I would suggest thatit was one of a number of considerations which made it difficult to deploy Indian infantry en mass inon the western Front, bearing in mind they remained part of the Indian army and therefore dependent on them for their equipment. It is worth noting that the Indian cavalry regiments stayed on until March1918. I would suggest that t the most significant issue was the high rate of officer casualties and the difficulty in supplying replacement officers to the Indian regiments.
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
Urdu was the lingua franca of the Indian Army, not Hindi. Hindi would have been needed by those in charge of Hindi speaking regiments but those were actually a minority in peacetime and only grew with Army expansion.
I think most British officer's who did a stint in the British Indian army could speak Urdu.
The Indian Army was active in the Italian campaign. Their logistics line ran from India and it was simply easier to run it to Italy via the Middle East than ship all the way to Britain. The dietary issue was minor in that meat was sourced locally and dealt with in the appropriate way and of the appropriate animals. Goats were always a handy compromise. Tinned meat came in the form of both corned beef and corned mutton. If it was so hard one has to wonder how Jews ate in the British army at all. I had a vegetarian in the army who dealt with it by the kind assistance of food swapping between him and his colleagues. The Indian Army was in service in France in both world wars and both my grandfather and father had the privilege of serving alongside them. They seemed not to starve. The same applies to those Indians (in the British India sense) who came to live in Britain in the same periods.
You are correct, problem of spending too much time researching my great-grandfather who was an officer in a Hindi speaking regiment. Either way teaching monolingual British 18 years old the necessary language skills (plus all the military training) was a major bottleneck, as in the Austro-Hungarian Army.
24 January 1942. War Office, London, England.
allanpcameron
Donor
24 January 1942. War Office, London, England.
Looking over the figures for tank production during 1941 was heartening. The combined production for the last quarter was 1877 giving a total 4841 tanks for the year. The previous year’s total had been less than 1500, a number surpassed in the last three months.
The introduction of the Churchill was still picking up, so between Matilda II and Churchills 479 Infantry tanks had been built. The slow production of Tetrarch light tanks continued, with twenty-three completed. The greatest output was in cruiser tanks. 1375 was the total of cruiser tanks, of which 459 were Nuffield’s Crusaders and 892 were Valiant I and IIs, with pre-production Victors making up the final twenty-four.
One of the changes that had been noticed was that more tanks could have been produced, perhaps as many as 10%, but the fighting in North Africa had shown that spare parts were crucial to keep the tanks running. Each company had therefore been ordered to accept fewer tanks to allow for enough spares to be produced.
As numbers of 6-pdr guns were increasing, the numbers of Valiant Is were running down, and should end during the first quarter of 1942. The primary difference between the two marks of tanks was in the turret, and with the decision to send tanks without guns to the Russians, there wouldn’t be too much disruption moving from the Valiant II to the Victor.
Nuffield were working on the turret for their Crusader to take the 6-pdr, but their efforts so far were resulting in having to delete the loader, making the tank commander load the gun on top of his other responsibilities. Everything that had been learned so far argued against this. The problem was obviously caused by the diameter of the turret ring. The design team which had worked on the Crusader were currently working on their follow up design.
Retaining the Christie suspension, the Liberty engine (although boosted to give 410 hp) and with less than three inches of armour, the main difference would be the turret ring of sixty inches. Nuffield’s estimate was that the 27-ton tank would have a top speed of 24 mph. There were obviously two immediate problems, the first was the design wouldn’t be able to be easily up-gunned. The sixty-inch turret ring would struggle with anything bigger than the 6-pdr and it seemed odd that they hadn’t thought about the probability of needing a larger gun in due course. The second problem was Nuffield’s commitment to the Liberty engine, even although both the Rolls-Royce Meteor and the Perkins diesel were already at least as powerful as the boosted Liberty.
The pre-production models (Nuffield had argued that since the tank was based on an existing design it wouldn’t need the prototype stage) were due to be delivered for testing in March 1942. The decision to avoid the prototype stage was strongly criticised by a number of different people and organisations. The chances were that the problems that had bedevilled the early production Crusaders was likely to be repeated in the new A24 tank, currently given the name “Cromwell”.
The Victor, had already gone through a long prototype process. The pre-production models that were being built were using hand-built conversions of the Meteor engine from otherwise unflyable Merlin IIIs. Newly built Meteor production was expected to begin in February, allowing the actual production Victors to be built. Work on the dual-purpose gun was continuing even although Major-General Clarke (Director of Artillery) was still intent on making sure that the 17-pdr ammunition and Vickers gun was compatible. Lord Beaverbrook, in his role as Minister of Supply, had been trying to resolve the conflict between Director of Artillery and Vickers. Carden was following the army’s expressed need for a dual purpose tank gun, while Clarke was still insisting that the tank gun and towed anti-tank gun were the same. Both viewpoints were understandable, but Beaverbrook (and Winston Churchill) were leaning more towards Carden’s point of view.
