Sixes and Snake eyes Rommel's luck in an alternate 1942 desert war

[Post]

In the simplest terms Wehrmacht logistics could support an advance of about 500km, beyond which things became vey sketchy as the supply lines consumed more supplies than they delivered. In France obviously this wasn’t really an issue and of course water and food were easily available from the benevolent French country side, which was also of course quite temperate.

Fuel was also fairly easily available, because the Panzers could fill up at french gas stations (I'm not joking).

 

[Sol Zagato]

In regards to ~clean Rommel~ Rommel was a child of Wilhelm's second Reich and had no particular problems killing people and overly violent military control of civilian areas. He had no particular problem with Nazis since they offered rapid military promotion, it's not like he resigned from the army after being Hitler's personal military adviser during the invasion of Poland which meant he saw that box on the map that was the Einsatzgruppen and knew exactly what they where doing. I am sure if he was sent to Russia his troops would have slaughtered Jews and Russian civilians and burned villages just like every other German formation

Rommel had strange ideas about what it meant to be a Nazi (Ref. "Jewish Gaulitiers") and IIRC took positive steps to keep the operation cleaner.

He was fortunate North Africa had very little civilian population. I could see the common German anti-partisan reflex operating if he was in Belarus, ie. complete ruthlessness against irregulars, along with at least not having the moral courage to kick out the Einsatzgruppen in an area where he's not in autonomous command. Fortunately(?) civilians will be mostly pro-axis where he's going soon, and he's on the end of a very long tether.

 

[cardcarrier]

The constant references to the glorious "Sickle cut" as a blue print for a glorious Axis advance are also rather misplaced. Yes, it was a bold, daring plan but it needed a mountain of luck for it to come off. Take 100 different dimensions and it probably worked as per OTL in one.

Here at Gazala, German logistics were stretched to breaking point and even with the great victory they actually won, they still lost 70% of their tanks - tanks that were extremely difficult to replace. At the first Alamein they were reduced to 70 operational tanks, while the Allies had over a hundred more. By a Herculean effort, the Axis had 500 ready for the second Alamein, but were still outnumbered 2:1.

I don't doubt that TTL the Axis will race to the Suez Canal with virtually no opposition and probably win the war in the process.

The German army in practice had favored radical maneuver and encirclement since at least the times of Frederick the Great and had it codified in their army colleges and field manuals since at least the 1880s

Operation Venice/Battle of Gazala was not really much different than sickle cut. He used the demonstration of the XX corps and the DAK, and the 5 Italian infantry divisions to fix the strong commonwealth and British divisions in the north and then looped around and flanked them with his concentrated armored fist and heavily disrupted their rear areas and gorged on captured supplies. The British (like the French in 1940) responded too slowly and tactically fumbled nearly all of the engagements, and where driven off the battlefield, despite their initial numerical and material superiority

 

[Garrison]

The German army in practice had favored radical maneuver and encirclement since at least the times of Frederick the Great and had it codified in their army colleges and field manuals since at least the 1880s

Yes and it was an obsession that failed time and again but because once in every generation or so they actually pulled one off they remained convinced it was the key to swift victories and played its part in persuading Germany it could fight wars where it was massively outclassed in terms of resources and logistics. The occasions when it did succeed invariably depended on a large degree of luck rather than judgement. But still the belief that the Germans are 'good' at fighting wars persists in the face of their leadership bringing their country to utter ruin twice within 30 years.

Operation Venice/Battle of Gazala was not really much different than sickle cut. He used the demonstration of the XX corps and the DAK, and the 5 Italian infantry divisions to fix the strong commonwealth and British divisions in the north and then looped around and flanked them with his concentrated armored fist and heavily disrupted their rear areas and gorged on captured supplies. The British (like the French in 1940) responded too slowly and tactically fumbled nearly all of the engagements, and where driven off the battlefield, despite their initial numerical and material superiority.

As I and others have pointed out earlier the difference in the scale of the theatre of operations means any grand bounce by Rommel capturing British supplies as he goes is a non starter unless those British depots are stocked with Panzer II spare parts. Rommel might get lucky with a couple of depots but anything more than that is just not credible. Rommel getting to Suez is as much of a mirage as as successful Operation Sealion.

