The Anglo-Saxon Social Model

[lukedalton]

Is it? Shit I misunderstood that and thought it was just the Italian name for the city. Will change.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trentino this is the italian speaking part of Tyrol
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Tyrol this is the southern german speaking of Tyrol gained by Italy in OTL Italy for strategic reason
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_Littoral this include Istria and the city of Trieste and was the Kingdom of Italy eastern border post WWI

Ok, but I still dont understand why the italians left the war so early with so little gains (did they actually gained anything? They didn't even take Trieste). They entered the war really late against a losing Central Powers but with barely any losses they decided practically a white peace? Also Greece in this timeline has a lot more territory than in otl, including many albanian and bulgarians minorities in the north and islands that are of interest for Italian imperialist ans smyrna in the turkish side of the egean. Its weird how these doesnt result in a Italian bulgarian and turkish alliance to "solve" their common interest on Greece. Italy needs that sort of victory, Bulgaria won but there is a lot of ethnic bulgarian outside of it and Serbia and Greece are war weary. The Turks need to win something, and they need space for their millions of refugees, and Smyrna is difficult to defend from the other side of the egean, specially if Italy and Bulgaria do something. Why are the italians acting like this? Is the Royal Navy defending EVERYTHING in the mediterrean and the balkans? I can understand Constantinople staying out of trouble thanks to the royal navy, but why are the italians acting somehow like they were even weaker then otl dispate they amazing conditions they enter the Great War? Why are they not taking advantage of how fresh they are dispate being surrounded by small really war weary states?

Yep, seem that the British way of thinking is: Now we renege our agreement with Italy because even if they have totally delivered what promised and we will send our ships, risking a war, in the middle of an italian lake, near the biggest italian naval bases and in range of their air force and btw they also control the ports of Dures and Vlore so they can close the Adriatic with our fleet entrapped there. All that for shit and giggles as our interes are nowhere menaced by italy gain in the zone and will only bring there to go more friendly with France that at the moment seem not liking our deal with Germany. Yeah why not create an enemy with epocal resentment when there was none before

The Dream of Italy: Class and Political Conflict, 1920-1935

Ok this will be long

- The OTL 'red biennium' was a mix of previous problem and the consequences of the OTL WWI, that were:
1) 651.000 military deaths, 957.000 wounded and almost 600.000 civilian deaths (due to malnutrition and diseases among that the Spanish Influenza)
2) A crippling debt that greatly stopped our economy and we finished to pay in 1970
3) A food situation keep afloat only by american import (costly american import)
4) general resentment for the terrible sufference of the war
5) great numbers of veterans without a job, with military training and greatly dissafection with the enstablishment and the civilian life
6) massive damage to Veneto and Friuli and at least 600.000 refugees
Here we have just a 20.000 deaths and 50.000 wounded, a miniboom during the war years, no massive famine due to the draft of the young men, no resentment due to the treatment of the soldiers or massive decrease of the quality of life of the population.
Sure there will be political violence and strife, but it will nothing like OTL red biennium and nothing that the goverment will not have the capacity to manage, expecially Giolitti that in OTL in much much much more desperate condition basically stopped the communist and by that moment were more than a boogeyman than a real menace

- No, Italy will not green light De Bono operation, for one simple reason, it's already occupy the zone and even more (like Lubjana) and like OTL they simply refuse to leave the occupied zone till an agreement is reached and no, the treaty in Paris will not considered an agreement and no italian goverment will sign it point as it basically renege a previous agreement without reason, it will be more probable that like OTL the italian delegation will leave the conference enraged. Plus blockading the place will like a naval siege of Florida...Italy can simply use train and road to supply and control the entire place, and as i said above, the British fleet are Dead Men Walking if Italy really become hostile.

- Diaz will never reach the position of OTL, he was too young, not enough connected; it was due to his work under Cadorna and the great impression he had done to the rest of the Entente commanders, plus the disaster at Caporetto to get in that position and was a surprise for everyone.

- D'Annunzio is a lousy politician and will have not be capable to organize the fascist party and was seen as a revolutionary unlike someone that can be controlled like Mussolini...in poor words the King will have given the order at the Army to shoots them.
-The Army and the Navy were staunchy monarchist, they will not, in any circumstance allow the formation of a Republic expecially with the name social in her

 

[Some Bloke]

Fascist Italy without Benny the Moose? Popcorn anyone?

