Which alphabet should the Somali language use?

  • The Cyrillic Alphabet

    Votes: 27 15.8%
  • The Latin Alphabet

    Votes: 77 45.0%
  • The Osmanya Alphabet

    Votes: 31 18.1%
  • The Kaddare Alphabet

    Votes: 20 11.7%
  • The Somalo-Arabic Alphabet

    Votes: 43 25.1%
  • Cyrillic/Latin/Kaddare Alphabets together

    Votes: 11 6.4%
  • Latin/Kaddare/Somalo-Arabic Alphabets together

    Votes: 8 4.7%
  • Cyrillic/Kaddare/Somalo-Arabic Alphabets together

    Votes: 7 4.1%
  • Latin/Cyrillic/Osmanya together

    Votes: 5 2.9%
  • Latin/Osmanya/Kaddare together

    Votes: 3 1.8%
  • Cyrillic/Osmanya/Kaddare together

    Votes: 5 2.9%
  • Cyrillic/Osmanya/Somalo-Arabic together

    Votes: 5 2.9%
  • Latin/Osmanya/Somalo-Arabic together

    Votes: 8 4.7%
  • Latin/Cyrillic/Osmanya/Somalo-Arabic/Kaddare together

    Votes: 17 9.9%

  • Total voters
    171
Introduction
  • Caashooy [Wildcats] by Ahmed Abubakar and the Sharero Band



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    Salaad Gabeyre Kediye just prior to the Las Anod coup



    "In Moscow, we were taught that revolution is a science, carefully plotted and planned. Revolution is a science, one only needs to study Lenin to see that, but any person who has been in the vanguard of great social change can tell you that it is a messy science. When the first comrades of the Academy and I discussed the future, we imagined ourselves as herders leading the camel of state to water. In practice, the camel runs to water without your help and you're left clinging to the back, hoping to stay on. I didn't understand the meaning of the maxim "the masses lead, the statesmen follow" until the day after Las Anod.
    --- Jaalle Salaad Gabeyre Kediye, excerpted from his memoirs




    Introducing the TL

    Welcome to Secret Policemen and Funky Bass Lines (or as I like to call it, The TL My Grandpa Would Have Wanted Me to Write.)

    During the late Sixties and Seventies, the Somali Democratic Republic may have been the most topsy-turvey place in Africa. Communism was associated with prosperity, religious freedom, and the blossoming of the arts, while the lingering taste of Shemarke's Somali Republic left the concept of liberal democracy tied to corruption, the violent suppression of Islam, and cultural stagnation in the minds of the Somali public.


    There were power struggles and rights abuses inside the Supreme Revolutionary Council's "Blue Star Republic", but the coming of scientific socialism was an economic boon compared to the mismanagement of the former country. The country also similarly abandoned its anti-tribal stances after Siad Barre killed his fellow Troika members Kediye and Koshel, then centralized power in the grasp of his Marehan clan. On the other hand, food production greatly increased, as inital plans for forced collectivization were abandoned early on in favor of introducing farming colleges and subsidizing the mechanization of agriculture. The Somali military was one of the largest and most modernized in all of Africa, thanks to purchases of surplus military hardware from the Warsaw Pact and the prevalence of Soviet Army trainers. Small businesses were allowed to run as before while the government nationalized and expanded manufacturing. The XHKS (Xisbiga Hantiwadaagga Kacaanka Soomaaliyeed, or Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party) pushed heavily for the inclusion of women in the workforce, universities, and military while remaining popular with the moderate ulema for ending the Somali Republic's suppression of mosque jama'ah prayers. All this was possible because the XHKS was pragmatic enough to make serious efforts toward improving the daily lives of Somali citizens, and the citizens of the SDR were alright with having the Supreme Revolutionary Council heading the country if it kept them away from the kleptocratic sectionalist mess that was the Somali Republic and pointed them towards increasing modernization/wealth.


    The most incredible part of the Somali Democratic Republic was the renaissance in new music, art, and literature that happened during the first 20 to 25 years under its government. With the XHKS generally well-liked by the populace, the party allowed and actually promoted everything from expressive new paintings to modernist versions of Somali traditional poetry. The government allowed its citizens to watch Western movies, particularly Italian and French films, in large public cinemas. A veritable explosion in new music occurred, with jazz, blues, and funk making waves in Hargeisa's nightclubs.


    We know how this story ends, though. Like a dictatorial Icarus, Siad Barre flies too close to the Sun when he rejects Soviet calls for a ceasefire after grabbing the Ogaden. He wanted to push into Addis Ababa and humiliate the Ethiopians, instead losing all of his gains as well as the friendship of the Warsaw Pact. Having spent millions on a top-quality military just to blow it at the final moment, the XHKS had broken the unspoken agreement between the populace and the party. When people raised their voices in protest, Siad stopped the "gentle hand" style of rule preferred by the party in the past and went full Stalin. The Hangash gendarme went from political legbreakers to vicious killers, the security services dragged out families in the night to disappear into the bowels of the installation called "The Hyena's Den", and members of non-Darod tribes were expelled from the Congress. When the North's Issaq tribe rose in revolt, Barre went to total war with his own people and terror bombed modern-day Somaliland. The Blue Star Republic descended into a brutal civil war that has left the country divided to this day.

    This TL will explore what the Horn of Africa could have been like if the Somali Democratic Republic held on to its golden days, if the dark times following the Ogaden disaster never came to pass. Particularly, we'll see would have happened if the popular young Comrade Kediye came out on top of the brief but bloody power struggle between the members of the revolutionary troika.




    You've got a real suspicious screen name there, pal. Are you some kind of tankie Siad apologist? Not in the slightest, mate. My family is from the Issaq in Burao, so I have a truly depressing number of relatives who died at that butcher's hands. I'm not writing this for that guy, and he's gonna be offed quick to be frank, but I won't make Kediye to be some saint either. I'm a socialist, but I don't think authoritarian party rule lends itself well to a "flowers and happiness forever" kind of governance.

    I will say that as a son of Somalia, the thought that we as a nation had struggled up from the depth of colonial oppression to the heights of the Seventies just to crash back down to failed state status hurts a lot too. I'll try to have events occur as they would logically and there won't be any "XHKS conquers all of Arabia and builds a rocket to Mars" ASB-type scenarios, but we need a good Somalia-wank on the board!


    I thought there weren't many records or studies done on the SDR following the Civil War? What are you gonna use for sources?
    It's true that the coming of the Civil War really screwed the progress of a lot of Western scholarship into the workings of the Somali Democratic Republic, the stabilization of Puntland and Somaliland means that there's a considerable amount of really good studies being done by professors and investigative journalists in Somali. Luckily for us, Somali is a language I read :)


    What's with the YouTube link? I'll admit, it's a blatant ripoff of @The Red and the fantastic art/film accompaniments he does for his "Our Struggle" TL. A big part of understanding the weird world of Communist Somalia is getting to know the wonderful array of popular and experimental music that it produced. There's everything from Somali operas to Somali bluegrass to Somali neo-traditional music, but the American music that caught on the most in the Democratic Republic was funk. There's some wild tracks out there and I'll try to include some in the TL as we go along so that readers can immerse themselves a bit better in Kediye's Somalia.
     
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    The Birth and Death of an Illiberal Democracy - I
  • The Birth and Death of an Illiberal Democracy - Part I




    Dooyo [Wandering] - Sahra Dawo on vocals with the Dur Dur Band




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    An early Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party anti-corruption poster, showing a hand labeled "the rectifying revolution" stabbing a shadowy arm [1] grasping at money. The upper text reads "THE CROOKS WHO GET RICH BY STEALING OUR WEALTH WILL NOT BE MISSED BY THE SWORD OF REVOLUTION!"




    "Everything you might want to know concerning what Abdi [2] thought about the First Somali Republic can be summed up by the fact that the news of President Shermarke's assassination was celebrated with all-night parties in Mogadishu coffeehouses and prayers of thankfulness at the Masjid al-Qiblatayn."
    --- Colonel Axmed Maxamed Guuleed, first chairman of Somali National Movement rebel milita

    "We'd watch these movies, from Britain or Italy or wherever, and all the characters on screen talked about how bad living under Communism would be. We, I mean my sisters and I, we'd never get it. The Somali Youth League were the ones who failed to keep their promises of progress and growth. Under the old Parliament, we never had enough to eat and nobody could afford to become a musician. After the XHKS, the government took over all the big clan conglomerates so regular people could open up shops, while they built up the industry. Electric lights in streets, cars on every curb, TVs in every home, big government grants for singers and performers; that was all the Communists. We thought the white people were crazy. [3]"
    --- Nimco Jamaac, singer-songwriter and theater actor






    Excerpted from "British Colonial Somalia: Underpinnings for a Communist State" by Raageh Omar

    "The Somali Republic has often been described by historians studying post-colonial Africa as an dysfunctional centrist oligarchy, doomed to fall apart because of both social pressures and external factors, but perhaps the novelist Nuruddin Farah said it best when he called the Somali Youth League's nationalist dream a "reanimated cadaver, already dead but made to keep walking by unnatural energies." This dark (if evocative) sentiment aside, the first Republic is important in understanding the later progression of the heterodox Communist rule of Kediye's XHKS. The defeat of their former Fascist Italian masters who had seemed invincible not only gave the new British Administration great prestige in Somali eyes, but also prompted an increasing Somali sophistication in the evaluation of foreign nations. In practical terms, the liberalizing effect of the British Military Administration, while it did not lead to the promotion of Somali civil servants to the extent followed in Eritrea, led to the training of a cadre of junior Somali officials and a smaller number of more senior police officers. This, as later events were to show, provided a sound if modest basis for more extensive Somali advancement in the civil service in the trusteeship period preceding independence. Of even greater significance, however, was the Administration’s attitude towards local politics. Once it had found its feet, the new government abolished the restrictions of the Italian régime on local political associations and clubs. Immediately, a proliferation of Italian societies arose, expressing all shades of metropolitan opinion from that of the extreme right to the extreme left. After the fall of the fascists, local branches of the Christian Democrats gained the largest affiliation amongst the Italian community. All these Italian groups were naturally interested in the question of the future status of Somalia, an issue on which all shades of Italian party opinion showed virtual unanimity, the strength of patriotism being apparently greater than that of party doctrine. This issue and the upsurge of activity among the Italian clubs and associations attracted considerable Somali interest.


    In these conditions, the currents of progressive Somali opinion which had begun to seek expression in the closing days of the fascist period, took concrete form with the establishment of a number of Somali societies and clubs. The first and most important of these movements to achieve a formal existence was the Somali Youth Club opened at Mogadishu on 13 May, 1943, after several weeks of discussion with the local Political Officer on the form of the society’s constitution. The Club had thirteen founder members representing all the main Somali clan groups. Much of the inspiration came from ‘Abdulqadir Sekhawe Din, a prominent religious figure of Mogadishu, and from Yasin Haji ‘Isman Shirmarke of the Majerteyn clan of northern Somalia. Another prominent religious leader who played an important part in the Club’s early days was Haji Muhammad Husseyn, also of Mogadishu. Thus, from its inception the new society contained representatives of the majority of the traditional clan divisions within the nation, and of men of religion as well as laymen, united in the desire to abolish the wasteful clan rivalries of the past and to establish a new conception of nationhood. These aims had always been present in Somali Islam, and forty years earlier, at the time of Sayyid Muhammad ‘Abdille Hassan, this was the only means by which national patriotism could be expressed coherently. Now, however, these religious aims were married to a modern consciousness of nationhood, and strengthened by a desire for progress in general expressed through the new vehicle of the Somali Youth Club.


    By 1946 the British Military Administration officially estimated the Club to number no less than 25,000 affiliates, and by the end of 1947 it had changed its name to the Somali Youth League and was strongly organized as a political machine with branches throughout Somalia, in the Ogaden, Haud, British Protectorate, and even in Kenya where its activities, in a different administrative milieu, were viewed with distinctly less favour. The League had now a four point programme: ‘To unite all Somalis generally, and the youth especially with the consequent repudiation of all harmful old prejudices (such, for example, as tribal and clan distinctions); To educate the youth in modern civilization by means of schools and by cultural propaganda circles; To take an interest in and assist in eliminating by constitutional and legal means any existing or future situations which might be prejudicial to the interests of the Somali people; And finally, to develop the Somali language and to assist in putting into use among Somalis the ‘Osmaniya Somali script.’


    These were aims with which, as will be evident, no reasonable and self-proclaimed progressive administration could possibly find fault. Of particular interest in this programme is its realistic attitude towards modern education, so different from the traditional religious opposition to western schooling. Nor was the League’s view on this matter merely verbal propaganda. Already, on its own initiative, and with the approval of the Administration, the S.Y.L. had opened a number of schools and classes in English. Now too, the ingenious Somali ‘Osmaniya script, was no longer merely a cultural curiosity, but had acquired definite nationalist significance. The difficulties attending its wholesale adoption, partly practical and partly as a result of competition with Arabic, have proved more intractable than some of the other objectives in this initial S.Y.L. statement of policy.


    Although the largest and best organized movement, the League was not the only organization to emerge in this initial period. Apart from a number of ephemeral smaller groups, mainly with limited local and particularistic interests, the most important rival was originally formed under the name of the Patriotic Benefit Union, or ‘Jumiya’, representing chiefly southern Rahanweyn and Digil tribesmen, the partly Bantu riverine peoples, and some of the local Arab community. This organization, with the welcome addition of Italian financial support, favoured a more conservative policy and sought particularly to protect the interests of the southern agricultural tribesmen from domination by the northern nomads who overwhelmingly supported the League. Out of this body, which was markedly less anti-Italian than its rival, developed the Hizbia Digil-Mirifle Somali, formed on 25 March, 1947, under the presidency of Sheikh ‘Abdallah Sheikh Muhammad. Meanwhile, the tempo of political activity and interest had soared after the war with increasing speculation on the future status of the Somalilands, an issue which could only be resolved in the context of the whole tangled problem of the disposal of all the former Italian colonies. Already Ethiopia was pressing for the return of the Ogaden and Reserved Areas, her sovereignty over which had been recognized in the 1942 and 1944 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreements. Ethiopian pretensions extended also even to Somalia, which of course Italy was now claiming strongly. To the four Powers initially charged with the disposal of the Italian colonies, however, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, sensibly proposed in the spring of 1946 that the interests of the Somali people would be best served if the existing union of Somali territories were continued. A trusteeship, preferably under Britain, although this was not an essential condition, was suggested.