 

[boredviewer1234]

@steamboy, in this particular context Gazala May 1942, the British 8th field army command structure was incompetent. This was remarked by none other than their own CIGS Sir Alan Brook who sacked everyone after the battle. Bonner Fellers regarded the 8th army command structure as completely incompetent, and his views where affirmed by Roosevelt and Marshal

Montgomery for all his ego and maybe being a little too conservative, ran a tight well organized ship, and crushed the Germans with much more modest losses to his own forces, and won the war. Every book I have ever read on Gazala including Alan Brook's own published Diary says the 8th army command staff in that battle failed at every level

In regards to ~clean Rommel~ Rommel was a child of Wilhelm's second Reich and had no particular problems killing people and overly violent military control of civilian areas. He had no particular problem with Nazis since they offered rapid military promotion, it's not like he resigned from the army after being Hitler's personal military adviser during the invasion of Poland which meant he saw that box on the map that was the Einsatzgruppen and knew exactly what they where doing. I am sure if he was sent to Russia his troops would have slaughtered Jews and Russian civilians and burned villages just like every other German formation

In Africa/Italy/France he committed war crimes, but by the standards applied to Western commanders he would probably have only gotten a moderate prison sentence if any at all, people with far more blood on their hands received no punishment and even became high level Bundswehr and NATO officers

That I agree with, that in the OTL here if somehow wins well the Jews in the Middle East are going to suffer and die a lot, the Arabs who while would appreciate the Nazi's ''freeing them'' would not get on the best given Britain for all it's their brutal crackdowns, understood, listen to and some of their elite even admire the Arabs and relate to them, as seen with the widespread amount of British who sided with Jordan against their new enemies despite some Israeli being British citizens.

Here the Axis still are going run a lot of issues, the war is not over and sure the Suez blown up will help somewhat but not change overall situation and ally armies will come from Africa and India to retake it.

That means A the Germans can't keep this area forever, they should just invest enough to keep some puppets alive for a bit, get as much as they can from the region before they withdraw and burn everything the Allies can use.

B This means the Arab/Axis partnership is destined to fail and be short. Sure they don't like Jews and hate not ruling themselves, however they want to live in the area, not extract from it like the axis.

Tens of thousands of Egyptians died building the Suez, they don't want it blown up they want to own it and get cash from it.

So I see a axis victory here akin to Burma where their native allies will either betray the axis first and join the allies to keep their self rule or the axis will betray their Arabs, as to ruin everything they can to prevent the allies from using anything here once they regain control.

 

[Sol Zagato]

It occurred to me this may do strange things to Vichy France, and may increase Axis support from neutrals, particularly Turkey and Spain. If the Middle East unravels, Turkey might not go full Axis, but would be a full trade partner for awhile.

Tens of thousands of Egyptians died building the Suez, they don't want it blown up they want to own it and get cash from it.

Blowing up the Suez doesn't even make sense. It's a sea-level canal, very difficult to damage. The most they could do is sink ships in it.

So I see a axis victory here akin to Burma where their native allies will either betray the axis first and join the allies to keep their self rule or the axis will betray their Arabs, as to ruin everything they can to prevent the allies from using anything here once they regain control.

There's not much to loot until they reach the oil (which they can't ship home anytime soon). Food, maybe, but Egypt alone would have enough surplus to comfortably feed the army present. Lack of Axis shipping, plus nothing really valuable, means looting isn't priority.

To get to the point of betrayal like you're discussing, they'd have to be there awhile, which may not happen.

 

[boredviewer1234]

It occurred to me this may do strange things to Vichy France, and may increase Axis support from neutrals, particularly Turkey and Spain. If the Middle East unravels, Turkey might not go full Axis, but would be a full trade partner for awhile.


Blowing up the Suez doesn't even make sense. It's a sea-level canal, very difficult to damage. The most they could do is sink ships in it.