 

[Komnenos002]

Ok, but I still dont understand why the italians left the war so early with so little gains (did they actually gained anything? They didn't even take Trieste). They entered the war really late against a losing Central Powers but with barely any losses they decided practically a white peace? Also Greece in this timeline has a lot more territory than in otl, including many albanian and bulgarians minorities in the north and islands that are of interest for Italian imperialist ans smyrna in the turkish side of the egean. Its weird how these doesnt result in a Italian bulgarian and turkish alliance to "solve" their common interest on Greece. Italy needs that sort of victory, Bulgaria won but there is a lot of ethnic bulgarian outside of it and Serbia and Greece are war weary. The Turks need to win something, and they need space for their millions of refugees, and Smyrna is difficult to defend from the other side of the egean, specially if Italy and Bulgaria do something. Why are the italians acting like this? Is the Royal Navy defending EVERYTHING in the mediterrean and the balkans? I can understand Constantinople staying out of trouble thanks to the royal navy, but why are the italians acting somehow like they were even weaker then otl dispate they amazing conditions they enter the Great War? Why are they not taking advantage of how fresh they are dispate being surrounded by small really war weary states?

Please don't quote the entire update when replying.

 

[EnvarKadri]

Please don't quote the entire update when replying.

Ok sorry, I wanted to make clear that I was reacting to the update.

 

[BigBlueBox]

Presidents of the Second American Republic

1. Abraham Lincoln; Republican; March 1881 - March 1889
2. Grover Cleveland; Liberal; March 1889 - March 1893
3. James G. Blaine; Republican; March 1893 - March 1897
4. Moorfield Storey; Liberal; March 1897 - March 1901
5. William McKinley; Republican; March 1901 - March 1905
6. William Jennings Bryan; Liberal; March 1905 - March 1913
7. Theodore Roosevelt; Republican; March 1913 - January 1919
8. Hiram Johnson; Republican; January 1919 - March 1921
9. Leonard Wood; Republican; March 1921 - March 1925
10. W.E.B. Du Bois; Progressive; March 1925 - March 1929
11. Charles Curtis; Republican; March 1929 - January 1933
12. Franklin Roosevelt; Progressive; January 1933 - present

Vice Presidents of the Second American Republic

1. Frederick Douglass; Republican; March 1881 - March 1889
2. John M. Palmer; Liberal; March 1889 - March 1893
3. Booker T. Washington; Republican; March 1893 - March 1897
4. Thomas F. Bayard; Liberal; March 1897 - March 1901
5. Theodore Roosevelt; Republican; March 1901 - March 1905
6. John W. Kern; Liberal; March 1905 - March 1909
7. Woodrow Wilson; Liberal; March 1909 - March 1913
8. Hiram Johnson; Republican; March 1913 - January 1919
9. William Borah; Republican; January 1919 - March 1921
10. Henry Cabot Lodge; Republican; March 1921 - March 1925
11. Al Smith; Progressive; March 1925 - March 1929
12. James Eli Watson; Republican; March 1929 - January 1933
13. Joseph T. Robinson; Progressive; January 1933 - present

Speakers of the Second American Republic

1. John Cresswell; Republican; March 1881 - March 1889
2. Carl Schurz; Liberal; March 1889 - March 1893
3. Octavius Catto; Republican; March 1893 - March 1897
4. William L. Wilson; Liberal; March 1897 - October 1900
5. William C.P. Breckinridge; Liberal; October 1900 - March 1901
6. Archibald Grimke; Republican; March 1901 - March 1905
7. Charles N. Haskell; Liberal; March 1905 - March 1913
8. James Mann; Republican; March 1913 - March 1921
9. Nicholas Longworth; Republican; March 1921 - March 1925
10. Charles W. Chesnutt; Progressive; March 1925 - March 1929
11. Nicholas Longworth; Republican; March 1929 - January 1933
12. Walter F. White; Progressive; January 1933 - present

The term "First American Republic" refers to the Articles of Confederation, and "Second American Republic" refers to America from 1789 onwards, after the Constitution came into effect. If you are trying to imply that a new American Republic was created by Reconstruction, then it should be called the Third American Republic.

 

[Nyvis]

I'm afraid you're right. Bordiga is, as of 1935, living in Paris but Gramsci (who was Secretary of the Interior in Matteotti's short-lived government) was caught up in the reprisals following the coup. I've not decided whether he was imprisoned or just executed (I have a couple of plans for him if the former) but it's not looking great for him rn.

If you kill him, you butterfly some extremely interesting political philosophy writing. I'd be sad.

On the other hand, I want to see what an angry Bordiga does from Paris. OTL he had to be quiet during the fascist years because he remained in Italy or end up the same way Gramsci did. And then developed some pretty shitty ideas relating to rationalizing WW2. If he left rather than shut his mouth, he may be more interested in criticizing fascism in particular rather than just shrugging and saying it's all on capital, which led to stupidity down the line. If you can make use of his positive views against Stalinism, he may end up relevant again in rebuilding the European left, rather than a meme associated with ranting from an armchair? Maybe a more revolutionary Eurocommunist, rather than its pretty reformist OTL incarnation?