The suggestion of looking to see if the 6-pdr could be used as the basis for a 75mm gun was progressing, and if that bore fruit, then Valiant IIs could be converted to take that compromise gun. If the 75mm HV proved ineffective against future German armour, then Carden was prepared to accept Clarke’s insistence on a 76.2mm HV, even though the gunners would need to take into account the differences of firing the AP and HE shells which would need different tables.
The question turned to expected production figures for 1942. Because of the need to ship Valiant tanks to Russia, production of the Valiant would continue, even though most of Vickers’ consortium of tank manufacturers would move to building the Victor. The production forecast for the first quarter of 1942 was for 320 Matilda IIs 350 Churchills, 395 Crusaders, 1105 Valiant II and the first 100 Victors, if all went well during February and March. The quarterly output of Tetrarch light tanks should also produce 90 tanks. If 1941 had produced 4841 tanks, the hope for 1942 would be more like 9400, though the likelihood was probably about ten or twelve percent less than that.
Canadian production at Canadian Pacific Railway (Valiant) and Montreal Locomotive Works (Ram) The arrival of American lend-lease tanks would pick up significantly during 1942, currently the Americans had capped deliveries to Britain at 180 per month, so that their own armoured formations could be built up. The M3 Light and Medium tanks (Stuart & Grant) were being shipped to Australia, and once the Australian Armoured Division was fully equipped, deliveries would be made to India for its armoured divisions. These would eventually be replaced by Australia’s own production of the Jumbuck. Depending on the outcome of trials of the new M4 (Sherman), deliveries to Commonwealth forces wouldn’t likely to begin until much later in 1942, possibly until the beginning of 1943. From the point of view of some in the army, this would be a better replacement for the Crusader than the Cromwell as proposed.
That being the case, British armoured and tank formations would need to continue to rely on British tank factories for the foreseeable future. The good news in 1941 was that production had expanded towards the levels needed. If that expansion carried on in 1942, then, even with the need to ship tanks to Russia, the British formations would have the tanks they needed for training, and start to build up a strategic reserve of tanks for when the invasion of Europe would make that necessary.
Looking over the figures for tank production during 1941 was heartening. The combined production for the last quarter was 1877 giving a total 4841 tanks for the year. The previous year’s total had been less than 1500, a number surpassed in the last three months.
The introduction of the Churchill was still picking up, so between Matilda II and Churchills 479 Infantry tanks had been built. The slow production of Tetrarch light tanks continued, with twenty-three completed. The greatest output was in cruiser tanks. 1375 was the total of cruiser tanks, of which 459 were Nuffield’s Crusaders and 892 were Valiant I and IIs, with pre-production Victors making up the final twenty-four.
One of the changes that had been noticed was that more tanks could have been produced, perhaps as many as 10%, but the fighting in North Africa had shown that spare parts were crucial to keep the tanks running. Each company had therefore been ordered to accept fewer tanks to allow for enough spares to be produced.
As numbers of 6-pdr guns were increasing, the numbers of Valiant Is were running down, and should end during the first quarter of 1942. The primary difference between the two marks of tanks was in the turret, and with the decision to send tanks without guns to the Russians, there wouldn’t be too much disruption moving from the Valiant II to the Victor.
Nuffield were working on the turret for their Crusader to take the 6-pdr, but their efforts so far were resulting in having to delete the loader, making the tank commander load the gun on top of his other responsibilities. Everything that had been learned so far argued against this. The problem was obviously caused by the diameter of the turret ring. The design team which had worked on the Crusader were currently working on their follow up design.
Retaining the Christie suspension, the Liberty engine (although boosted to give 410 hp) and with less than three inches of armour, the main difference would be the turret ring of sixty inches. Nuffield’s estimate was that the 27-ton tank would have a top speed of 24 mph. There were obviously two immediate problems, the first was the design wouldn’t be able to be easily up-gunned. The sixty-inch turret ring would struggle with anything bigger than the 6-pdr and it seemed odd that they hadn’t thought about the probability of needing a larger gun in due course. The second problem was Nuffield’s commitment to the Liberty engine, even although both the Rolls-Royce Meteor and the Perkins diesel were already at least as powerful as the boosted Liberty.
The pre-production models (Nuffield had argued that since the tank was based on an existing design it wouldn’t need the prototype stage) were due to be delivered for testing in March 1942. The decision to avoid the prototype stage was strongly criticised by a number of different people and organisations. The chances were that the problems that had bedevilled the early production Crusaders was likely to be repeated in the new A24 tank, currently given the name “Cromwell”.