    Unfortunately for Somali aspirations but scarcely surprisingly, this solution was strenuously opposed by Ethiopia. Nor was Ethiopia to be distracted from her determination to regain the Ogaden by the promise of British support for her claims to Eritrea, or more directly, by the offer of the port of Zeila and parts of the north-west of the Protectorate in exchange for those areas of the Haud and Ogaden regularly frequented by British protected clansmen in their grazing movements. This tardy British attempt to adjust the situation showed some concern for Somali nomadic interests, and a recognition of the real problems created by the partition of a nomadic people. Even under the unitary control of the British Military Administration these had proved singularly troublesome and had been a constant source of friction. This argument, however, had no appeal for Ethiopia. Nor did it carry much weight with the other three powers concerned with the problem of the disposal of the Italian territories..."



    1. The hand is actually based on the gnarled claw of an evil cannibal witch from Somali folklore called Dhegdheer (or Long Ear in English.) Unsurprisingly, her trademark feature is one long ear which she used to hear her human prey from long distances away. Mostly used as a scary story to freak out kids, her greedy nature leading to her eventual defeat is also something like an Aesop's Fable warning against selfishness in Somali culture. Naturally, she's used heavily by the XHKS in propaganda denouncing wreckers and capitalists. She's basically the Porky meme of 70s Somalia.
    2. "Abdi" or "the average Abdi" is Somali slang for any random person, much like "Joe Shmoe" or "John Q. Public" in English.
    3. A good way to think about the first 20 years of "the soft rule" under the XHKS is to imagine a proto-Dengist semicommand economy with the government holding the "controlling heights" of the economy in their hands, combined with a liberal stance on social control, Islamic overtones, and fervent Somali irredentism.



    EDIT: Thanks for all the interest and kind comments! It's not well-known that Somalia's Communists were so initially successful, though they did have a lot going for them. The Somali Youth League did the nasty work of forcibly settling many nomadic populations, suppressing the tribal separatists, and crushing the conservative wing of the ulema. This made them widely unpopular, letting the Communists come off squeaky clean because the previous regime had committed most of the atrocities they would have had to do if they ran things from the start. As far as the Communists themselves, they were remarkably pragmatic as far as allowing capitalism and freeholding farmers to run at the small scale while quickly taking over industries. They never picked up the abhorrence of Western media that other parties did and had tons of Warsaw Pact money poured in because of Somalia's strategic location. It's basically the mirror image of the hardliner Derg that takes power in Ethiopia.
     
    Fascist Flicks, Mystic Musicals - Film and Theater in Colonial Somalia
    • Fascist Flicks, Mystic Musicals:
    Film and Theater in Colonial Somalia



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    A still shot of nomad women performing the dhaanto dance




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    Romolo Marcellini, the director of the first full-length film shot in Somalia - the Fascist propaganda movie Sentinels of Bronze




    "Nothing infuriates the nationalists among my colleagues more than reminding them that Somalia's first film was about Ethiopians."
    --- Hadji Maxamed Giumale, director and father of native Somali cinema


    "That gifted girl
    was found guilty of what?
    Love that was tethered to
    ‘the branch with short roots
    that can’t reach the heights;
    the wild choice
    of the wrong beloved’ –
    so they threw her in jail.

    Then, although no-one tried her,
    that Holy Place of love
    which was a seat for
    her gleaming heart,
    that shrine to passion
    was ripped open by a bullet."

    --- from the sheeko play "Death of a Princess"





    Transcript from a BBC Africa broadcast - May 12, 1986

    BBC Africa editor Mary Harper: In this installment of our series on the culture of Africa's "Blue Miracle", I'm sitting here in a Mogadishu cafe with Somalia's most beloved filmmaker Haji Muhammad Giumale. Thank you for being here today, Dr. Giumale.

    Hadji Muhammad Giumale: Thank you for having me, but please call me Muhammad. Only my students and my bosses call me Dr. Giumale. (Laughs)

    MH: Alright, Muhammad. You're famous for being the mind behind the first wave of indigenous cinema here in Somalia, but it's less well known that you were actually in the first movie made in Somalia. Can you talk about that for a little?

    HMG: That's right. I was an extra in Sentinelle di Bronzo, Marcellini's big war movie about heroic Italian soldiers and their loyal Somali colonial auxiliaries fighting off mad hordes of Ethiopian warriors. It was exactly what you'd expect from a fascist movie: lots of glorious battle, the superiority of the European over his barbaric opponents, and a bad romantic subplot thrown in for little reason. I was maybe 15 or 16 at the time, hoping to get a little extra cash for my family. Times were tough back then, everybody had to scrimp and save to get by. I played an Ethiopian soldier, one who dies about 15 seconds after he shows up on screen. Now that I think about it, it may have been the most realistic scene in the film. The fascists did kill a lot of Ethiopian boys, barely old enough to wear a uniform.

    MH: In your autobiography, you mention that you never saw the film until years after it had come out. Did you disagree with the message or was it too expensive to see in the Somali theaters?

    HMG: Certainly the pricing didn't help, but the main reason I didn't get to watch it was that the theaters - even the grand old Cinema Italia down the road where the MOGPAAFIS [1] is held - didn't allow colonial subjects to watch films. Somalis, Bantus, Arabs, we all got locked out of the moviehouses. It was a hurtful gesture but not unexpected. We knew where we stood in the eyes of Rome. Even the Italo-Somali kids from mixed families, they didn't get it much better than we did. Their Italian families often shunned them, so naturally they became closer to their Somali heritage. That just further proved the degeneracy of the biracial population to the fascists until there was almost no difference in status between the half-Italians and the full Somalis in colonial eyes.

    MH: You worked closely with a series of Italo-Somali filmmakers when producing your Early short films. How much of an influence was Italian cinema on your own work?

    HMG: It's hard to overstate the importance of my Italo-Somali colleagues in helping me with my first projects. Before the relations between the colonial government and the Italo-Somali community turned frosty, many of them went to Rome to study. The ones who studied filmmaking brought back a lot of technical skill and starting capital, which they used to kickstart the indigenous production of films when the Italian colonials turned on them. This was a slow process, though, and I wouldn't say there was a mature Somali cinema until the 60s.

    MH: But the people of Somalia were all watching the riwayaado [2], yes? This is when native musical theater makes its apperance in the cities.

    HMG: Yes and no. Colonial Somalia was, as you say, where the genesis of Somali musicals took place, but it wasn't yet the heavily produced riwayaado theater that has since migrated to other parts of the Islamic world. This was the transitionary stage between the Sufi sheeko tradition and our Democratic Republic's over-the-top romance and history musicals.

    MH: You're referring to the Qadiriyya order and their itnerent thespian-poets.

    HMG: Someone did their homework! That's exactly correct, Miss Harper. Even though Somalia's most famous Sufis are the Saalihiya order that Muhammad Abdullah Hassan popularized, the Horn has been home to dozens of other Sufi traditions. The Qadiriyya of Somalia are a heterodox branch of that order, heavily influenced by the Zaidi Shi'as of Yemen that frequently visited Hargeisa and Berbera up north. It began in the multicultural city of Harar, blending further with Oromo syncretic Islam. It's born in Ethiopia, but the Qadiriyya-Harariya definitely did best in Somalia. The devotees would go from village to village, putting on these religious plays where they would act out either stories from Islamic history or Somali folktales. Singing and dancing was a big component of this - many of the songs would be standard and memorized but for the last portion of every song, the actor was expected to improvise their own lyrics.

    MH: Improvise?

    HMG: Yes, improvise. Somalis have been fond of impromptu poetry for about as long as we've known how to speak to each other. The main entertainment of the nomadic peoples before the sheeko was the "poetry duel", where one duelist would come up with a poem in the gabey style, then their opponent would respond with a poem beginning with the last word of the previous poem. An element of this gets preserved in the sheeko, where the actor-devotee becomes "intoxicated by God and beauty" at the crescendo of the music and sings original lyrics to complete the song. The audience is supposed to clap rhymically to help the actors enter the trance. It's quite an experience. This sheeko tradition starts to become more like musical theater of Europe when Italo-Somalis, cast out by their Italian compatriots, begin to fund the presentation of sheeko plays in native-built theater halls.

    MH: I'd like to see one someday, but I understand that currently the nature of the sheeko is a hot-button issue. Could you talk about Saudi Arabia banning the viewing of Somali musicals for "insidious corrupting tendencies?"

    HMG: The elephant in the room, no? This is fundamentally the clash of two kinds of Islam: the hidebound Islam of the reactionary puritan class and the popular Islam of the revolutionary masses. "Insidious corrupting tendencies" is clearly a dog whistle for homosexuality, on which the Kingdom has made its medieval stance well known. The Somali nomadic branch of the Qadiriyya, being the one of two branches that allow for female disciples, does have a long history of being a refuge for romance between women [3]. Sufis have historically been far more tolerant of homoeroticism, as evidenced by the Sufi traditions in Anatolia and Iran, and this holds true in Somalia. Some of the most famous sheeko performances have been about love between women, like Death of a Princess [4]. This is simply part of Somalia, we've been a Sufi country for most of our history, and we have no intentions of conforming to whatever dictates come out of Saudi Arabia. As for their own strictures, well, they can only fight the future for so long.

    MH: Muhammad, thanks for your time today.

    HMG: No, thank you.

    MH: This has been an interview with the director and Somali Film Service official Dr. Hadji Muhammad Giumale. Tune in next week as BBC Africa takes you back stage with the Blue Star Republic's hottest youth band.



    1. The Mogadishu Pan-African and Arab Film Symposium. This was actually a well-attended film festival in OTL.
    2. Now used to refer to any film or stage show with singing, this was originally a term used specifically for the secular stage musicals that emerged from the Sufi sheeko musical theater tradition.
    3. Yet another thing that everybody would call ASB if it wasn't from OTL. Somalia's religious conservatism is an incredibly recent phenomenon, owing to influence from the Arabian Peninsula during the period of destabilization starting just before the Civil War until now. Even though the average Somali considered themselves Shafi'i Sunnis, they also saw themselves as members of one or more Sufi orders simultaneously. The Somalists like Enrico Cerulli, Said Samatar and Charles Geshekter all write extensively about the lesbian homoeroticism of the female adherents to Qadiriyya-Harariyya - which is honestly not that shocking if you look at some of the stuff they were singing. I mean, there's literally a sheeko with a title that more or less translates to "I Prefer the Soft Curves of Eve to the Rigid Embrace of Adam." Anything more blatantly lesbian would just consist of someone screaming "I'M GAY!" at the audience for two hours. The sheeko tradition (and all of Somali sufism) is heavily suppessed in the three modern-day Somali succesor states, even though its descendant riwayaado has found a new home in Somaliwood films. If you want a laugh, you should try to find a video of Somalia's new "liberal" president Farmaajo attempting to praise the sheeko play tradition as Somali heritage while awkwardly avoiding how so much of it was about ladies kissing ladies.
    4. There's a translation of the formal poetic adaptation of Death of a Princess floating around the Internet (which is good, so much of Somalia's literary tradition is still only in Somali), written by the poet Gaariyye. This version is what Said Samatar called "a neutered replica of the original, with anything that might offend conservative sensibilities removed." The original version of this was about a woman who was killed for openly loving another woman by zealots, but the Gaariyye version has her killed for loving a boy from another clan. Anyone who has even a passing familiarity with how clans work in Somalia could tell you that this makes no sense. Somalis are heavily exogamous, with strong taboos against marrying with one's own subclan. Even marrying within your wider tribe was weird until the fracturing after the Civil War. The idea was to make your clan stronger, you had to make as many marriage alliances with other clans as possible. This is also one reason why Italo-Somalis are quickly absorbed into Somali society.
     
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    The Birth and Death of an Illiberal Democracy - II
  • The Birth and Death of an Illiberal Democracy - Part II



    Is Yeelyel [You Better Do It Quick!] - Sahra Dawo and the Dur Dur Band performing in Hargeisa, Somali Democratic Republic (modern-day Somaliland) [1]



    Bandiera Rossa [Red Flag] (also called "Avanti Popolo!" or "Forward, People!") - the anthem of the Partito Comunista Italiano, written by Carlo Tuzzi


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    An XHKS propaganda poster celebrating May Day, displaying the arms of people from different ethnicities lifting up a red banner emblazoned with the image of Karl Marx while Somali, Bantu and Arab workers look on. An olive branch symbolizing the peace of socialism appears in the bottom left, while the starry background represents the new horizons that the proletariat can aspire to. The text on the flag reads "Workers of the World, Unite!", with the words "1st May, the Symbol of the Struggle of the World's Workers" written across the bottom.






    "The problem that was troubling those of us who wished to develop socialism in Somalia was the one that also vexed Comrades Lenin and Bukharin [2] as they reviewed the post-Revolution state of Russia: capitalist development was not existant in Somalia when we were junior officers. The proletariat had attained the developmental stage and industry was beginning to progress, but the industrialists in the First Republic were interested in backwards feudal relations, not modernized capitalism. It was apparent to the comrades assembled that we had to absorb the progressive bourgeoisie and utilize them to create the conditions for completed socialism like Lenin did in the New Economic Policy. To ward off later treachery, as history shows is rife in the ranks of the bourgeois class, our Somali NEPmani would have to be affixed to the socialist programme from the beginning. Much like the proletariat could be hoodwinked by the powerful into acting against their class interests, we would teach a generation to put the future of the SomaliI people above their class interests. It was an ambitious goal: to create a class of petite bourgeoisie who would happily toil for the Worker’s Republic."
    --- Jaale Salaad Gabreye Kediye in Warqadaha ku Saabsan Kacaanka (The Letters on Revolution)








    Excerpted from "From Bad Policy to Chaos in the Somali Republic" by Nuruddin Jamaac Farah



    "From the very beginning, all of the polities involved in the British plan to unite all ethnically-Somali territories under one government was to have any prospect of success it would need strong advocacy. Although the plan was pushed for by a majority of the rank-and-file British Somali Service officers, many of whom had fond memories of serving with the Somaliland Camel Corps against the Italians during the war against fascism, it soon became obvious that the forces arrayed against the plan were such that to have sought to overcome them would have required a degree of effort and political sacrifice which was not warranted by Britain’s very limited strategic interests in the area. By the end of 1946, the Four Powers had still not reached agreement on the whole turgid question of Italy’s former possessions and it was decided to send out a commission to the countries concerned (Somalia, Eritrea, and Libya in particular) to consult their own aspirations for the future. The commission arrived at Mogadishu in the beginning of 1948, but by this time, the local political scene had become complicated by the increased efforts of the Italians to secure a favourable pro-Italian front, and by the premature announcement of the Bevin proposals. Though still uncompromisingly opposed to any return of their territory to Italy, and still the party with by far the largest following, the S.Y.L. had experienced a something of a split in its ranks in its former base voters in the Majerteyn, where large cash bribes forwarded by Italian interests had secured the promotion of a rival splinter group called the ‘Progressive Majerteyn League’. The Hizbia Digil Mirifle was more seriously divided internally: and all the other Somali societies had joined together in an alliance called simply ‘The Interest’ [3] – in which pro-Italian sentiments were fostered by Italian money. Nevertheless, despite the presence of this intrusive Italian influence, this configuration of interests had a basis in Somali political realities at the time.



