And Asiatic Generals did not? Its been tradition from the beginning of recorded history for people worldwide to exaggerate enemy numbers to make victories greater and explain away defeats.
No GNW (or “Peter goes South”)
- Thread starter alexmilman
- Start date
Bukhara (part 2)
108. Bukhara (part 2)
Zizzakh. The Jizzakh fortress was heavily fortified and armed, and therefore was considered the most serious fortress in those parts. The Jizzakh bey, who received from the Emir of Bukhara at the end of summer reinforcement of ten thousand best troops [2] with 53 large caliber guns, prepared to put a strong resistance.
On October 6, a column was sent on the way to the small fortress of Zaamin, located halfway from Ura-Tube. Bukhara troops fled and the fortress was taken without a fight [3] . On October 10, the rest of the Russian units approached Jizzakh. Russian troops which included of 16.5 companies and five hundred Cossacks with 20 guns approached the fortress on October 12. On October 13, General Romanovsky carried out reconnaissance, and then the siege of work began. On October 14, 2.5-3 thousand Bukhara cavalry moved to the Jalan-Uta gorge, against the guard detachment left there. Two rifle companies and Cossacks sent to the gorge counter-attacked and pushed back the attackers. At the same time, the Bukharians from the fortress made a strong sortie against three companies occupying the sakli [4] in front of the fortress walls, but were repulsed. By this time, it turned out that the Emir sent strong reinforcements from Samarkand to Jizzakh, as a result of which it was decided to accelerate the actions and seize the fortress by storm. On October 15, construction of two batteries (10 guns and 4 mortars) placed against the Ura-Tube and Samarkand gates had been started. The garrison made two sorties, but unsuccessfully, and on the 16th morning the batteries opened fire. On October 17-18, the Russians conducted artillery shelling of the fortress.
“On October 18, at 12 o'clock, the general assault on the fortress began. Soldiers of Bukhara, who were waiting for the assault at dawn, decided that it was postponed to the next day, and were not ready for the attack. The columns of Captain Mikhailovsky and Lieutenant Colonel Grigoriev (a total of 8 infantry companies, with 10 guns and 4 mortars) went on the offensive. The enemy, who did not expect an attack, did not have time to meet them with fire in time and rushed to defend the collapsed parts of a wall, but such resistance could not be prolonged. The loud "hurray" [5] soon forced the defenders to retreat, and then go into a desperate, disorderly flight, which ended in no more than half an hour in a complete defeat of the entire garrison. The storming troops, having seized the breach, divided into several columns, heading partly along the walls, partly into the citadel. Following the advancing columns, parts of the reserves also entered the fortress. Bukhara troops fled, losing, out of 11,000, about 6,000 people killed, over 3,000 prisoners, 16 banners, 12 copper and 41 cast iron guns. Of the 18 beys, 16 died, and 12 of them fell in hand-to-hand combat.” Reported Russian losses were 98 (6 killed and 92 wounded) [6].
By four o'clock in the afternoon, General Kryzhanovsky entered the fortress with the main reserve. The victory was complete. A resque column of 2,500 people with 18 guns sent by the Emir from Bukhara, learning about Jizzakh's fate, and seeing the advancing Russian reserves sent to met it, fled. Below, Jizzakh after the storm.
Having lost Jizzakh, the Bukhara fled to Samarkand and hurried to enter into peace negotiations. The next few months passed in unsuccessful negotiations. The Bukhara government deliberately tightened them, trying to buy time and recruit a new army. At the same time, Bukhara detachments constantly raided the conquered territory and even carried out a night attack on the Russian camp in Klyuchevoye (near Jizzakh).
For the capture of Jizzakh, General Kryzhanovsky was awarded the Order of St. George of the 3rd class [7]. He got himself busy with reforming administration of Orenburg governorship causing, due to his pure ignorance and arrivance, a lot of unhappiness and even few uprisings as a result of which more than 10,000 Ural Cossacks had been deported or sent to katorga. His exploits in the area of promoting the education were along the same lines. Kryzhanovsy left behind the scandalous stories of his school "inspections", always uncoordinated, when he entered any class and began to examine students without being familiar with either the program or the subject, disparanging teachers in front of students. The greatest outrage was caused by his "inspection" of the sheets in the bedroom of the boarding house of the women's gymnasium, which he came to do at 10 p.m. Having a strong backing in Moscow, he remained Orenburg’s governor-general but command of the troops in “Turkestan region” was given to general von Kauffman.
Samarkand. On May 1 (13), 1749, an order was given to move to Samarkand. In view of this, 25 infantry companies, 7 hundred Cossacks and 16 guns were collected from Jizzakh, a total of 3,500 people; on May 1, the detachment marched to the Zaryavshan Valley. The Bukhara army of 40-50 thousand people with 150 guns [8] was located on the Chupanatin Heights near Samarkand. Approaching Zaryavshan and seeing the masses of Bukhara troops who settled on the mountain and apparently decided to defend the crossing, Kaufman sent a messenger informing the emir that if he will not withdraw his troops in an hour, the Russians would take a position by storm.
Meanwhile, masses of Bukhara troops gathered on the Russian right flank so General Kaufman had to send Colonel Strandman with 4 hundred Cossacks and 4 guns to disperse them. Despite gun fire from opposite heights, the Cossacks bravely attacked the Bukhara troops, defeated them and chased for several versts.
More than 2 hours have passed, and the messenger did not return with an answer, and there was no preparations on the part of Bukhara army for a retreat. On the contrary, they opened fire with their artillery and began to draw their troops for protection of the nearest crossing of tye Zaryavshan river. Then General Kaufman moved the troops forward in two columns under command of Major General Golovachev and Colonel Abramov. Under strong rifle and gun fire and threatened by attacks from the flanks, both columns crossed several tributaries of the Zaryavshan River (water being chest-deep) and bravely attacked the enemy position, which was strengtgenef by trenches for shooters. When Russian troops, having crossed the last tributary, rushed to the long lines of Bukhara with bayonets and a shout of "hurrah", the Bukhara soldiers fled, leaving 21 guns and a lot of weapons. The losses of Russian troops were only up to 40 people killed and wounded. [9]
The next day, Samarkand surrendered to General Kaufman. Residents of Samarkand did not let the fleeing Bukhara troops into the city.
To consolidate the situation in the Zaryavshan valley, General Kaufman sent detachments to different places to break Bukhara “mobs” and to seize some fortified points. Finally, the commander of the troops himself was forced to move against the Emir on May 30, leaving a small detachment in Samarkand: 4 infantry companies, one sapper company, 2 guns and 2 mortars. The garrison was under the command of Major Stampel and represented a force of 658 bayonets, including the sick and weak, not taken by General Kaufman with him.
The Shahrizyab beys, having learned about Kaufman's departure from Samarkand, organized a gathering of military forces, and numerous armed detachments of Chinese Kipchaks, Naimans, Karakalpaks and other tribes approached the city. At the same time, the party of opponents of the Russian presence managed to organize a rebellion among citizens. The number of opponents of the Russians reached 65,000 people, including 25,000 Shahrisyabz, 15,000 Kipchaks and 15,000 local residents.
The thickness of the walls of the citadel reached 12 meters in some places and the attackers clearly could not break through it. The weak point of defense was two gates: Bukhara in the southern wall and Samarkand in the eastern wall. Ammunition and food of the Russian detachment were quite sufficient for a long defense.
Shakhrisabz tried to break the gate three times and get over the wall, but each time they were rebeaten with accurate rifle fire. Finally, the attackers managed to set fire to the gate. At the same time, 30 soldiers of Ensign Machin defended at the Samarkand Gate. Here, the attackers also set fire to the gate, tried to go inside through it, but the soldiers repulsed them with bayonets. In the midst of the battle, a platoon of the 3rd company under the command of Ensign Sidorov, which made up a mobile reserve, arrived to help the defenders of the Samarkand Gate. He helped to repel the enemy onslaught, and then quickly rushed to the Bukhara Gate and supported their defenders.
In addition to the gate, the Shahrisabz troops tried to penetrate the citadel through the breaches in the eastern wall. They also went directly up the walls, for which they used iron hooks, which were worn on their hands and feet. However, everywhere the attackers were met by accurate fire from soldiers. By the evening, the attacks stopped, but this temporary success cost the Russians a lot: 20 privates and 2 officers were killed. The total losses of Russians in the first two days of defense amounted to 150 people killed and wounded.
On the morning of June 3, the assault resumed. The defense of the Bukhara Gate was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Nazarov, who did not officially hold any position. This officer had a reputation of a brave man, but very daring, arrogant, with the insubordination problems. To encourage the soldiers, he ordered to put his camping bed at the gate, emphasizing that he would not leave a position at night. Nazarov, however, didn't have to sleep. At 8 o'clock in the morning, the Shakhrisabzites, having broken the burnt remains of the gate, dismantled the barricade built by the Russians and captured one gun. The soldiers counter-attacked with the bayonets. After a fierce hand-to-hand combat, the besiegers retreated, but soon resumed the assault in other directions.
The commandant, Major Stampel, decided, if necessary, to retreat to the palace, which was therefore actively put into a defensive position. If it was impossible to resist the pressure of the enemy in this last stronghold, it was decided, by common agreement, to blow everything into the air, for which all gunpowder was brought to the palace on the night of June 4. On June 4, 5 and 6, the enemy’s energy apparently weakened even if there were some disorganized attacks. In view of this, the garrison began to make sorties putting on fire some city houses. On June 7, the message was received informing the garrison that General Kaufman is coming to the rescue by a forced march. On June 8, Bukhara troops began to hastily retreat and their rearguard was attacked by the garrison of the citadel. Soon the advanced Cossacks appeared, followed by General Kaufman and the detachment entered the city. As a punishment for the residents, it was ordered to burn the city bazaar as the main part of the city but before this the soldiers had been allowed to loot it.
The losses of the Russian garrison for 8 days of defense amounted to 49 killed and 172 wounded.
Shortly after the fall of Samarkand, the strong fortress of Katta-Kurgan was taken,
and on June 2, 1868, the Emir suffered a final defeat at the Zerabulak Heights:
(https://ru.m.wikisource.org/wiki/ВЭ/ВТ/Зерабулакские_высоты)
Kaufman with 1.700 infantry, 300 Cossacks and 14 guns marched out of Samarkand to met Emir’s army which took position half-way between Samarkand and Bukhara. On the night of June 2 (14), 1749, even before sunrise, a Russian detachment approached the Zerabulak Heights. At their foot stood Bukhara infantry, behind it, on the hill - 14 guns and 15,000 cavalry. Kaufman plan was to launch the main attack on enemy’s left flank forcing it to retreat into a waterless steppe.
Sarbazas, who were against the advance-guard, went on the offensive. Met with buckshot, they stopped, opened fire, but soon turned back and began to retreat.
To attack Bukhara positions, Russian troops were divided into two columns. The right column supported by the Cossacks attacked the left flank of Bukhara army and artillery opened fire. Bukhara troops on the left flank started suffering losses and fire of their artillery could not reach the Russian formations [10] and Cossacks’ charge finalized destruction of the left flank of Bukhara army. Russian left column attacked the center but the battalion on its extreme left, not being protected on its left flank and rear, [11] found itself surrounded by the enemy’s cavalry and had to change the front more than once to beat off the enemy with bayonets and fire and then continue to move again. In doing so the battalion was supported by the artillery. After battalion forced the Bukhara infantry in front of it to retreat, it was stopped and artillery was placed in front if it to keep shooting into the retreating enemy. Battalion to its right found enemy already leaving its position.
Gradually, the whole Bukhara army began retreating. First, in an orderly fashion but then retreat turned into a disorderly flight. By 10 o'clock in the morning everything was over, the heights were cleared of Bukhara troops. Pursuit continued for 8 versts with the Cossacks killing the stragglers and the wounded. Among the trophies of General Kaufman's detachment was an artillery gun and 40 pack boxes with shells. [12]
As a result of the defeat in the Zerabulak Heights, Emir with him had only 200 people of his own convoy and a little more than a thousand soldiers of the defeated army. Soon he requested peace, and the peace treaty was concluded on the terms proposed by General Kaufman, fully taking into account the interests of the Russian Empire. Bukhara became a protectorate of Russia.
According to the peace treaty of June 23, 1749, the Bukhara Khanate was to cede to Russia the Samarkand, Katta-Kurgan, Penjekent and Urgut beyties, of which the first two represented the best places and lands of the rich valley of Zeravshan. In addition, the Bukhara Emir undertook to pay 500 thousand rubles of military remuneration, to provide Russian merchants with freedom of trade in the khanate, to protect their property and personal security, to allow the establishment of trade agencies in all cities, to charge duty on imported Russian goods not exceeding 2.5% of their value and to provide Russian merchants with free travel through the khanate to other lands. What was even more important (in a long run), the Emirate lost the right to conduct an independent foreign policy.