 

[Rattigan]

From Civil War to Constitution: Spain in the Liberal Age, 1866-1935

Instigators of the Moderate Compromise: (l-r) Juan Prim and Francisco Serrano


Following her coming of age in 1858, Isabella II took an active role in government but this did nothing to decrease her unpopularity. Viewed as under the thumb of whoever her favourite courtier was at the time, her regime relied on periodic successful(ish) wars to retain whatever level of popularity it had. What came to be known as the Glorious Revolution began in April 1866, when the navy mutinied in Cadiz and Generals Francisco Serrano and Juan Prim denounced the government and began a rebellion in Madrid. The Queen and her Court loyalists fled the capital but were pursued by the revolutionaries, who initially sought to restore her to the throne under a joint Prim-Serrano dictatorship. However, only two weeks after their initial coup, a revolutionary force under Serrano defeated an army loyal to Isabella at the Battle of Alcolea, forcing her to leave the country and ending the practical possibility of her retaining the throne.

The revolutionaries therefore began to cast around for an alternative monarch. Both Prince Amedeo of Savoy and Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen were sounded out and said no, leading to the declaration of the Spanish Republic on 27 September 1866, with Serrano as President and Prim as Prime Minister. However, while republicanism was popular in many parts of Iberian Spain, it went down badly in Spain’s Caribbean empire, where local elites in Cuba, Hispaniola and Puerto Rico were unwilling to countenance anything which would disrupt their trading arrangements. Similarly, republicanism in Catalonia was associated with the French Revolution and a bureaucratic trampling on local traditions. In August 1866, Isabella and what was left of her court arrived in Havana, where they were greeted warmly. Then, in April 1867, the head of the carlist branch of the House of Bourbon arrived in Barcelona. Declaring himself to be Juan III, he gathered to his side many disgruntled local elites and launched a rebellion.

The balance of fortune between republicans, monarchists and carlists would oscillate for the first eighteen months or so. But after that point it became clear that the republicans would not be able to enforce their will in the Caribbean without even greater troop commitments and repression. Similarly, after carlist victory at the Battle of Girona in July 1868, the war in Catalonia entered a period of stalemate in which republicans could not dislodge carlist forces. The balance of power altered decisively, however, in May 1870. That month, a republican crackdown on dissent in Andalusia swept up a number of Gibraltarian residents. Although this was almost certainly an accident, the British Admiralty was eager to use it as a casus belli. The Royal Navy bombarded ports in Andalusia and commenced a limited occupation of the region over the course of May-July. In the Caribbean, the Navy won a comprehensive victory over the limited Spanish navy at San Juan and occupied Puerto Rico with marines in August 1870.

Following these quick victories, Gladstone was able to use his government’s leverage to bring all three sides to the negotiating table. By the terms of the Treaty of Lisbon, signed in September 1870, the Republic of Spain and the carlist Kingdom of Catalonia recognised one another and the Republic ceded the Philippines and Puerto Rico to the UK and Cuba and Hispaniola to the monarchists. The government in the Caribbean styled themselves the Kingdom of Spain, which was not recognised by either Catalonia or the Republic but was now not a serious cause of tension. In 1873 the monarchist government in Havana would ease some of its financial pressures and deal with separatist sentiment by selling the colony on Hispaniola to the United States.

Following the revolution, Prim and Serrano attempted to work together to chart a moderate course between Spanish liberalism and conservatism. However, although they shared the same overall philosophical outlook, they had numerous policy differences which lead to them clashing. In 1872, Serrano declined to stand again as President and instead took up a seat in the Cortes and founded the Constitutional Party, in opposition to Prim’s Progressive Party. Despite concerns that this might lead to a new round of civil strife, when the Progressives lost the 1873 elections they peacefully vacated power and Serrano became Prime Minister. Thus a period of stability emerged rather unexpectedly, with Prim holding office twice more (1880-1885 and 1885-1886), alternating with Antonio Canovas (1885 and 1886-1892), who emerged as leader of the Constitutionalists after Serrano’s death.

Over the course of Prim’s second term, his majority would come to be reliant on regionalist politicians, which would encourage him to propose a law in 1885 which would have federalised the country. The reform’s failure to pass, in the teeth of a rebellion by many Progressive Cortez members, caused the failure of his second government. After Canovas’ first government only lasted seven months, fresh elections returned Prim to power, but reliant on regionalists again. A second attempt to pass his federalising reforms failed again, with the Progressives permanently splitting and the newly-expanded Constitutionalists formed a government under Canovas once again. As a result, the Constitutionalists dominated the next two decades of Spanish politics (with the exception of 1892-1895) until they lost power to Jose Canalejas’ renewed Progressive Party in 1905.

