The vote itself was a single referendum over all of the provinces, which was agreed to by both the Ottawa government and PAP because it cut down on the cost of running seven simultaneous referendums and because both sides thought it made them more likely to win. Ottawa also didn't put anything in the legislation about needing a majority in every province because they didn't think that secession would succeed (stop me if you've heard something like this before). And, you're right, four of the provinces voted to remain and that will be an important thing to bear in mind when it comes to negotiating the provinces' exit (again, stop me if you've heard this before).
The Anglo-Saxon Social Model
- Thread starter Rattigan
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The vote itself was a single referendum over all of the provinces, which was agreed to by both the Ottawa government and PAP because it cut down on the cost of running seven simultaneous referendums and because both sides thought it made them more likely to win. Ottawa also didn't put anything in the legislation about needing a majority in every province because they didn't think that secession would succeed (stop me if you've heard something like this before). And, you're right, four of the provinces voted to remain and that will be an important thing to bear in mind when it comes to negotiating the provinces' exit (again, stop me if you've heard this before).
Taking bets that Western Canada’s Commonwealth membership becomes a big talking point? Especially the phrase “they have no economic interest in denying us XYZ, something something whatever Eastern Canada’s main export industry is”?
Western Australia Independence Referendum, 2027
Contagion: A Black Swan Event in Australia
“What can you do for me?”
That was the famous question posed by Yves-Francois Blanchet in the aftermath of the 2024 referendum that confirmed, narrowly, that the western two thirds of Canada wished to secede and create their own nation. The answer was not a simple one, for a number of reasons. In the first place, a victory margin of 89,102 votes seemed like some way from a mandate for the kind of sweeping constitutional reform that this election had suggested. Secondly, almost from the moment the results were announced, it became clear that the narrow margin had been decided by a relatively small amount of rural-based voters in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Alberta. Indeed, the provinces of Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut and British Columbia all voted to remain, albeit by narrow margins in each case. Finally, many argued that the vote for leave was the result of voters regarding the possibility of leave actually winning being so remote that they voted for it almost as a free hit to beat a relatively unpopular minority Liberal administration in the middle of their second term. Opinion polling conducted in the first few days after the referendum certainly suggested that at least a plurality of leave voters regarded the likelihood of the provinces actually leaving Canada as fairly remote.
The emergency prime ministers’ conference concluded with a press conference where Commonwealth President Khusro Bakhitar confirmed that it was the Commonwealth’s view that the referendum result would have to be respected and that all Commonwealth member states would work together to prepare for an orderly transition. The Speaker, New Zealander Jacinda Ardern, was quoted as saying in the meeting that “with the amount of sovereignty we’ve already pooled, the biggest issue is going to be what to call these guys,” which caused a certain amount of controversy in Canada itself.
However, while it was probably an impolitic thing to be caught saying (although there was a small side-controversy about the ethics of the journalist in question using that quote and whether it had been off the record), as things turned out it wasn’t entirely incorrect. During the referendum campaign, the most common analogy that analysts reached for was with the Sicilian independence referendum of 2018, where the campaign to leave ultimately foundered on the failure of the pro-independence campaign to convincingly answer questions about the currency, the national debt and future trading relations. However, in the case of the western Canadian provinces, these soon proved to not be an issue. Despite some initial murmerings from Pakistan, Australia and Canada itself, the other member states soon prevailed on them to confirm that the separatist provinces would be admitted to the Commonwealth on their separation from Canada, thus allowing continuity in their currency and economic relationships. Of course, questions remained regarding the apportioning of the national debt but that was comparatively minor technocratic tinkering that would mostly be done by the Bank of England anyway. This, it was hoped, would satisfy the demands of PAP and other leave voters as well as mollifying the majorities who had voted to remain in four provinces.
Eventually, the process was completed comparatively simply, with the provinces eventually gaining independence as the ‘Confederation of West Canada’ on 1 September 2026. As a few wags had predicted, the choice of name proved to be one of the sticking points in negotiations between the seven provinces. If people thought that this would prove to be the end of constitutional issues in the Commonwealth, however, they were wrong.
The polity looking at the Western Canadians most closely was Western Australia. The subject of a referendum on independence in 1933 that had indicated a clear majority for independence (even if, in the political culture of the time the Commonwealth, British and Australian administrations felt that they could ignore it), in the decades since the state had been a steadfast member of the Australian Commonwealth, albeit often a truculent one with an internal and political culture that was notably distinct from their cousins in the eastern half of the continent. In particular, they were generally considered more right wing than their eastern compatriots, much like the West Canadians had been. Two political events brought the question of separation back to the forefront of the political conversation with force. Firstly, the aforementioned relatively amicable separation of West Canada demonstrated that it could be done, in practical terms. Secondly, in 2025 the Liberal government of Andrew Bartlett went down to an election defeat despite 12 of Western Australia’s 16 MPs being Liberals.