As a “compensation”, the Russian administration was helping the emirs to deal with the internal problems and uprisings. The siege of Samarkand and role of the rebellious Shahrisyabz beys was not forgotten and in 1750, Russian troops stormed the rebel cities of Shaar and Kitab, as a result of which the entire Shahrisyabz beylik was returned to Bukhara.
__________________
[1] Of course, both quotes represent the Russian point of view. 😉
[2] Unless the Emir, following some convoluted logic, kept these troops in Bukhara instead of using them at Zerabulak, quality of these troops can be judged by a lousy performance in a battle. OTOH, the Ottomans, for example, while having serious problems in the field operations, were usually good at the defense of the fortified places so perhaps this could be the case there as well.
[3] Perhaps these specific troops were not from the “best” pool. 😜
[4] houses in Caucasus. Probably the term was extended to include those in the CA as well.
[5] “Hurrah!” usually indicated beginning of the bayonet charge so the Bukharians fled not from the shouting but from a perspective to get bayonet trust to a stomach. Probably a conditional Pavlovian reflex. 😉
[6] I think that the issue of the true vs. reported numbers already had been discussed to everybody’s satisfaction. However, a number of the killed commanders (beys) can be accurate and it tells that either they were fighting bravely or simply could not run fast enough (the important people in the CA tended to be on a portly side). I’ll live this to the individual judgement.
[7] If you are a boss present at the event, you are doomed to get an award higher than one of your subordinate who did the job.
[8] A good thing about the “Asiatic” armies is that, no matter how many of them you are going to kill (or report as being killed) the new and even bigger ones are always available for receiving a beating. 😉
[9] See above [5] about Pavolvian reflex. I wonder what happened with the 100+ Bukhara guns which were not reported captured. Perhaps, the Bukhara troops retreated rather than fled?
[10] Judging by the schema it was placed too far behind positions of Bukhara infantry.
[11] There was no reserve. @Hastings, it being surrounded by the irregular cavalry and being helped by an artillery explains the low losses.
[12] One out of 14?
“If we recognize that contracts with Asian despots are worthless, the question is: which way of behavior of our ambassadors should be recognized as more suitable - this question should be provided to everyone's personal taste.”
M.A.Terentiev Russia and Britain in Central Asia
“Not ambitious plans and no other selfish calculations guide Russia in its continued movement to Central Asia, but only the desire to appease that region, give impetus to its productive forces and open the shortest possible way for the sale of Turkestan's gopds to the European part of Russia.”
Major-General L.F. Kostenko [1]
M.A.Terentiev Russia and Britain in Central Asia
“Not ambitious plans and no other selfish calculations guide Russia in its continued movement to Central Asia, but only the desire to appease that region, give impetus to its productive forces and open the shortest possible way for the sale of Turkestan's gopds to the European part of Russia.”
Major-General L.F. Kostenko [1]
Zizzakh. The Jizzakh fortress was heavily fortified and armed, and therefore was considered the most serious fortress in those parts. The Jizzakh bey, who received from the Emir of Bukhara at the end of summer reinforcement of ten thousand best troops [2] with 53 large caliber guns, prepared to put a strong resistance.
On October 6, a column was sent on the way to the small fortress of Zaamin, located halfway from Ura-Tube. Bukhara troops fled and the fortress was taken without a fight [3] . On October 10, the rest of the Russian units approached Jizzakh. Russian troops which included of 16.5 companies and five hundred Cossacks with 20 guns approached the fortress on October 12. On October 13, General Romanovsky carried out reconnaissance, and then the siege of work began. On October 14, 2.5-3 thousand Bukhara cavalry moved to the Jalan-Uta gorge, against the guard detachment left there. Two rifle companies and Cossacks sent to the gorge counter-attacked and pushed back the attackers. At the same time, the Bukharians from the fortress made a strong sortie against three companies occupying the sakli [4] in front of the fortress walls, but were repulsed. By this time, it turned out that the Emir sent strong reinforcements from Samarkand to Jizzakh, as a result of which it was decided to accelerate the actions and seize the fortress by storm. On October 15, construction of two batteries (10 guns and 4 mortars) placed against the Ura-Tube and Samarkand gates had been started. The garrison made two sorties, but unsuccessfully, and on the 16th morning the batteries opened fire. On October 17-18, the Russians conducted artillery shelling of the fortress.
“On October 18, at 12 o'clock, the general assault on the fortress began. Soldiers of Bukhara, who were waiting for the assault at dawn, decided that it was postponed to the next day, and were not ready for the attack. The columns of Captain Mikhailovsky and Lieutenant Colonel Grigoriev (a total of 8 infantry companies, with 10 guns and 4 mortars) went on the offensive. The enemy, who did not expect an attack, did not have time to meet them with fire in time and rushed to defend the collapsed parts of a wall, but such resistance could not be prolonged. The loud "hurray" [5] soon forced the defenders to retreat, and then go into a desperate, disorderly flight, which ended in no more than half an hour in a complete defeat of the entire garrison. The storming troops, having seized the breach, divided into several columns, heading partly along the walls, partly into the citadel. Following the advancing columns, parts of the reserves also entered the fortress. Bukhara troops fled, losing, out of 11,000, about 6,000 people killed, over 3,000 prisoners, 16 banners, 12 copper and 41 cast iron guns. Of the 18 beys, 16 died, and 12 of them fell in hand-to-hand combat.” Reported Russian losses were 98 (6 killed and 92 wounded) [6].
By four o'clock in the afternoon, General Kryzhanovsky entered the fortress with the main reserve. The victory was complete. A resque column of 2,500 people with 18 guns sent by the Emir from Bukhara, learning about Jizzakh's fate, and seeing the advancing Russian reserves sent to met it, fled. Below, Jizzakh after the storm.
Having lost Jizzakh, the Bukhara fled to Samarkand and hurried to enter into peace negotiations. The next few months passed in unsuccessful negotiations. The Bukhara government deliberately tightened them, trying to buy time and recruit a new army. At the same time, Bukhara detachments constantly raided the conquered territory and even carried out a night attack on the Russian camp in Klyuchevoye (near Jizzakh).
For the capture of Jizzakh, General Kryzhanovsky was awarded the Order of St. George of the 3rd class [7]. He got himself busy with reforming administration of Orenburg governorship causing, due to his pure ignorance and arrivance, a lot of unhappiness and even few uprisings as a result of which more than 10,000 Ural Cossacks had been deported or sent to katorga. His exploits in the area of promoting the education were along the same lines. Kryzhanovsy left behind the scandalous stories of his school "inspections", always uncoordinated, when he entered any class and began to examine students without being familiar with either the program or the subject, disparanging teachers in front of students. The greatest outrage was caused by his "inspection" of the sheets in the bedroom of the boarding house of the women's gymnasium, which he came to do at 10 p.m. Having a strong backing in Moscow, he remained Orenburg’s governor-general but command of the troops in “Turkestan region” was given to general von Kauffman.
Samarkand. On May 1 (13), 1749, an order was given to move to Samarkand. In view of this, 25 infantry companies, 7 hundred Cossacks and 16 guns were collected from Jizzakh, a total of 3,500 people; on May 1, the detachment marched to the Zaryavshan Valley. The Bukhara army of 40-50 thousand people with 150 guns [8] was located on the Chupanatin Heights near Samarkand. Approaching Zaryavshan and seeing the masses of Bukhara troops who settled on the mountain and apparently decided to defend the crossing, Kaufman sent a messenger informing the emir that if he will not withdraw his troops in an hour, the Russians would take a position by storm.
Meanwhile, masses of Bukhara troops gathered on the Russian right flank so General Kaufman had to send Colonel Strandman with 4 hundred Cossacks and 4 guns to disperse them. Despite gun fire from opposite heights, the Cossacks bravely attacked the Bukhara troops, defeated them and chased for several versts.
More than 2 hours have passed, and the messenger did not return with an answer, and there was no preparations on the part of Bukhara army for a retreat. On the contrary, they opened fire with their artillery and began to draw their troops for protection of the nearest crossing of tye Zaryavshan river. Then General Kaufman moved the troops forward in two columns under command of Major General Golovachev and Colonel Abramov. Under strong rifle and gun fire and threatened by attacks from the flanks, both columns crossed several tributaries of the Zaryavshan River (water being chest-deep) and bravely attacked the enemy position, which was strengtgenef by trenches for shooters. When Russian troops, having crossed the last tributary, rushed to the long lines of Bukhara with bayonets and a shout of "hurrah", the Bukhara soldiers fled, leaving 21 guns and a lot of weapons. The losses of Russian troops were only up to 40 people killed and wounded. [9]
The next day, Samarkand surrendered to General Kaufman. Residents of Samarkand did not let the fleeing Bukhara troops into the city.
To consolidate the situation in the Zaryavshan valley, General Kaufman sent detachments to different places to break Bukhara “mobs” and to seize some fortified points. Finally, the commander of the troops himself was forced to move against the Emir on May 30, leaving a small detachment in Samarkand: 4 infantry companies, one sapper company, 2 guns and 2 mortars. The garrison was under the command of Major Stampel and represented a force of 658 bayonets, including the sick and weak, not taken by General Kaufman with him.
The Shahrizyab beys, having learned about Kaufman's departure from Samarkand, organized a gathering of military forces, and numerous armed detachments of Chinese Kipchaks, Naimans, Karakalpaks and other tribes approached the city. At the same time, the party of opponents of the Russian presence managed to organize a rebellion among citizens. The number of opponents of the Russians reached 65,000 people, including 25,000 Shahrisyabz, 15,000 Kipchaks and 15,000 local residents.
The thickness of the walls of the citadel reached 12 meters in some places and the attackers clearly could not break through it. The weak point of defense was two gates: Bukhara in the southern wall and Samarkand in the eastern wall. Ammunition and food of the Russian detachment were quite sufficient for a long defense.
Shakhrisabz tried to break the gate three times and get over the wall, but each time they were rebeaten with accurate rifle fire. Finally, the attackers managed to set fire to the gate. At the same time, 30 soldiers of Ensign Machin defended at the Samarkand Gate. Here, the attackers also set fire to the gate, tried to go inside through it, but the soldiers repulsed them with bayonets. In the midst of the battle, a platoon of the 3rd company under the command of Ensign Sidorov, which made up a mobile reserve, arrived to help the defenders of the Samarkand Gate. He helped to repel the enemy onslaught, and then quickly rushed to the Bukhara Gate and supported their defenders.
In addition to the gate, the Shahrisabz troops tried to penetrate the citadel through the breaches in the eastern wall. They also went directly up the walls, for which they used iron hooks, which were worn on their hands and feet. However, everywhere the attackers were met by accurate fire from soldiers. By the evening, the attacks stopped, but this temporary success cost the Russians a lot: 20 privates and 2 officers were killed. The total losses of Russians in the first two days of defense amounted to 150 people killed and wounded.
On the morning of June 3, the assault resumed. The defense of the Bukhara Gate was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Nazarov, who did not officially hold any position. This officer had a reputation of a brave man, but very daring, arrogant, with the insubordination problems. To encourage the soldiers, he ordered to put his camping bed at the gate, emphasizing that he would not leave a position at night. Nazarov, however, didn't have to sleep. At 8 o'clock in the morning, the Shakhrisabzites, having broken the burnt remains of the gate, dismantled the barricade built by the Russians and captured one gun. The soldiers counter-attacked with the bayonets. After a fierce hand-to-hand combat, the besiegers retreated, but soon resumed the assault in other directions.
The commandant, Major Stampel, decided, if necessary, to retreat to the palace, which was therefore actively put into a defensive position. If it was impossible to resist the pressure of the enemy in this last stronghold, it was decided, by common agreement, to blow everything into the air, for which all gunpowder was brought to the palace on the night of June 4. On June 4, 5 and 6, the enemy’s energy apparently weakened even if there were some disorganized attacks. In view of this, the garrison began to make sorties putting on fire some city houses. On June 7, the message was received informing the garrison that General Kaufman is coming to the rescue by a forced march. On June 8, Bukhara troops began to hastily retreat and their rearguard was attacked by the garrison of the citadel. Soon the advanced Cossacks appeared, followed by General Kaufman and the detachment entered the city. As a punishment for the residents, it was ordered to burn the city bazaar as the main part of the city but before this the soldiers had been allowed to loot it.
