Newest of the Empires: Bolshevik Russia and the Soviet Union, 1920 - 1935
The New Soviet Man: Nikolai Bukharin at around the time of the implementation of the New Economic Policy in 1931
Following their seizure of power in 1917, the Bolsheviks had been forced to deal with rebellious forces at home and a hostile international climate. Leon Trotsky, in his capacity as Commissar for Foreign Affairs (and de facto head of the military) lead the new regime successfully through the resulting civil war (generally dated 1917-1919 but sporadic fighting would continue in the east until c.1922), all the while keeping Russia in the Great War (albeit that they acted more as an army in being in 1917-18 rather than an actual military threat) and currying favour with international regimes. Trotsky’s aims for the Great War was to dismember the Hohenzollern and Habsburg empires into small republics which were ripe for the anticipated world revolution. Although this objective was partially accomplished by the Treaty of Paris, the resulting Russian-backed revolutions in eastern Europe all failed and resulted in Trotsky being removed from his position at the 10th Party Congress in 1921 and packaged off as governor of Nenets Province.
The 10th Party Congress was also significant for another reason, namely the passing of two important motions: ‘On the Management of the Free Market’; and ‘On Internal Disagreements.’ The first motion adopted a policy of what was labelled (derisively by some) as “market socialism”, which foresaw a role for entrepreneurs and markets in trade and pricing. Rather than requisitioning agricultural surpluses according to centralised dictat (as had been the case previously), peasants were allowed to sell these on the open market. Furthermore, while what Lenin termed the “commanding heights” of the economy - i.e. heavy industry and banking - remained nationalised, market socialism loosened direct controls and empowered managers to make their own economic decisions. Meanwhile, the second motion relaxed some of the restrictions on factionalism within the party, recognising that reliance on the genius of one man (Trotsky) without sufficient space for reasonable critique had lead the country to foreign policy failure in 1918-22. Although there was no question of there being alternative parties or public policy debate, internal factions now had somewhat more room to maneuver freely.
The adoption of market socialism empowered Nikolai Bukharin, who became its foremost supporter, but Lenin remained firmly in control of the government and, after his incapacitation by a stroke in 1922, so did the triumvirate of Lev Kamenev, Grigory Zinoviev and Joseph Stalin. At the 13th Party Congress, the first held after Lenin’s death in 1924, Lenin’s final will and testament was read, in which the deceased leader urged his former comrades to remove Stalin. For some time, it seemed that Stalin’s fate hung in the balance but, in the end, the intervention against him by the head of the Cheka, Feliz Dzerzhinsky, proved decisive. Stalin and his cronies (Anastas Mikoyan and Sergo Ordzhonikidze - forming the so-called Gang of Three) were arrested and blamed for the excesses of the first near-decade of Bolshevik government.
For the remainder of this period, Bukharin was the driving force behind the Russian government (re-named and re-organised as the Soviet Union in 1927), although he did not hold either of the key positions of either General Secretary or Premier. His influence within the party led the country to significant economic reforms, including the loosening of state control over the sale of land and the opening up so-called ‘Enterprise Zones’ in areas where certain key industries were located. The most successful of these Enterprise Zones was located in Petrograd, which soon became home to numerous British bankers and German industrialists. Trotsky returned to government following the Gang of Three’s fall in 1924, serving as Foreign Secretary again. Under his guidance, relations improved on Russia’s Caucasus border with Turkey and they became especially close with Germany (as emphasised by the substantial involvement of German industry in the Soviet economy by 1930). Trotsky also managed to maintain an uneasy peace with Poland, which was threatened by the nationalist government of Jozef Pilsudski, who periodically advanced claims to Russian Poland.
Although the Soviet Union was the world’s only communist country, it was still a player in international trade and could not help but be buffeted by the financial crisis of 1929-30. At first, the government seems to have trusted its managed command economy to ride out the global crisis but continued balance of payments issues and depletion of foreign currency reserves forced a change of plan in September 1931. Bukharin’s old ally Alexei Rykov was removed from his post as General Secretary as the party resolved to adopt what came to be called the ‘New Economic Policy’ or ‘NEP’ for short. The NEP revolved around widespread government investment in heavy industry, designed to make the Soviet Union industrially self-sufficient. The uninspired but diligent Vyacheslav Molotov was appointed General Secretary to oversee the administration of this mammoth task.
The NEP was explicitly designed following research on the industrial revolutions in Britain and the United States and, in many senses, it proved the advantages of, on its own terms, a planned economy: that they can copy a pre-existing path or catch up economically faster than a market economy could. The amount of industrial, capital and consumer goods produced in the Soviet Union exploded by over 100% in the first five years of NEP, pushing the country further and faster down its road to becoming an economic and industrial superpower. Attempts were made to move the country’s economic centre of gravity away from just the older centres of Petrograd and Moscow, with factories being set up east of the Urals where none had existed before.