While to say that this was the straw that broke the camel’s back would imply a more violent event than actually occurred, it did seem to describe what happened. The Western Australian Liberal Party, dominated by its most senior Canberra MP Ian Goodenough, came out in favour of secession in November 2025. A ‘day of action’ was called for 1 September 2026, leading to a demonstration of an estimated 250,000 people on the streets of Perth, calling for a referendum on the same terms as that offered to West Canada. As the West Canadians had done with the Ottawa government, the Western Australian Liberals found an unlikely ally in Jenny McAllister’s Labor government in Canberra. Viewing the entirety of Western Australia, probably correctly, as simply 10 (at least) guaranteed Liberal MPs to eat into their lead, they collaborated with Goodenough to produce an agreement in December 2026 for a referendum to take place on 6 June 2027.
This referendum was considerably less close than the one in West Canada. While Liberals outside the state and Labor supporters within it were worried about their futures under secession, the Western Australian Liberal Party put all of their institutional backing behind leaving and the Canberra Labor government took a ‘relaxed’ approach to opposing it on this point. The independence campaign took and early lead and didn’t relinquish it and the end result of 56-44 victory for the independence campaign was largely what polls had predicted beforehand.
While the scenes in Perth were jubilant, the scenes in the Commonwealth’s other capitals were a good deal less so. Notably, many were absolutely furious with the McAllister government: the West Canadian referendum had been one Ottawa had been largely bounced into and the eventual secession of the country was considered a reasonable compromise; the Australian one, on the other hand, was one that Camberra had walked into with open eyes and had proceeded to largely shoot themselves in the foot as a result. Although they had raised certain vague protests over West Canadian admission, now London (under pressure from the Alliance) and Karachi (which faced their own problems with the Kashmiri Nationalist Party gaining votes and seats) put their foot down and demanded that, while the referendum be respected, something be done to prevent the complete Balkanisation of the Commonwealth and threaten the group’s dissolution by stealth.
In this, national governments had an unlikely ally in Adern, who was eager to use her position as Speaker to push for constitutional reform. As far as she was concerned, it was clear that support for national governments was collapsing across the Commonwealth under the weight of economic stagnation and recurrent corruption scandals. But what could replace it?
“What can you do for me?”
That was the famous question posed by Yves-Francois Blanchet in the aftermath of the 2024 referendum that confirmed, narrowly, that the western two thirds of Canada wished to secede and create their own nation. The answer was not a simple one, for a number of reasons. In the first place, a victory margin of 89,102 votes seemed like some way from a mandate for the kind of sweeping constitutional reform that this election had suggested. Secondly, almost from the moment the results were announced, it became clear that the narrow margin had been decided by a relatively small amount of rural-based voters in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Alberta. Indeed, the provinces of Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut and British Columbia all voted to remain, albeit by narrow margins in each case. Finally, many argued that the vote for leave was the result of voters regarding the possibility of leave actually winning being so remote that they voted for it almost as a free hit to beat a relatively unpopular minority Liberal administration in the middle of their second term. Opinion polling conducted in the first few days after the referendum certainly suggested that at least a plurality of leave voters regarded the likelihood of the provinces actually leaving Canada as fairly remote.
The emergency prime ministers’ conference concluded with a press conference where Commonwealth President Khusro Bakhitar confirmed that it was the Commonwealth’s view that the referendum result would have to be respected and that all Commonwealth member states would work together to prepare for an orderly transition. The Speaker, New Zealander Jacinda Ardern, was quoted as saying in the meeting that “with the amount of sovereignty we’ve already pooled, the biggest issue is going to be what to call these guys,” which caused a certain amount of controversy in Canada itself.