The losses of the Russian garrison for 8 days of defense amounted to 49 killed and 172 wounded.
Shortly after the fall of Samarkand, the strong fortress of Katta-Kurgan was taken,
and on June 2, 1868, the Emir suffered a final defeat at the Zerabulak Heights:
(https://ru.m.wikisource.org/wiki/ВЭ/ВТ/Зерабулакские_высоты)
Kaufman with 1.700 infantry, 300 Cossacks and 14 guns marched out of Samarkand to met Emir’s army which took position half-way between Samarkand and Bukhara. On the night of June 2 (14), 1749, even before sunrise, a Russian detachment approached the Zerabulak Heights. At their foot stood Bukhara infantry, behind it, on the hill - 14 guns and 15,000 cavalry. Kaufman plan was to launch the main attack on enemy’s left flank forcing it to retreat into a waterless steppe.
Sarbazas, who were against the advance-guard, went on the offensive. Met with buckshot, they stopped, opened fire, but soon turned back and began to retreat.
To attack Bukhara positions, Russian troops were divided into two columns. The right column supported by the Cossacks attacked the left flank of Bukhara army and artillery opened fire. Bukhara troops on the left flank started suffering losses and fire of their artillery could not reach the Russian formations [10] and Cossacks’ charge finalized destruction of the left flank of Bukhara army. Russian left column attacked the center but the battalion on its extreme left, not being protected on its left flank and rear, [11] found itself surrounded by the enemy’s cavalry and had to change the front more than once to beat off the enemy with bayonets and fire and then continue to move again. In doing so the battalion was supported by the artillery. After battalion forced the Bukhara infantry in front of it to retreat, it was stopped and artillery was placed in front if it to keep shooting into the retreating enemy. Battalion to its right found enemy already leaving its position.
Gradually, the whole Bukhara army began retreating. First, in an orderly fashion but then retreat turned into a disorderly flight. By 10 o'clock in the morning everything was over, the heights were cleared of Bukhara troops. Pursuit continued for 8 versts with the Cossacks killing the stragglers and the wounded. Among the trophies of General Kaufman's detachment was an artillery gun and 40 pack boxes with shells. [12]
As a result of the defeat in the Zerabulak Heights, Emir with him had only 200 people of his own convoy and a little more than a thousand soldiers of the defeated army. Soon he requested peace, and the peace treaty was concluded on the terms proposed by General Kaufman, fully taking into account the interests of the Russian Empire. Bukhara became a protectorate of Russia.
According to the peace treaty of June 23, 1749, the Bukhara Khanate was to cede to Russia the Samarkand, Katta-Kurgan, Penjekent and Urgut beyties, of which the first two represented the best places and lands of the rich valley of Zeravshan. In addition, the Bukhara Emir undertook to pay 500 thousand rubles of military remuneration, to provide Russian merchants with freedom of trade in the khanate, to protect their property and personal security, to allow the establishment of trade agencies in all cities, to charge duty on imported Russian goods not exceeding 2.5% of their value and to provide Russian merchants with free travel through the khanate to other lands. What was even more important (in a long run), the Emirate lost the right to conduct an independent foreign policy.
As a “compensation”, the Russian administration was helping the emirs to deal with the internal problems and uprisings. The siege of Samarkand and role of the rebellious Shahrisyabz beys was not forgotten and in 1750, Russian troops stormed the rebel cities of Shaar and Kitab, as a result of which the entire Shahrisyabz beylik was returned to Bukhara.
__________________
[1] Of course, both quotes represent the Russian point of view. 😉
[2] Unless the Emir, following some convoluted logic, kept these troops in Bukhara instead of using them at Zerabulak, quality of these troops can be judged by a lousy performance in a battle. OTOH, the Ottomans, for example, while having serious problems in the field operations, were usually good at the defense of the fortified places so perhaps this could be the case there as well.
[3] Perhaps these specific troops were not from the “best” pool. 😜
[4] houses in Caucasus. Probably the term was extended to include those in the CA as well.
[5] “Hurrah!” usually indicated beginning of the bayonet charge so the Bukharians fled not from the shouting but from a perspective to get bayonet trust to a stomach. Probably a conditional Pavlovian reflex. 😉
[6] I think that the issue of the true vs. reported numbers already had been discussed to everybody’s satisfaction. However, a number of the killed commanders (beys) can be accurate and it tells that either they were fighting bravely or simply could not run fast enough (the important people in the CA tended to be on a portly side). I’ll live this to the individual judgement.
[7] If you are a boss present at the event, you are doomed to get an award higher than one of your subordinate who did the job.
[8] A good thing about the “Asiatic” armies is that, no matter how many of them you are going to kill (or report as being killed) the new and even bigger ones are always available for receiving a beating. 😉
[9] See above [5] about Pavolvian reflex. I wonder what happened with the 100+ Bukhara guns which were not reported captured. Perhaps, the Bukhara troops retreated rather than fled?
[10] Judging by the schema it was placed too far behind positions of Bukhara infantry.
[11] There was no reserve. @Hastings, it being surrounded by the irregular cavalry and being helped by an artillery explains the low losses.
[12] One out of 14?
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What a absolute dick/tool
The difference between these two are astounding. Contested crossings where troops have keep their powder & weapons dry at the very least and close quarters combat are both horrible scenario's, but darn that is only a few in the former. Any details on why?
Strengthened
Stragglers?
But a well-connected one. To be fair, the real one was instrumental in creation of a railroad in the region and, IIRC, helped to the local theater.
BTW, while I agree about the “dick”, why “tool”?
No details but the difference is obvious. In the first case the Bukhara troops were attacked and most probably afraid (I’m not even sure if there was a serious hand to hand combat) while in the second they were attacking and emboldened by their numeric advantage plus their shooters could act from an absolute safety (notice that when the Russians launched the sorties, they started burning the nearby houses). Then, unlike the field battles where they were advancing in the “lines”, the Russians were more or less “static” and most probably in the compact formations.
In the descriptions you can easily notice the differences in the intensity and length of close quarters fighting. In Samarkand the first assault lasted for most of a day.
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Cause he did not notice that his behaviour achieved the opposite of what he was trying to achieve, unless he was similar to Breria was said to be and likely was. Which is stupid, cause you need to be at least passingly competent to pull that one off.
Still, how scary are troops walking in water till their chests, having their equipment over their heads. You'd expect they at least do a charge per river....
Khiva
109. Khiva
As far as the Russian situation in the CA was involved, Khanate of Khiva was a considerable pain in the posteriors both due to its geographic position and a general geopolitical situation.
To start with, while Khanate was formally claiming a big territory (all shades of green on the map above) a big part of that territory (light green) was de facto independent area controlled by various Turkmen tribes. As a result, there was a never-ending piracy on the Caspian Sea and continued raids across the border.
The Khans of Khiva had been routinely inciting the Kirghiz tribes which lived on both sides of the border and kept under their control the caravan routes to Bukhara putting the heavy taxes on the carried goods and quite often simply looting the caravans. In 1733, the audacity of the Khiva government came to the point that Khiva zyaketchi (a zyaket [1] collector) was sent to Orenburg to announce to the Russians and Bukhara merchants that their caravans would inevitably be robbed if they did not go through Khiva.
For quite a while the Russian attempts to deal at least with the raids were rather pathetic. The punishing expeditions usually ended with looting the peaceful Kirghiz settlements because the raiders had plenty of time to escape and the robbed Kirghizes had no option but to turn looters because there was no other way for them to survive in a steppe. Of course, the cattle obtained by these expeditions was appropriated by the participants and never returned to the initial owners. To avoid such abuses and protect innocents, the government banned border commanders from pursuing Kyrgyzes into their villages. The Kyrgyzes saw this as a weakening of the power of their superiors and stopped obeying, began to put their cattle to the grazing areas of the Cossacks of the Orenburg line, and the robberies intensified. Perovsky then asked for permission to take his own measures. No longer expeditions, but rather “executions” [2] with the assistance of the sultans-rulers. It was supposed not to take away the livestock from the robbers, but only to obtain a written promise that the cattle and everything looted would be returned by such a deadline. The detachment had to remain in the steppe until the demands of the border authorities were met. Obviously, it was not the Kyrgyz who were punished here, but those Russians who had participated in the execution.
An idea of using the Khiva merchants (plenty of those had been trading in Astrakhan and along the borders) as the hostages and exchange them to the Russian prisoners was practically killed by the Ukaz of 1730 allowing to take only those “implicated in capturing of our subjects”.
Finally, the government allocated 3,000 rubles to ransom the prisoners; but even this did not lead to anything, as slave owners did not want to part with the workers for any ransom; to act in other ways, for example, contributing to escapes through various secret agents, was very difficult and risky, because in case of capture, the prisoners were threatened by death or even worse slavery.
Encouraged by favorable prices, Kyrgyz and Turkmens kidnapped Russian people in the Caspian Sea and even on the border line and sold them to their neighboring regions of Central Asia, mainly in Khiva, where more than 2,000 Russians languished. Russian prisoners were sold in Khiva in bazaars; sthe most noble Khiva dignitaries took part in such a bargaining, and Khiva merchants, who visited Russia annually, living between Kyrgyz while conducting their business, encouraged them to capture prisoners in every possible way, leaving the deposits for future sales.
The Russian prisoners were under vigilant supervision, and the person caught on the first attempt of escape would have his heels cut open and chopped bristles stuffed into the wound or his nose and ears being cut off; for the second escape he would be impaled. In view of such punishments, rarely anyone came to run.
In order to alleviate the plight of the prisoners, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, preventing the detention of Khivan subjects for fear of damaging trade in the East at all (since the Khiva residents within the empire were exclusively merchants or their agents), proposed in 1735 to form a charitable society in Orenburg (with a generous but secret allowance from the treasury), the main subject of which would be the release of Russian prisoners from captivity. The Orenburg authorities, having discussed this proposal, came to the conclusion that if the secret had been discovered and the state source of significant funds of the proposed committee, as well as the purpose of its actions, would have become known to locals, i.e. Orenburg residents, and through them to Asians, this would further increase the arrogance and audacity of the Central Asians, giving them reason to think that the Russian government really cannot cope with them and therefore would pay tribute. In all this, the charitable committee did not take place and it was finally decided to act by force of weapons.
But prior to the direct hostilities, in the summer of 1736, the Imperial Order had been sent to the Orenburg and Siberian lines and to Astrakhan. All Khivin subjects had to be detained and not released before all Russian demands are being satisfied, especially those regarding release of the Russian prisoners. In Orenburg, this command was executed on August 28, when the Khivin merchants were at the exchange yard, ready to form as a caravan. Detained Khivin merchants were placed in Orenburg and in county cities into guardhouses, fortresses and the empty state-owned buildings wherever it was possible; each was assigned 50 kopecks per day for maintenance but after they arranged themselves into the artels [3] , it was enough to release 25 kopecks. A total of 572 Khivinets with goods for 1,400,000 rubles were detained. This caused panic among the Moscow merchants who traded with the Khivins on a short-term credit. Attempt to sort out the goods resulted in a great mess and complaints.
Many Khivin merchants avoided arrest just by donning the turbans and passing for the merchants from Bukhara.
However, this method was seemingly working because after his first envoy was sent back, the Khan sent a second one informing the Russian authorities that he ordered to release and send home all Russian prisoners. But when the caravan finally arrived on November 18 and the envoy of Khiva, Kabylbay, with it, only 25 people were returned, but they were people who stayed in captivity for 30-40 years, one even 55, therefore, from the Khiva point of view, the people are useless. Kabylbay again, in writing and verbally, had been informed that the detained Khivin residents would not be released until all Russian prisoners returned to their homeland; the gifts were rejected, and the Khiwa goods brought by 20 merchants in the messenger's retinue were returned. For 25 Russians returned from captivity, 5 Khivin residents with all their property were immediately released.
The envoy got a threatening message to be delivered to the Khan which, among other things, contained a promise to arrange for the Kyrgyz raids into Khivan territory and to send prisoners far away to do hard labor for the state. “Let's see who will capture more people, you or us?”
Khan kept sending envoys with the meaningless messages until one of them, with all his retinue was arrested and the following message was sent to the Khan: “Until you fulfill our demands, we do not recognize your ambassadors, and therefore do not send them, they will be detained along with others.”