There's not much to loot until they reach the oil (which they can't ship home anytime soon). Food, maybe, but Egypt alone would have enough surplus to comfortably feed the army present. Lack of Axis shipping, plus nothing really valuable, means looting isn't priority.

To get to the point of betrayal like you're discussing, they'd have to be there awhile, which may not happen.

I guess they can feed Turkey some Syria? I believe Turkey still had a lot claims till the fifties but that will alienate the Arabs, this would be akin to how Thailand took over bits of Cambodia.

 

[stodge]

The only similar scenario to this I've seen starts with the POD of the Axis capturing Malta which would of course help Rommel's supply issues but that in turn leads to a postponement of Barbarossa to 1942 - that's completely ASB of course as Hitler's whole political and ideological motivation was the crushing of Communism and the creation of Lebensraum in the East.

So, even if Malta is captured in early 1941 (no involvement in the Balkans perhaps), the Afrika Korps would soon become a sideshow denuded of supplies and troops.

From there, the scenario argues nationalist officers in the Egyptian Army would have risen in revolt against the British had El Alamein been a disaster for Montgomery or whoever and in fact Rommel's forces would have been welcomed into Alexandria and Cairo as liberators.

The British are forced to flee south by air and east by land to Sudan and the Sinai respectively.

As OTL history has proved, the Sinai is no real obstacle for tanks and once refreshed and re-equipped (and with thousands of willing Egyptian volunteers for the Waffen SS), the Germans can push east into Palestine and Jerusalem (the Mufti offering assistance) and Syria/Lebanon (Vichy France ditto).

From there. you can theorise Turkey joining the Axis and enabling German forces to move towards the Caucasus and pushing Russian and British forces out of Iran as well.

Perhaps but it's logistically difficult to conceive and the ideological imperative of Barbarossa trumps anything and everything.

There's also the small matter of America re-enforcing the British from mid-1942 onwards and the landings which in effect forced Rommel to fight on two fronts and sealed the fate of the Afrika Korps.

 

[RedSword12]

The TL-DR version. Sickle cut was a tactically improvised gamble that worked and persuaded the Wehrmacht they had come up with some radical new form of warfare that they called Blitzkrieg, and they clung to the concept even as it repeatedly failed them after the Battle of France.

Incorrect.
1. The Germans hated the word Blitzkrieg. It wasn't even coined by them. Hitler called blitzkrieg a stupid term.
2. Maneuver warfare makes a lot of sense where straightforward grinding cannot succeed. It helped the Germans many times after the Battle of France. It wasn't a stupid idea. It just had certain limitations. If the Wehrmacht had abandoned maneuver warfare in Operation Barbarossa, the campaign would have been a total failure, instead of a tactical victory. I don't know where people get the idea that maneuver warfare is some amateurish gimmick, but history has proven that it is a sensible doctrine. If an army can maneuver to a superior position, or bring superior force to bear on a crucial point, it has a major advantage. The limitations of German offensives in both World Wars were largely dictated by resource limitations, not some inherent flaw in the idea of using maneuver and concentration of force to achieve a breakthrough with less casualties than more costly alternative methods.
3. The Germans did not believe they had stumbled on some new miracle doctrine. Combined arms was hardly radical. Vital principles of what became Blitzkrieg were already extensively laid out by officers of the Reichswehr like Hans von Seeckt.

 

[oldironside]

The Israeli army was able to penetrate into the Sinai in 1967 because it had spent years analysing which routes were passable and produced detailed trafficability maps. They knew more about the Sinai's geography than the Egyptians who were defending it. Also, Israeli tanks had improved tracks to help them travel over inhospitable terrain. Neither of these things is true for the Afrika Korps

 

[Garrison]

Incorrect.
1. The Germans hated the word Blitzkrieg. It wasn't even coined by them. Hitler called blitzkrieg a stupid term.