However, while it was probably an impolitic thing to be caught saying (although there was a small side-controversy about the ethics of the journalist in question using that quote and whether it had been off the record), as things turned out it wasn’t entirely incorrect. During the referendum campaign, the most common analogy that analysts reached for was with the Sicilian independence referendum of 2018, where the campaign to leave ultimately foundered on the failure of the pro-independence campaign to convincingly answer questions about the currency, the national debt and future trading relations. However, in the case of the western Canadian provinces, these soon proved to not be an issue. Despite some initial murmerings from Pakistan, Australia and Canada itself, the other member states soon prevailed on them to confirm that the separatist provinces would be admitted to the Commonwealth on their separation from Canada, thus allowing continuity in their currency and economic relationships. Of course, questions remained regarding the apportioning of the national debt but that was comparatively minor technocratic tinkering that would mostly be done by the Bank of England anyway. This, it was hoped, would satisfy the demands of PAP and other leave voters as well as mollifying the majorities who had voted to remain in four provinces.
Eventually, the process was completed comparatively simply, with the provinces eventually gaining independence as the ‘Confederation of West Canada’ on 1 September 2026. As a few wags had predicted, the choice of name proved to be one of the sticking points in negotiations between the seven provinces. If people thought that this would prove to be the end of constitutional issues in the Commonwealth, however, they were wrong.
The polity looking at the Western Canadians most closely was Western Australia. The subject of a referendum on independence in 1933 that had indicated a clear majority for independence (even if, in the political culture of the time the Commonwealth, British and Australian administrations felt that they could ignore it), in the decades since the state had been a steadfast member of the Australian Commonwealth, albeit often a truculent one with an internal and political culture that was notably distinct from their cousins in the eastern half of the continent. In particular, they were generally considered more right wing than their eastern compatriots, much like the West Canadians had been. Two political events brought the question of separation back to the forefront of the political conversation with force. Firstly, the aforementioned relatively amicable separation of West Canada demonstrated that it could be done, in practical terms. Secondly, in 2025 the Liberal government of Andrew Bartlett went down to an election defeat despite 12 of Western Australia’s 16 MPs being Liberals.
While to say that this was the straw that broke the camel’s back would imply a more violent event than actually occurred, it did seem to describe what happened. The Western Australian Liberal Party, dominated by its most senior Canberra MP Ian Goodenough, came out in favour of secession in November 2025. A ‘day of action’ was called for 1 September 2026, leading to a demonstration of an estimated 250,000 people on the streets of Perth, calling for a referendum on the same terms as that offered to West Canada. As the West Canadians had done with the Ottawa government, the Western Australian Liberals found an unlikely ally in Jenny McAllister’s Labor government in Canberra. Viewing the entirety of Western Australia, probably correctly, as simply 10 (at least) guaranteed Liberal MPs to eat into their lead, they collaborated with Goodenough to produce an agreement in December 2026 for a referendum to take place on 6 June 2027.
This referendum was considerably less close than the one in West Canada. While Liberals outside the state and Labor supporters within it were worried about their futures under secession, the Western Australian Liberal Party put all of their institutional backing behind leaving and the Canberra Labor government took a ‘relaxed’ approach to opposing it on this point. The independence campaign took and early lead and didn’t relinquish it and the end result of 56-44 victory for the independence campaign was largely what polls had predicted beforehand.
While the scenes in Perth were jubilant, the scenes in the Commonwealth’s other capitals were a good deal less so. Notably, many were absolutely furious with the McAllister government: the West Canadian referendum had been one Ottawa had been largely bounced into and the eventual secession of the country was considered a reasonable compromise; the Australian one, on the other hand, was one that Camberra had walked into with open eyes and had proceeded to largely shoot themselves in the foot as a result. Although they had raised certain vague protests over West Canadian admission, now London (under pressure from the Alliance) and Karachi (which faced their own problems with the Kashmiri Nationalist Party gaining votes and seats) put their foot down and demanded that, while the referendum be respected, something be done to prevent the complete Balkanisation of the Commonwealth and threaten the group’s dissolution by stealth.
In this, national governments had an unlikely ally in Adern, who was eager to use her position as Speaker to push for constitutional reform. As far as she was concerned, it was clear that support for national governments was collapsing across the Commonwealth under the weight of economic stagnation and recurrent corruption scandals. But what could replace it?
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Hum... I guess Australia is big enough to split like this, but I do wonder that with the Commonwealth so stable, wealthy, and prosperous what real difference being in the Commonwealth as you own country or as part of Oz or Canada really means?
Indeed should there be a movement for one Pan-Commonwealth government rather than ones for splitting it up? Esp with space habitats so close now.
Indeed should there be a movement for one Pan-Commonwealth government rather than ones for splitting it up? Esp with space habitats so close now.
Ask not what your country can do for you, but how you can tell them to f**k-off.
The rest of the Commonwealth, looking at both Canada and Australia: This is getting out of hand. Now there are two of them!