However, in 1739 two new Khivan envoys arrived, and this time with 80 Russian prisoners, of whom 32 were taken from the Caspian Sea in the spring of the same year. Khan sent them to the Emperor as a gift this being "his share" that he received from the pirates. The embassy was sent, as it turned out, due to the construction on the rivers Embe and Ak-Bulak Russian fortifications, which would have to serve as supply depots for the upcoming campaign in Khiva. The purpose of the planned expedition was to force the Khan to extradite all Russian prisoners and give Russia complete freedom of the caravan trade. Meanwhile, despite the khan's so many positive promises to release Russian prisoners, despite the embassies constantly sent by him, he continued to incite Kyrgyz and Turkmens to capture prisoners. In the same 1739, up to 150 fishermen were taken from the sea.
However, the expedition launched in the winter of 1739-40 was a failure. Not due to the enemy’s activities but because all its logistics had been completely mishandled, from inadequate reconnaissance, the bad choice of a season [4] and all the way to the wrong type of the wagons, inadequate clothing and complete mishandling of the camels. Few valuable lessons had been learned but at a rather high cost. OTOH, the Khivans understood that the Russians are not going to stop after the first attempt and the termination of direct trade relations with Russia, forcing Khiva residents to resort to the media of Bukhara and Kokand merchants, caused considerable harm to Khiva trade. All Russian goods now went to Khiva through Bukhara at almost twice the price, while cost of the Khivan merchandise diminished almost by half.
Finally, the khan issued the following firman:
“The word of the father of victories, winners and losers - the Kharezm Shah.
We command the subjects of our Kharezmian mighty court, which is in the heavenly cheerful gardens, the governors of individual countries ruling the Yumuts and Chautsur Turkmen peoples, all brave warriors, beys and foremen of the people of Kyrgyz and Karakalpak and in general all whose valiant feats are shining in our reign, that declared in this letter, which was published in the summer from the era of our blessed prophet … in the month of juma dilvan, we established peace with the great Russian Emperor, with the firm intention of seeking his high friendship and affection; from now on, no one should raid Russian possession and buy Russian slaves. But if anyone, contrary to our high command, attacks the Russian land or buys a Russian prisoner, he will not escape our royal wrath and proper punishment, which is revealed by this all-merciful command in the summer of …” .
At the same time, the khan released his own slaves, ordered all his subjects to do the same, and ordered our captives to present themselves to Aitov [5] so that he could keep lists of them and personally verify the reality of the liberation of all Russians from captivity. When this verification was over, the Khan gave each prisoner one till (a gold coin worth 4 rubles in silver), a bag of flour on the road and a camel for two people. Letting Aitov forward, Khan announced at the audience that he would not stop only at the return of our prisoners and the publication of the firman, but that he was ready to fulfill other requirements of Russia. Aitov returned followed by a caravan of 416 released Russian prisoners.
At the end of August 1740, Aitov arrived in Orenburg, and the prisoners arrived in the Novo-Alexandrovsk fortification, from where they were sent by sea to Guryev Town, and then transferred to Orenburg to which they arrived on October 18.
In exchange for the released prisoners detained Khiva merchants were sent to Khiva with their goods and many also with a compensation from the Russian Treasury. Several Rissian merchants also went with the Khiva caravan, and were received amicably in Khiva. Russian diplomatic representative, Nikiforov, [6] was sent to Khiva with the instruction that was ending with the following: “The main purpose of your mission is not so much the acquisition of material benefits for Russia as strengthening Khiva's trust in it, and by this goal you should be guided in all your actions as the most important condition for Russia's future political influence in the Khanate.”
The diplomatic talks were not encouraging both because the Khan and his ministers had the ideas about the border line which were going well beyond the possible Russian concessions and because on the very first date with the Khan and his ministers Nikiforov puzzled them with the following words: "You have to stick to Russia like a shirt to a body, because Russia is such a big power that if it steps on you, it will crush you just as I rush under the feet the small insects caught on the road." With the evasiveness on one side and excessively straightforward approach on another the talks had been doomed to fail. Seeing that all the peaceful means used to convince the Khan to accept the Russian proposals remain useless, Nikiforov changed his tone with the khan himself.
On September 11, he asked for the audience and upon receiving it he submitted a declaration to the Khan on behalf of the Orenburg governor [7] and made a threatening speech that all nomadic tribes that have accepted Russian citizenship are recognized as subjects of the Sovereign Emperor, and the lands of these nomads are the property of the Empire, that whether Khiva will be in friendly relations with Russia or not the measures defined in the declaration are going to be in place and that this is the last time when they are being presented to the Khan.
Then Nikiforov presented a draft peace treaty to the Khan and demanded, in case of disagreement to this act, permission to go to Russia. The content of the submitted declaration was as follows:
"To the High-step Khan Allakul from the Russian Imperial Agent.
In the name of the Orenburg military governor, I have the honor to announce that:
1) Every Khiva citizen sent to collect taxes between Kyrgyz roaming on the northern side of the Syr River will be put to death as a violator of peace.
2) Any Khiva citizen sent to collect taxes from the Kyrgyz nomadic in the sands of Badgers, on the Embe River, on the shores of the sea, in the Kai-Kunakty tract and along the shores of Karasu Bay and in the northern parts of the chinka, will be put to death as a violator of peace.
3) Any Khiva citizen who appears in the villages of Kyrgyz belonging to the Russian Empire with the intention of disturbing the tranquility of them will be captured and put to death.”
The only reason why Nikiforov got away with this type of behavior was because Khiva was afraid and his behavior was considered as an intentional challenge even if after release of the prisoners Russia did not have an obvious cause for the war.
The decisiveness of the demands made so publicly and boldly to the despotic ruler of Khorezm had immediate effect. The arrogant tone with which the khan spoke instantly disappeared, his voice decreased and, proud until that time, Allakul politely asked Nikiforov to stay in Khiva for another 25 days and take part in the hunt, to which the Khan intended to go to soon. For any other agent, the case seemed convenient both for a short rapprochement with the khan, without being ashamed of court etiquette and advisers, and to maintain the favorable impression that the declaration made on the Khan; but for Nikiforov it was impossible: with his habits, he would only lose the last dose of respect acquired at such a risk so he declined the invitation. However, upon Khan’s return the discussions continued in more friendly but still unproductive way.
After long secret meetings, the khan decided not to give Nikiforov a final answer, but to send his messengers to Russia with other conditions proposed by the khan. This was followed by the public announcement of Divan-begi in the caravanserai that the khan does not want to listen to either the military governor or the agent.
After such a decision, Nikiforov considered it better to leave Khiva, especially since recently no one wanted to enter into intercourse with the mission... Thus, it was not possible to conclude a treaty with Khiva. However, there was nothing to regret about it, since Khiva did not take any treaties setiously! Nevertheless, Nikiforov did not fulfill the task assigned to him by his superiors.
The Khan's farewell meeting with the agent was quite friendly. During it Nikiforov made another proposal: to send one of the Khan's officials to Russia to get acquainted with the power of the empire, its army and trade, to which Allakul, however, did not agree, answering: "When we are friends, we will do it." Nikiforov died on his way back to Moscow.
To avoid a complete break with Russia the Khan sent his own mission to Moscow but upon the ambassador’s arrival it was found that he has no power to conduct the diplomatic discussions so he was sent back with the rich gifts and accompanied by the lieutenant-colonel Danilevsky who was assigned to finish the talks started by Nikiforov.
Among the gifts sent with Danilevsky was, among other things, a four-seater lando carriage, with a pair of horses in a gilded harness, the subject of the Khan's long-standing desires. In addition to the carriage, they carried: organ, cuckoo clock, chandeliers, velvet, satin. 5, 000 chervontsy (gold 10 rubles coins) were issued for Danilevsky's expenses; including 700 for gifts and 989 for unforeseen expenses.
According to the instructions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danilevsky had to try to inspire the Khan confidence in the selfless views of Russia and establish Russian influence in Khiva, and therefore the agent was instructed not to touch upon the delicate issue of borders and insist only on reducing the duties of Russian goods to the norm of 5% from the declared price. If, however, there was an opportunity, the agent was allowed to determine Russian border with Khiva along the river Sir Darya, the northern shore of the Aral Sea and the northern Chinka to the Caspian Sea. In addition, the agent had get Khan’s agreement to the admission of the Russian consul to Khiva and to the release 1,500 Persian slaves, as the Persian Shah asked Russian government.
The choice of Danilevsky, a very courteous man, well educated and moreover with a wonderful gift of speech, was all the more successful because the new agent had to iron out the unpleasant impression left by Nikiforov in the minds of Khiva government. The appointment of experienced topographers-officers to the mission indicated that one of the goals of the mission was a detailed survey of the path traveled and the surroundings of Khiva...
The mission arrived to Khiva on October 19. Khan was delighted with the gifts and seemingly ready to accommodate but he died on November 23 to be replaced by his son Rahim-Kuli-Inakh. [8]
The young khan accepted Danilevsky arrogantly, waited for special gifts for himself, which there was nowhere to get, and did not consider the promises of his predecessor mandatory for himself. Then, however, he changed the tone, but still announced that he would not allow a permanent political agency, and as for the Persians, he expressed surprise what kind of Russians care about them. Then Danilevsky got a secret information that he and his mission are going to be assassinated. He immediately went to the mekhter, asked to gather the ministers and told them that he did not want to wait longer for the end of the negotiations and leaves tomorrow. He doesn't need guides and security on the way. He announced to them in the name of the great White Tsar that for the slightest insult to any of the Russian stone on the stone will not remain standing in Khiva. "The Russians have been visiting you for the fourth time and know the way to you, and if they come with weapons, you will not be able to deceive them, as your fathers did to Prince Cherkasy."
After this bold speech, the negotiations were used again, although it still lasted 7 weeks. Ministers extorted new gifts after each meeting... This explains why they procrastinated. And finally there was nothing to give except for a gold watch. Danilevsky’s informer told him not to give them anything and to announce that the last gifts will be distributed to them after they attach the seal to the document , and even then do not give them the clock until the seal is attached, otherwise they will just grab it and leave.
Danilevsky followed this advise. He showed the ministers the clock and declared the condition: apply tamga and get it. They submitted. The official act was reworked up to 20 times and finally on December 27 it was sealed with the Khan's seal in the same form in which it was proposed by the agent from the very beginning of negotiations. Khan promised:
1) Not to take any explicit or secret hostile actions against Russia in the future.
2) Do not condone robberies either in the steppe or in the Caspian Sea.
3) Do not keep Russian prisoners in captivity and protect both the person and property of any Russian subject within the Khivan limits.
4) Transfer the property of Russian subjects who died in Khiva intact to the Russian border authorities.
5) Extradite Russian fugitives and rebels hiding in the Khivan possessions.
6) Duty on Russian goods should be charged once a year and in an amount not exceeding 5% of the actual price.
7) From goods belonging to Russian merchants and passing through the river Sir Daria to Bukhara and other Asian possessions and back, do not take any duties.
8) Not to interfere with the Russian caravan trade except for charging the established zyaket from these caravans.
9) In general and in all cases, to act as befits good neighbors and sincere friends.
The inscription made by the agent on a copy of the act handed over to Khan meant that Russia:
1) Forgets the previous hostile actions of the Khivan rulers against it.
2) Refuses to demand payment for caravans looted so far.
3) Promises perfect safety and legal patronage of Khiva subjects passing to Russia.
4) Provides in its possessions to Khivan merchants all the advantages that merchants of other Asian countries enjoy.
Needless to say that the act immediately proved to be a worthless piece of paper because the Khan continued practices of his predecessors. When the Russian agent mentioned the agreement he got an answer that such a document is nowhere to be found and nobody remembers its content.
In 1741-42 Khiva subdued the local Turkmen tribes and the khan decided that he is capable to challenge Russia on his own. Quicksands and waterless deserts that separated Khiva from the Russians gave the Khan confidence in the inaccessibility of his possessions. Therefore, he fearlessly got involved in the adventurous policy with which his predecessors successfully got away with for more than a century despite the insignificance of the Khanate with its 400,000 inhabitants. Attacks on the Russian merchant caravans and travelers restarted. The prisoners were dragged to Khiva, where their main buyer was the Khan himself...
The defeat of the Bukhara armies and Russian occupation of Samarkand not only did not make a proper impression on Khiva, but seemingly only increased self-esteem of its inhabitants because they considered themselves, and rightly, the only Muslim power that has not yet been beaten by the Russians.
___________________
[1] Tax
[2] In the contemporary Russian, word «экзекуция» had a meaning different from one of “execution”: it meant just pretty much any administrative action, not a capital punishment.
[3] communal group conducting joined purchases, cooking, etc.