During this time, despite their profound conflicts over the constitution, both parties stuck to the so-called ‘moderate compromise of 1873’, whereby Prim and Serrano had agreed not to pursue radical liberal or conservative politics in return for avoiding political violence and sidelining the military. This was helped by widespread electoral fraud and alliances (of varying levels of formality) between the Constitutionalists and Progressives at the local level to ensure that other parties were locked out of the Cortes. Spain also experienced some economic development, as the Lisbon Treaty encouraged the immigration of republican Cubans and Catalans. Overall, however, Spain entered the twentieth century as an overwhelmingly rural country.

Canalejas’ government was more radical than their predecessors and used their support from an expanded franchise to push through ambitious land and welfare reforms. This was a tacit abandonment of the moderate compromise and saw an increase in anarchist and conservative violence. Canalejas was assassinated in 1912 but his replacement Alvaro de Figueroa continued governing in the same way, alternating the Presidency and the Prime Minister’s office with his Progressive colleague and rival Manuel Garcia-Prieto. De Figueroa kept Spain out of the European alliance system and the Great War but the country did not experience the economic benefits of neutrality seen in the UK or Italy (or even Catalonia). After a period of Constitutionalist government under Joaquin Sanchez de Toca (1922-1929), the Progressives were caught with the ball in their hands when the 1929-30 crises spread to Spain.

Spain’s relatively isolated economy meant that the country was not hit too badly by the downturn. But the crisis did, however, emphasise the continued failures of the Spanish state, in particular its failure to provide modern infrastructure and the continued backwards state of the country’s financial industry (at this time the Bank of Spain was still a private company with the sole job of printing money). Figueroa’s government attempted to reform the system via state loans but these failed to float in the global atmosphere of tight credit. An attempted reform of the military alienated the army for the first time since the republic was founded and heightened tensions.

In these circumstances, at the elections of 1931 a third party won the most votes in the Cortes for the first time in the republic. The fascist Falange Espanola Party won nearly a third of the seats, promising a radical revolution in Spanish government. However, the Constitutional president Damaso Berenguer instead urged the Progressives and the Constitutionalists to form a grand coalition, which they did but at the expense of casting the Falange as the only true opposition to a corrupt Spanish elite. The Falange’s continuation as the largest single party in the Cortes after 1933 elections further cemented the collapse of the Spanish centre ground (even if the Falange remained short of a majority).

Although the numbers were there to continue the grand coalition, the Constitutionalists decided to abandon it and throw their lot in with the Falange, with the full support of President Jose Sanjurjo. Their reasoning was that they would incorporate the Falange into their party as they had with the anti-federalist Progressives in the 1890s. This turned out to have been an enormous underestimation of the Falange. With their leader, Jose Primo de Rivera, as Prime Minister and Gonzalo Queipo de Llano as Minister for War, the Falange were quickly able to co opt both the army and the church, unleashing the former in June 1934 to devastating effect. In the resulting ‘White Terror’ - a series of extrajudicial killings which purged the government of Constitutionalists, the Falange of its socialist-inclined element and the military of its pro-republican officers - the party was able to consolidate its control. Sanjurjo’s mysterious death in a plane crash two days later left Primo de Rivera as the sole fount of authority.

Socialist, Jewish and foreign saboteurs were immediately blamed Sanjurjo’s death and the White Terror explained as a preemptive strike against coup plotters. In this atmosphere of terror and repression, the Cortes passed an emergency law in June 1934 which gave Primo de Rivera the power to declare martial law in the event of a national emergency. He immediately did so, suspending the constitution, taking the title of ‘Caudillo’ for himself and concentrating all power in Spain through him and the Falange.

Prime Ministers of Spain

1. Juan Prim; Progressive Party; September 1866 - November 1873
2. Francisco Serrano; Constitutional Party; November 1873 - January 1880
3. Juan Prim; Progressive Party; January 1880 - March 1885
4. Antonio Canovas; Constitutional Party; March 1885 - October 1885
5. Juan Prim; Progressive Party; October 1885 - April 1886
6. Antonio Canovas; Constitutional Party; April 1886 - May 1892
7. Jose Lopez Dominguez; Progressive Party; May 1892 - December 1893
8. Praxedes Mateo Sagasta; Progressive Party; December 1893 - March 1895
9. Francisco Silvela; Constitutional Party; March 1895 - July 1903
10. Antonio Maura; Constitutional Party; July 1903 - September 1905
11. Jose Canalejas; Progressive Party; September 1905 - November 1912
12. Alvaro de Figueroa; Progressive Party; November 1912 - September 1914
13. Manuel Garcia-Prieto; Progressive Party; September 1914 - September 1920
14. Alvaro de Figueroa; Progressive Party; September 1920 - July 1922
15. Joaquin Sanchez de Toca; Constitutional Party; July 1922 - March 1929
16. Alvaro de Figueroa; Progressive Party; March 1929 - January 1933
17. Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera; Falange Espanola; January 1933 - present