    Notwithstanding the attempt to detach the important Majerteyn element, the S.Y.L. had now a strong Darod following and anti-Darod traditional interests were often suspicious of and hostile to the League. This was the case with many, though not all Somalis of the Hawiye clans, of whom an important group centring on Mogadishu tended to regard the Italians as potential allies against further Darod intrusion and pressure in their affairs. Similarly, a number of the Rahanweyn and Digil tribesmen continued to accept Italian support in an effort to advance their interests against those of the predominantly Isaaq townsmen and pastoralists of the North, many of whom had preferred the British to the Italians and had been pushing for increased modernization. In addition to attempting to divide the ranks of their strongest opponents in the League and to sponsoring and encouraging the growth of rival organizations, the Italians were also engaged in a direct and forthright propaganda campaign for the return of Somalia to Italy. Towards the end of 1947 these manoeuvres assumed formidable proportions, and local manifestations of Italian concern, backed by the metropolitan radio and press, had become increasingly vociferous and imperialist in tone. It was, moreover, difficult for the British Military Administration to deal fairly and also firmly with this upsurge of Italian national pride. The future of the territory was still in question and already Somali hopes had been unjustifiably encouraged by discussion of the Bevin plan which, as was now becoming increasingly evident, could not be implemented. The local Italian community was, however, warned officially of the dangers which were likely to ensue if this exuberant campaign continued. But, apparently, the Italians relied upon the British Administration to uphold their interests, even if this meant suppressing Somali nationalist fervor with money and political intimidation. Certainly there was little if any modification in the conduct of the Italian agitation for a return of Somalia to Italy, and events came to a tragic head with the arrival of the Four Power Commission of inquiry. As soon as the Commission had assembled at Mogadishu it was greeted by a flurry of Italian flags and slogans. The British Chief Administrator of Somaliland, a man who had spent almost 27 years in Somaliland for the Crown, warned the Commissioners of the danger to public order, and particularly to Italian lives and property, likely to follow if similar demonstrations were allowed to continue.



    The Commission, however, replied that it wished to observe such public manifestations of support, and asked that permission be granted for a large public rally to be held by the S.Y.L. on 11 January. This was granted, and on the appointed day the Youth League assembled a large number of its supporters at Mogadishu. On the morning of the same day, without prior notification or authorization, members of the Italian community and their supporters and henchmen, many of whom had been hired for the occasion, thronged into the town. Many of the Italian party were armed with rifles, blades, and clubs, which they proceeded to apply in a determined effort to break up the S.Y.L. demonstration. The S.Y.L had been tipped off by sympathizing Italians associated with the local Partito Comunista Italiano supporter club beforehand and the Somalis brought their own Sten guns and bush knives to the rally. Tensions rapidly mounted, and both sides were soon engaged in a full-scale street battle in the course of which anti-Somali independence Italians shot at S.Y.L. supporters and threw hand-grenades into the crowd, while the S.Y.L Somali nationalists and their Italian communist allies fired back in full auto with their submachine guns. The British were unprepared for the scale of the violence, with coffeeshops and city buildings being riddled with bullets as the anti-S.Y.L forces were pushed back and dispersed by the victorious pro-Somali coalition. This rash action cost the Italian community dear; fifty-one Italians were killed and a similar number wounded. Somali casualties were somewhat less severe. Widespread looting also occurred, and further violence was only prevented by the action of the British-trained Somali Gendarmerie supported by troopers from the King’s African Rifles. After this unfortunate incident, hysterical allegations were levelled at the British Administration which was accused of complicity on the Somali side and of failing adequately to protect Italian lives and property [4]. It was in this atmosphere of smouldering animosity that the Four Power Commission proceeded to examine, surprisingly nonchalantly in the circumstances, the cases of the various parties and groups, the Italians hoping to profit from the sympathy which their losses had attracted.



    The main spokesman for the S.Y.L. was ‘Abdillahi Issa (later to become the first Premier of Somalia). The League’s President, Haji Mahammad Husseyn, also played a prominent part in the hearings; and the very detailed and impressive S.Y.L. programme for the future development of the country was drafted with the advice of Gheedi Salole, an Aden-born Somali lawyer employed in the legal department of the Administration, and of Michael Mariano, a former administrative employee from the north. As on previous occasions, the party stressed its aim of bringing the Somali territories together under a single government, of working steadily towards full independence, and advocated a ten years’ period of trusteeship for Somalia under Four Power administration. On no account would the SYL or its supporters in the Italian left that had carved out a niche in Somalia countenance a return of Italian rule. The majority of the other Somali groups, organized with Italian financial support into a consortium under the name of the ‘Somalia Conference’, presented a less coherent programme in which they proposed a trusteeship period of thirty years for Somalia, under Italian rule, but subject to the radical reform of the country and its development in all spheres. The H.D.M.S., while previously supporting this view, had now broken with the Conference and favoured Four Power trusteeship for the same lengthy period. The opinions of all the local Italian societies and interest-groups were conscientiously heard, and treated indeed with greater respect and attention than their numbers might have seemed to warrant. These, with only the exception of the aforementioned Partito Comunista Italiano supporters [5] unanimously favoured the return of Somalia to Italy. Having studied the views of a considerable cross-section of the population, the Commission in due course submitted its findings on Somalia to the Council of Foreign Ministers, reporting correctly, despite frequent humiliating and often-racist insults aimed at S.Y.L. delegates during the hearings, that the League’s programme commanded the largest public support in the territory. With this failure to reach agreement which involved also the other ex-Italian colonies, the whole turgid issue was passed for settlement to the General Assembly of the United Nations. And having now abandoned its earlier proposals for Somali unification, the British government proceeded to defend its new position by seeking to discredit the S.Y.L. claim to speak for the majority of Somali. Statements in the House of Commons to this effect, drew a sharp reply from Shermarke who had now become Secretary of the League (and was later to lead an independent Somali government before falling to a coup.) ‘Abdillahi Issa was dispatched to lobby the United Nations delegates: and the pro-Italian Conference now enjoying little public support, and largely controlled by the Italian Liaison staff at Mogadishu, sent representatives to promote the Italian case.



    While the U.N. Assembly discussed the disposal of the Italian colonies at its meeting at Lake Success in 1949, having before it the Bevin-Sforza compromise plan proposing Italian trusteeship for Somalia for an unspecified period, popular demonstrations against the Italians continued at Mogadishu and elsewhere in the territory. Somalia’s fate was now clearly in the balance, and Somali hopes seemed likely to founder, as so often in the past, for reasons beyond their control in occuring in countries far away. This plan presentation did happen, but, despite the strength of local anti-Italian feeling, the Assembly’s decision on to entrust Somalia for ten years to Italian administration under U.N. tutelage was received calmly and without incident. This unexpectedly peaceful acceptance of the decision was not merely a matter of resignation in the face of the inevitable, although the upper bureaucracy of the British government was far less concerned than the outcry from the career British Somali Service officers, who felt that they were leaving their Somali charges to be crushed under the boot of resurgent Italian nationalism. Due account has to be taken of the very firm provisions which the Assembly laid down ensuring that Italy would discharge her new responsibilities honourably, and, even more significant, of the limitation of the period of trusteeship to ten years. In any case, Somali nationalism expressed through the S.Y.L, which had immediately gathered a wave of support from the populace in the wake of the news from the UN, was now so firmly entrenched that there could be no return to the stagnation and oppression of the fascist period without the Somalis paying back the colonizers in blood."



    1. Finally, some video of a performance as well! The guy on the drums at 0:14 sec in really gets into the groove, which gave me a chuckle. More informatively, though Mogadishu is the administrative capital and largest city of the SDR, Hargeisa (The current capital of Somaliland) was the cultural hub of 70s-80s Somalia. I haven't seen a reason why this was that I've found too convincing, but Said Samatar makes the case that Hargeisa's local party branch of the XHKS (there was some small amounts of local party autonomy, mostly in cultural settings, as a way to throw a bone to the remnants of the tribal seperatists) was particularly generous in giving grants to artists and musicians, but I haven't seen anything else saying that, so who knows?
    2. Now, there's a couple of things to note here. Kediye is Moscow-trained and obviously well-versed in the Marxist-Leninist foundational literature, but the reference to Bukharin surprised me. My Sovietology isn't the best, so I'm not sure whether or not Bukharin had been rehabilitated by this time. If he hadn't been, this would be a n interesting doctrinal difference with Kremlin Marxism-Leninism, which the rest of the passage shows Kediye was not afraid of. The Soviets did often send letters asking the Somali communists why they were so weird, but since they were steadfastly loyal allies to Moscow who were doing a good job of promoting USSR interests in a useful region, the Sovs mostly let the XHKS do as they wished. Obviously, more than one country has thought of reviving the NEP, but I'm not sure if the concept of creating loyal petty bourgeoisie who would act against their class interests is one I've seen elsewhere. It's a strange feature of Somali communism, but Kediye's theory is more or less adopted by the Siad regime.
    3. You'd think they'd come up with a name that doesn't sound like a shadowy conspiratorial organization of villains, but here we are.
    4. Neglecting to mention, of course, that they had been the ones to start the shooting :rolleyes:
    5. It may seem like the Italian Communist's token resistance (and not so token resistance in the street fighting earlier) would be forgotten in a wave of anti-Italian resistance, but the fact that the PCI Supporter's Club in Somalia was the only foreign group that didn't try to actively screw them or roll over in the face of Italian screaming at the UN leaves a deep impression on the populace. These are the formative years for the young communists that found the SDR and what they'll remember is that the PCI supporters were the ones who stood up for Somalia when even their old friends the British wrung their hands. Now, this isn't quite fair to the British Somali Service careerists who did want to keep the Italians out of Somalia, but it makes little difference to the Somali people. Even if they were a minority and their advocacy/physical support resulted in little, the very fact that they gave a damn gives Marxism a positive reputation in the country.
    EDIT: Look, I know Bandiera Rossa isn't Somali music, but the PCI is involved and it's a banger.
     
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    The Birth and Death of an Illiberal Democracy - III
  • The Birth and Death of an Illiberal Democracy - III


    DAv_C38_RXc_AAae_W.jpg

    The ladies of a biracial Italo-Somali family pose for a picture, Berbera, British Somali Protectorate, 1948


    12717101_1260964423933871_541878062_n.jpg

    A view of the Indian Ocean from the Old Quarter of Merca




    excerpted from "The Roots of a Conquest - Understanding the Post-War Ogaden from Ethiopian Rule to Reunification" by Ali Warsame


    "While in Somalia itself the majority of the population had been fighting to achieve independence and freedom from Italian rule, in the Ogaden a similar campaign was in progress against the surrender of that territory to Ethiopia. And despite its isolation and backwardness, the new aspirations spread by the League quickly found support. As early as 1942 there had been disturbances in the Harar–Jigjiga region connected with Ethiopian attempts to impose direct taxation. Two years later, leaders of the Ogaden clans petitioned the British Military Administration, urging Britain not to relinquish their territory to Ethiopian rule. These attempts to preserve Somali independence were countered by Ethiopian moves designed to win Somali favour. To the embarrassment of the British authorities, the Ethiopian Governor at Jigjiga sought to solicit Somali goodwill by offering higher salaries to Somali elders and clan leaders than those paid by the Administration. The response to these overtures varied, but were generally negative. The official head of the faction-ridden Gadabursi clan, in receipt of a stipend from both sides, was gradually won over to the Ethiopian cause, leading a set of Gadabursi to defect from the S.Y.L. The majority, however, flocked to the League which became so successful that the Ethiopians sought to ban it, but were prevented by the British Administration. Having failed in this direct line of attack, a counter-movement financed by the Ethiopian government was launched called the Somali Mutual Relief Association. This, however, did not attract much support. Full advantage was also taken of the occasion of the Duke of Harar’s wedding in 1946 to which leading Ogaden clansmen were invited as official guests. These various blandishments were of questionable value, but with uncertainty as to whether the Bevin plan would be implemented mounting, towards the end of 1946 a number of Ogaden leaders took the precaution of making loose contact with the Ethiopian governor at Jigjiga. This situation, indeed, was one with which the Ogaden clansmen were already only too familiar from their previous experience of Italo-Ethiopian competition. And in the present circumstances of continued doubt as to their future position, it was natural that the clansmen concerned should seek to provide for every possibility. Nevertheless, the general character of opposition to Ethiopian control was indisputable. In 1947, this was amply demonstrated when, with the exception only of the Gadabursi, all the clans of the Ogaden and Reserved Areas presented the British authorities with a petition against the surrender of their country to Ethiopia, requesting that their protests should be conveyed to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Britain, as has been seen, had earlier sought to retain the Ogaden as part of the Bevin scheme for Somali unification. But as this plan had come to nothing, the British government decided that the time had now come to abandon the Ogaden to Ethiopia in fulfilment of the 1942 and 1944 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreements. This course of action was adopted despite the known strength of Somali feeling on the matter, and the natural repugnance of the British officials on the spot to participate in what many regarded as a betrayal of Somali interests. And when the decision was announced at Jigjiga, a riot occurred in which twenty-five Somalis and four Italian communists lost their lives when Ethiopian soldiers shot into the crowd. Nevertheless, apart from this gesture of defiance, the population of the Ogaden as a whole bowed to the inevitable; and the transfer from British to Ethiopian control took place smoothly and without further incident on 23 September, 1948. This unexpectedly peaceful exchange, whether or not this was the intended effect, was no doubt facilitated by the disbursement amongst the Ogaden clansmen of some £91,000 by the departing British in settlement of all outstanding blood-dues and claims incurred during the period of British rule.