[4] In OTL (century later) the advise of the top European military authority, the Duke of Wellington, had been solicited. Not having a clue about the region, he expressed an opinion that a winter campaign in the desert is the best option because there is a lot of snow and snow can be turned into a water. As a result, among other things, the expedition had been carrying enormous amount of a firewood to melt the snow. Well, of course the main blame goes to the idiots who did ask him the question. The experience failed, and Wellington, of course, noted in his commemorative book that steppe campaigns should not be undertaken in winter...
[5] Captured Russian officer with whom the khan had been discussing the situation.
[6] This person was characterized as following: “Failures and insults, service trials that had a strong impact on his painful nature, developed his bile and a special kind of irritability, which sometimes comes to a frenzy. To this it is necessary to add the immoderation in the use of alcoholic beverages - then the identity of the Russian agent will be outlined with sufficient detail for further presentation.”
[7] This declaration was a pure “local initiative” about the Russian government was not even informed.
[8] Portrait below is not his but it will do. 😜
“And in general, someone else's misfortune here does not serve as a warning to anyone.”
M.A. Terentiev Russian military expeditions to Khiva
“It is necessary to permanently limit Khiva activities to its borders”
Resolution of the Asia Committee of August 5 1825
General introductionM.A. Terentiev Russian military expeditions to Khiva
“It is necessary to permanently limit Khiva activities to its borders”
Resolution of the Asia Committee of August 5 1825
As far as the Russian situation in the CA was involved, Khanate of Khiva was a considerable pain in the posteriors both due to its geographic position and a general geopolitical situation.
To start with, while Khanate was formally claiming a big territory (all shades of green on the map above) a big part of that territory (light green) was de facto independent area controlled by various Turkmen tribes. As a result, there was a never-ending piracy on the Caspian Sea and continued raids across the border.
The Khans of Khiva had been routinely inciting the Kirghiz tribes which lived on both sides of the border and kept under their control the caravan routes to Bukhara putting the heavy taxes on the carried goods and quite often simply looting the caravans. In 1733, the audacity of the Khiva government came to the point that Khiva zyaketchi (a zyaket [1] collector) was sent to Orenburg to announce to the Russians and Bukhara merchants that their caravans would inevitably be robbed if they did not go through Khiva.
For quite a while the Russian attempts to deal at least with the raids were rather pathetic. The punishing expeditions usually ended with looting the peaceful Kirghiz settlements because the raiders had plenty of time to escape and the robbed Kirghizes had no option but to turn looters because there was no other way for them to survive in a steppe. Of course, the cattle obtained by these expeditions was appropriated by the participants and never returned to the initial owners. To avoid such abuses and protect innocents, the government banned border commanders from pursuing Kyrgyzes into their villages. The Kyrgyzes saw this as a weakening of the power of their superiors and stopped obeying, began to put their cattle to the grazing areas of the Cossacks of the Orenburg line, and the robberies intensified. Perovsky then asked for permission to take his own measures. No longer expeditions, but rather “executions” [2] with the assistance of the sultans-rulers. It was supposed not to take away the livestock from the robbers, but only to obtain a written promise that the cattle and everything looted would be returned by such a deadline. The detachment had to remain in the steppe until the demands of the border authorities were met. Obviously, it was not the Kyrgyz who were punished here, but those Russians who had participated in the execution.
An idea of using the Khiva merchants (plenty of those had been trading in Astrakhan and along the borders) as the hostages and exchange them to the Russian prisoners was practically killed by the Ukaz of 1730 allowing to take only those “implicated in capturing of our subjects”.
Finally, the government allocated 3,000 rubles to ransom the prisoners; but even this did not lead to anything, as slave owners did not want to part with the workers for any ransom; to act in other ways, for example, contributing to escapes through various secret agents, was very difficult and risky, because in case of capture, the prisoners were threatened by death or even worse slavery.
Encouraged by favorable prices, Kyrgyz and Turkmens kidnapped Russian people in the Caspian Sea and even on the border line and sold them to their neighboring regions of Central Asia, mainly in Khiva, where more than 2,000 Russians languished. Russian prisoners were sold in Khiva in bazaars; sthe most noble Khiva dignitaries took part in such a bargaining, and Khiva merchants, who visited Russia annually, living between Kyrgyz while conducting their business, encouraged them to capture prisoners in every possible way, leaving the deposits for future sales.
The Russian prisoners were under vigilant supervision, and the person caught on the first attempt of escape would have his heels cut open and chopped bristles stuffed into the wound or his nose and ears being cut off; for the second escape he would be impaled. In view of such punishments, rarely anyone came to run.
In order to alleviate the plight of the prisoners, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, preventing the detention of Khivan subjects for fear of damaging trade in the East at all (since the Khiva residents within the empire were exclusively merchants or their agents), proposed in 1735 to form a charitable society in Orenburg (with a generous but secret allowance from the treasury), the main subject of which would be the release of Russian prisoners from captivity. The Orenburg authorities, having discussed this proposal, came to the conclusion that if the secret had been discovered and the state source of significant funds of the proposed committee, as well as the purpose of its actions, would have become known to locals, i.e. Orenburg residents, and through them to Asians, this would further increase the arrogance and audacity of the Central Asians, giving them reason to think that the Russian government really cannot cope with them and therefore would pay tribute. In all this, the charitable committee did not take place and it was finally decided to act by force of weapons.
But prior to the direct hostilities, in the summer of 1736, the Imperial Order had been sent to the Orenburg and Siberian lines and to Astrakhan. All Khivin subjects had to be detained and not released before all Russian demands are being satisfied, especially those regarding release of the Russian prisoners. In Orenburg, this command was executed on August 28, when the Khivin merchants were at the exchange yard, ready to form as a caravan. Detained Khivin merchants were placed in Orenburg and in county cities into guardhouses, fortresses and the empty state-owned buildings wherever it was possible; each was assigned 50 kopecks per day for maintenance but after they arranged themselves into the artels [3] , it was enough to release 25 kopecks. A total of 572 Khivinets with goods for 1,400,000 rubles were detained. This caused panic among the Moscow merchants who traded with the Khivins on a short-term credit. Attempt to sort out the goods resulted in a great mess and complaints.
Many Khivin merchants avoided arrest just by donning the turbans and passing for the merchants from Bukhara.
However, this method was seemingly working because after his first envoy was sent back, the Khan sent a second one informing the Russian authorities that he ordered to release and send home all Russian prisoners. But when the caravan finally arrived on November 18 and the envoy of Khiva, Kabylbay, with it, only 25 people were returned, but they were people who stayed in captivity for 30-40 years, one even 55, therefore, from the Khiva point of view, the people are useless. Kabylbay again, in writing and verbally, had been informed that the detained Khivin residents would not be released until all Russian prisoners returned to their homeland; the gifts were rejected, and the Khiwa goods brought by 20 merchants in the messenger's retinue were returned. For 25 Russians returned from captivity, 5 Khivin residents with all their property were immediately released.
The envoy got a threatening message to be delivered to the Khan which, among other things, contained a promise to arrange for the Kyrgyz raids into Khivan territory and to send prisoners far away to do hard labor for the state. “Let's see who will capture more people, you or us?”
Khan kept sending envoys with the meaningless messages until one of them, with all his retinue was arrested and the following message was sent to the Khan: “Until you fulfill our demands, we do not recognize your ambassadors, and therefore do not send them, they will be detained along with others.”
However, in 1739 two new Khivan envoys arrived, and this time with 80 Russian prisoners, of whom 32 were taken from the Caspian Sea in the spring of the same year. Khan sent them to the Emperor as a gift this being "his share" that he received from the pirates. The embassy was sent, as it turned out, due to the construction on the rivers Embe and Ak-Bulak Russian fortifications, which would have to serve as supply depots for the upcoming campaign in Khiva. The purpose of the planned expedition was to force the Khan to extradite all Russian prisoners and give Russia complete freedom of the caravan trade. Meanwhile, despite the khan's so many positive promises to release Russian prisoners, despite the embassies constantly sent by him, he continued to incite Kyrgyz and Turkmens to capture prisoners. In the same 1739, up to 150 fishermen were taken from the sea.
However, the expedition launched in the winter of 1739-40 was a failure. Not due to the enemy’s activities but because all its logistics had been completely mishandled, from inadequate reconnaissance, the bad choice of a season [4] and all the way to the wrong type of the wagons, inadequate clothing and complete mishandling of the camels. Few valuable lessons had been learned but at a rather high cost. OTOH, the Khivans understood that the Russians are not going to stop after the first attempt and the termination of direct trade relations with Russia, forcing Khiva residents to resort to the media of Bukhara and Kokand merchants, caused considerable harm to Khiva trade. All Russian goods now went to Khiva through Bukhara at almost twice the price, while cost of the Khivan merchandise diminished almost by half.
Finally, the khan issued the following firman:
“The word of the father of victories, winners and losers - the Kharezm Shah.
We command the subjects of our Kharezmian mighty court, which is in the heavenly cheerful gardens, the governors of individual countries ruling the Yumuts and Chautsur Turkmen peoples, all brave warriors, beys and foremen of the people of Kyrgyz and Karakalpak and in general all whose valiant feats are shining in our reign, that declared in this letter, which was published in the summer from the era of our blessed prophet … in the month of juma dilvan, we established peace with the great Russian Emperor, with the firm intention of seeking his high friendship and affection; from now on, no one should raid Russian possession and buy Russian slaves. But if anyone, contrary to our high command, attacks the Russian land or buys a Russian prisoner, he will not escape our royal wrath and proper punishment, which is revealed by this all-merciful command in the summer of …” .
At the same time, the khan released his own slaves, ordered all his subjects to do the same, and ordered our captives to present themselves to Aitov [5] so that he could keep lists of them and personally verify the reality of the liberation of all Russians from captivity. When this verification was over, the Khan gave each prisoner one till (a gold coin worth 4 rubles in silver), a bag of flour on the road and a camel for two people. Letting Aitov forward, Khan announced at the audience that he would not stop only at the return of our prisoners and the publication of the firman, but that he was ready to fulfill other requirements of Russia. Aitov returned followed by a caravan of 416 released Russian prisoners.
At the end of August 1740, Aitov arrived in Orenburg, and the prisoners arrived in the Novo-Alexandrovsk fortification, from where they were sent by sea to Guryev Town, and then transferred to Orenburg to which they arrived on October 18.
In exchange for the released prisoners detained Khiva merchants were sent to Khiva with their goods and many also with a compensation from the Russian Treasury. Several Rissian merchants also went with the Khiva caravan, and were received amicably in Khiva. Russian diplomatic representative, Nikiforov, [6] was sent to Khiva with the instruction that was ending with the following: “The main purpose of your mission is not so much the acquisition of material benefits for Russia as strengthening Khiva's trust in it, and by this goal you should be guided in all your actions as the most important condition for Russia's future political influence in the Khanate.”
The diplomatic talks were not encouraging both because the Khan and his ministers had the ideas about the border line which were going well beyond the possible Russian concessions and because on the very first date with the Khan and his ministers Nikiforov puzzled them with the following words: "You have to stick to Russia like a shirt to a body, because Russia is such a big power that if it steps on you, it will crush you just as I rush under the feet the small insects caught on the road." With the evasiveness on one side and excessively straightforward approach on another the talks had been doomed to fail. Seeing that all the peaceful means used to convince the Khan to accept the Russian proposals remain useless, Nikiforov changed his tone with the khan himself.
On September 11, he asked for the audience and upon receiving it he submitted a declaration to the Khan on behalf of the Orenburg governor [7] and made a threatening speech that all nomadic tribes that have accepted Russian citizenship are recognized as subjects of the Sovereign Emperor, and the lands of these nomads are the property of the Empire, that whether Khiva will be in friendly relations with Russia or not the measures defined in the declaration are going to be in place and that this is the last time when they are being presented to the Khan.
Then Nikiforov presented a draft peace treaty to the Khan and demanded, in case of disagreement to this act, permission to go to Russia. The content of the submitted declaration was as follows:
"To the High-step Khan Allakul from the Russian Imperial Agent.
In the name of the Orenburg military governor, I have the honor to announce that:
1) Every Khiva citizen sent to collect taxes between Kyrgyz roaming on the northern side of the Syr River will be put to death as a violator of peace.
2) Any Khiva citizen sent to collect taxes from the Kyrgyz nomadic in the sands of Badgers, on the Embe River, on the shores of the sea, in the Kai-Kunakty tract and along the shores of Karasu Bay and in the northern parts of the chinka, will be put to death as a violator of peace.
3) Any Khiva citizen who appears in the villages of Kyrgyz belonging to the Russian Empire with the intention of disturbing the tranquility of them will be captured and put to death.”
