XXXIII: Forming Plans (1/43)
XXXIII: Forming Plans, January 1943
In the days following the successful landings in Northwest Africa, Roosevelt and Churchill had been planning a new conference, so that the future of the war could be planned. In November, Casablanca had been proposed as the location of the conference, but after Charles de Gaulle refused to appear (it is believed he was still angry at Roosevelt’s handling of the situation in New Caledonia), the two leaders believed it would be inappropriate to have the conference in French territory, and Washington was chosen to host them instead. Stalin was offered an invitation, but declined, claiming that the ongoing Battle of Stalingrad demanded his full attention (whether it really did is open to debate: the German Sixth Army surrendered in early February).
The Third Washington Conference focused mostly on events in Europe, in line with the policy of ‘Germany first’. Stalin had been vocal in the past about his desire to see a second front opened with an amphibious landing in France, but during the conference this was decided not to be feasible in the summer of 1943, and the decision was made to land in Italy instead upon the conclusion of the Tunisian campaign, with France planned for 1944. The “unconditional surrender” policy, which had been informally discussed even before the Japanese peace offer was made, became official with the Washington Declaration. Hitler turned the declaration into a propaganda piece, attempting to motivate Germans to fight harder, “the alternative our opponents would leave us with being the dismemberment of the German nation and the eradication of the German people”. The Japanese convinced themselves that the Declaration was an attempt to disguise fear, and that American resolve was one great battle away from total collapse.
Churchill said little about the war in the Pacific during his time in Washington. Since the fall of Singapore, the British Empire’s most significant contributions to the fight against Japan consisted of the Burma front, which had stalled once more as an offensive into Arakan was defeated by the IJA, the return of the Australian and New Zealand units to their home countries, and the two carriers which would soon be sent to Fletcher. These contributions were important, but it was obvious to all that the Americans would dominate Allied policy in the Pacific, and Churchill was willing enough to follow that in exchange for more influence in Europe.
Thus it would be another conference, held in Honolulu in the last week of January, where the direction of the Pacific war would be determined. Among those attending were the four most important US commanders: Admirals King, Nimitz and Fletcher, and General Douglas MacArthur, as well as John Curtin and Peter Fraser, the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand. Roosevelt was kept well informed of the discussions, but allowed his commanders to make nearly all of the decisions on how to fight Japan.
Honolulu was dominated by one question: which of two strategies was to be adopted. The first was to make the Central Pacific be the main axis of advance, beginning in Hawaii and invading a series of important island groups in Micronesia, among them the Marshalls and Marianas, before invading Japan itself and taking Tokyo. The alternative, championed by MacArthur, was to focus on the Southwestern Pacific, taking first New Guinea and then the Philippines, before striking the Home Islands from the south.
MacArthur’s proposal made a lot of political sense – the Philippines had been an American territory in 1941 after all – but few could doubt that MacArthur wanted glory for General Douglas MacArthur as well. He had spent many years in the Philippines and had developed an attachment to the people there, and had boasted “I will return” upon his defeat there the previous year. But to get to the Philippines, several island groups would have to be taken or neutralised first, New Guinea and its inhospitable terrain first among them, but also Japan’s island fortress at Rabaul and perhaps the Solomons as well. The Central Pacific route by contrast, was almost entirely open ocean, which could easily be dominated by the US Navy once Yamamoto was defeated and the copious quantities of ships currently under construction were put to sea. With little need for bloody overland campaigns like New Caledonia, it was clearly the easier route. Nimitz and Fletcher agreed that it should have the priority.
That didn’t mean that the southern route could be abandoned entirely however. While the admirals were willing to ignore MacArthur, they could not ignore their Australian and New Zealand allies in the same way. Curtin had been as fixated on New Guinea as MacArthur had been since Coral Sea, and was adamant that Port Moresby be retaken at the earliest opportunity. Fraser meanwhile advocated for Fiji’s recapture, which absent political pressure would have been entirely unnecessary. Thousands of New Zealander POWs believed still to be on Viti Levu, and the threat of an invasion of New Zealand, meant that bypassing Fiji would not be acceptable. The New Hebrides, once considered in the same light as Fiji, were now determined to be a lower priority target: New Caledonia had been won and Efate was no longer a serious threat.
While the Central Pacific strategy was favoured, it would also not be possible to attempt a primarily sea-based campaign before the end of 1943. Japan’s navy was still powerful, and Yamamoto would surely attempt to engage the landing fleet in battle, a battle where the Japanese would likely hold the advantage in numbers for the immediate future. Any attempted landings would therefore have to be conducted under land-based air cover, which was possible over Fiji and New Guinea but not over the Marshalls. While the carriers were built, the Southwestern strategy would be adopted.
Fletcher proposed Fiji as the first target, with D-day set for March or April 1943, at the end of the tropical wet season. Fiji, he argued, would be an easier target than Port Moresby, and could be used to gain experience before the more difficult operation was attempted. Not only was Fiji much more distant from major Japanese bases, but Cyclone Sam had just hit and in three months it would be unlikely for the Japanese to have totally recovered. The native resistance would also be a considerable help to the forces that landed, and the capture of a POW camp was undoubtedly more important than stopping the activities of a small submarine base. Despite MacArthur’s misgivings, King and Nimitz agreed that Fiji would be the first operation, now given the codename ‘Hangman’, while Port Moresby would follow a month or two later.