    In any event, Ethiopia had at last gained the Ogaden which she had so long coveted, and, in contrast to the position at the time of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict in 1935, was now in a position to establish her rule throughout this vast area. The tribute-gathering sorties which Ras Makonnen had sent out from Harar and Jigjiga at the turn of the century, which had created a basis for Ethiopia’s pretensions to sovereignty over the Ogaden, had at last borne fruit. However, by agreement with Ethiopia, Britain retained a temporary civil affairs administration, directed from the British Protectorate, within that part of the Haud and Ogaden which the 1935 Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission had established as being habitually frequented by British protected Somali clansmen in their further grazing movements. This, of course, did not in any way question Ethiopia’s sovereignty in these ‘Reserved Areas’, although this rested ultimately upon the ambiguous 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian treaty, which despite the recent interpretation given to it had originally carefully refrained from acknowledging Ethiopian sovereignty over the areas in question.Thus Ethiopia had in fact done very well in these transactions, and had turned the Italian conquest of her territory to considerable profit. She had gained the Ogaden which she had never fully administered and to which her only international title was provided by the 1897 and 1908 Italo-Ethiopian agreements. And even if she was not at once to administer it fully, she had also now unambiguously acquired the Haud, to which her original legal, as well as moral, claim was tenuous and debatable. As the victim of fascist aggression, Ethiopia had naturally every right to the most considerate and generous treatment. But it was unfortunate that, in the process of satisfying her claims to reparation for the events of the past, protesting Somalis should be sacrificed and the collective Somali desire for national self-determination be cast aside almost as soon as it had achieved an articulate existence.


    The rehabilitation of the British Protectorate after having abandoned the Bevin plan for a Greater Somalia, and having relinquished the Ogaden to Ethiopia, the next step was obviously the return of the British Somaliland Protectorate to its pre-war status. This took place in November 1948 when Mr Gerald Reece (later Sir Gerald), formerly Provincial Commissioner in the Northern Province of Kenya, was appointed Governor of the Protectorate and also invested with the office of Military Administrator of the Haud and Reserved Areas. Since the re-occupation of the Protectorate in 1941 much had occurred, the old care and maintenance policy of the past having been at last decisively abandoned in favour of more progressive policies. For this complete change of orientation much credit is due to the efforts of Sir Gerald Fisher, Military Governor from 1943 to 1948. Despite the more intractable character of economic and social conditions in the Protectorate as compared with Somalia, and the absence of the colonial basis which had been created there by the Italians, the upheavals of the war had not been without effect upon the local Somali population. These circumstances favoured an extension of the modernist trend which had begun to appear before the war; there was now appreciably less hostility to secular progress and social change. On the return of the British in April 1941, the first problems were again those of re-establishing normal trade and commerce and of restoring law and order, which, as in Somalia, entailed the recovery of the large stores of weapons and ammunition discarded during the fighting. Since Berbera, as well as a number of other stations, had been seriously damaged in the operations, it was decided to build a new government headquarters at Hargeisa, the site of Sheikh Maddar’s religious community, in the central hinterland of the Protectorate. This was a decision in full accord with the new forward policy of extending administrative and social services through the Protectorate: the old days of the coast administration based on Berbera had gone for ever. The reception accorded to the returning British was also propitious. On its own initiative the Camel Corps reported for duty armed with Italian weapons, and was at once dispatched to disarm and gauge the feelings of the clansmen of the interior. By the end of the year, trade and commerce were back to normal although the attempted disarmament of the whole population had not been achieved. By the end of the following year the police force had been completely reorganized and, with a strength of eight British officers and inspectors and some 800 Somali other ranks, was in a secure position to maintain civil order. By 1945, with the aid of the new Colonial Development and Welfare scheme of grants, a co-ordinated programme for development was under way. A general survey of the resources and potentialities of the country, including a study of grazing and watering requirements, began in 1943 under the direction of Mr J. A. Hunt, an experienced geologist and administrative officer. Public health services were extended, and a training school for Somali nurses opened in 1945. The long-standing problem of secular education was also attacked. With three elementary schools opened at Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao in 1942, a concerted campaign by radio and mobile cinema was mounted two years later to win support for further educational developments. The response this received was favourable; and by 1945, seven elementary schools with an attendance of over four hundred boys were functioning. Assistance was also being given to nineteen private Koranic schools teaching Arabic and arithmetic. By 1950 there were two Intermediate schools and plans for starting secondary education. In the same period the scope of agricultural services expanded considerably; experiments with new crops and fertilizers were initiated, grazing control schemes were put into effect, and a number of small experimental date plantations were established. It might be thought that the successful introduction of these new measures, and particularly of secular education, implied that all conservative resistance to change had been overcome. This, however, was far from being the case. There was still an undertow of antagonism which the severe devastation caused by a plague of locusts in 1944–45 brought to a head. Anti-locust measures employing locust bait, which was regarded with suspicion, were interpreted by some elements in the population as a deliberate attempt by the government to kill Somali camels and stock; and in 1945 this issue provoked a serious riot at Burao and similar troubles at Erigavo. Order was restored without much difficulty, but the situation pointed to the need for a marked improvement in public relations and a tightening up in administrative control. In point of fact, at the time, the administrative establishment was quite inadequate, there being only five District Commissioners available to run six Districts, and only one of these officials could speak Somali. As will be evident, the Protectorate was still very lightly administered.


    The most notable experiment launched in this period, however, was the creation of a Protectorate Advisory Council, which in the presence of the Governor, held its first meeting in July 1946. Delegates representing most sections of public interest, the new as well as the old, attended from each District. The first meeting lasted a week, and the Council’s agenda included such topics as: the development of agriculture, the problem of destitution and juvenile delinquency in towns (very pressing at the time), the extension of the Subordinate Court scheme, the opening of further rural dispensaries, grazing control, and the more controversial issue of grazing movements in the Haud and Reserved Areas. This last item concerned the conflicting grazing movements of the Isaq and Dulbahante clans from the Protectorate and those of the Ogaden, a problem to become increasingly difficult of solution after the surrender of the Ogaden and Haud to Ethiopian administration. These progressive moves were accompanied by a considerable awakening of modern political interest which was further stimulated by growing concern over the future status of the Protectorate and the Somali territories generally. In this situation, the Somaliland National Society which had emerged immediately before the war, joined with another local association to form the Somaliland National League. Although described in the official records of the time as more conservative than the S.Y.L., this body shared the League’s aim for Somali unification as well as championing the extension of education and the abolition of clan particularism. Also in existence in this period was the more narrowly based Isaqiya association, concerned almost entirely with the needs and interests of the Isaq clans and particularly active in promoting these in Kenya. In the Protectorate, either through this organization, or independently of it, most of the Isaq supported the S.N.L. The introduction of the Somali Youth League to the Protectorate, and its gradual growth in adherents in 1947, brought a new element into the situation, and one which was by no means welcomed by the local Administration. Although the S.Y.L. was generally representative of all the Somali clans, to the dominantly Isaq population of the Protectorate it was tinged with a strongly Darod flavour, appealing therefore more immediately to the eastern Dulbahante and Warsangeli clans than to the central Isaq.


    However, the serious disturbances which marked the political scene in Hargeisa in 1947, though connected with a proposed merger of the S.N.L. and S.Y.L., were apparently not motivated by traditional Isaq-Darod antagonism. They were produced, in fact, it seems, by a split within the Isaq themselves, one party favouring the new alliance, while the other, being more conservative, supported the Isaqiya association. One of the two factions concerned consisted mainly of Habar Yunis clansmen who had recently lost their traditional position as the main source of employees in government service. The loss of this lucrative and influential monopoly, which dated from the earliest days of British rule, had been hastened by the new administrative policy of seeking to relate the employment of Somali personnel to the relative strengths of the various clans. This policy, while appealing to others, had little attraction for the Habar Yunis, and caused considerable bitterness. This turbulent phase, however, quickly passed, and after the abandonment of the Ogaden to Ethiopia, the announcement of Somalia’s future status, and the resumption of civil administration in the Protectorate itself, having no major and immediate issue to marshal public concern, interest in the new political associations temporarily flagged. Such interest as remained seemed for the present in the main content to co-operate with the Administration in the gradual development of the country. By 1950, indeed, it seemed that a new spirit of co-operation between the public and its government had been achieved, and the Protectorate appeared to be set fair on a course of gradual evolution and progress. And in keeping with this state of affairs the first decisive steps in the eventual Somalization of the civil service had been taken. Several police officers had reached the rank of Inspector, a Somali Inspector of Schools had been appointed, and two Somali officials had gone to England on Colonial scholarships. A modest beginning, to be sure, but still a beginning."
     
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    A People of Song and Spear - A Look at Somalis Past and Present
  • People of Song and Spear
    A Brief Ethnographic Update

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    A nomad girl on pilgrimage to a shrine venerating the Sufi saint Abadir Umar Ar-Rida in Harar, Ethiopia


    The Somali Peace Caravan performing in the wordless devotional music style called "grassland playing"




    "God did not make Somalia for the Somalis, God made the Somalis for Somalia"
    -- Sheikh Maxamad Caabdille Xasan





    From the book "A Tree to Rest Under - Somalia's Culture and History" by Bianca Sorrenti, Chair of the XCKS (Revolutionary Communist Party of Somalia) International Solidarity Department, Deputy Head of the International Meeting of Communist and Worker's Parties


    "Ethnically and culturally the Somali belong to the Cushitic ethnic group. Their closest kinsmen are the surrounding Cushitic (or as they are often called ‘Hamitic’) peoples of the Ethiopian lowlands who the Somalis know as the 'sisterfolk' – ‘Afar (or Danakil), the Oromo (Galla), Saho, and Beja. Their immediate neighbours to the north are the pastoral ‘Afar with whom they share Djibouti and who extend into the Somali province of the Ogaden. To the west, in Ethiopia, the Somali are bounded by the cultivating and pastoral Oromo; and in the south by the Boran Galla of Kenya. Although there is much variation amongst them, the physical features which immediately strike the eye and seem most generally characteristic of the Somali people as a whole, are their tall stature, thin bone structure and decidedly long and narrow heads. In their features particularly, the Somali also exhibit evidence of their long-standing relations with Arabia; and, in the south, amongst the Digil and Rahanweyn tribes, physical traces of their past contact with Oromo and Bantu peoples in this region. Traditionally, however, Somali set most store by their Arabian connexions and delight in vaunting those traditions which proclaim their descent from noble Arabian lineages and from the family of the Prophet. They commemorate the many centuries of contacts between the Somali and Arabian coasts which have brought Islam and many other elements of Muslim Arab culture. Thus, the Somali language contains a considerable number of Arabic loan-words, and Arabic itself is sufficiently widely known to be regarded almost as a second language. Nevertheless, although unwritten in any standard form until 1972, Somali retained its distinctiveness as a separate and extremely vigorous tongue possessing an unusually rich oral literature.


    Within Somali, the widest dialect difference is between the speech of those decended from the northern pastoralists and that of the Digil and Rahanweyn decendants. These differ to much the same extent as Portuguese and Spanish. Yet, since many of its speakers are also familiar with standard Somali, the existence of this distinctive southern dialect does not alter the fact that from Djibouti to Garissa on the Tana River, standard Somali provides a single channel of communication and a common medium in which poems and songs compete for popularity. Poetry, it should be added, today as much as in the past, plays a vital part in Somali culture, and the extensive use of radio broadcasting and television in the modern-day Democratic Republic has enhanced rather than diminished its significance. Often a poem is not merely the private voice of the author, but frequently the collective tongue of a pressure group, and propaganda either for peace or for war is more effectively spread through poetry than by any other means.


    The distinction between the speech of the Digil and Rahanweyn and their previously nomadic countrymen to their north and south is one feature of the wider cultural, geographic, and historical primary division in the Somali nation between the ‘Samale’ or Somali proper and the Sab. The former make up the bulk of the nation, and their name ("Somali" is a derivation from "Samale") has come to include the Sab, perhaps in the same fashion as the word ‘English’ is applied by foreigners to all the inhabitants of the British Isles. This larger fraction of the Somali nation consists of four principal groups of clans or ‘clan-families’. Descent in Somaliland is traced in the male line, and each of these units has a separate founding ancestor from whom, traditionally, its members trace their descent and take their collective name. The Samale clan-families comprise the Dir, Isaq, Hawiye, and Darod, all of whom are primarily pastoral nomads and variously distributed throughout the land. The Dir clans (‘Ise and Gadabursi) are mainly concentrated in the western part of the northern regions of the Somali Democratic Republic (the former British Somaliland), in the Jibuti Republic, and the east of the Somali Harar Province: a smaller nucleus also occurs in the south in Merca District, and between Brava and the Juba River. The Isaaq (who in conjunction with the Dir probably number almost three quarters of a million) live mainly in the centre of the northern regions of the Democratic Republic, but in their grazing movements extend also into the Haud.



    To their east, the Isaaq mingle with the Dulbahante and Warsangeli divisions of the Darod who, with a strength of perhaps one and a half million, are the largest and most widely distributed of all the Somali clan-families. As well as the eastern part of the former British Somaliland Protectorate, the Darod occupy the Eastern, Nugal and Mudug Regions, most of the Haud and Ogaden; and finally, although interrupted by a large wedge of Hawiye in the centre of the Republic and the Digil and Rahanweyn between the rivers, extend eventually into the NFD-province which once belonged to Kenya. The Hawiye, who boast probably more than half a million persons, live to the south of the Majerteyn Darod in Mudug, Hiran, and round Mogadishu. They extend some way across the Shebelle basin where they mingle with the Sab tribes, and also, like the Darod, are found again in strength in Democratic Republic's NFD. With a total population of little more than half a million, the Sab tribes are less numerous, less widely distributed, and contain only the two major divisions already mentioned. As they had the a stronger cultivating bias than any other Somali group in the past, their living space is primarily restricted to the fertile region between the two rivers where their pastoral and cultivating sections mingle not only with each other but also with pastoral nomads of the other Samale clans (although in today's industrial Somalia, all of these distinctions are being worn away in favor of new social groupings as discussed below.)