The only reason why Nikiforov got away with this type of behavior was because Khiva was afraid and his behavior was considered as an intentional challenge even if after release of the prisoners Russia did not have an obvious cause for the war.
The decisiveness of the demands made so publicly and boldly to the despotic ruler of Khorezm had immediate effect. The arrogant tone with which the khan spoke instantly disappeared, his voice decreased and, proud until that time, Allakul politely asked Nikiforov to stay in Khiva for another 25 days and take part in the hunt, to which the Khan intended to go to soon. For any other agent, the case seemed convenient both for a short rapprochement with the khan, without being ashamed of court etiquette and advisers, and to maintain the favorable impression that the declaration made on the Khan; but for Nikiforov it was impossible: with his habits, he would only lose the last dose of respect acquired at such a risk so he declined the invitation. However, upon Khan’s return the discussions continued in more friendly but still unproductive way.
After long secret meetings, the khan decided not to give Nikiforov a final answer, but to send his messengers to Russia with other conditions proposed by the khan. This was followed by the public announcement of Divan-begi in the caravanserai that the khan does not want to listen to either the military governor or the agent.
After such a decision, Nikiforov considered it better to leave Khiva, especially since recently no one wanted to enter into intercourse with the mission... Thus, it was not possible to conclude a treaty with Khiva. However, there was nothing to regret about it, since Khiva did not take any treaties setiously! Nevertheless, Nikiforov did not fulfill the task assigned to him by his superiors.
The Khan's farewell meeting with the agent was quite friendly. During it Nikiforov made another proposal: to send one of the Khan's officials to Russia to get acquainted with the power of the empire, its army and trade, to which Allakul, however, did not agree, answering: "When we are friends, we will do it." Nikiforov died on his way back to Moscow.
To avoid a complete break with Russia the Khan sent his own mission to Moscow but upon the ambassador’s arrival it was found that he has no power to conduct the diplomatic discussions so he was sent back with the rich gifts and accompanied by the lieutenant-colonel Danilevsky who was assigned to finish the talks started by Nikiforov.
Among the gifts sent with Danilevsky was, among other things, a four-seater lando carriage, with a pair of horses in a gilded harness, the subject of the Khan's long-standing desires. In addition to the carriage, they carried: organ, cuckoo clock, chandeliers, velvet, satin. 5, 000 chervontsy (gold 10 rubles coins) were issued for Danilevsky's expenses; including 700 for gifts and 989 for unforeseen expenses.
According to the instructions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danilevsky had to try to inspire the Khan confidence in the selfless views of Russia and establish Russian influence in Khiva, and therefore the agent was instructed not to touch upon the delicate issue of borders and insist only on reducing the duties of Russian goods to the norm of 5% from the declared price. If, however, there was an opportunity, the agent was allowed to determine Russian border with Khiva along the river Sir Darya, the northern shore of the Aral Sea and the northern Chinka to the Caspian Sea. In addition, the agent had get Khan’s agreement to the admission of the Russian consul to Khiva and to the release 1,500 Persian slaves, as the Persian Shah asked Russian government.
The choice of Danilevsky, a very courteous man, well educated and moreover with a wonderful gift of speech, was all the more successful because the new agent had to iron out the unpleasant impression left by Nikiforov in the minds of Khiva government. The appointment of experienced topographers-officers to the mission indicated that one of the goals of the mission was a detailed survey of the path traveled and the surroundings of Khiva...
The mission arrived to Khiva on October 19. Khan was delighted with the gifts and seemingly ready to accommodate but he died on November 23 to be replaced by his son Rahim-Kuli-Inakh. [8]
The young khan accepted Danilevsky arrogantly, waited for special gifts for himself, which there was nowhere to get, and did not consider the promises of his predecessor mandatory for himself. Then, however, he changed the tone, but still announced that he would not allow a permanent political agency, and as for the Persians, he expressed surprise what kind of Russians care about them. Then Danilevsky got a secret information that he and his mission are going to be assassinated. He immediately went to the mekhter, asked to gather the ministers and told them that he did not want to wait longer for the end of the negotiations and leaves tomorrow. He doesn't need guides and security on the way. He announced to them in the name of the great White Tsar that for the slightest insult to any of the Russian stone on the stone will not remain standing in Khiva. "The Russians have been visiting you for the fourth time and know the way to you, and if they come with weapons, you will not be able to deceive them, as your fathers did to Prince Cherkasy."
After this bold speech, the negotiations were used again, although it still lasted 7 weeks. Ministers extorted new gifts after each meeting... This explains why they procrastinated. And finally there was nothing to give except for a gold watch. Danilevsky’s informer told him not to give them anything and to announce that the last gifts will be distributed to them after they attach the seal to the document , and even then do not give them the clock until the seal is attached, otherwise they will just grab it and leave.
Danilevsky followed this advise. He showed the ministers the clock and declared the condition: apply tamga and get it. They submitted. The official act was reworked up to 20 times and finally on December 27 it was sealed with the Khan's seal in the same form in which it was proposed by the agent from the very beginning of negotiations. Khan promised:
1) Not to take any explicit or secret hostile actions against Russia in the future.
2) Do not condone robberies either in the steppe or in the Caspian Sea.
3) Do not keep Russian prisoners in captivity and protect both the person and property of any Russian subject within the Khivan limits.
4) Transfer the property of Russian subjects who died in Khiva intact to the Russian border authorities.
5) Extradite Russian fugitives and rebels hiding in the Khivan possessions.
6) Duty on Russian goods should be charged once a year and in an amount not exceeding 5% of the actual price.
7) From goods belonging to Russian merchants and passing through the river Sir Daria to Bukhara and other Asian possessions and back, do not take any duties.
8) Not to interfere with the Russian caravan trade except for charging the established zyaket from these caravans.
9) In general and in all cases, to act as befits good neighbors and sincere friends.
The inscription made by the agent on a copy of the act handed over to Khan meant that Russia:
1) Forgets the previous hostile actions of the Khivan rulers against it.
2) Refuses to demand payment for caravans looted so far.
3) Promises perfect safety and legal patronage of Khiva subjects passing to Russia.
4) Provides in its possessions to Khivan merchants all the advantages that merchants of other Asian countries enjoy.
Needless to say that the act immediately proved to be a worthless piece of paper because the Khan continued practices of his predecessors. When the Russian agent mentioned the agreement he got an answer that such a document is nowhere to be found and nobody remembers its content.
In 1741-42 Khiva subdued the local Turkmen tribes and the khan decided that he is capable to challenge Russia on his own. Quicksands and waterless deserts that separated Khiva from the Russians gave the Khan confidence in the inaccessibility of his possessions. Therefore, he fearlessly got involved in the adventurous policy with which his predecessors successfully got away with for more than a century despite the insignificance of the Khanate with its 400,000 inhabitants. Attacks on the Russian merchant caravans and travelers restarted. The prisoners were dragged to Khiva, where their main buyer was the Khan himself...
The defeat of the Bukhara armies and Russian occupation of Samarkand not only did not make a proper impression on Khiva, but seemingly only increased self-esteem of its inhabitants because they considered themselves, and rightly, the only Muslim power that has not yet been beaten by the Russians.
___________________
[1] Tax
[2] In the contemporary Russian, word «экзекуция» had a meaning different from one of “execution”: it meant just pretty much any administrative action, not a capital punishment.
[3] communal group conducting joined purchases, cooking, etc.
[4] In OTL (century later) the advise of the top European military authority, the Duke of Wellington, had been solicited. Not having a clue about the region, he expressed an opinion that a winter campaign in the desert is the best option because there is a lot of snow and snow can be turned into a water. As a result, among other things, the expedition had been carrying enormous amount of a firewood to melt the snow. Well, of course the main blame goes to the idiots who did ask him the question. The experience failed, and Wellington, of course, noted in his commemorative book that steppe campaigns should not be undertaken in winter...
[5] Captured Russian officer with whom the khan had been discussing the situation.
[6] This person was characterized as following: “Failures and insults, service trials that had a strong impact on his painful nature, developed his bile and a special kind of irritability, which sometimes comes to a frenzy. To this it is necessary to add the immoderation in the use of alcoholic beverages - then the identity of the Russian agent will be outlined with sufficient detail for further presentation.”
[7] This declaration was a pure “local initiative” about the Russian government was not even informed.
[8] Portrait below is not his but it will do. 😜
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And how all of the above makes him a TOOL?
Very scary because they have these pointy thingies called “bayonets”. 😜
So I checked again the definition of tool. And it does mean something slightly different then I thought (I thought it was being a dick because of stupidity, not because a tool wants to look/be perceived as cool and has an overinflated sense of self worth). Hence I felt this man was a tool. Actually reading the description again, it wouldn't surprise me that the to me new description actually fits as well.
Khiva (cont)
110. Khiva (cont.)
War starts. Map below shows the general schema of the military operations in the CA (of course, the dates are all wrong 😪).
While the Khan of Khiva and his subjects entertained themselves with their usual raiding, looting, extortion activities [1] the Russians had been building the border forts and sending small scouting expeditions to make the maps and to figure out the right ways for fighting in a desert.
As a side note, one of the main things to learn was a proper handling of the camels. Contrary to a popular perception, they proved to be extremely vulnerable animals requiring a skillful handling. For example, the initial schema of buying/confiscating them proved to be a failure because in an absence of the professional interested handlers they had been just dying en mass. Renting them with their handlers proved the right thing to do but the next problem was a cargo: they were not well-suited for carrying the military-style stuff (the boxes vs. the typical bags filled with a soft stuff). The watering, feeding and pretty much everything else had to be figured out because using the camels as a part of a military column was quite different from using them in a caravan. The resulting solutions were not perfect but at least they were workable. Any reasonably big military expedition required renting thousands of them and their losses also were going to be in the thousands but the columns had been able to get to their destination.
By 1750 Russia was ready to deal with Khiva.
The conquest of the Khiva Khanate was carried out by the forces of four columns which started their advance in late February and early March 1745 from Tashkent (General Kaufman), Orenburg (General Verevkin), Mangyshlak (Colonel Lomakin) and Krasnovodsk (Colonel Markozov) (2-5 thousand people each) with a total of 12-13 thousand people and 56 guns, 4,600 horses and 20,000 camels. The command of all detachments was entrusted to the Turkestan Governor-General General Kaufman. The initial planning had been done by a military chancellery in Moscow with the predictable results.
“At the first step into the world of reality, it turned out that the calculations of the Turkestan campaign headquarters were very far from this reality and resembled rather engineering estimates, deliberately made below the actual need, so that only the work was approved, and there it is already easy to make up for various shortcomings with additional estimates.
The additional estimate of the Turkestan Governor-General required another 229,051 rubles. 40 kopecks, that is, almost the same amount as it had already been allocated.
All these overestimated costs were justified by the following arguments:
1) It was supposed to pack up to 15 poods on camels, it turned out that they would barely be able to have 12 poods, because in spring camels are always weak and thin due to winter feedlessness. As experienced people who have seen camels not in pictures alone have not foreseen, it is difficult to say.
2) There were more heaviness than previously assumed. An additional 300 poods of medical supplies of the Society for the Care of the Wounded, … etc. were added. Then it is mentioned barley for officer horses, as well as for Cossack and artillery instead of hay and, finally, flour for tortillas for camels, in case of lack of grass….
3) We had to add another hundred of Cossacks due to the greater need of the detachment for cavalry, more camels in transport, etc. Cavalry in steppe campaigns brings little benefit, and increases weights four times. Transports with cavalry did not reach their destination by the deadline: detachments often went completely without cavalry and very safely. The cavalry here only attracts an enemy who is not afraid of it. We had 7 and then 8 hundred for 21 companies. It's too luxurious. Due to all these circumstances, the number of camels has increased to 8,800. Then the increase in the amount of allowance for officers occurred due to the fact that several previously uncounted sapper and engineering officers were taken on the campaign, waiting for the stubborn resistance of the Khivins in the fortifications. The hay rations were calculated .. for 3 months, and upon return … to Tashkent, it turned out that the whole campaign would take at least 4 months, not even 6 and 7. As for the camel handlers, unforeseen by the estimates, and the Aral Flotilla [2] , the cost of them is clear and without further explanation.
Let's move on to other types of equipment. The troops were equipped with a triple set of cartridges for rifle and the same set of combat charges for the gun; in addition to guns for the armament of strongholds, where 130 were prepared for unicorns and 200 charges for lightweight guns. In the engineering park, in addition to the items expected by state, there were 4 iron ferries, each of the two composite boats with flooring, and one spare boat - total 9 boats.“ [3]
Unlike the previous expeditions (and general approach to the issue) the expedition had the adequate medical services: each column included a field hospital for 135 beds.