Semantics, call it what you will but the Germans pinned all their hopes on this one tactic, and after France it never brought them the swift victories they needed. And since Blitzkrieg is the term everyone knows to describe the post Battle of France doctrine that Germany repeatedly relied on, I will continue to use it

2. Maneuver warfare makes a lot of sense where straightforward grinding cannot succeed. It helped the Germans many times after the Battle of France. It wasn't a stupid idea. It just had certain limitations. If the Wehrmacht had abandoned maneuver warfare in Operation Barbarossa, the campaign would have been a total failure, instead of a tactical victory. I don't know where people get the idea that maneuver warfare is some amateurish gimmick, but history has proven that it is a sensible doctrine. If an army can maneuver to a superior position, or bring superior force to bear on a crucial point, it has a major advantage. The limitations of German offensives in both World Wars were largely dictated by resource limitations, not some inherent flaw in the idea of using maneuver and concentration of force to achieve a breakthrough with less casualties than more costly alternative methods.

I don't think you really read my analysis properly. I pointed out that the tactics the Germans used were well established, but that they convinced themselves they had found some new key to swift victories when all they had done was apply old principles to a very particular situation that they couldn't apply elsewhere.

3. The Germans did not believe they had stumbled on some new miracle doctrine. Combined arms was hardly radical. Vital principles of what became Blitzkrieg were already extensively laid out by officers of the Reichswehr like Hans von Seeckt.

Their actions contradict your statement, they convinced themselves that Manstein had come up with some new strategic synthesis, one that would allow them to overcome their numberical disadvantages regardless of other conditions. This fits in with the Nazi psyche throughout the war, endlessly looking for some force multiplier that would reverse the disadvantages they faced. Blitzkrieg, Speer's 'armaments miracle', wonder weapons, all panaceas for Germany's inherent weaknesses that failed one after another.

 

[RedSword12]

after France it never brought them the swift victories they needed.

Tell that to Yugoslavia and Greece. Even in the Soviet Union it initially proved effective. It fulfilled its tactical purpose: wiping out the Soviet troops on and near the border, when the Germans believed that would eliminate the Red Army as an effective fighting force. The failure of Operation Barbarossa to destroy the Red Army was a failure of intelligence and logistics, not the idea of maneuver warfare. Most of OKW believed that the Red Army had far, far less reserves than it had in actuality, so when the Soviet Union brought forward more and more reserves long after the Germans figured they should have run out, it came as a shock.

 

[Gudestein]

The discussion above seemingly arguing why Rommel could not reach Alexandria for logistical reasons after ATL decisive victory at Gazala is absurd. There are 630 kms from Gazala to El Alamein which they reached with an enemy in front of them without capturing the supplies of TTL. In TTL there will likely not remain noteworthy resistance and its only a further 110 km to Alexandria.
Give it a rest and see what happens.

 

[oldironside]

The discussion above seemingly arguing why Rommel could not reach Alexandria for logistical reasons after ATL decisive victory at Gazala is absurd. There are 630 kms from Gazala to El Alamein which they reached with an enemy in front of them without capturing the supplies of TTL. In TTL there will likely not remain noteworthy resistance and its only a further 110 km to Alexandria.
Give it a rest and see what happens.

Actually, it's the ATL victory with Rommel throwing 6 after 6 after 6, circumventing the defensive line, capturing the supply dumps, and continuing to advance without mechanical problems or fatigue that is the problem.

Nobody needs to give it a rest to see what happens. We can all see that already.

 

[Lexijag]

Chapter 4 segment 1- The shopping spree

Black Thursday 05-28-42 2300
Forward HQ 90th light Africa division, Commander GeneralMajor von Kleeman (30km E-SE of Tobruk, El Adem area)
Prisoner interrogation Lt. General William "Strafer" Gott Commander British XIII Corps

Von Kleeman could shake off the exhaustion, 60 hours strait of marching, fighting and more marching

Today was Black Thursday for the British 8th army

Flush with their maps of British positions in the area, handily confiscated yesterday from the 7th armored brigade, the 90th light had performed a brilliant right hook around the 1st British army tank brigade (historical) destroying and capturing much of their rear transport, including 6 full water tankers. By mid day they reached what he could only consider paradise, the British El Adem supply dump:

This region had been built up over the previous several months to nourish General Ritchie's long planned and forever delayed attack against the PAA at Gazala, and his men where upon the greatest shopping spree of their lives, hundreds of thousands of gallons of petrol, water, hundreds of thousands of rations, cigarettes, millions of rounds of ammunition, 4 dozen running tanks under repair, and 26 British aircraft of the Desert airforce (which his unit destroyed on the ground)

They of course stirred up a furious response from panicked and surprised British rear security and logistic forces, but 90th light outnumbered them 8 to 1 and was reinforced right after lunch by the panzer regiment of the 15th Panzer division (butterfly from their eastward displacement) which gave them complete control of the area

Security was turned over to the 15th and Kleeman drove his half tracks and trucks full speed to the North East, vectored on by two of their divisions attached Fiesler storch aircraft and the 621st radio interception company which had identified the HQ of the XIII corps less than 10km away

90th light surged that distance in 30 minutes catching William Strafer Gott's corps command post in the process of limbering up to retreat following reports of the DAK reaching El Adem. They where quickly bracketed by self propelled artillery and anti guns, and Kleeman's armored cars dashed for the post hosing the area down with machine gun and 20mm auto cannon fire, with mechanized infantry right behind them hopping out of their half tracks grabbing staff officers and sprinting for documents before they could be burned. The entire corps staff including General Gott was scooped up in the maneuver having no armor or force greater than their tiny security company and an AA platoon them to defend them from the entire 90th division. Maps obtained, aircraft and prisoner interrogations showed there where no forces between the 90th and the even larger British supply dump at Belhamed

Exhausted and starving, but riding aboard Gott's confiscated command vehicle, and with their fuel tanks refilled from the El Adem dump, 90th light pushed on all through the afternoon reaching the front of the British rail head and the Desert air force base at Gambut, destroying another 40 British aircraft, with the recon battalion reaching the coast by 9pm. The supplies for a 2 month army offensive where before the 90th light including rail cars, tanks, trucks, ammo, cannons and everything they could want for the rest of the year. More rear area headquarters and logistics officers where captured

The capture of Gambut and Belhamed had significant tactical and strategic consequences, beyond the supply booty. In theory all of the British and common wealth forces on the Gazala line where now cut off, including the huge garrisons at Gazala itself and Tobruk. Gambut was within fairly easy aircraft ferry range to Malta, and had been being used to try and succor the starving garrison and populace of that island which was straddled across the PAA supply lines back to Italy. The Desert airforce lost significant numbers of machines, and pilots captured and huge stocks of forward fuel and would have to displace some distance back over the next couple of days, conceeding air superiority over the Gazala line to the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeornautica. The loss of XIII corps HQ and other staffs in the rear had dramatic effects on command and control throughout the area, which was already suffering from DAK forces stampeding their supply zones

As General Kleeman mused to General Gott, showing him a map of 90th light's progress the last 48 hours, they had reach 100 percent behind the British and knifed them in the neck before they even knew they where there

author's note and perspective: XIII corps HQ very nearly had this happen to them historically, missing being over run and captured by the 90th light by about 2 hours. 90th light could not pursue them because they needed to remain at El Adem to safeguard the huge cache of supplies they had captured. The British 1st army tank brigade punched air historically on this day and completely missed the 90th light, and largely became immobilized because 90th light captured or destroyed most of their supply tail. X corps HQ also missed being captured by 90th light historically by only a few hours, but 90th light's orders where not to march in their direction anyway. XIII corps HQ was directly between the supply dumps at El Adem and Belhamed/Gambut

Our timeline has seen the 15th panzer division maneuver inbetween the 1st tank brigade and the 2nd guards brigade (directions and instructions provided by 90th light who was advancing faster than them) and seen them able to join the battle at El Adem, and then hold the area so 90th light could resume it's lightening advance to the rear. All well possible with the elimination of the Free French box and the historical divisional spacing of the 8th army on 5-28-42

Very nicely thought out scenario

 

[Lexijag]

I don't know if that's exactly true, it's pretty fair to judge that the 8th army was in the position that it was in, due to Britain's enormous worldwide military commitments, including the loss of all of the field equipment of their entire army in May 1940