- BNC
In the days following the successful landings in Northwest Africa, Roosevelt and Churchill had been planning a new conference, so that the future of the war could be planned. In November, Casablanca had been proposed as the location of the conference, but after Charles de Gaulle refused to appear (it is believed he was still angry at Roosevelt’s handling of the situation in New Caledonia), the two leaders believed it would be inappropriate to have the conference in French territory, and Washington was chosen to host them instead. Stalin was offered an invitation, but declined, claiming that the ongoing Battle of Stalingrad demanded his full attention (whether it really did is open to debate: the German Sixth Army surrendered in early February).
The Third Washington Conference focused mostly on events in Europe, in line with the policy of ‘Germany first’. Stalin had been vocal in the past about his desire to see a second front opened with an amphibious landing in France, but during the conference this was decided not to be feasible in the summer of 1943, and the decision was made to land in Italy instead upon the conclusion of the Tunisian campaign, with France planned for 1944. The “unconditional surrender” policy, which had been informally discussed even before the Japanese peace offer was made, became official with the Washington Declaration. Hitler turned the declaration into a propaganda piece, attempting to motivate Germans to fight harder, “the alternative our opponents would leave us with being the dismemberment of the German nation and the eradication of the German people”. The Japanese convinced themselves that the Declaration was an attempt to disguise fear, and that American resolve was one great battle away from total collapse.
Churchill said little about the war in the Pacific during his time in Washington. Since the fall of Singapore, the British Empire’s most significant contributions to the fight against Japan consisted of the Burma front, which had stalled once more as an offensive into Arakan was defeated by the IJA, the return of the Australian and New Zealand units to their home countries, and the two carriers which would soon be sent to Fletcher. These contributions were important, but it was obvious to all that the Americans would dominate Allied policy in the Pacific, and Churchill was willing enough to follow that in exchange for more influence in Europe.
Thus it would be another conference, held in Honolulu in the last week of January, where the direction of the Pacific war would be determined. Among those attending were the four most important US commanders: Admirals King, Nimitz and Fletcher, and General Douglas MacArthur, as well as John Curtin and Peter Fraser, the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand. Roosevelt was kept well informed of the discussions, but allowed his commanders to make nearly all of the decisions on how to fight Japan.
Honolulu was dominated by one question: which of two strategies was to be adopted. The first was to make the Central Pacific be the main axis of advance, beginning in Hawaii and invading a series of important island groups in Micronesia, among them the Marshalls and Marianas, before invading Japan itself and taking Tokyo. The alternative, championed by MacArthur, was to focus on the Southwestern Pacific, taking first New Guinea and then the Philippines, before striking the Home Islands from the south.
MacArthur’s proposal made a lot of political sense – the Philippines had been an American territory in 1941 after all – but few could doubt that MacArthur wanted glory for General Douglas MacArthur as well. He had spent many years in the Philippines and had developed an attachment to the people there, and had boasted “I will return” upon his defeat there the previous year. But to get to the Philippines, several island groups would have to be taken or neutralised first, New Guinea and its inhospitable terrain first among them, but also Japan’s island fortress at Rabaul and perhaps the Solomons as well. The Central Pacific route by contrast, was almost entirely open ocean, which could easily be dominated by the US Navy once Yamamoto was defeated and the copious quantities of ships currently under construction were put to sea. With little need for bloody overland campaigns like New Caledonia, it was clearly the easier route. Nimitz and Fletcher agreed that it should have the priority.
That didn’t mean that the southern route could be abandoned entirely however. While the admirals were willing to ignore MacArthur, they could not ignore their Australian and New Zealand allies in the same way. Curtin had been as fixated on New Guinea as MacArthur had been since Coral Sea, and was adamant that Port Moresby be retaken at the earliest opportunity. Fraser meanwhile advocated for Fiji’s recapture, which absent political pressure would have been entirely unnecessary. Thousands of New Zealander POWs believed still to be on Viti Levu, and the threat of an invasion of New Zealand, meant that bypassing Fiji would not be acceptable. The New Hebrides, once considered in the same light as Fiji, were now determined to be a lower priority target: New Caledonia had been won and Efate was no longer a serious threat.
While the Central Pacific strategy was favoured, it would also not be possible to attempt a primarily sea-based campaign before the end of 1943. Japan’s navy was still powerful, and Yamamoto would surely attempt to engage the landing fleet in battle, a battle where the Japanese would likely hold the advantage in numbers for the immediate future. Any attempted landings would therefore have to be conducted under land-based air cover, which was possible over Fiji and New Guinea but not over the Marshalls. While the carriers were built, the Southwestern strategy would be adopted.
Fletcher proposed Fiji as the first target, with D-day set for March or April 1943, at the end of the tropical wet season. Fiji, he argued, would be an easier target than Port Moresby, and could be used to gain experience before the more difficult operation was attempted. Not only was Fiji much more distant from major Japanese bases, but Cyclone Sam had just hit and in three months it would be unlikely for the Japanese to have totally recovered. The native resistance would also be a considerable help to the forces that landed, and the capture of a POW camp was undoubtedly more important than stopping the activities of a small submarine base. Despite MacArthur’s misgivings, King and Nimitz agreed that Fiji would be the first operation, now given the codename ‘Hangman’, while Port Moresby would follow a month or two later.
- BNC
