted that his country became (in his eyes) a puppet in hands of the Soviets and was vocal in condemning Wallace for selling Korea to Stalin. Rhee would become an active pro-Patton and Republican supporter, and later would be very active in supporting the Chinese Nationalists in the hope their victory could lead to the invasion and liberation of Korea as well. Disabused of those hopes due to the Korean stance in the war, Rhee would spend the rest of his life attempting to build a democratic or nationalist (depending by the patron he attempted to get periodically, from the British to the Italians and then the Chinese Republicans) Korean government in exile and an underground network.
In December of 1945, the Rodongdang was officially established. While Kim’s Stalinist faction was prominent, there were other relevant factions in the party: the returners from China (the so called Yanan faction who were more friendly towards Mao), Lyuh’s southern moderates, Cho’s Right, and the southern Soviets leaded by Pak Hon-Yong, who managed to pry away enough voters from Lyuh’s base to guarantee Kim a solid support among the Southern Koreans.
Kim during 1946 would manage to establish a Stalinist line, with the support of Pak and the Yanan faction, while planning to undermine his main adversaries, Cho and Lyuh. He would manage to neutralize him, after a heated debate over the definitive seat of the capital, between Pyongyang and Seoul. Kim favoured Pyongyang as it was closer to the USSR, Lyuh wanted Seoul as it was more centrally placed in the country and the Assembly was divided between Northerners and Southerners on the matter. In the end, Cho, despite at the time having a strong support in Pyongyang, would throw his vote on Seoul. Cho took the decision because, as a Korean Christian, he feared for the large Christian community of Pyongyang in case it would have become the effective capital, the city is still called today the “Jerusalem of the East”. He also considered the benefits of an alliance with Lyuh.
Kim considered this an act of defiance from Cho, and therefore would organize a campaign to discredit him, managing to isolate and remove him from his positions, with the tacit silent consensus of Lyuh, mollified by certain concessions and promotions for his faction. Cho attempted to organize his faction, but the right wing of the Rodongdang was soon eradicated. In the meanwhile, Kim’s supporters would gradually take control of Pyongyang, becoming soon his major political stronghold, despite growing diffidence from the Christian population of the city.
With Cho’s political defeat, the party stabilized, with Kim at the top and Lyuh and Pak as his subordinates. Korea would therefore commence its own “path to socialism”, starting by the obvious redistribution of the land to the tiller. With the expulsion of the Japanese, the Rodongdang would easily manage to overcome the resistance of the remnant agrarian elites. After an uncertain start, a more organized agrarian collectivist effort under the guidelines of the first 5 year economic plan launched in 1947 while producing initially modest efforts, would still create a more than sufficient positive agricultural effort, especially in the south. Also, with Soviet benevolence, the Chinese divisions, the Japanese impotence, and using Hokkaido as an operational base, Korean fishermen would practically dominate the surrounding waters, hence tuna and other sea based dishes would become an important part of Korean diet, so the Republic never faced real starvation issues in its early years.
Besides, Soviet help was quite consistent and welcomed, contributing to lifting the Koreans from their more urgent needs. But Kim welcomed above all weapons, tanks, fighters which would be useful for the creation of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) under the leadership of one of his most loyal allies, Choe Yong-gon, and one of the most prepared military officers the Koreans had at disposal. In a few years, with the Red Army’s assistance, the KPA would become a well-trained and powerful force, and in the aftermath of the Chinese war, the second strongest army of the Communist world, as the Chinese PLA, even if remaining numerically superior by state of necessity, never fully recovered from the last conflict.
In 1949, Korea would look into growing worry about the Chinese war, with Mao’s apparent incoming triumph, to then remaining surprised by the PRC’s halted advance due to the Italian military support of the Nationalists, and after that, the American intervention. Kim and the party establishment started to become worried, fearing an escalation and US invasion from Japan; after discussions with Moscow, the Koreans would operate on a line of neutrality in the conflict, while starting to supply the Chinese with resources. However, Mao would soon become more demanding towards the Koreans, especially when the PLA started to lose ground – when the Allied troops started to approach the Yangtze, he practically demanded a direct Korean support, in short, soldiers. In Seoul, a debate in the party over the scale of Korean intervention created new divisions and tensions. Kim, who privately started to have doubts over Mao’s capacities and the PRC’s chances to win the war and certainly not wanting to bring Korea down with him, was intrigued to test the KPA in a large scale war, and in case of success, it would cement his leadership beyond the Korean borders. But Pak and Lyuk had their own reservations and, despite the growing anti-Japanese rhetoric in the Republic, the Korean Communist elite was more wary of the Maoists than of Japan. Also, despite the war being a boon for industrial development in Korea, Mao was stingy on his payments while siphoning away resources more useful to them. In the end, also under direct request of Stalin, the Koreans would send a volunteer army, about 100,000 of their own best soldiers. The KPA’s performance in the war was considered overall satisfactory, and despite losing over a third of their committed forces (additional 50,000 soldiers arrived in a second phase) in the war, the fact to be better equipped and trained than the average PLA division would permit the PRC to get some pyrrhic victories in Central China. However, periodic disagreements with the PLA chain of command would hamper the Korean volunteer Army’s performance in more than an occasion.