    In addition to these divisions of the Somali nation whose distribution and relative strengths are vital to an understanding of both past and present events, there are a number of smaller ethnic communities which require to be mentioned. The most numerous (some 80,000 strong) are Somalized Bantu scattered in cultivating villages along the Shebelle and Juba Rivers and in pockets between them. These derive in part from earlier Bantu and Swahili-speaking groups, as well as from former slave populations freed by the suppression of slavery at the end of the nineteenth century. Somalis acted as a link in the Arab Slave Trade, but saw the personal keeping of slaves as distasteful and a stain on their honor since Somalia was "a free sky land, where every man should have a camel and a path to travel" in the words of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah Hassan. Although they still retain today much of their physical distinctiveness, socially these communities are becoming increasingly absorbed in the wider Somali society. The best-known groups are the Shidle, and Shabelle on the Shebelle River, and the Wa-Gosha (or Gosha) and Gobaweyn on the Juba. Less numerous but economically and politically more important is the immigrant Asian community (some 40,000 in the Democratic Republic) which consists chiefly of Arabs (many of families domiciled on the coast for centuries) and a smaller number of Indians, Pakistanis, and Persians. Similarly largely occupied in trade and commerce and also in development and technical aid is the small European community, numbering about 42,000 in Somalia. The permanent European settlers live mainly as city dwelling workers, buisinesspeople, and farmers in the south of Somalia. Although the proportion of people who practise some form of cultivation is higher, probably not much more than an eigth of the total Somali population are sedentary cultivators, and these mainly the southern Digil and Rahanweyn tribes. Thus for the majority, in the arid conditions of the north, centre, and extreme south (Northern Kenya) of their country, nomadism is the prevailing economic response, and mode of livelihood and social institutions in general are tightly adjusted to the scant resources of an unenviably harsh environment. Although true nomadism has all but gone extinct in favor of mixed cultivation and large ranch-style semi-pastoralism, which has unified the once disparate Sab and Samale branches of the Somali family, understanding the past helps understand the makeup of the current SDR.



    In these regions, with their home-wells as a focus of distribution, the pastoralists move over many miles in the year, driving from pasturage to pasturage and water-point to water-point their flocks of sheep and goats and herds of camels, and, in some southern areas particularly, of cattle also. Of this mixed patrimony, although the hardy Somali pony remains the prestige beast par excellence, it is their camels which Somali most esteem. These are carefully bred for milk and for carriage. Milch camels provide milk for the pastoralist on which they previously depended on for diet; burden camels, which are not normally ridden except by the sick, transported their collapsible hut or tent and all their worldly possessions from place to place. Camel-hide was used to make sandals to protect their feet on the long treks across the country. But these uses do not in themselves account for the way in which the pastoralists value their camels (to this day) or, despite the longstanding and wide use of money as a currency, explain why it is primarily in the size and quality of his camels that a man’s substance was most tellingly measured. This striking bias in Somali culture is best expressed briefly by saying that in their social as well as economic transactions the pastoralists operate on a camel standard. Thus the exchange of substantial gifts of livestock and other wealth which cements a marriage between a man and a woman and their respective kin was once conducted in camels. This difference in attitudes is consistent with the fact that the milch camels and sheep and goats usually form two separate herding units. A man’s wife and children move with the flocks which provide them with milk and the few burden camels necessary for the transport of their tents and effects. With their much greater powers of endurance and resistance to drought, a man’s milch camels are herded by his unmarried brothers, sons and nephews, moving widely and rapidly about the country far from the sheep and goats which, in the dry seasons especially, have to cling closely to sources of water. Particularly in the dry seasons, when long and frequent treks back and forth between the pastures and wells are required, camel-herding is an arduous and exacting occupation and one well calculated to foster in the young camel boys all those traits of independence and resourcefulness which are so strongly beloved by the Somali culture.



    Clans were traditionally "led" by Sultans, Kings, or Princes (in Somali: Suldan, Boqar, Garad, Ugas, etc.). These titles, which evoke something of the pomp and splendour of the grand old Islamic states, had (and still have) little with the actual position of Somali clan leaders, who are normally little more than convenient figureheads and lack any firmly institutionalized power. Indeed for the majority of northern Somali clans, the position of Sultan, though often hereditary, is hardly more than an honorific title dignifying a man whose effective power is often no greater, and sometimes less, than that of other clan elders. It is in fact the elders – and this in its broadest connotation includes all adults of a family – who control clan affairs. With a few special exceptions, a hierarchical pattern of authority is foreign to pastoral Somali society which in its customary processes of decision-making is democratic almost to the point of anarchy. It must be added, however, that this markedly unstratified traditional political system did recognize a seperate category of people known as sa'sab who fulfiled such specialized tasks as hunting, leather- and metal-working, and haircutting. The people who practise these occupations form a minute fraction of the total population and, traditionally, were separated from other Somali by restrictions on marriage and commensality. Today the enfranchisement of these Midgans, Tumals, and Yibirs, is far advanced and most of their traditional disabilities are disappearing. With the absence of institutionalized hierarchical authority, Somali pastoral groups are not held together by attachment to chiefs. Beyond the clan, the widest kinship ties are those which unite kindred clans as members of the same clan-family. In the traditional social system, however, the six clan-families into which the Somali nation is divided (the Dir, Isaq, Hawiye and Darod; and the Digil and Rahanweyn) are generally too large, too widely scattered, and too unwieldy to act as effective corporate political units. In the modern situation of Somalia, the social groupings of neighborhoods and cities acquired new vitality and significance to the point having supplanted many of the old tribal kinship relations.


    Despite the prevalence of war, feud, and fighting in the epic songs and poems of Somali culture, particularly amongst the descendants of the old nomads, not all men were considered warriors. Those who devote their lives to religion and in some sense practise as men of God are known as wadads, and thus distinguished from the remainder and majority of men who, whatever secular calling they follow, fell into the category of warriors (waranleh, ‘spear-bearers’). This general division still retains validity despite the proliferation of occupations available today. Sufi holy men and scholars of religion, or sheikhs – to use the Arabic title which is usually applied to the more learned among them – fulfil such important tasks as teaching the young the Quran and the elements of the faith, solemnizing marriage and ruling according to the Sufi Islamic tradition in matrimonial disputes and inheritance, assessing damages for injury, and generally directing the religious life of the community in which they live. Essentially their role is to mediate between men; and, through the Prophet, between man and God – with the help of the many local saints to whom Somali look for support in the preferment of their pleas for divine aid and succour. Ideally, whatever their clan obligations (or neighborhood associations in the modern day), men of religion are assumed to stand outside secular rivalry and conflict, although in practice in the circumstances of Somali life this expectation is rarely if ever fully sustained. What is significant here, however, is that in contrast to the position in so many other Muslim countries, Somali sheikhs are not normally political leaders and only in exceptional circumstances assume political power. Although the more hierarchical political organization of the Arabs and the Oromos might seem to afford more purchase to the theocratic ordinances of Islam, it would be very mistaken to imagine that Islam rests lightly upon the Somalis. For if in some respects the circumstances of Hijazi or Oromo society conform more closely to the theocratic Muslim pattern elsewhere when compared to the saint-venerating freewheeling Somalis, there is no distinction between the two communities in their observance of the five ‘pillars’ of their faith – the profession of belief in God and the Prophet, the daily prayers, fasting, alms-giving, and pilgrimage. Nor, certainly, are the nomads any less pious or devout than the cultivators. The true position is rather that each community has adopted Islam in slightly different ways corresponding to differences in traditional social organization.


    Thus, for example, while the adoption of Sufi saints was based on adherence to a particular order in many neighboring cultures, average Somalis venerate a wide array of saints - from "family saints" that were traditionally venerated by one's lineage, to "local saints" who were the patrons of one's city or neighborhood, to "order saints" who were the patrons or teachers of one's Sufi order. Notwithstanding these regional variations, for the Somali as a whole, it is not too much to say that in many important respects Islam has become one of the mainsprings of Somali culture; and to nomad, farmer, and worker alike the profession of the faith has the force almost of an initiation rite into their society. Thus while the Somali draw many of their distinctive characteristics, especially their strong egalitarianism, their political acumen and opportunism, and their fierce traditional pride to their own culture, they also owe much to Islam. And it is typical of their mutual dependence upon these two founts of their culture that the highly pragmatic view of life which nomadism seems to foster is tempered by a deep and, as it must seem to some, fatalistic trust in the power of God and His Prophet.


    Above all, Islam adds depth and coherence to those common elements of traditional culture which, over and above their many sectional divisions, unite Somalis and provide the basis for their strong national consciousness. Although the Somali did not traditionally form a unitary state, it is this heritage of cultural nationalism which, strengthened by Islam, lies behind Somali nationalism today."
     
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    Red Nights in the Seastone City - Part I
  • Red Nights in the Seastone City - Part I

    How Mogadishu's Coffeehouses made Communism Cool


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    The members of the Toghdeer Jazz Band [1] in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. From right to left: Salma Gheedi Jaamac, Nimco Gheedi Jaamac, Qamar Asli Raashid, Halimo Deeqa Suldaan



    Toosoo! [Waking Up!] by Nimco Jamaac and the Toghdeer Jazz Band





    From the June 12th, 19XX [2] edition of Xidigta Oktoobar [3]



    President Taariq Askari Hiraale [4] Awards Nimco Gheedi Jaamac and Salma Gheedi Jaamac the Ocean Star Medal for Lifetime Achievement

    By Fadumo Taariq Burale


    It almost sounds too strange to be true; Somalia might be the only socialist republic in the world with monarchs, two in fact. You won't find a crown on the head of our queens - they prefer sweaters and Wartburgs to gowns and Rolls-Royces. Just because the royals are too humble to sit on a throne, though, doesn't mean that their loyal subjects won't flock to see them when they deign to appear in public. Today was no exception, with the grounds of the Villa Somalia getting filled by adoring fans who lined up to see the Sultanas of Saxophone Nicmo and Salma Jaamac recieve the Democratic Republic's highest civilian award.


    Everyone from dignitaries like former President Salaad Gabreye Kediye and South Yemeni Premier Abdul Fatteh Ismail to military heroes like Cosmonaut Asli Xasan Abade, Captain Alberto Franceschini and General Abdullahi Ahmed Irro to the members of controversial band People's Jihad attended the ceremony honoring the Blue Star Republic's first musical sensations. Even guests from the Italian mainland section of the PCI, the CPSU and the Communist Party of Cuba were among the people watching on the lawn of the Villa Somalia, but the most cheered attendee was none other than Sir Gerald Reece of the former British Imperial Service [5]. Lately in and out of the hospital due to ill-health, the hale apperance of the ex-colonial offical was an added cause for celebration.


    President Hiraale gave a moving speech, describing how the first record he had ever bought was the Toghdeer Jazz Band's hit single "Hold My Hand" and the way that the two sister's stalwart anti-capitalism in the face of colonial oppression opened his eyes to Marxism."I am certain that I would not be a communist today if it wasn't for the two women standing next to me. One song of theirs was - and still is - better propaganda for scientific socialism than a hundred thousand posters." Members of all the parties in the Popular Front [6] spoke, with Assemblywoman Palazzola of the Farmer's Alliance stating that the music of the sisters was "a bright light in dark times for the nation, both in colonialism and after."


    The sisters were born fraternal twins in 1937, during the upheaval of the Fascist subjugation. Daughters of a Yibir millet farmer and a Bantu cattle herdswoman, the sisters faced the double sting of oppresion at the hands of the colonial masters from Italy and the contempt of their own people due to their Yibir bloodline. They moved to the city of Berbera in the northerly British Somali Protectorate, both pursuing training to become teachers at the British School set up by the colonial government. There they met the other members of their band, which they formed as a hobby project while they attended college. They played at the Communist-frequented clubs and spread their political beliefs at every town they toured in as their music became more popular. The Toghdeer Jazz Band were known for their angry riots against the Italian Gendarmie as much as the intensity of their stage shows.

    ....

    Although the twins are heroes to the nation in many ways, with both having served in the Burundi Emergency, the Ugandan Revolution, and the Wars of Reunification, to millions they will always be Somalia's Sultanas of Saxophone.






    Cafephiles Incorporated Podcast - Episode 33 "Back in the S.D.R" Transcript Excerpt



    DH: So, we've talked about Somalia on this show a few times before.

    AJ: I mean, we had to! The country is right in between Ethiopia and Yemen, the two probable homelands of coffee, and Somalia's coffee culture has a good claim to being the most developed in the world.

    DH: Yeah, we discussed this a bit on the last episode. There are coffee-lovers all over the world, but Somalis are fanatical about their beans. Somalia's mythical culture hero Fox Princess [7] was said to have stolen the coffee bush from the Ethiopian Lion-Emperor's private grove. The Somali Coast and Riverine Region are home to an awe-inspiring number of cultivars, including a Robusta coffee with an ultra-high caffeine content bred specifically to drink before battle, an Arabica variant for religious ceremonies, and even a type that was used in a courtship ritual [8]. There was war coffee, guys.


    AJ: The countries in the area are not only great to visit on a summer vacation, but are also some of the heavyweights in coffee production. What you might not know, dear listeners, is that coffee played a large role in the creation of modern Somalia.

    DH: That's not even an exaggeration - the nationalist movement in the country picked up steam from people becoming exposed to independence activists in coffeeshops run by communists like Mogadishu's Cafe Liberation. Many of those same activists became communists themselves and started the wave of revolts and strikes that lead to the Las Anod coup. There's one event that stands out in particular - the violent Al-Shuuri Riots of '57....