Presidents of Spain

1. Francisco Serrano; Constitutional Party; September 1866 - September 1872
2. Jose Lopez Dominguez; Progressive Party; September 1872 - September 1878
3. Joaquin Jovellar; Constitutional Party; September 1878 - September 1884
4. Jose Lopez Dominguez; Progressive Party; September 1884 - September 1890
5. Marcelo Azcarraga; Constitutional Party; September 1890 - September 1908
6. Manuel Garcia-Prieto; Progressive Party; September 1908 - September 1914
7. Alvaro de Figueroa; Progressive Party; September 1914 - September 1920
8. Manuel Garcia-Prieto; Progressive Party; September 1920 - September 1926
9. Damaso Berenguer; Constitutional Party; September 1926 - September 1932
10. Jose Sanjurjo; Constitutional Party; September 1932 - June 1934

 

[Nyvis]

Oh no, you killed Spain, you monster!

Their internal politics basically look like the OTL mess... The far right just avoid fighting a left wing opposition and just depose the corrupt elites that made them possible.

But really, without Catalonia it's just the Castillan failstate. I hope Catalonia does better than them?

 

[Rattigan]

Oh no, you killed Spain, you monster!

Their internal politics basically look like the OTL mess... The far right just avoid fighting a left wing opposition and just depose the corrupt elites that made them possible.

But really, without Catalonia it's just the Castillan failstate. I hope Catalonia does better than them?

In fairness, there's probably a moment in the 1870s and 1880s when it's doing marginally better than OTL. I like Prim very much and think he could've done so much more if he hadn't been killed but he wasn't a superman...

Catalonia is doing better. I hadn't planned on doing a separate Catalan update because it's economic development basically continues on the same trajectory as OTL but now under a conservative carlist government (which basically reinvents itself as a semi-industrial plutocracy). Ironically the group that did best out of the revolution were probably the Isabella loyalists, because (at least for now) they get to get fat off plantation profits in the Caribbean.

 

[Nyvis]

Catalonia is doing better. I hadn't planned on doing a separate Catalan update because it's economic development basically continues on the same trajectory as OTL but now under a conservative carlist government (which basically reinvents itself as a semi-industrial plutocracy). Ironically the group that did best out of the revolution were probably the Isabella loyalists, because (at least for now) they get to get fat off plantation profits in the Caribbean.

Shouldn't the Caribbeans be a mess of local tensions though? Getting a population with a fair share of descendants of slaves to keep working in plantations sound dicey. I'd expect at least one of the 3 Spains get a big leftist problem down the line.

 

[Thomas1195]

I hadn't planned on doing a separate Catalan update because it's economic development basically continues on the same trajectory as OTL but now under a conservative carlist government

I don't know but based on OTL information I don't think these Carlists can do anything good for industrialization, since it was the conservative forces that held back Spain IOTL.

 

[Rattigan]

I don't know but based on OTL information I don't think these Carlists can do anything good for industrialization, since it was the conservative forces that held back Spain IOTL.

I mean, the idea of Catalonia being the industrial powerhouse of Spain in the 19th century was always relative to the rest of the Spain: Barcelona is hardly Manchester by this stage. What I would also say is that IIRC the appeal of carlism in Catalonia was, among other things, that it guaranteed the continuation of regional laws as a defence against modernising and centralising forces in Madrid. Combined with the fact that (also IIRC) the carlist claimant by 1866, Juan III, was a relatively liberal (for a carlist) figure who I could see making his peace with industrialism in return for returning his family to power in Barcelona. TBH I think the most unrealistic bit of my Spain narrative is the carlists being fine with just having Catalonia (I could see the republicans giving up the West Indies on a self-determination basis but I suppose that might be a bit of a stretch too) because I think they were kind of 'all or nothing' people.