Well if one of the facilitators for independence is that it is within the very forgiving framework of the Commonwealth, and arguably you’re better off doing it because the Commonwealth is still very intergovernmental and it gets you a seat at the table, then you’ve got to defang the national governments. Not obsolete them entirely, that would seem to defeat the purpose.
Maybe whilst they’re at it they’ll deal with some of the de jure privileges of the UK with the BoE and so forth?
Maybe whilst they’re at it they’ll deal with some of the de jure privileges of the UK with the BoE and so forth?
If this Commonwealth is a very rough analogue of the EU in OTL, then perhaps there will be an even more powerful pan-Commonwealth identity that will gradually dilute or balance the sovereignty of traditional member states that emerged from the old British Empire. The Europe of the Regions was/is a real driver of the EU; perhaps that's what's happening to the Commonwealth ITTL? Will this rise of regionalism/nationalism in Western Canada (Cascadia?) and Westralia (maybe Scotland and Wales too?) be counterbalanced by the growing power of the Commonwealth as a supranational institution?
Just a little issue but I was wondering what London is like, as the centre of the Commonwealth? As the focus of the world's preeminent power, it'd be fascinating to see what London is like and how its different experiences of war and economic development have left their mark. Perhaps certain proposed projects actually came to pass - like Seddon and Lamb's Imperial Monumental Halls and Tower in Westminster. Or perhaps certain lost jewels have survived - like the Crystal Palace? There is a Commonwealth Parliament isn't there? Where does that sit? In a new purpose built parliament or has the Palace of Westminster been re-purposed as the seat of the Commonwealth? Perhaps the City of Westminster has been ceded by the UK to the Commonwealth as the Commonwealth Capital Territory? Or is it the case that in order to rightly purge the Commonwealth of old Imperialist ideas, its capital has been located in a more neutral location (rather like the EU's capitals are in Brussels and Strasbourg)? Or maybe it has no capital at all? Not expecting an answer to all this by the way! I just love this timeline - really gets me thinking.
A Kashmir vote will be interesting to Pakistan and the whole of South Asia. Any Exit movements in the Commonwealth members in the Caribbean or Africa?
To take all of these questions at once, the Commonwealth as such doesn’t have a capital but its main bodies (the Assembly, the Commonwealth Cabinet and the Commonwealth Courts) are all, reflecting its history, based in London. The Commonwealth Cabinet is based in Marlborough House, the Courts in Middlesex Guildhall and the Assembly in London County Hall (although, given that it was built in the 1950s, the building itself more closely resembles the QE2 Centre than the OTL building). There have been periodic suggestions that the administrative centre be moved out of London but these haven’t really got anywhere. There is also an unofficial policy that all other major Commonwealth agencies be based outside of the UK (the Commonwealth Environmental Protection Agency, for example, is based in Lahore) and prime ministers’ conferences take place outside of London, except for in emergencies.
After the devolution to the English regions in 1922, the capital of the UK was changed to Westminster rather than London as a whole. (The legal designation ‘Westminster’ is limited to covering more or less just the government and Commonwealth offices - akin to roughly the OTL pre-1900 City and Liberty of Westminster.) The devolved Greater London Assembly is housed in a mildly refurbished Mansion House.
On Crystal Palace, I'm happy for the 1936 fire to be butterflied away because it's a nice building but I'm not sure what it will be used for by the 2020s TTL. Seddon's imperial tower won't be around, I'm afraid, as I've always thought it looked a bit silly tbh.
Most member states have at least one separatist movement (Buganda from East Africa, Bougainville from PNG, most members of the West Indies to at least an extent) but none of them have really gone as far as the movements in Westralia, West Canada or the potential ones in Kashmir and the Celtic Fringe. To give an analogy, most of them are roughly at the same level as the campaigns to create new states in the US OTL. Partly this is the result of the way that the postcolonial federations in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific tend to be very decentralised.
On Crystal Palace, I'm happy for the 1936 fire to be butterflied away because it's a nice building but I'm not sure what it will be used for by the 2020s TTL. Seddon's imperial tower won't be around, I'm afraid, as I've always thought it looked a bit silly tbh.
Glad to hear Crystal Palace might have survived its mysterious fire, although I guess the Luftwaffe would've caught up with it later anyway! Seddon's tower does indeed seem to be an exercise in imperial megalomania although a lot of its silliness comes from the way it was meant to be next to Westminster Abbey and how it would have overshadowed the Palace of Westminster. And everything else, by the looks of it.