    1. Not really a useful footnote, I just love the range of expressions on their faces. Especially Halimo with her eyes closed - we've all been there.
    2. I'm not giving away exactly what year this was written in, but a good deal has changed already (if you couldn't tell from the rest of this.)
    3. October Star, the most popular state-run newspaper (not all or even many newspapers in the SDR were state-run) and known for being the "artsy" paper that spent a lot of ink discussing popular culture. Since the government was reading political content quite closely (they let people write what they wanted - it didn't mean that they weren't gonna set Hangash operatives to watch people writing critical pieces) it was actually an honor to write for some of the "fluff" columns as you could do what you wanted with them.
    4. I'm not gonna give away too much, but I will say this much: President Hiraale is an ATL-sibling of an OTL person and the transition of power was not bloodless but was relatively quiet with the eventual cooperation of Kediye.
    5. Surprisingly, this is loosely OTL. Sir Gerald Reece was very fondly remembered in the SDR for being an advocate for Somali enfranchisment, increasing the rights of Somalis and modernizing during his overseeing of the territory, and setting up the first primary schools in the country. There was even a statue of him reading a book to children in Hargeisa before it got blown up in an air raid during the Civil War.
    6. Read "DDR-style union of parties that actually is run by the Communist Party."
    7. The Amirad Dawacada [Fox Princess], also known as the Lady of Foxes or simply Fox, is a folklore trickster hero (much like Raven or Coyote in Native American myths) in Somali fables and a recurring villain in Amhara stories. She's my favorite figure in Somali folktales, so I'll talk about her at length. Depending on what story and who's telling it, she is either a stately middle-aged chieftain, a young woman with some fox-like features, or a literal fox, though all might be true since she could shapeshift. Firstly - sorry weebs, but she's a Bat-Eared Fox native to the Horn and not a Red Fox like kitsune are. To Amharas, she was a devious bloodthirsty raider whose band of marauding warriors was always repelled by the bold Solomonic Emperor Lion. To Somalis, the Fox-Princess was a noble thief who used cunning and charm to best an old and tyrannical Emperor Lion before escaping with a laugh into the bush when he figured out her tricks too late. Obviously, you can see the cultural biases of the imperial Amharas and the government-hating Somalis reflected :p. The Emperor Lion's court was composed of noble animals (or people, or animal-people) like Hawk, Horse, Cobra and Ethiopian Wolf, the Fox-Princess presided over a rival court of "lowly" animals like the slow-witted bruiser Hyena-Man (who was the butt of Fox's practical jokes as often as Emperor Lion), her royal spy Crow, the grouchy curse-happy magician Crested Porcupine, the wazir Sand Cat, and her head warrior and ghazi Chief Leopard (the stories of why a noble animal like a leopard would serve the Fox-Princess varied from a blood-feud that Leopard had with Lion to Leopard owing Fox a life-debt for saving him from a hunter's trap.) Like some other trickster heroes (can anyone say Sun Wukong?), she had a number of geas-like compulsions placed on her by a human Sufi saint that forced her to serve anyone who recited the Ninety-Nine Names of God in backward order. The Fox-Princess stories were often blatantly allegories for the Horn's political divisions - Fox represents the Samale Somalis, the regal Lion is obviously the Solomonic Dynasty of Abyssinia, the Leopard was the settled Sab Somalis, Porcupine represented the craftsmen-wizards from the Yibir that lived on the margins of Somali society, and so on. There's a short ultra-low-budget YouTube video featuring a typical Fox story (though the usual version has Fox as female and tricking Lion instead of Hyena) but the book Tales of Punt is a good place to start if you wanna find more stories from the Somali perspective of the Fox-Princess and her band of outcast subjects. The popularity of the proverb "If you must bow to a king, bow low, but sharpen your claws for when his back is turned" traditionally attributed to the Fox-Princess tells you a lot about Somali culture:closedeyesmile:.
    8. Yup, you read that right. This particular tradition is all but dead in Somalia today, but in the past, lovesick youths would buy or grow a special crop of coffee, roast the beans, and deliver them to their prospective lovers. After some time, the one who had recieved the coffee invites the gifter to share a cup of coffee with them. The way that the recipient of the gift prepares the coffee and arranges the set gives the proposer the answer, whether it be "Yeah, let's date seriously", "Let's see where it goes, but this is for fun", or "Stay away from me." Somalis are often said to be a forthright people, but we love pageantry and ritual in our coffee.
     
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    Supplemental Info Post 1 - Somali Alphabets
  • Don't apologize! It's an interesting topic and one I've been thinking about quite a bit, in fact. The common wisdom is that Somali didn't have an alphabet until the creation of the Latin orthography, but this is untrue. Somali didn't have a standard alphabet, which is a very different thing from not having an alphabet at all. Somali civilizations and scholars produced a number of writing systems over time:


    1) The Lowland East Cushite Glyphs: Not an alphabet but a pictographic system, these glyphs are old - at least as old as New Kingdom Pharaonic Egypt.This is the cryptic writing adorning the cairns and steles that dot the northern Somali plains, but very little is known about it (or the people who made it for that matter; chances are good that the builders of the stone tombs are not the ancestors of the current Somalis - who modern researchers have begun to consider descendants of a migrating wave of pastoralists from NW Africa) and linguists are still working it out.

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    A modern recreation of Lowland East Cushitic glyphs

    2) Wadaad Writing: Wadaad writing is not so much a singular alphabet, but is instead a catch-all term for the various homecooked Arabic transliterative alphabets used to write Somali. Somali culture has been quite oral for most of its history, but Sufi scholars and legal petitions (pre-modern pastoral Somali society has often been called a kritarchy, rather accurately in my opinion, since the only authority a nomad family acknowledged was the Xeer customary law system) required a writing system, so Somali Arabic(s) were made that varied in particulars from location to location. The linguist Muuse Xaaji Ismaaciil Galaal codified it into one version in the 1950s - this is one of the four big competitors for the title of The Somali Alphabet when the Communists looked to standardize an alphabet.

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    Galaal's Somalo-Arabic Alphabet

    3) Osmanya Alphabet - The Osmanya alphabet was created in 1922 by Cusmaan Yuusuf Keenadiid, a Sufi scholar, the brother of the Sultan of Obbia, and an amateur linguist. The first of the Native standardized alphabets for Somali, the Osmanya alphabet was the one initially pushed by the nationalists of the Somali Youth League. This is the second of the four heavyweight competitors for the role of official alphabet.

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    Article One of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the Osmanya script

    4) The Kaddare Alphabet: My favorite Somali alphabet aesthetically speaking, Kaddare was made by Sheikh (not a literal sheikh like Sheikh Keenadiid, this is just his name) Kaddare in 1952. It only ever catches on amongst his clansfolk in the Hawiye (cue everybody looking through the tribes update to remember who the hell the Hawiye are :p) and is basically a non-starter compared to the other ones. Shame, cause it looks pretty cool.

    kaddare.gif


    5) The Latin Alphabet: Do I really have to explain this one? It's the Latin alphabet you all know and (presumably) love - adapted to the wonky vowels and glottal stops of Somali. The brains behind this one is linguistics professor and XHKS member Shire Jaamac Axmed and a small team of grad students at Somali National University - Mogadishu. It gets selected for practicality, as @ETA50M stated; the Somali government could buy tons of surplus office equipment, typewriters, and other supplies from the West and put it to good use if they shared an alphabet. It also facilitated the learning of other languages if students didn't have to relearn an alphabet from scratch. Pragmatic as ever, the Somali Communists announced that Shire Axmed's proposal was accepted and here we are today.

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    EDIT: Expect the horror film mini-update tomorrow - I know the last time I said that there would be a "short update" it turned into the behemoth post on Somali culture, but I promise that it'll actually be short this time!
     
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    Savannah Slashers, Were-Hyenas and Folk Witches - Four "Somali Gothic" Horror Films
  • Savannah Slashers, Were-Hyenas and Folk Witches - Four "Somali Gothic" Horror Films
    (a mini-update)


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    The Kaniisadda Muqdisho (or the Cattedrale di Mogadiscio) - a landmark of Colonial Mogadishu built in the Normano-Arab Gothic style of Sicily's churches. It features prominently in many horror films from the 50s in the Somali Protectorate


    "In every meaning of the word, the Somalis are a haunted race. The camel nomad, though a devout Mohammetan, sees myriad ghosts and spirits cavorting around the vast plains. He consults with the aloof witchmen of the Yibir to divine his future. He wears Koranic charms crafted by ascetic murshids living in the bush to ward off angry jinn. This haunted character is not the fearful supernaturalism of the Crimean villager, but more akin to that of the Irishmen closer to our own shores. Both the Somali and the Irish do not fear the unknown hallows of the world, but respect their power." [1]
    --- Richard Burton



    To foreign cinephiles, Somali film is most famous for producing quality offerings in three genres - (occasionally melodramatic) historical romances, the Ogaden Osterns [2] and Afro-Futurist thrillers [3]. It's the last of those three that informs what most people think of when they hear the words "Somali movies"; a result of the genre's deep association with the Individualist Collectivism ideology [4] and cult of technological progress fostered by the XHKS government during the boom years of the Kediye presidency. Roaring engines, pounding machinery, far-future retellings of folk tales, distorted soundtracks, cosmic settings - Somalia's Afro-Futurist cinema has been central in the development of the genre.


    Comparatively left in the shadows, however, is the impressive catalogue of horror films produced from before independence to today in the Blue Star Republic. Although the movies run the gamut of themes and topics, the very best of Somali horror is often of the Somali Gothic style - an African mirror of the simutaneously emerging Italian Gothic genre. Both Italian and Somali films portrayed Gothic staples in a stylish and idiosyncratic way, taking a daring approach to the supernatural, but where Italian films often featured a sinister eroticism - with menacing yet seductive witches, vampires and ghosts - Somali Gothic trades the heightened sexuality for a melancholy focus on decay and ruin.

    Since it's both the hundredth anniversary of Red October [in the Old Calender, at least] and the leadup to Halloween, today we're going to be ranking Somalia's ten best gothic horror films from the colonial period till the 80s.



    1 - The Evil of Our Deeds

    Initially released in Arabic under the title "Wa min Sayi’aati A’maalinaa", a title taken from the supplication read before Friday Prayer in Sunni Islam which asks God to forgive the participants for "the evil in [them]selves and the evil in [their] deeds", this tale of witchcraft plays out in the halls and classrooms of Somalia's elite Hargeisa Technical University. But at the academy, everything isn't as it should be: one of its students is murdered horrifically, a sudden infestation of vermin causes maggots and pouched rats to rain from the ceiling and there’s some kind of conspiracy afoot that causes the sinister teachers to close ranks around their elusive director.



    2 - Hunter

    Perhaps the Somali horror film most well-known abroad, Ugaadhsade is a movie about a ritual serial killer that stalks the streets of 80s Mogadishu - murdering with seeming impunity - and the Hangash internal intelligence officers assigned to the task of stopping their reign of terror. Hunter is a fragmented and loosely correlated fever dream of a film, replete with narrative loose ends, disturbing set pieces, and dramatic shifts in both pacing and tone - swinging between the driving suspense of a traditional slasher film and jarring melancholy. Decay is everywhere in this film: from the physical realm with rotting animal carcasses or crumbling colonial era buildings - to that of spirit, shown through the increasingly bestial actions of the slasher and the frenzied slipping of the city's populace into psychosis with every fresh atrocity. Although the team that worked on Hunter has been tight-lipped about their intentions when creating the film, many critics read the movie as a commentary on how the crash modernization of the SDR had created a "psychic split" in the country, where clash of past and future abutting in so short a time left the nation adrift without a sense of history or direction.



    3 - Unholy Hunger

    This movie is as campy as they come and full of gore. Following the story of a village in the Dervish era as it tries to protect itself from the depredations of a pack of roving were-hyenas who use cursed magic staves to assume monstrous half-man shapes. Iniially
    appearing as a simple tale about "marauding nomads and heroic farmers", the plot twist halfway through the film forces the viewers to reconsider exactly who is to blame for the violence. Under a thin layer of gratuitous blood and guts, Unholy Hunger presents complex (if grim) look into the tensions between Somalia's settled and nomadic heritage.



    4 - The Longest Detour

    Also called Drive into Hell, this film centers around a vacationing Italian socialite who takes a detour off the National Coastal Highway running from Kismaayo to Boosaaso - and accidentally comes face to face with the Devil. It’s an encounter that leads her to a derelict mansion appearing inexplicably in the bush, where her story becomes interwoven with that of a set of surrealist, Calvinoesque characters, as reality and hallucination become more and more indistinct. In a nod to the film Orfeu Negro, she descends down into an allegorical hell, filled with subtle imagery from both the Italian classic Dante's Inferno and Islamic understandings of Jahannam (Gehenna.)

    1. I guess this is a compliment? It's hard to tell through all the colonial-era racism.
    2. This isn't even my idea - though I've made up the name # there were literal Somali versions of Osterns set in the Haud with Ethiopian soldiers, nomads and Hangash intelligence officers in place of the "black hat" settlers, the Native Americans and the "good guy" settlers, respectively. Future updates are gonna be wild.
    3. Not quite OTL's Afro-Futurism, although many of the themes are similar. The Somali brand in particular has a dash of the usual Marxist-Leninist obsession with heavy industry and tendency to lionize heroes of socialism. The fact that Somali media is not state-controlled (for the most part) and XHKS communism is very different from Kremlin communism, however, means that these trends emerge in unorthodox ways.
    4. Not to tease, but I've had a lot of fun constructing the Somali version of the New Soviet Man. Weird communism = weird communist propaganda. Once again, stay tuned.
    P.S: Whoever can guess which two of these films are whole-cloth TTL inventions of mine and which two are spins on actual Somali Gothic horror films gets an imaginary "Somali Film Connoisseur" award!
     
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    Red Nights in the Seastone City - Part II
  • Red Nights in the Seastone City - Part II

    There's Nothing More Rock-n-Roll Than A Riot!



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    Staff members from the government-run Radio Muqdisho posing with the musicians from the band Warsangeli.



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    The students of a free summer school program run by the Communist Party of Italy take a class photo, Bosaso, Italian Somali Protectorate




    Buuraha Uu Dheer [The Highest Mountains] by Nimco Jamaac and the Toghdeer Jazz Band






    From "Slouching towards Mogadishu: The Reformist Dream of the Somali First Republic" by Oskar Schwartzmann


    Italy's new position in her former colony of Somalia was carefully and closely defined in the United Nations Trusteeship agreement under which she assumed responsibility for the territory. The Italian Trust Administration (A.F.I.S.) was required to ‘foster the development of free political institutions and to promote the development of the inhabitants of the territory towards independence’. To achieve this end Somalis were to be given increasing responsibility in the political and administrative control of their country under the benevolent tutorship of the Trust Administration. The Agreement, which was approved by the U.N. Assembly on 2 December, 1950, also contained as an annex a declaration of constitutional principles guaranteeing Somali rights and the full implementation of the Trust Administration’s obligations.