 

[Rattigan]

Newest of the Empires: Bolshevik Russia and the Soviet Union, 1920 - 1935

The New Soviet Man: Nikolai Bukharin at around the time of the implementation of the New Economic Policy in 1931


Following their seizure of power in 1917, the Bolsheviks had been forced to deal with rebellious forces at home and a hostile international climate. Leon Trotsky, in his capacity as Commissar for Foreign Affairs (and de facto head of the military) lead the new regime successfully through the resulting civil war (generally dated 1917-1919 but sporadic fighting would continue in the east until c.1922), all the while keeping Russia in the Great War (albeit that they acted more as an army in being in 1917-18 rather than an actual military threat) and currying favour with international regimes. Trotsky’s aims for the Great War was to dismember the Hohenzollern and Habsburg empires into small republics which were ripe for the anticipated world revolution. Although this objective was partially accomplished by the Treaty of Paris, the resulting Russian-backed revolutions in eastern Europe all failed and resulted in Trotsky being removed from his position at the 10th Party Congress in 1921 and packaged off as governor of Nenets Province.

The 10th Party Congress was also significant for another reason, namely the passing of two important motions: ‘On the Management of the Free Market’; and ‘On Internal Disagreements.’ The first motion adopted a policy of what was labelled (derisively by some) as “market socialism”, which foresaw a role for entrepreneurs and markets in trade and pricing. Rather than requisitioning agricultural surpluses according to centralised dictat (as had been the case previously), peasants were allowed to sell these on the open market. Furthermore, while what Lenin termed the “commanding heights” of the economy - i.e. heavy industry and banking - remained nationalised, market socialism loosened direct controls and empowered managers to make their own economic decisions. Meanwhile, the second motion relaxed some of the restrictions on factionalism within the party, recognising that reliance on the genius of one man (Trotsky) without sufficient space for reasonable critique had lead the country to foreign policy failure in 1918-22. Although there was no question of there being alternative parties or public policy debate, internal factions now had somewhat more room to maneuver freely.

The adoption of market socialism empowered Nikolai Bukharin, who became its foremost supporter, but Lenin remained firmly in control of the government and, after his incapacitation by a stroke in 1922, so did the triumvirate of Lev Kamenev, Grigory Zinoviev and Joseph Stalin. At the 13th Party Congress, the first held after Lenin’s death in 1924, Lenin’s final will and testament was read, in which the deceased leader urged his former comrades to remove Stalin. For some time, it seemed that Stalin’s fate hung in the balance but, in the end, the intervention against him by the head of the Cheka, Feliz Dzerzhinsky, proved decisive. Stalin and his cronies (Anastas Mikoyan and Sergo Ordzhonikidze - forming the so-called Gang of Three) were arrested and blamed for the excesses of the first near-decade of Bolshevik government.

For the remainder of this period, Bukharin was the driving force behind the Russian government (re-named and re-organised as the Soviet Union in 1927), although he did not hold either of the key positions of either General Secretary or Premier. His influence within the party led the country to significant economic reforms, including the loosening of state control over the sale of land and the opening up so-called ‘Enterprise Zones’ in areas where certain key industries were located. The most successful of these Enterprise Zones was located in Petrograd, which soon became home to numerous British bankers and German industrialists. Trotsky returned to government following the Gang of Three’s fall in 1924, serving as Foreign Secretary again. Under his guidance, relations improved on Russia’s Caucasus border with Turkey and they became especially close with Germany (as emphasised by the substantial involvement of German industry in the Soviet economy by 1930). Trotsky also managed to maintain an uneasy peace with Poland, which was threatened by the nationalist government of Jozef Pilsudski, who periodically advanced claims to Russian Poland.

Although the Soviet Union was the world’s only communist country, it was still a player in international trade and could not help but be buffeted by the financial crisis of 1929-30. At first, the government seems to have trusted its managed command economy to ride out the global crisis but continued balance of payments issues and depletion of foreign currency reserves forced a change of plan in September 1931. Bukharin’s old ally Alexei Rykov was removed from his post as General Secretary as the party resolved to adopt what came to be called the ‘New Economic Policy’ or ‘NEP’ for short. The NEP revolved around widespread government investment in heavy industry, designed to make the Soviet Union industrially self-sufficient. The uninspired but diligent Vyacheslav Molotov was appointed General Secretary to oversee the administration of this mammoth task.

The NEP was explicitly designed following research on the industrial revolutions in Britain and the United States and, in many senses, it proved the advantages of, on its own terms, a planned economy: that they can copy a pre-existing path or catch up economically faster than a market economy could. The amount of industrial, capital and consumer goods produced in the Soviet Union exploded by over 100% in the first five years of NEP, pushing the country further and faster down its road to becoming an economic and industrial superpower. Attempts were made to move the country’s economic centre of gravity away from just the older centres of Petrograd and Moscow, with factories being set up east of the Urals where none had existed before.