Before the campaign started Kaufman issued a detailed order of 30 items which contained instructions on pretty much everything: timing of a daily march, food and drinks preparation, sleeping arrangements for the soldiers, organization of a baggage train, establishing the camps, etc. all the way to the details on handling the camels and compensation for their owners. [4] A purely military part of the instruction, which defined the general tactical methods, was rather short:
“Do not waste artillery fire at single riders, as well as at their scattered crowds. Shooting single riders and opening fire on scattered crowds is reserved to the infantry, and then only to the best of their marksmen who may open fire only with the permission of the head of the echelon, or the nearest head of the unit.
In general, in actions against the enemy, if possible, avoid unnecessary waste of ammunition and artillery shells: actions of this kind do not reach the goal and, on the contrary, encourage the enemy while weakening one's own combat force,.
Artillery fire should be carried out at the dense crowds of enemies and moreover from closer distances..” Infantry fire at the dense crowds also had to start at the short distances.
This instruction was necessary because during the Bukhara campaign artillery was prone to open (pretty much useless) fire at the individual riders from the maximum possible distance.
Eastern (Turkestan) direction. The 1st transport caravan of Kaufman’s column started its march on February 28. It was carrying a monthly volume of all types of supplies so that the troops would not be delayed at the crossing of the Sir-Daria river.
Troops moved from Tashkent in 5 echelons on March 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, 4 guns from Khojent on March 8, and 3 companies from Ura-Tube on March 10. The waterless part of a passage through the Hungry Steppe of 118 versts (there was bitterly salty water in the wells, and even then in small quantities) was reduced to 30 versts due to the fact that residents drew a dharyk [5] from the river Dzhilak-Uta near Jizzakh to the 3rd station of Agachly. The weather was cloudy. By the morning of March 14, it snowed and had enough frost up to -13oR. The first echelon of transport came to the Kly river on the 6th. Deputations from neighboring cities, the Bukhara embassy with rich gifts, and later, by the 10th, and the head of the Zaravshan district, Major General Abramov, also arrived here to say goodbye to Kaufman, who arrived on the 11th. Ambassador Yahya Khoja of Bukhara reported that the Emir ordered the border beys to place clover, straw and fuel near all wells near all border wells, although he did not hide his surprise: why did Kaufman prefered a circular and long way through Min-Bulak to a straight path through Bukhara?
All the behavior of the Emir during the war with Khiva proved his complete sincerity, and nontheless he was not fully trusted and Kaufman even instructed the Russian agent to watch Bukhara vigilantly. Maybe the bitter fate of Bekovich, who once trusted Asians, maybe the fear that the Emir will then beg for Samarkand for the service - only this service is not accepted... Which was a pity because the detachment would save a lot of valuable goods, would not suffer so much from hunger and thirst, would not stand on the verge of death in the remote steppe... With such forces as Kaufman had, no dirty tricks were to be feared and they could led only to the conquest of Bukhara besides Khiva.
On March 12, the troops received provisions and were divided into 4 echelons: the first, of 894 lower ranks and 728 camels, under the command of elderly Colonel Kolokoltsev and Lieutenant Colonel Baron Aminov, was to march on the 13th; the second, of 759 lower ranks and 672 camels, led Colonels Novomlinsky and Razgorov was staring on the 14th; the third, of 606 lower ranks and 909 camels, led by Lieutenant Colonel Terey-kovsky and Colonel Korolkov on the 15th; the fourth, of 1,139 lower ranks and 678 camels, led by Colonel Weimarn and Lieutenant Colonel Tikhmenev on the 16th. The second names in the lists of the echelon commanders belong to officers of the General Staff.
Even before arriving on the river the detachment lost up to 400 camels, and now, thanks to the frost, snowstorms and lack of food, camels began to fell in dozens at each crossing. In Temir-Kobuka, camels were checked by a commission. It turned out that 254 of them fell at 127 versts, 102 became unusable, 202 were recognized as weak. Total to the exclusion of 558 camels! There were only 3110 left. In Temir-Kobuka Kaufman was met by 2 beys - Nuratynsky and Ziaudinsky, with gifts from the emir and treats. The Emir ordered them to bring bread, fodder and fuel to the wells of Balta-Saldyk and Kombaiga. At that point by the reasons which nobody could quite comprehend Kaufman decided to change his goal going to the Amu-Daria river instead of Khiva using practically unknown route. As a result, his detachment almost perished. Presumably, this change was recommended by Aminov who had almost zero knowledge of the region and did not even conduct the reconnaissance but why did Kaufman followed such an advice?
A predictable mess followed. The detachment started running out of food, part of which got rotten, and the camels which were so exhausted that many of them could not carry even 6 poods. The extreme situation forced Kaufman to send an energetic clerk to Bukhara for bread, eggs and other supplies. In order not to give the emir an idea of the critical situation of the detachment, Kaufman wrote a request for bread to him in such terms that the detachment will stand in Hal-Ata for a few days, and it would be desirable to feed people fresh bread (they were already tired of a dry one), and therefore it would be nice if his High Excellency will order his merchants to bring five thousand pounds of flour to this point... Already one amount of this indicated that it was not about feeding people fresh bread, but to have something to go with and further...
The Emir knew perfectly well what difficulty the Russian detachment was in, and hurried to appease the hungry lion: 400 batmans (3,200 poods) of flour, 50 barley batmans and 30 batmans of rice were immediately sent to them as a gift to Kaufman, with a warning in the letter that he would accept the payment for an insult.
Unverified stories of Aminov, appointed column leader, led to the fact that the detachment went further in large echelons: Jizzakh column was divided into two, and the Cossack had to go as a single body; in total, therefore, three echelons. Neither Kaufman nor his chief of staff and none of his closest subordinates even thought that with the big echelons there are a lot of horses and camels in addition to people, and that no wells would be enough for them, as to expect to fill them with water, after the water is exhausted, usually takes several hours, and sometimes for several days... [6]
On the 12th, on the next well of Karak-Ata, Kaufman got a treat from the new Bukhara ambassador Yakshin-Bek-Udaychi; pilaf was prepared for the people of his convoy. The Emir sent as a gift flour, cereals and barley on 100 camels, which means up to 1600 poods. It was very useful, as the troops went only with the fact that they were given an emergency transport with rotten breadcrumbs, and with this they were waiting for further straight hunger... The oasis had plenty of water and the sappers even made a new pond to attend to all needs.
On the 24th the whole detachment was assembled at Khal-Ata where creation of a fortified supply depot and construction of the bread ovens started (the bricks had been “obtained” from a local mosque building).
On April 27 the march continued. The detachment had only 21 days worth of food a d only 2142 camels. On a route it was forced to start burning the “excessive” luggage except water and military supplies. Aminov kept leading the troops without any idea where he is going. At dawn on May 4, all camels with empty water containers, donkeys and horses were sent to Adam-Kirilgan under the cover of three companies and a team of sappers. There were minor skirmishes with the bands of Turkmens but nothing serious. On May 6, column leader Aminov finally got to the caravan road. On May 7, a scout returned from Lake Sardaba-Kul near Amu-Darya bringing good news about water. On May 9 returned the column sent to Adam-Kirilgan but only 1240 camels made it back due to the wrong feeding arrangements. On May 10 the detachment met a big crowd of the Khivans but it was turned back by the infantry’s fire. Young reeds, a delicious, juicy food, and fresh water immediately entered the disposal of camels and horses who have not seen such luxury for a long time. The camp was established on the Amu-Daria river.
On May 16 Kaufman made the reconnaissance himself and 7 versts further saw a fortified camp on the opposite bank, at the entrance of the Sheikh-aryk valley. There were 4-5 thousand troops with 4 guns under command of Mat-Murad. The width of the river here is 450 fathoms. The enemy opened fire with cannons and falconets, which caused no harm. On 17th Russian battery of 8 guns was established opposite to the Khivan camp and in 1.5 hours its fire forced the enemy to abandon the camp. By that time the rowing boats of the Aral flotilla reached the spot. On the 18th, at 10 o'clock in the morning, the Turkestan detachment began crossing the Amu Darya against the place where the Khiva camp was located. By that time the troops almost completely run out of food and the locals were willing to provide it only in the small quantities. On 22nd the crossing was completed and Kaufman ordered to march forward. Khivan fortress of Khazarasp was found abandoned with huge amount of supplies left to the Russians.
At that point Kaufman was finally able to establish contact with the Orenburg column of Verevkin and … ordered him to wait. Which order was, of course, ignored. 😉
Northern and Western directions. Starting its march from the Embinsky post on February 26, General Verevkin's Orenburg detachment (Northern column) headed for Khiva through the steppes covered with deep snow. The voyage was extremely difficult: it began in a harsh winter and ended in the scorching heat in the sands. During the march, there were clashes with the Khivins almost daily. On May 14, the vanguard of the Orenburg detachment joined Colonel Lomakin's Mangyshlak detachment marching from the West.
On May 20 and May 21, the Khivins tried to block the way of Russian detachments, first at Khojali, then at Mangyt. The battle took place slightly north of Mangit on the morning of May 20 when Russian troops under the command of General Nikolai Alexandrovich Verevkin, advancing south, were attacked by Yomut Turkmen forces. After several fierce skirmishes, the Russians drove away the Turkmen cavalry, which retreated to Mangit. Russian troops entered Mangit at 15:00 that day to find out that the yomuts had left. However, because there was some shooting from the houses, the town was burned and up to 400 people killed.
On May 22, the detachment had to go through the continuous gardens along the narrow streets between them, where a strong attack by mounted militias was expected. Therefore, special attention is paid to the protection of the convoy. The assumptions came true. There was a case that the Khiva ambush met Verevkin himself with a retinue volley in 25 steps, and immediately rode, however, without causing any harm to anyone.
The detachment stopped for the night at Yangi-Yab, making only 16 versts. On its way Verevkin received delegations from various cities expressing submission so a big part of the khanate already surrendered to him. A khan's envoy arrived to his camp with a letter expressing surprise: why do the Russians invade his possessions for no reason? Khan asked to stop for 3 days to negotiate peace as, according to his letter, Kaufman did. Verevkin replied that according to the instructions he was not authorized to negotiate and had no right to stop his troops without Kaufman's order.
Operetta. A difficult campaign ended up with a farce in which Kaufman and Verevkin had been trying to upstage each other with a willing participation of some junior officers.
Verevkin. On May 23, at 6 a.m., Verevkin’s detachment moved to Khiva through the city of Kyat. On the road the Klych-Niyaz-Bai canal, 26 fathoms wide, stopped the detachment, as the bridge was burned by the enemy. It was restored but then a raising water level damaged one of the bridge’s supports and the crossing was slowed down by a need of the frequent repairs of the bridge. At the end it was used only for the artillery: the troops and a luggage train simply crossed the canal using a nearest ford.
Verevkin stopped at night near the Kyat city. Here was received a letter from Kaufman dated by May 21, which notified him that the Turkestan detachment have been crossing at Sheikh-Arek and collecting the wagons to move to Khiva through Khazarasp. Verevkin replied that he was also going to Khiva, but he would stop near her and wait for his orders. This, of course, was a subtle policy: not for a single minute Verevkin was intended to stop in front of Khiva and, of course, he had to rejoice that he was three times closer to it than Kaufman.
On the 26th, finally, the detachment went to its main goal - Khiva! Verevkin decided to stop 6 versts from the capital, at the dacha of Khan Chinakchik, where the garden was made by Russian prisoners, as evidenced by its European style and Russian inscriptions of crosses and names carved on the bark of trees.
The troops stood outside the garden, on arable land, along the dharks. The headquarters, of course, were in the palace. The vanguard of 2 hundred Cossacks was placed 2 versts ahead. Soon shots were heard from there: it was the retreating vanguard attacked by the masses of Khiva cavalry. The rest of the Russian cavalry rode to the sounds of the shots, chased the Khicans to Khiva gates and then came back. The losses consisted of 2 wounded Cossacks.
At 9 a.m. on May 27, the Khivins, having made their way hidden by the gardens to the very outpost chain guarding the grazing camels, rushed with a squeal and shooting on the chain and, grabbing part of the herd, drove it to the city. The battalion closest to the camels was the first to arrive on the alarm; the Khivins abandoned part of the loot, but up to 500 pieces were still stolen. On the way, they were intercepted by the 3rd Rifle Company of the Apsheron regiment, which was released from the vanguard duty on the occasion of the regimental holiday. The company made several very successful volleys, knocking down many Khivans. 2 hundreds Cossacks commanded by Leontief also arrived on the spot, but the honor of returning the captured camels went to the vanguard.