When Stalin fell into a coma and the Troika took power in Moscow, wanting to end the war in China they decided to dispose of Mao. They convinced him to come in Russia with the excuse of a meeting inviting also Kim as well. While the Korean leader rested in his embassy, Mao was unceremoniously arrested. The Troika would inform Kim the next day of the detention of the Chinese leader, and despite giving him all the best reassurances possible, the Korean leader would grow wary of the clique in power, asking to seeing Stalin only to receive a firm and stern refusal. It didn’t take much to realize why, when few weeks later the news of the death of the Man of Steel spread across the world. Even if Kim would fly again to Moscow to give his homages, and him being welcomed with all honours, his distrust for the new Soviet leadership was total, believing also they would distance themselves from Stalinist principles. Between 1953 and 1957, Korea slowly asserted its internal authority, including a visit to North Iran, their government suspicious of Khrushchev’s leadership. The Tudeh Party were growing apart from Moscow due to their fear and hatred of Aflaq’s UAR, fearing the Persians would be next after the Jews and European Settlers were cleansed from the region.
If anything else, the events in Moscow would push Kim in develop a proper Korean intelligence service, while wondering if he could be the new torch bearer of Stalinism in case the USSR would eventually proceed towards revisionist guidelines. He wondered too if he could create his own form of Stalinism, cult of personality included. Anyway, the outcome of the Chinese war left the Koreans quite satisfied: China will remain divided in two, and North China was exhausted and impoverished, in debt with them. Jiang’s regime would agree to pay diluted payments, and partially relent Mao’s past actions over Korean manpower working in the PRC. Also, with the Soviets pulling out of the peninsula from good in sign of good will from the Troika, Korea was now fully sovereign of its own actions and its own destinies. It’s often believed among historians that the relative success of the ‘Hermit Kingdom’ of Korea compared to the once glorious China (or rather its Communist representative) would lead to her mental decline throughout the fifties and sixties, and ultimately to her infamous eccentricities.
Kim would plan for 1955, at the plenum of the Rodongdang, an internal political offensive to secure the party’s loyalty for good, full implementation of a personal cult of personality like Stalin, and the presentation of his own branch of Socialism, the so called “Juche” (Self-reliance). But the winds of change in the Soviet Union would sweep into Korea as well. The Rodongdang August plenum of 1955 would become soon a showdown between Kim’s supporters and his main opposition, essentially Lyuk. But, during the political struggle, Pak would arrive to make an alliance with Lyuk, as becoming wary of Kim’s ambitions. Managing to convince the Yanan faction as well, they would put Kim into minority, forcing him into a session of self criticism, and in the end to resign as first minister, Pak taking his place shortly after.
While Kim would remain in the Politburo, his power was diminished by demoting several of his political supporters. But Pak and Lyuk hesitated to give him the coup of grace, to prevent a possible coup from the KPA, where the grip of Choe Yong-gon, now minister of defense, was still strong. But Choe ultimatly accepted the new party majority. Kim however was far from becoming irrelevant. Managing shortly after his defeat in the plenum to become president of the executive committee of Pyongyang (in short his mayor), he would reassert his network of influence in part of the Northern provinces, refining his Juche theory, and leave his imprint to the city, to the point even today is renown as “the realm of the Kims” in Korea. He bided his time, waiting for the events of world history to put him back on top.
Surprisingly quite reasonable in Communist standard. There's not even a large scale atrocity happened, quite refreshing seeing what happened to many other Communist countries ITTL and Nork OTL
Well it is often stated an unified Korea would be a true Asiatic power, economically, industrially, and militarly. With TTL China messed up, the USSR looking to themselves, and Japan slightly more weak because, no Hokkaido, Korean ascension would be inevitable in the Far East.
Also, I wish to say Koreans were aligning generally towards Communism both in the South and in the North, it was only due to American meddling in 1945 that the Southern Communists were crushed because at Potsdam was decided so. Here, Kim would have to deal with the Southerners, hence new internal dynamics came into place which he wasn't able to fully control.
When Korea is more prosperous, Kim is not such strongman as in OTL and Korea is not such paranoid "hermit kingdom" this might mean that Kim Il-sung is not succeeded by his son assuming that Communist Korea survives so long and remain as Communist after Kim's death.
This Korea might too get nuclear bomb earlier than in OTL.
This Korea might too get nuclear bomb earlier than in OTL.
With the mess the PRC remnant is in TTLs DPRK might eventually start having designs about "Restoring the ancestral lands of Goguryeo stolen by Chinese Imperialism to the People of Korea". Especially if this DPRK follows OTL Chinas path about economic success combined with The Party maintaining their grip on power.
That might be intresting when communist nation put claim over another communist nation. Just wondering if Nixon becomes president after JPK would he increase relationships with Korea like he did with PRC in OTL.
I'm not saying it's assured, but considering OTL Sino-Soviet relations during the Cold War it's hardly impossible either IMHO.