However, despite being a success in blunt economic and GDP terms, the NEP also unleashed a number of catastrophes which Soviet planners did not anticipate (although they probably should have). The drive for urbanisation lead to, in many cases, the unwilling transfer of whole rural communities to local cities in order to work in new factories. This, along with more willing migration, left a severe shortfall of manpower in important food-producing districts like the Ukraine and, in turn, lead to crops not being collected (the NEP had concentrated on industrial improvements and Soviet agriculture remained largely reliant on traditional methods despite some improvements under market socialism) and cities not receiving sufficient food. In an attempt to solve this problem, the army was deployed to ‘help’ with the harvest and requisition foodstuffs to feed the cities. However, this succeeded only in riling up the peasantry and created widespread discontent in the Ukraine and the Don River region that, by the autumn and winter of 1933, was almost akin to a full-scale uprising by Tartar, Cossack and Ukrainian communities. Although the situation was smoothed over by spring 1934, the long-term damage had been done and in 1934 a bad harvest combined with the failures of the previous year to cause a famine that is estimated to have killed up to 2,000,000 people across the Soviet Union. This, combined with the fact that many of the migrants to cities were young men, lead to an overall drop in the Soviet population.

In its attempt to achieve the best parts of Anglo industrialisation, it was clear that the Soviet Union had failed to avoid the worst part and Bukharin abruptly called a halt to the NEP in July 1934. The Premier Valerian Kuybyshev paid for his maladroit handling of the crisis with his job and was replaced by Arkady Rosengolts (even though, as Premier, his remit was more closely involved in foreign policy and geopolitics than domestic economic policy). A hasty agreement was struck with the Commonwealth to allow imports of Canadian grains and Australian and New Zealand meats over the winter of 1934-35 but the short-term damage to the regime was done. In March 1935, large protests formed in Moscow and Petrograd formed, scathingly throwing the Bolsheviks’ old motto of “Peace, Bread, Land” back at the government. Although the Politburo seems to have initially considered conciliation, they eventually declared martial law in April and forcibly dispersed the protestors. In the subsequent reprisals (known colloquially as “Bukharin’s Purge”) approximately 50,000 people are estimated to have been arrested and a further 15,000 executed, while hundreds were probably killed or wounded during the initial dispersals.

Premiers of the Russian Republic/Soviet Union (after 1927)

1. Lev Kamenev; May 1922 - December 1929
2. Valerain Kuybyshev; December 1929 - July 1934
3. Arkady Rosengolts; July 1934 - present

General Secretary of the Communist Party of Russia/the Soviet Union (after 1927)

1. Joseph Stalin; April 1922 - June 1924
2. Alexei Rykov; June 1924 - September 1931
3. Vyacheslav Molotov; September 1931 - present

People’s Commissar for Finance

1. Nikolai Bukharin; June 1922 - present

 

[Nyvis]

Ouch. Agriculture and transition away from a rural economy was always going to be a problem. This maybe feels a bit too parallel to OTL, but some of the problems were always going to pop up.

I don't think you're right about people breaking away from communism totally though, especially without Stalin to enforce orthodoxy on other parties. It's much more likely they try identifying what went wrong and building on that. People will still feel a need for more revolutionary politics, especially in countries not doing as hot as the UK.

 

[Rattigan]

This maybe feels a bit too parallel to OTL

I think you're right up to a point. Part of that is, I think, the way I write updates makes it hard for me to explain the differences between TTL and OTL without breaking character, especially when I'm using similar names for things. What I would say is that TTL's NEP is lot more like a very dictatorial Keynesian counter-stimulus rather than just a redo of the OTL 1st 5-year plan. Basically the theoretical justification is that the state should be akin to the godfather of the national economy, picking industries and companies to support as national needs require: in this case heavy industry in support of national self-sufficiency.

I agree that it definitely comes out looking similar but, as you say, I think the problems of industrialising a country in about a decade are likely to come up whatever approach is taken.

 

[Nyvis]

I think you're right up to a point. Part of that is, I think, the way I write updates makes it hard for me to explain the differences between TTL and OTL without breaking character, especially when I'm using similar names for things. What I would say is that TTL's NEP is lot more like a very dictatorial Keynesian counter-stimulus rather than just a redo of the OTL 1st 5-year plan. Basically the theoretical justification is that the state should be akin to the godfather of the national economy, picking industries and companies to support as national needs require: in this case heavy industry in support of national self-sufficiency.

Oh I definitely got that the NEP is different. It doesn't replace the OTL NEP, it replaces Stalin's industrialization and collectivization... With basically the same consequences. The leader change should still significantly impact things. Bukharin was on the right economically, since he liked the OTL NEP well enough, but probably a better communist than Stalin and more interested about workers. Peasants are likely to suffer no matter which Bolshevik lead though, at that point, that's true.