However, despite being a success in blunt economic and GDP terms, the NEP also unleashed a number of catastrophes which Soviet planners did not anticipate (although they probably should have). The drive for urbanisation lead to, in many cases, the unwilling transfer of whole rural communities to local cities in order to work in new factories. This, along with more willing migration, left a severe shortfall of manpower in important food-producing districts like the Ukraine and, in turn, lead to crops not being collected (the NEP had concentrated on industrial improvements and Soviet agriculture remained largely reliant on traditional methods despite some improvements under market socialism) and cities not receiving sufficient food. In an attempt to solve this problem, the army was deployed to ‘help’ with the harvest and requisition foodstuffs to feed the cities. However, this succeeded only in riling up the peasantry and created widespread discontent in the Ukraine and the Don River region that, by the autumn and winter of 1933, was almost akin to a full-scale uprising by Tartar, Cossack and Ukrainian communities. Although the situation was smoothed over by spring 1934, the long-term damage had been done and in 1934 a bad harvest combined with the failures of the previous year to cause a famine that is estimated to have killed up to 2,000,000 people across the Soviet Union. This, combined with the fact that many of the migrants to cities were young men, lead to an overall drop in the Soviet population.
In its attempt to achieve the best parts of Anglo industrialisation, it was clear that the Soviet Union had failed to avoid the worst part and Bukharin abruptly called a halt to the NEP in July 1934. The Premier Valerian Kuybyshev paid for his maladroit handling of the crisis with his job and was replaced by Arkady Rosengolts (even though, as Premier, his remit was more closely involved in foreign policy and geopolitics than domestic economic policy). A hasty agreement was struck with the Commonwealth to allow imports of Canadian grains and Australian and New Zealand meats over the winter of 1934-35 but the short-term damage to the regime was done. In March 1935, large protests formed in Moscow and Petrograd formed, scathingly throwing the Bolsheviks’ old motto of “Peace, Bread, Land” back at the government. Although the Politburo seems to have initially considered conciliation, they eventually declared martial law in April and forcibly dispersed the protestors. In the subsequent reprisals (known colloquially as “Bukharin’s Purge”) approximately 50,000 people are estimated to have been arrested and a further 15,000 executed, while hundreds were probably killed or wounded during the initial dispersals.
Premiers of the Russian Republic/Soviet Union (after 1927)
People’s Commissar for Finance
The New Soviet Man: Nikolai Bukharin at around the time of the implementation of the New Economic Policy in 1931
Following their seizure of power in 1917, the Bolsheviks had been forced to deal with rebellious forces at home and a hostile international climate. Leon Trotsky, in his capacity as Commissar for Foreign Affairs (and de facto head of the military) lead the new regime successfully through the resulting civil war (generally dated 1917-1919 but sporadic fighting would continue in the east until c.1922), all the while keeping Russia in the Great War (albeit that they acted more as an army in being in 1917-18 rather than an actual military threat) and currying favour with international regimes. Trotsky’s aims for the Great War was to dismember the Hohenzollern and Habsburg empires into small republics which were ripe for the anticipated world revolution. Although this objective was partially accomplished by the Treaty of Paris, the resulting Russian-backed revolutions in eastern Europe all failed and resulted in Trotsky being removed from his position at the 10th Party Congress in 1921 and packaged off as governor of Nenets Province.
The 10th Party Congress was also significant for another reason, namely the passing of two important motions: ‘On the Management of the Free Market’; and ‘On Internal Disagreements.’ The first motion adopted a policy of what was labelled (derisively by some) as “market socialism”, which foresaw a role for entrepreneurs and markets in trade and pricing. Rather than requisitioning agricultural surpluses according to centralised dictat (as had been the case previously), peasants were allowed to sell these on the open market. Furthermore, while what Lenin termed the “commanding heights” of the economy - i.e. heavy industry and banking - remained nationalised, market socialism loosened direct controls and empowered managers to make their own economic decisions. Meanwhile, the second motion relaxed some of the restrictions on factionalism within the party, recognising that reliance on the genius of one man (Trotsky) without sufficient space for reasonable critique had lead the country to foreign policy failure in 1918-22. Although there was no question of there being alternative parties or public policy debate, internal factions now had somewhat more room to maneuver freely.
The adoption of market socialism empowered Nikolai Bukharin, who became its foremost supporter, but Lenin remained firmly in control of the government and, after his incapacitation by a stroke in 1922, so did the triumvirate of Lev Kamenev, Grigory Zinoviev and Joseph Stalin. At the 13th Party Congress, the first held after Lenin’s death in 1924, Lenin’s final will and testament was read, in which the deceased leader urged his former comrades to remove Stalin. For some time, it seemed that Stalin’s fate hung in the balance but, in the end, the intervention against him by the head of the Cheka, Feliz Dzerzhinsky, proved decisive. Stalin and his cronies (Anastas Mikoyan and Sergo Ordzhonikidze - forming the so-called Gang of Three) were arrested and blamed for the excesses of the first near-decade of Bolshevik government.