World wide enormous Navy
World wide air force including enormous numbers of tactical and strategic squadrons based in the UK itself
Home defense/build up for Operation Round up
Divisions for the far east and threatened territories
Uboats aggressively fighting their lines of communications
Transfer of tanks, aircraft, fuel, and soft commodities to Russia to try and keep them in the war

The British war economy, by any objective measure was already being pushed to the limit, and they where increasingly reliant on what the Americans could transfer. So much as they could want to ~pour everything~ into Egypt they where limited by their very long supply line back home. So other than garrison divisions in the Mid East or Lower Egypt anything else is far off in the future. So a decision such as maybe sending the 1st Canadian Division from the Home Island to Egypt would have to take at least 60 days, I'd have to imagine sending an American division would take another 30 days past that

Also GB might reduce their lend lease dramatically, and the impact on USSR would be significant

 

[Lexijag]

Yeah I think you need to do some further research there, the British economy was in better shape than the German economy, it never had to ramp up to the same level of production precisely because it had the Americans and the Empire to rely on. By 1942 Germany was facing ration cuts, which in turn debilitated heavy industry. These were only reversed by the brutalties of the Hunger Plan. But of course I don't expect such facts to get in the way of the outcome you've already decided on. The Germans will be supermen and the British as weak and inept as your fantasy story requires.

I always find it interesting that in an alternate history web site no wants to even consider any alternative history. So far I think the story has good basis of facts. And it is plausible. No different than may 1940 would have been viewed is plausible on Jan 1940.

 

[22000 Kevin]

Why is this entire thread argument that Rommel won't achieve much after El Alamein happened here of all places.

If you had a objection to this timeline then why didn't you make your points in here Decisive German Victory in North Africa 1942 instead of the actual timeline, disrupting the TL and the OP's attempt at making a plausible story after a historical OTL ASB event involving a 3700 man strong French brigade delaying the Axis not happening in the TL, allowing for an even greater success at the Battle of Gazala.

Edit: The story even hinted that Rommel only got to 90 miles of Alexandria, instead of actually taking the city.
Although that might be subsequent to change.

 

[EWHM]

It seems to me quite possible that General Keonig's Free French Brigade may well have saved the entire British 8th army with its heroic stand. There was every material reason for them to fold like a house of cards. They were seriously outnumbered, not really expecting an attack, and even poorly supplied. But they held in a heroic stand due to intangible qualities of the soldiers and their leadership. Had they not done so, the history of that battle would have been far different. More of them probably would have survived, adherence to the Geneva convention with respect to prisoners between Germans and the Western allies was actually pretty good most of the time (obviously not the case on the Eastern Front).
It is hard I think for people to get their minds around the fact that at this point in history, the UK doesn't have high confidence of ultimate victory. It doesn't look great for them right now. That one little French brigade, perhaps with something to prove and a chip on its shoulder from the Fall of France, may well have made the difference in the North Africa campaigns of 1942.

 

[Garrison]

Tell that to Yugoslavia and Greece. Even in the Soviet Union it initially proved effective. It fulfilled its tactical purpose: wiping out the Soviet troops on and near the border, when the Germans believed that would eliminate the Red Army as an effective fighting force. The failure of Operation Barbarossa to destroy the Red Army was a failure of intelligence and logistics, not the idea of maneuver warfare. Most of OKW believed that the Red Army had far, far less reserves than it had in actuality, so when the Soviet Union brought forward more and more reserves long after the Germans figured they should have run out, it came as a shock.

The failure of Barbarossa was the Germans thinking they could repeat the same tactics that defeated the French and replicate the same swift victory, ignoring the factors, including copious luck, that made it work.

I always find it interesting that in an alternate history web site no wants to even consider any alternative history. So far I think the story has good basis of facts. And it is plausible. No different than may 1940 would have been viewed is plausible on Jan 1940.

In Post-1900 its supposed to be about plausible alternate history. The logistics of the Afrika Korps are a well discussed topic and the notion of Rommel making his way to Alexandria on captured British supplies is wildly implausible. At the end of the day this is a work of fiction and if the 'plot' is constantly being driven forward by luck and happenstance that does not make for a good story/TL.