The Victor, had already gone through a long prototype process. The pre-production models that were being built were using hand-built conversions of the Meteor engine from otherwise unflyable Merlin IIIs. Newly built Meteor production was expected to begin in February, allowing the actual production Victors to be built. Work on the dual-purpose gun was continuing even although Major-General Clarke (Director of Artillery) was still intent on making sure that the 17-pdr ammunition and Vickers gun was compatible. Lord Beaverbrook, in his role as Minister of Supply, had been trying to resolve the conflict between Director of Artillery and Vickers. Carden was following the army’s expressed need for a dual purpose tank gun, while Clarke was still insisting that the tank gun and towed anti-tank gun were the same. Both viewpoints were understandable, but Beaverbrook (and Winston Churchill) were leaning more towards Carden’s point of view.
The suggestion of looking to see if the 6-pdr could be used as the basis for a 75mm gun was progressing, and if that bore fruit, then Valiant IIs could be converted to take that compromise gun. If the 75mm HV proved ineffective against future German armour, then Carden was prepared to accept Clarke’s insistence on a 76.2mm HV, even though the gunners would need to take into account the differences of firing the AP and HE shells which would need different tables.
The question turned to expected production figures for 1942. Because of the need to ship Valiant tanks to Russia, production of the Valiant would continue, even though most of Vickers’ consortium of tank manufacturers would move to building the Victor. The production forecast for the first quarter of 1942 was for 320 Matilda IIs 350 Churchills, 395 Crusaders, 1105 Valiant II and the first 100 Victors, if all went well during February and March. The quarterly output of Tetrarch light tanks should also produce 90 tanks. If 1941 had produced 4841 tanks, the hope for 1942 would be more like 9400, though the likelihood was probably about ten or twelve percent less than that.
Canadian production at Canadian Pacific Railway (Valiant) and Montreal Locomotive Works (Ram) The arrival of American lend-lease tanks would pick up significantly during 1942, currently the Americans had capped deliveries to Britain at 180 per month, so that their own armoured formations could be built up. The M3 Light and Medium tanks (Stuart & Grant) were being shipped to Australia, and once the Australian Armoured Division was fully equipped, deliveries would be made to India for its armoured divisions. These would eventually be replaced by Australia’s own production of the Jumbuck. Depending on the outcome of trials of the new M4 (Sherman), deliveries to Commonwealth forces wouldn’t likely to begin until much later in 1942, possibly until the beginning of 1943. From the point of view of some in the army, this would be a better replacement for the Crusader than the Cromwell as proposed.
That being the case, British armoured and tank formations would need to continue to rely on British tank factories for the foreseeable future. The good news in 1941 was that production had expanded towards the levels needed. If that expansion carried on in 1942, then, even with the need to ship tanks to Russia, the British formations would have the tanks they needed for training, and start to build up a strategic reserve of tanks for when the invasion of Europe would make that necessary.
allanpcameron
Donor
| Total | Infantry Tanks | Cruiser Tanks | Light | ||
| 1941: | January–March | 653 | 184 | 469 | nil |
| April–June | 943 | 347 | 566 | 30 | |
| July–September | 1,368 | 406 | 942 | 20 | |
| October–December | 1,877 | 479 | 1,375 | 23 |
FYI this was the actual breakdown for 1941. As you can see I've basically changed round the Infantry and Cruisers. I could have swapped out the Valiant I* and II* (technically cruisers [lighter armour, petrol engine, but faster]) from the Valiant I & II (heavier armour, diesel engine, bit slower) infantry tanks. But since both are being used basically as cruisers (as was the Valentine IOTL) then it was easier to keep it the same. The 10% being used for spare parts is why the numbers of tanks ITTL matches the OTL numbers, although increased production was happening ITTL.
The fundamental difference between OTL and TTL is 746 Covenanters being replaced with Valiant 1* &11* and 690 Churchills built in 1941 is at more like 230 and they've had longer to be fixed up before full deployment. The other 460 is roughly made up of Valiant I & IIs.
Sorry for the long delay in putting this up, but I was getting bogged down again in the fighting in the Far East, so I wanted to get back to a more tank-focused story.
Allan
allanpcameron
Donor
Just following the OTL system. The A24, the A27L and A27M: Since Nuffield wanted to keep the Liberty their A24 Cromwell became the Cavalier. When Leyland took over the A24L became the Centaur (using Liberty). A27M was the Cromwell we know and love with the meteor, built by Birmingham Rail.
Allan
Somehow, I think Nuffield's design lineage isn't long for this world.
allanpcameron
Donor
That's what the Victor will be. At the moment there are still Armoured and Tank Brigades (cruiser and infantry tanks).
Certainly going to have to up his game - perhaps a effective comet design if the long 75mm gets into service earlier?
The lack of a prototype, based on wishful thinking and the fact it's based on an existing design so it'll be fine, cross Nuffield's heart and hope to die, is a massive black mark against it.
Nuffield's track record IOTL is not great. Castle Bromwich anyone?