    To make assurance doubly sure from the Somali point of view, a special U.N. Advisory Council was created to sit in Mogadishu to provide direct liaison with the Italian Administration and its wards. This body, which consisted of a small committee of representatives of U.N. member governments and a small secretariat staff, was available to make recommendations and reports on the progress of development in all spheres and to provide tangible evidence of United Nations responsibility and concern. The effect of this U.N. presence was also further strengthened by the provision of regular visiting missions which, like the Advisory Council, reported to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations These measures which left Italy little room for manœuvre or evasion, coupled with the restriction of the trusteeship period to ten years, helped to allay Somali apprehensions. Nevertheless, the first few years of the new régime were marked by animosity and suspicion on both sides. With memories of the 1948 disturbances very much alive, and conscious that they were unlikely to receive a very cordial welcome, the returning Italian authorities judged it prudent to ensure that they were adequately protected against any violent expression of Somali resentment.


    To Somalis, however, the strong military forces which were dispatched to support the establishment of the new administration, gave the handover much of the character of a military occupation. Nor was the position much eased by the heavy-handed manner in which the Italians tended, initially at least, to reassert their authority. Some prominent S.Y.L. members who had achieved responsible positions in the civil service under the British were reduced in rank, dismissed, and even arbitrarily imprisoned. Similar measures were also taken against leading PCI-supporting civilians, particularly those judged to be dangerously anti-colonial; and a determined attempt was made to discredit the strength and popularity of the League. Arbitrary acts of this sort led to S.Y.L. demonstrations and, on a number of occasions, to riots which were strongly repressed by the authorities.


    This unfortunate vendetta, however, did not involve all the rank and file of the S.Y.L. and did not prevent some members from unostentatiously co-operating with the Italians in the implementation of new progressive developments. Hence, although the first two years of the trusteeship were marked by a series of incidents between the League and the Administration which reduced the immediate effectiveness of measures designed to promote Somali advancement, this equivocal period nevertheless saw the groundwork for progress firmly established. Nowhere was this more striking than in the field of education. An ambitious and imaginative scheme for general education crystallized in a five-year development programme launched in 1952 with UNESCO collaboration. New state schools providing free education replaced the mission schools upon which the Italians had relied in the past; and by 1957 some 31,000 children and adults of both sexes were enrolled in primary schools, 246 in junior secondary schools, 336 in technical institutes, and a few hundred more in higher educational institutions. This represented a notable advance on the situation in 1950 when little more than two thousand students were receiving education. It also testified to the new and widespread public appetite amongst the old and young alike, especially in the towns, for Western education.


    Despite this progress in certain settings, much was left to be desired by the Italian administration's rule. The breakup of legal firms for Somalis meant that native Somalis lacked quality representation in the Italian courts, the proletarianization of the workforce as more and more families flooded into the cities meant that there was a new class consciousness awakening in the minds of the populace that sought expression, and the problems with getting credit from the Italian banks left many Somalis unable to start businesses or mechanize their farms. Taking a crack at solving all of these problems in place of the government were some old and trusted allies of the Somali people - the Communists of the PCI affiliates. Led by the twenty-seven year old Mogadishu-born teacher and revolutionary firebrand Vinfredo Montanari (fondly called "the Young Dervish" by the Somalis of Mogadishu for his passionate speeches), the PCI affliate politiclubs began the "Good Neighbor" program; their Young Pioneers became a popularly attended youth group for Somali and Italian children alike (many later members of the XHKS and its successor party of the XCKS were introduced to Marxism here), the House of Labour trade union council was jointly set up by the PCI and the left-SYL, and communist-run credit unions swiftly replaced the Italian sanctioned banks as the main financial institutions of the Somali people. Another result of the close cooperation between the PCI/left-SYL and the urban population was the prevalence of left-wing coffeehouses.


    The institution of the coffeehouse in Somalia is an old one, initially evolving from waystations where settled Somalis and Bantus sold coffee to migrating nomads passing through farming villages. As Somali trading outposts on the coasts became flourishing cities, coffeehouses became cultural hotspots - a trend only reinforced by the coming of the Ottoman administration in Zelia and the introduction of Ottoman coffee culture into Somalia. Like in other parts of the Islamic world, coffeehouses became centers of political agitation in the colonial days (Italy, itself a nation of coffee lovers, only contributed to the rapid proliferation of coffeehouses in the country.) Cafes built in the European style serving both Somali, Yemeni, and Italian varities of coffee alike became frequented by communists and left-wing nationalists, while the "collaborator" centrist nationalists and the right wing Italians shunned them as being hangouts for angry youths and the working-class. There was some truth to this: the majority of cafes were co-operatives run by PCI members and Somalia's growing proletariat openly preferred to frequent PCI-operated establishments in a show of solidarity with the embattled communists. While the Somali and Bantu communities grew closer to the PCI affiliated Italians, the ruling Italians began to see the coffeehouses as hothouses of rebellion and sedition. Attempts to violently close down some coffeehouses during performances by Italian and Somali jazz musicians on the part of the gendarme ended in shootings and riots. Soon, the communists and their Left-SYL allies were drinking their coffee and listening to music with rifles slung across their backs, ready for fresh attempts at "crowd control" by the police. The golden age of colonial co-operation was dead without having spent even five years in the sun and it looked like armed communist revolution was just around the corner.
     
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    Fly that Blue Flag, Comrade!
  • Fly that Blue Flag, Comrade!

    The Coming of the First Republic




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    A Girl Scout troop in Mogadishu takes a group picture after attending an affiliated Young Socialist Pioneer meeting - the Girl Scouts Somalia often served as a Western-friendly arm of the Communist youth groups






    Stars - The Sharero Band




    "The philosophy of praxis does not aim at the peaceful resolution of existing contradictions in history and society, but is the very theory of these contradictions. It is not the instrument of government of the dominant groups in order to gain the consent and exercise hegemony over the subaltern classes. It is the expression of subaltern classes who want to educate themselves in the art of government and who have an interest in knowing all truths, even the unpleasant ones, and in avoiding the impossible deceptions of the upper class, and even more their own."
    ---- Antonio Gramsci





    If by 1957 it was still too early to be certain of what could be achieved with the resources available in economic progress, in the field of politics there was little doubt as to the outcome. The power of the left wing of the SYL and the communists were getting to the point where their unions and worker's militias controlled whole blocks of urban Mogadishu that became death traps for any policemen who tried to enforce Protectorate law in the neighborhoods. The original hope of the Italian administrators, that the Italian communists and rhe Somali-Bantu left would be unable to work together thanks to the ethnic divide had long since been dashed - in a rare moment of true transcencion of racial barriers thanks to shared suffering under the colonial government, Montanari's PCI affliates and the Left-SYL were deeply intertwined. The countrysides were not much better for the colonials; if anything, they were worse. Any attempt to fully subjugate the unruly and well-armed nomads of the Issaq and Isse had been abandoned and the nomads (who were very politically active despite living a migratory pastoral lifestyle) by and large identified with the left wing of the SYL. It became clear that in order to stop revolution from coming to fruition, the Italians were going to have to give in to many of the most popular Communist demands.



    The first of these major steps was the political preparation of Somalia for independence. Unlike the position in many other evolving African territories, in Somalia political advancement proceeded in step with the replacement of expatriate troops by Somali officials in the civil service and police. There was thus a smooth and regular devolution of authority in both the administrative and political spheres at the same pace of advancement. This sensible matching of the two lines of progress towards full autonomy was greatly facilitated by the success of the new educational measures which, if they did not produce an immediate cadre of university graduates, at least ensured a wide spread of general education. In politics, the first important step was the creation of a national Territorial Council in 1950 with consultative functions for which the ground had already been prepared under the British Military Administration. This was not merely a decorative or nominal body, but an active forum to which governmental decrees and draft ordinances were passed for scrutiny and discussion by the Trust Administration. Between 1950 and 1955 little short of a hundred ordinances, covering a wide range of subjects, were thus considered by the Council. Hence, although this body which contained some thirty-five members representative of both traditional and modern interests (including the political parties) was in composition similar to the British Protectorate’s Advisory Council, it was more truly an embryonic legislature than the latter organization. A further step in this direction was taken when, on the advice of the U.N. Advisory Council, legislative committees and offices were created to prepare the way for a fuller devolution of political authority. At the same time, at a local level, governmental responsibility was progressively devolved through two types of local government body: District Councils in the rural areas, and Municipal Councils in the towns and main centres. These organs were a direct development of what had already been established under the British Military Administration.


    Although elected membership in the rural councils was introduced in 1955, the District Councils tended to be less effective than their urban counterparts and remained essentially consultative bodies providing a useful adjunct to the system of direct administration through District Officers. The municipal councils which were not so directly affected by the exigencies of the nomadic life developed very successfully, their members showing a marked desire and aptitude for increased responsibility. Thus by 1956, 48 of these councils had been established with a fair degree of financial as well as political autonomy This rapid progress was assisted by the Administration’s policy of attaching as secretaries to the councils officials with a training in municipal administration. Initially council members were nominated by the Administration, but in 1954 the first municipal elections were held and no less than sixteen parties presented candidates. Seventy-five per cent of the male electorate voted, suffrage being then confined to men, and the S.Y.L. won over half the available 281 seats. In 1956 when Somalis were replacing Italians in all senior administrative positions, these developments were crowned by the transformation of the Territorial Council into a legislative assembly composed of 70 seats, ten of which were reserved for ethnic minorities: the Italian and Arabian communities being allocated four seats each, and the Indian and Pakistani groups one seat each. The new assembly was given full statutory powers in domestic affairs, although the head of the Italian Trust Administration retained the right of absolute veto. Initially Italian counsellors were to be attached to the Somali Ministers in the cabinet appointed after the elections, and draft legislation had to be approved by the Italian authorities before passing to the assembly. Candidates for election were required to be literate in Arabic or Italian, a qualification which indicates the spread of education which had already been achieved by this time. As was to be expected, the new assembly was much more representative in composition than the old Territorial Council, and included a wider coverage of modernist opinion.


    Voting, which the communists had been able to ensure would be kept open for both men and women as opposed to earlier colonial legislatures, was conducted by different procedures in the urban and rural constituencies. In the municipalities, voters had to be registered on the municipal lists and votes were cast by secret ballot. In the interior where the conditions of nomadic life made this procedure difficult and uncertain, voting took place through traditional clan and clan section assemblies. These meetings passed block lists of votes to the recorders, a procedure which lent itself to manipulation. It was therefore no surprise to find that the total recorded vote was far in excess of what might have been predicted from the estimated strength of the population, although the latter figures themselves were by no means definitive. Whatever shortcomings may have marred the conduct of the elections in the rural areas, the exuberance with which the general population seized this first opportunity to express its political will was remarkable.


    Of the 60 seats available to the Somali electorate, 43 were won by the S.Y.L (of those, 27 were won by Left-SYL members), 13 by the H.D.M.S., three by a small group called the Somali Democratic Party, and one by a frankly clan organization called the Marehan Union. From fifteen opponents at the previous municipal elections, the League’s rivals had now dwindled to five, largely as a result of amalgamations amongst the smallest and most narrowly based groups. With this impressive consolidation of their position, the party was called upon to form a government under ‘Abdillahi ‘Ise as Somalia’s first Prime Minister. By this time, little trace remained of the earlier antagonism between the Italian Administration and the bourgeois sections of League; a good working basis of agreement had now been reached between the two sides, which was strengthened with the appointment in 1955 of the highly respected liberal Dr Enrico Anzilotti as Administrator. Although this new happiness was not quite present amongst the trade unionists and communist sympathizers of Somalia, the obvious march towards independence kept them from engaging in total revolt.


    Henceforth, in so far as it was in a position to do so, the Italian Administration confined its participation in Somali politics to seeking to encourage those elements within the S.Y.L. which it considered most ‘moderate’ and favourable to a continuation of the Italian connexion. At the 1956 elections the League was estimated to have a mixed national membership distributed amongst the main clan groups as follows: Darod, 50 per cent; Hawiye, 30 per cent; Digil-Mirifle, 10 per cent; and others, 10 per cent. When the British withdrew from Somalia the principal cleavages within its leadership (which the Italians had sought to exploit) had been amongst its Darod adherents. Now although it still did not command an absolute monopoly of Darod support, the party’s following from this major group of clans was exceedingly strong. The Hawiye, however, were divided in their attitude towards the party. Division within the leadership between Darod and Hawiye members, had led to the formation prior to the 1956 elections of an organization originally calling itself the Hawiye Youth League which sought to detach Hawiye support. These differences within the S.Y.L., however, were resolved in time to present a united front at the elections (in which the Hawiye Youth League won no seat). But the extent of the party’s difficulties in patching up this cleavage was evident in the composition of ‘Abdillahi ‘Ise’s government. In addition to the Premiership itself, two of the remaining five ministries were assigned to politicians of the Hawiye clans, while the Darod gained two ministries, and the Dir one. This allocation of portfolios, which seemed to meet the needs of the moment, later caused the pendulum to swing in the opposite direction, thus favouring the formation of Darod break-away groups.


    Certainly no other party could boast the same national following. But, as later events were to show, the more effectively the League widened its base, and the greater its electoral success, the more profound became its internal divisons. In the circumstances of Somali political realities, any party with strong national support could not but be essentially a consortium of rival clan interests. The League’s weakest following was still amongst the southern Digil and Rahanweyn who remained strongly attached to their own particularistic party, the H.D.M.S. This party did not campaign on a national basis; yet by winning 13 seats in its own electoral areas of Upper and Lower Juba Provinces, it found itself the main block on the opposition benches in the Assembly. Relations between the H.D.M.S. and the League continued to be coloured by the traditional hostility between the two factions of the nation which the rival parties tended to represent, and by their earlier differences in their attitudes towards Italy. Thus the H.D.M.S. accused the S.Y.L. government of discriminating against its supporters in the public service: and some conception of the depth of feeling between the two sides can be gathered from the assassination, in obscure circumstances by a radical young trade unionist named Aaisha Cali Raashid, of the prominent H.D.M.S. deputy Ustad ‘Isman Muhammad Husseyn in 1956. Later, H.D.M.S. members in the Assembly succeeded in having their ‘martyred’ colleague commemorated by the naming of a street after him near the principal mosque in Mogadishu. But although in 1956, the H.D.M.S. was still a force to be reckoned with, its lack of national appeal gave it little prospect of victory in a political atmosphere increasingly charged with the left-wing nationalistic fervour of a people moving rapidly towards independence.
     