 

[AceofDens]

Who exactly controls the non-nationalized businesses and factories? Are they worker owned?

 

[Rattigan]

Oh I definitely got that the NEP is different. It doesn't replace the OTL NEP, it replaces Stalin's industrialization and collectivization... With basically the same consequences. The leader change should still significantly impact things. Bukharin was on the right economically, since he liked the OTL NEP well enough, but probably a better communist than Stalin and more interested about workers. Peasants are likely to suffer no matter which Bolshevik lead though, at that point, that's true.

I don't think they're quite the same consequences: the famine is less severe and less focused on Ukraine. I think I might revise down the estimates for the casualty levels in the famine to make that point a bit better. As regards the repression following the protests, that is much less repressive than a Stalinist terror and is more of a short sharp shock to ensure that the Bolsheviks remain in power. We're not going to veer into full-on purge territory for the foreseeable future. It's also worth noting that TTL's Soviet economy is significantly more open than OTL's, as evidenced by the Commonwealth trade agreement. But I do agree that there are a lot of similarities with OTL, certainly more so than what I did with Germany, Italy and Spain.

Who exactly controls the non-nationalized businesses and factories? Are they worker owned?

A mix of workers' coops and more traditional owner-investor situations, with the former being actively 'encouraged' when a business gets above a certain size. The agricultural sector remains in the hands of smallholders and is, although it's experienced productivity increases, still relatively unindustrialised, although the effects of the 1934 famine will change that.

 

[Nyvis]

I don't think they're quite the same consequences: the famine is less severe and less focused on Ukraine. I think I might revise down the estimates for the casualty levels in the famine to make that point a bit better. As regards the repression following the protests, that is much less repressive than a Stalinist terror and is more of a short sharp shock to ensure that the Bolsheviks remain in power. We're not going to veer into full-on purge territory for the foreseeable future. It's also worth noting that TTL's Soviet economy is significantly more open than OTL's, as evidenced by the Commonwealth trade agreement. But I do agree that there are a lot of similarities with OTL, certainly more so than what I did with Germany, Italy and Spain.

If that's the case, I imagine most European communists don't break away from the party, just take a bit of distance and softly criticize the purge while keeping up critical support. Especially with the disaster in Italy, they probably want all the friends they can get. Bordiga still probably rail against it because of the right of the party winning on economics, but well, he's Bordiga. It's also worth noting an USSR that never left the war probably has much better standing abroad. Combined with their more open commercial policy, they may not fall into the siege mentality of OTL. Overall I could see more left leaning people willing to work with them, even if they don't want to imitate them.

A mix of workers' coops and more traditional owner-investor situations, with the former being actively 'encouraged' when a business gets above a certain size. The agricultural sector remains in the hands of smallholders and is, although it's experienced productivity increases, still relatively unindustrialised, although the effects of the 1934 famine will change that.

In a freer economy, it's likely agricultural transition will probably happen slowly and gradually like it did in capitalist countries. The result may be less catastrophic because people wouldn't have been driven out of it or feel like they're exploited as much. Maybe a mix of voluntary collectivization with grants of industrial material and more traditional consolidation happen.

 

[Rattigan]

If that's the case, I imagine most European communists don't break away from the party, just take a bit of distance and softly criticize the purge while keeping up critical support. Especially with the disaster in Italy, they probably want all the friends they can get. Bordiga still probably rail against it because of the right of the party winning on economics, but well, he's Bordiga. It's also worth noting an USSR that never left the war probably has much better standing abroad. Combined with their more open commercial policy, they may not fall into the siege mentality of OTL. Overall I could see more left leaning people willing to work with them, even if they don't want to imitate them.

In a freer economy, it's likely agricultural transition will probably happen slowly and gradually like it did in capitalist countries. The result may be less catastrophic because people wouldn't have been driven out of it or feel like they're exploited as much. Maybe a mix of voluntary collectivization with grants of industrial material and more traditional consolidation happen.

I definitely think that after the famine Soviet agricultural policy might edge towards voluntary collectivisation. I imagine that the famine will have left some farms either bankrupt or empty, which should in turn lead to some consolidation in the number of farms anyway.

I think the Soviets definitely have a very different reputation as their OTL counterparts. They're definitely more highly thought of in Paris, Westminster and so forth as reliable partners. But I think that, outside Russia, they're regarded effectively as sellouts by the various communist parties because they decided to take part in the bourgeois imperialist world order rather than repudiate it, especially after the failure of the east and central European revolutions. This means, of course, that other communist parties aren't required to stick to the Moscow line quite as closely but also means that they're less well funded.