For the remainder of this period, Bukharin was the driving force behind the Russian government (re-named and re-organised as the Soviet Union in 1927), although he did not hold either of the key positions of either General Secretary or Premier. His influence within the party led the country to significant economic reforms, including the loosening of state control over the sale of land and the opening up so-called ‘Enterprise Zones’ in areas where certain key industries were located. The most successful of these Enterprise Zones was located in Petrograd, which soon became home to numerous British bankers and German industrialists. Trotsky returned to government following the Gang of Three’s fall in 1924, serving as Foreign Secretary again. Under his guidance, relations improved on Russia’s Caucasus border with Turkey and they became especially close with Germany (as emphasised by the substantial involvement of German industry in the Soviet economy by 1930). Trotsky also managed to maintain an uneasy peace with Poland, which was threatened by the nationalist government of Jozef Pilsudski, who periodically advanced claims to Russian Poland.
Although the Soviet Union was the world’s only communist country, it was still a player in international trade and could not help but be buffeted by the financial crisis of 1929-30. At first, the government seems to have trusted its managed command economy to ride out the global crisis but continued balance of payments issues and depletion of foreign currency reserves forced a change of plan in September 1931. Bukharin’s old ally Alexei Rykov was removed from his post as General Secretary as the party resolved to adopt what came to be called the ‘New Economic Policy’ or ‘NEP’ for short. The NEP revolved around widespread government investment in heavy industry, designed to make the Soviet Union industrially self-sufficient. The uninspired but diligent Vyacheslav Molotov was appointed General Secretary to oversee the administration of this mammoth task.
The NEP was explicitly designed following research on the industrial revolutions in Britain and the United States and, in many senses, it proved the advantages of, on its own terms, a planned economy: that they can copy a pre-existing path or catch up economically faster than a market economy could. The amount of industrial, capital and consumer goods produced in the Soviet Union exploded by over 100% in the first five years of NEP, pushing the country further and faster down its road to becoming an economic and industrial superpower. Attempts were made to move the country’s economic centre of gravity away from just the older centres of Petrograd and Moscow, with factories being set up east of the Urals where none had existed before.
However, despite being a success in blunt economic and GDP terms, the NEP also unleashed a number of catastrophes which Soviet planners did not anticipate (although they probably should have). The drive for urbanisation lead to, in many cases, the unwilling transfer of whole rural communities to local cities in order to work in new factories. This, along with more willing migration, left a severe shortfall of manpower in important food-producing districts like the Ukraine and, in turn, lead to crops not being collected (the NEP had concentrated on industrial improvements and Soviet agriculture remained largely reliant on traditional methods despite some improvements under market socialism) and cities not receiving sufficient food. In an attempt to solve this problem, the army was deployed to ‘help’ with the harvest and requisition foodstuffs to feed the cities. However, this succeeded only in riling up the peasantry and created widespread discontent in the Ukraine and the Don River region that, by the autumn and winter of 1933, was almost akin to a full-scale uprising by Tartar, Cossack and Ukrainian communities. Although the situation was smoothed over by spring 1934, the long-term damage had been done and in 1934 a bad harvest combined with the failures of the previous year to cause a famine that is estimated to have killed up to 2,000,000 people across the Soviet Union. This, combined with the fact that many of the migrants to cities were young men, lead to an overall drop in the Soviet population.
In its attempt to achieve the best parts of Anglo industrialisation, it was clear that the Soviet Union had failed to avoid the worst part and Bukharin abruptly called a halt to the NEP in July 1934. The Premier Valerian Kuybyshev paid for his maladroit handling of the crisis with his job and was replaced by Arkady Rosengolts (even though, as Premier, his remit was more closely involved in foreign policy and geopolitics than domestic economic policy). A hasty agreement was struck with the Commonwealth to allow imports of Canadian grains and Australian and New Zealand meats over the winter of 1934-35 but the short-term damage to the regime was done. In March 1935, large protests formed in Moscow and Petrograd formed, scathingly throwing the Bolsheviks’ old motto of “Peace, Bread, Land” back at the government. Although the Politburo seems to have initially considered conciliation, they eventually declared martial law in April and forcibly dispersed the protestors. In the subsequent reprisals (known colloquially as “Bukharin’s Purge”) approximately 50,000 people are estimated to have been arrested and a further 15,000 executed, while hundreds were probably killed or wounded during the initial dispersals.
Premiers of the Russian Republic/Soviet Union (after 1927)
- Lev Kamenev; May 1922 - December 1929
- Valerain Kuybyshev; December 1929 - July 1934
- Arkady Rosengolts; July 1934 - present
- Joseph Stalin; April 1922 - June 1924
- Alexei Rykov; June 1924 - September 1931
- Vyacheslav Molotov; September 1931 - present
People’s Commissar for Finance
- Nikolai Bukharin; June 1922 - present
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