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    Flowers of the Revolution
  • "Flowers of the Revolution"

    General Secretary Kediye's Wunderkind Generation of Technocrats, Apparatchiks, Propagandists and Killers

    (A Short Look into the Future)


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    Members of the XHKS' Combat Groups of the Working Class party paramilitary drilling. From the mid-70s onward, the Combat Groups were mostly staffed by youths raised in Kediye's Flower Revolutionaries program





    Waaberi - Tolweynaha Hantiwadaagga Ah (The Socialist Commune)





    "All Russia was learning to read, and reading—politics, economics, history—because the people wanted to know. . . . In every city, in most towns, along the Front, each political faction had its newspaper—sometimes several. Hundreds of thousands of pamphlets were distributed by thousands of organisations, and poured into the armies, the villages, the factories, the streets. The thirst for education, so long thwarted, burst with the Revolution into a frenzy of expression. From Smolny Institute alone, the first six months, went out every day tons, car-loads, train-loads of literature, saturating the land. Russia absorbed reading matter like hot sand drinks water, insatiable. And it was not fables, falsified history, diluted religion, and the cheap fiction that corrupts—but social and economic theories, philosophy, the works of Tolstoy, Gogol, and Gorky.

    --- John Reed, Ten Days That Shook the World



    "Let us do away with this noxious idea of the clan, abolish it entire from the face of the Earth! What has it brought Somalia but misery and a slavish worship of the old traditions? Our new socialist Somalia will be built during our lives, God willing, but we can not be its citizens. The revolutionary generation are forever exiles from the old world which they dismantled; the first citizens of Socialist Somalia in truth will be our children. They will not know any race but the proletariat, they will have no clan but the nation."

    --- Comrade Salaad Gabreye Kediye





    From "Marx-Engels-Lenin Thought: The General Secretary's Ideology and the Nation it Made" by Anthony Richards, UT Austin Press



    "We must now attempt a deeper assessment of the true extent of the transformation achieved by Scientific Socialism (offically known as Marx-Engels-Lenin Thought or Individualist Marxism in Somalia) of the most pervasive traditional forces; Islam and the clan (or lineage) system. Although there were said to be more than a few atheists amongst the young Somali Marxist elite (perhaps including even Secretary Kediye himself - who was married to a Christian Italian communist and was certainly a non-practicing Muslim at least), Colonel Kediye repeatedly insisted that his government’s commitment to Scientific Socialism was fully compatible with Islam and indeed, as he pointed out with some justice, expressed the essential communal spirit of Islam. As he declared in a speech a few months after seizing power:

    ‘Our Islamic faith teaches us that its inherent values are perennial and continually evolving as people progress. These basic tenets of our religion cannot be interpreted in a static sense, but rather as a dynamic source of inspiration for continuous advancement. . . . To help our brethren and our fellows, we must go beyond the concept of charity and reach the higher and more altruistic concept of co-operation on a national scale. We must strive with enthusiasm and patriotism to attain the highest possible rate of general welfare for all.’

    Moreover, as General Siyad explained in a speech in 1972, evidently aimed at young secular radicals,

    ‘The founders of Scientific Socialism - the fathers Marx and Engels, who are a part of our nation as much as Maxamad Cabdille Xasan - were not against religion in particular but they exposed and disproved the reactionary elements of religion that dominate [the] sound reasoning of mankind and hence hinder [the] progress of society.’

    There was no question, therefore, of the death of God here – whatever conservative Islamic critics inside Somalia or outside it claimed. As the secretary declared in another speech in 1972:

    'As far as socialism is concerned, it is not a heavenly message like Islam but a mere system for regulating the relations between man and his utilization of the means of production in this world. If we decide to regulate our national wealth, it is not against the essence of Islam. God has created man and has given him the faculty of mind to choose between good and bad, between virtue and vice. We have chosen social justice instead of exploitation of man by man and this is how we can practically help the individual Muslim and direct them to a virtuous life. However, the reactionaries wanted to create a rift between socialism and Islam because socialism is not to their interest. Let us be clear, the realization of socialism is the realization of Islam.'

    In this eclectic fashion the Kediye regime staunchly defended its blend of socialism and Islam against conservative criticism of such reformist measures as the introduction of sexual equality in inheritance rights, women in the military and government, and huge welfare programs funded by the mixed capitalistic economy. In effect, in an old and venerable Islamic tradition, the Head of State claimed to understand the Prophet’s message better than his critics. The state media, and particularly the television shows, promoted a subtle synthesis of Islam and Somali socialism, in which Quranic texts and commentaries led naturally to socialist ideals and to their pithy formulation in the Head of State’s much-quoted slogans. If external reservations from the more conservative Muslim powers about the orthodoxy of Kediye’s Islam persisted, it was at least a much less implausible and logically consistent interpretation than that implied in Colonel Gaddafi’s bizarre Libyan confection of Islam and socialism....


    ....The announcement of the advent of Individualist Marxism was coupled with a vehement denunciation of tribalism, which as the official slogan succinctly stated ‘divides where Socialism unites’. The former government-stipended local lineage headmen (akils) were replaced by elders with the appealing title of ‘peace-seekers’ (nabad-doon), or at any rate this new designation was officially adopted. The abolition of payment of blood money was likewise confirmed, and those prone to engage in this or other tribalistic actions connected with the traditional lineage and clan organization warned that they risked swingeing fines and prison sentences. As a positive measure against urban tribalism, the government undertook to provide funeral expenses for those who died in towns without relatives available to help them perform these services. The national campaign (olol) or ‘crash programme’ (parnaamaaj) against tribalism culminated in demonstrations later in the year and early in 1971 when effigies representing ‘tribalism, corruption, nepotism and misrule’ were symbolically burnt or buried in the Republic’s main centres. The circumlocutary use of the term ‘ex’ (ex-clan) tolerated by previous civilian regimes was completely outlawed - a rare case of explicit social control by the Kediye regime -and the word comrade (jaalle) launched into general currency with official blessing to replace the traditional, polite term of address ‘cousin’ (ina‘adeer), which was now considered undesirable because of its tribalistic, kinship connotations.


    Earlier Somali nationalists, both religious and secular, had appealed to the transcendent brotherhood of Somalis, uniting those of different clan and lineage. The new stress on friendship appealed for co-operation and unity on the basis of an undifferentiated, nationalistic Somali identity, in which traditional divisions were totally annulled. The development of this official ideology and of other reinforcing divisions became increasingly important to Kediye's regime to keep up the public enthusiasm which had greeted the Second Red October coup initially. The new official hagiography presented the youth of Somalia as the ‘Victorious Leaders’ (Guulwaadde), dauntessly leading the nation in its unremiting struggle against its foes - both the reactionaries at home and the targets of Somali irredentism abroad. Posters, poems, songs of praise and panegyric speeches soon proclaimed throughout the country the sublime calling of Individualist Marxism. Inspired by Scientific Socialism, this mystical union of personal drive and collective achievement was depicted as the source of prosperity and success in the nation’s struggle forward.


    Amongst its more precious progeny were the ‘Flowers of the Revolution’ (as they are officially designated) – destitute children, often orphans, who had been gathered from the streets of Mogadishu and other towns during the first years following the Red October Coup into Revolutionary Youth Centres, where they received food, clothes, shelter in schoolhouse dorms, education and training in the tasks of nation-building. These new recruits to the nation symbolized the ideal new citizen whose dedication to their country was pure and untarnished by atavistic kinship allegiances. East German and Russian instructors drilled them, hoping to mold these eager young party members into the finest technocrats of a new Africa. They were trained to be critical thinkers in accordance with the individualistic currents of Marx-Engels-Lenin Thought - Kediye did not want his country run by robots when he was gone - but the children were utterly loyal to the XHKS and even something like a nascent cult of personality around the General Secretary. Only time would show where the Flower Revolutionary program and the communist party members it created would lead the nation."
     
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    "Exit Stage Left" - Part I
  • "Exit Stage Left" - Part I

    European Decolonization and Growing Pains in the Blue Star Republic




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    An XHKS poster from 1977 celebrating May Day. The Somali nation is represented by the legendary chieftain Arraweelo (reimagined as a symbol of working-class feminism by the party) bearing the gifts of modernity. The upper text reads "Long Live May 1st", while the bottom text says "Long Live the Progressive Cooperation Between the Somali Workers, Farmers, and Pastoralists!"





    The Iftin Band - Shimaali




    "Always remember that the people are not fighting for the ideas that lie inside men’s minds. The people fight and accept the sacrifices demanded by the struggle in order to gain material advantages, to live better and in peace, to benefit from progress, and for the better future of their children. National liberation, the struggle against colonialism, the construction of peace, progress and independence are hollow words devoid of any significance unless they can be translated into a real improvement of living conditions."

    --- Amilcar Cabral






    From "Comrade Husna: Exploring the World of Africa's Red Lady" by Maria Salvini




    "The government formed in Somalia by ‘Abdillahi ‘Ise in 1956 was confronted by all the problems of a country moving rapidly towards autonomy. Interest naturally centred on those internal issues of vital concern to the future stability and prosperity of the state. External affairs being outside his government’s purview, the only gesture towards the fulfilment of the abiding goal of Pan-Somali unity which the Prime Minister permitted himself was the announcement, given first place in his programme, that every effort would be made to settle the disputed frontier with Ethiopia – a subject on which more will be said presently. Of more immediate moment was the stabilization of the country’s precarious economy, the attraction of foreign capital and aid, and the raising of increased revenue by wider taxation. The perennial and vexed question of deciding upon an official language – Somali being still in the main unwritten – also received attention, but, as will be seen later, remained unresolved.


    In social affairs the Right-SYL government pledged itself to examine ways of extending further voting rights to women as a compromise with the communist-sympathizing Left, and to promote the further Somalization of all branches of government and administration, including the judicial system. In this latter field satisfactory progress was in the main achieved, and a number of other progressive measures were successfully launched. The statutory authority of chiefs, in practice greater amongst the southern cultivators than the northern nomads, was reduced; and the procedure of applying collective punishments in the control of inter-clan feuds was modified in the direction of placing a stronger burden of responsibility upon the individual criminal. This move was designed to weaken the continuing vitality of collective clan solidarity. At the same time, in an effort to separate secular from religious authority, the considerable criminal powers wielded by Muslim magistrates (Kadis) under the Italian system were reduced in order to restrict their jurisdiction more unambiguously to matters of personal status. As far as the Somalization of the judiciary was concerned, pending the training of the necessary Somali staff, Somali District Commissioners were temporarily granted judicial powers to be exercised subject to the overriding authority of higher courts presided over by Italian judges.


    On a different plane, in a climate of opinion increasingly hostile to the disruptive effects of clan particularism (an anti-tribalism initally spread by the militant trade unions and Italian communists), legislation was passed making it illegal for political parties to bear tribal names. This measure, was, no doubt, partly directed against the opposition Digil-Mirifle party which adroitly changed its title to that of Hizbia Dastur Mustaqil Somali (Somali Independent Constitutional Party) thus taking advantage of the plurality of languages in Somalia to retain its original initials. Legislation was also enacted forbidding the use of the traditional derogatory names applied to the sab specialist occupational groups who, in any case, were now rapidly acquiring a considerable degree of emancipation from their former status as bondsmen. As well as such issues as these, the government was also soon preoccupied with the important question of preparing a constitution for the independent state.


    In the light of the prevailing Pan-Somali aim shared by all nationalists, the constitution had to provide for the possibility of the eventual union of Somalia with other Somali territories. and provisions fulfilling this requirement were incorporated in the final proposals. Here the S.Y.L. government and the H.D.M.S. opposition held very different views. The League favoured, indeed insisted upon, a unitary state with a high degree of centralized authority. In the light of its own particularistic interests, the H.D.M.S. on the contrary sought a federal relationship which would permit a high degree of regional autonomy. Already the opposition had advocated the creation in its own southern area of a separate Digil-Mirifle state, and in conflict with the government’s firm repudiation of them had expressed sympathy towards the Ethiopian Emperor’s overtures contained in his speech at Qabradare.15 Here as in other matters such as the discrimination against Digil and Rahanweyn clansmen alleged to exist in the public service, the H.D.M.S. position proceeded directly from its own particularistic interests and general opposition to the S.Y.L. But with only thirteen members in the Assembly its voice was naturally weak. The real threat to the League’s authority came from within its own ranks, both through the independent-mindedness of its deputies in the Assembly, and through the wider cleavage between Darod and Hawiye supporters. The issue which best served as a vehicle for the expression of these internal differences was the moderation of ‘Abdillahi ‘Ise’s government’s policies, derided by the Left-SYL as too conciliatory to Italian interests and ignoring both the needs of the rural nomads and the urban proletariat.


    The Left of the party now openly attacked the government, and the President of the Assembly, Adan ‘Abdulle ‘Isman, who was dubbed ‘President Alright’ after his repeated insistence that the fundamentals of the colonial system were "alright" and did not need changing. Strong demands were made for a more open pro-Soviet and pro-Egyptian stand. This line of attack seemed favoured at the time by the public sympathy provoked by the recent assassination of the Egyptian member of the U.N. Advisory Council at Mogadishu. Earlier, some Somalis had volunteered for service with Egypt during the Suez crisis; but since then there had been Somali protests at alleged Egyptian interference in Somalia’s internal affairs. Now, however, opinion seemed again generally favourable to a more definite pro-Egyptian/Soviet Bloc alignment and this was strongly advocated by the Somali trade union communist and SYL politician Haji Muhammad and his associates. The League’s new President was a severe embarrassment to the government and its supporters, and his influence was such that an open split in the party seemed imminent.


    These fears were proven well-founded when Haji Muhammad Husseyn, who enjoyed a formidable reputation as an orator and who had in the past played an important part in the development of Somali nationalism, struck out on his own to form a new militant socialist party called the Worker's Front of Somalia. To this new organization, known locally as ‘the Front’, Haji Muhammad sought to attract support from the dissident flanks of the League, the Italian PCI affiliates, and to exploit what remained of the Darod-Hawiye breach, after Adan ‘Abdulle’s intervention. The October 1958 municipal elections – in which for the first time women participated equally with men thanks to communist agitation – provided an opportunity for assessing the extent of the new movement’s appeal.


    Of 663 seats the S.Y.L. won 416; the H.D.M.S. 115; while the Worker's Front came in third place winning 86 seats but nevertheless beating the only other national party which contested the elections, the Liberal Party, which gained 27 seats. Clearly the Worker's Front did not as yet constitute a threat to the League with its massive national following. But, taking into account its rapid snowballing growth and the Front's incredible performance for having only been organized a year ago, it could by no means be dismissed altogether, particularly in view of the forthcoming elections for the national assembly due the following spring.
     
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