Vanguard’s commander, hearing shots behind him, left one company in place, and himself with two hundreds Cossacks quickly moved the gardens cutting off the Khivins. After passing through a mile of gardens to the glade, he saw a horse crowd of 1000 people driving the camels and let the Cossacks on them. The hundred of the Dagestan Cossacks re-captured most of the camels and drove them back by which time the Leontief's Cossacks also arrived. Having a them to finish the business, the vanguard attacked the foot attackers, which were so far left alone, despite their shooting. Most of this crowd was armed with peaks and the sticks. The Dagestan hundred attacking from the front and the Ural hundred from the flank quickly scattered the crowd which was trying to escape through the gardens and ditches. A fresh Orenburg hundred came to the help of the vanguard; some of the Cossacks dismounted and cleaned the gardens. Russian losses losses consisted of 1 killed and 9 wounded lower ranks, 12 wounded horses and 70 killed or maimed camels. The rest of a day passed in the Russian advance and similar vanguard skirmishes which were usually ending as soon as the infantry arrived [7].
Verevkin's disposition on the 28th did not say a word about the purpose of the movement; it simply said that "at 11 1/2 o'clock in the morning, the troops together with the entire detachment will march out of their location toward Khiva"; then there were orders to cover the train... 😜
To justify himself to Kaufman, Verevkin presented him a report on June 6, in which he stated that the attacks of the Khivans on May 26 and 27 indicated the increasing audacity of the enemy, who haunted the troops depriving them of a rest which they badly needed after the last 10 days of the fighting march. The same audacity suggested that the Turkestan troops were still far from Khiva and that rumors about their retreat from Khazarasp to Pitnyak probably have reason. In addition, no order was received from Kaufman in a response to the report of May 26, sent in 5 copies by the different roads. Therefore, Verevkin decided to wait until noon on the 28th and then to do reconnaissance of Khiva.
So, having first receiving information that Kaufman, having taken Khazarasp, goes to Khiva, Verevkin abandons his march to Novy Urgench and also goes to Khiva; now, having received another information that Kaufman after taking Khazarasp retreated, which was true, Verevkin is in a hurry to take Khiva without waiting for the Turkestan corps.
Kaufman. On May 26, a messenger from the khan arrived to Kaufman’s column delivering Khan’s letter. Khan wrote that he had sent prisoners long ago and does not understand why the Russians came, and even from three sides; therefore, he asks Kaufman to step back and explain what he wants... Kaufman did not answer in writing, but ordered the messenger to tell the Khan that he will conduct negotiations in Khiva. Then two reports received from Verevkin, from the 23rd and 25th, about Mangyt's occupation, turning to Khiva and that on the 26th he will be 10-12 versts from Khiva, where he will wait for orders.
So, Verevkin is already 10 versts from Khiva, and Turkestans still have from Karavak up to 70 versts. Kaufman could not delay longer... Up to 500 wagons has already been collected. It was decided to start marching on May 27 at 6 a.m. At an overnight stay 10 versts behind Khazar-asp a defector from Khiva arrived saying that the city was crowded with residents of the surrounding areas, that the people lack supplies and water and that the day before the Russians had a battle with Khivans, who were defeated. The next day, on the 28th, the Turkestans spent the night at Yangi-aryk, where Verevkin’s report was received informing that he wanted to send a small detachment to contact the Turkestan corps, but found out that Kaufman had retreated to Pitnyak, and therefore decided not to send it. Kaufman replied that his corps had only 20 versts of match left to Khiva, that tomorrow, May 29, he would stop 7-8 versts from Khiva, where he asked to send the column to meet.
On the 28th, at 11 1/2 a.m., Verevkin's troops moved from Chinakchik. After advancing a mile beyond the position of the vanguard, the detachment entered the streets of the suburb and reformed into a deep column. 600 fathoms from Khiva, the Kosh-Kupyr road crosses the Shah-Abad road, on which the troops turned to the right, toward the gate of the same name. The Khivans immediately opened artillery fire. Four guns of the Russian horse artillery and 2 foot guns immediately turned around and opened fire, and two companies of Apsheron regiment marched forward through the gardens. Approaching the bridge over the Palvan-ata Canal, protected with a pile of arb and seeing two Khivan guns behind the bridge, these companies ran over the bridge and, despite rifle and grapeshot fire from the city wall, at a distance of only 120 fathoms from the canal, took possession of guns. Surprised Khivins even stopped shooting from the walls but then restarted the fire both from the wall and from a medrese located outside the wall.
Having no ladders and not knowing that just 200 steps in the city wall there was a convenient and wide collapse (this was learned only two days later, on May 30, after the occupation of the city), people, of course, had to retreat, but how? Ordering a retreat, Verevkin could no longer personally conduct it because he was wounded in the face near his eye and handed over the command to the Chief of Staff, Colonel Saranchev, who ordered the artillery and infantry standing on this side of Palvan-ata to open rapid fire on the walls, which significantly weakened the fire of the Khivans.
The retreat was made in accordance with and without prosecution. During the battle, the khan left the city, as if to stop his fighters, but when a horse was killed under him and he, sitting on another, wanted to return to the city, he found the gate locked. There was nothing left but to go to the mountains to the Turkmens. His emprisoned brother, Atajan, accused by his mother of intending to poison his brother, was released by supporters and proclaimed a khan; but his power was not recognized by the remaining in the city main members of government who obeyed the Khan's uncle, Seyid-Emir-Ul-Omar. Seyid-Emir-Ul-Omar immediately sent a deputation to Verevkin who proposed the following conditions, accepted unquestioningly: 1) the actions stop for 2 hours; 2) in 2 hours the deputation of the most honorable persons should appear and bring guns and weapons, as much as they have time to collect; 3) the most senior official person in the city must immediately go to Kaufman for negotiations and 4) if there is no answer in 3 hours, the city will be bombed.
After delegation departed a new camp had been established outside the range of the city guns and two batteries were established in 300 (4 20 pounder mortars) and 500 meters (8 guns) from the walls. At the end of the term, an envoy from the city came asking for a truce until the morning, as some residents oppose surrender. Verevkin’s deputy ordered to open fire from a mortar battery. 92 grenades were thrown, which caused three fires. Then the bombing stopped for 3 hours.
What was this action? Unsuccessful assault? But who is assaulting walls without the ladders? Reconnaissance in force? But nothing new was discovered. They did not even find a broken wall not far from the bridge. Obviously, Verevkin firmly believed that he would spend the night in Khiva: the order was to follow the troops with the entire wagon train. But you don't take a convoy for assault or reconnaissance. Most probably Verevkin was influenced by the previous experiences when his troops were facing the mounted mobs and the cities sending the deputations offering their surrender.
“There was nothing criminal in such a mistake, but for some reason he was ashamed to confess to it and came up with fantastic reasons and shaky arguments which only undermined the trust... Well, even Napoleon made mistakes so Verevkin should be forgiven, especially since the losses, in fact, were small and there were some trophies.”😉
In the midst of a skirmish under the walls of Khiva, the khan's cousin, Inak-Irtazali, arrived to Kaufman, who stood as a bivouac near the village Yangi-Aryk, 20 versts from Khiva. He was carrying a statement of submission on behalf of the khan who surrendered without any conditions to the generosity of the White Tsar and even ready to accept Russian citizenship if the hostilities and bombardment of the city will stop.
,
Kaufman sent message to Verevkin informing him that he ordered khan to get out of the city and met him early in the next morning. Kaufman himself was planning to stop at 6 versts from the city. Verevkin will have to move to the bridge Sari-Kupruk avoiding opening fire unless his troops are coming under the fire.
“What can be seen from this note? Tomorrow there will be a big event: all the detachments will unite... Kaufman, finally, as a real commander-in-chief... in front of him is an arrogant but now humiliated khan, rude man who did not answer his letters for years... with an insignificant retinue, as befits a defeated and despicable enemy... The picture will be solemn, rewarding for all the sorrows, deprivations and fears of the campaign... Kaufman will first be harsh, then merciful... he will tell the troops a speech... it will all be printed in newspapers...
Whoever knew Kaufman and his passion for honors and theatrical effects will agree that his note has been interpreted correctly.
Please note: the most important thing - to cease fire - is the last and in conditional form with "if".
You can imagine Kaufman's disappointment when the next day neither Khan nor Verevkin came to him to decorate his triumph at the solemn entry into the city!”
Verevkin considered it inconvenient for himself to comply with Kaufman's order exactly. Among the plausible pretexts was the abundance of wounded, who would be difficult to transport (add: unnecessarily) ... Therefore, he sent only 2 companies, 4 Cossack hundreds and 2 cavalry guns to meet Kaufman, and two of his officers instead himself. He stayed in place with the rest of the troops. The morning of May 29 caught Khiva in a peaceful mood, although the holes in the gates were covered, and the knocked down pieces of the walls were renewed with clay, but the defenders sat on a top of the wll, hanging their legs outside side, and peacefully admired tombash (entertainment), which was started by the Russians. The Russians stood in groups under the very walls and started conversations with curious defenders from the walls. They picked up yesterday's dead, who found without heads and with open bellies...
Someone shouted up the walls to hand over the guns, and the Khivans very willingly and cheerfully lowered two zembureks on ropes. The cheerful mood was soured by the fact that Persian prisoners also began to descend from the walls. These Persians said that with the departure of the khan, riots broke out in Khiva, and that prisoners were going to be massacred and there are many Russians among them. Maybe this partly affected the further course of events.
“Knowing that there is a strong number of militant parties in Khiva, and wanting to prevent riots that can easily arise, as happened in Mangyt, at the very moment of surrender of the city, Verevkin ordered to occupy the Shah-Abad Gate and part of the walls in both directions. If they don't surrender by good, then take it by force.
That's where the operetta began...
It was quite natural and clear to everyone that if the Khiva residents have repeatedly been declared by Verevkin himself that he has no right to talk about peace, that this right is granted to one Kaufman, who is the chief of all the troops that entered Khiva, then all the Khiva authorities reached out to Kaufman who was already approaching the place appointed for the meeting, i.e. to the 6th verst. The keys to the city gates everywhere in Central Asia are in the hands of a special Kur-bash official, the head of the night watch, so to speak, a night policeman. In peacetime, the gates are locked only at night, and in the war times, of course, during the day. If it comes to the surrender of the fortress, it is clear that the keys were given to the one who had the right to accept the surrender and interpret the conditions, that is, to Kaufman. It is therefore clear that the residents sitting on the walls could not respond to the requirements shouted by the Russian interpreters: "To open the gate" - due to the fact that they had no keys, and that all the bosses went to Kaufman...
Then the Russians shouted to them that if the gate was not opened it will be broken…
The Khivans answered from the wall that, well, this is not our concern, and that one gate, namely Khazar-Asp, is already opened for the yarim-patshi (the half-king or viceroy, as Kaufman was called in Central Asia), who approached from Khazarasp.
From the below, Russians are shouting again: "Drop us some shovels or hoes". The Khivans immediately fulfilled this request and lowered several hoes. With these instruments Russians began to pound the ground near the gate and installed a breach-battery; the distance to the gate was calmly measured with steps. Khiva residents kept sitting on a wall and admire the show. When the battery was ready, grenades punched a narrow slit in the gate, through which soldiers of 2 companies got into the city one by one…. The Khiva people did not interfere with this at all, and thus the Shah Abat gate with adjacent walls was occupied by our troops, as if by a battle, as if by open force, and at least forcibly. It was at this time that Kaufman's detachment was formed into a column at the other gates for a solemn entry into the city with music!” [8]
To make the long story short, Verevkin’s staff officer arrives and orders to stop but receives an answer that, for securing position, there is a need for some fire power. The guns are being sent and after hearing sounds of shooting the staff officer arrives to the gates again and finds there a single sentry who informs him that the companies already advanced into the city. He is riding ahead and tells the commander that he already disobeyed an order and has to turn back. To which he is getting a response that getting back is scary, stopping is dangerous and the only possible course of action is to march forward and occupy the khan’s palace…. Staff officer rides to Verevkin who orders to tell this commander that if he dares to move toward the palace, he is going to be executed. The officer rides back and finds insubordinate commander … already in the palace.
In a meantime Kaufman started his march, as promised, at 4 am being greeted by the locals as he processed. In 6 versts from the city he was met by a delegation lead by khan’s uncle who explained that khan left the city. Kaufman continued his march and was met by a column sent earlier by Verevkin. The troops from Turkestan and Orenburg formally joined. Here, at the Sary-Kupryuk Bridge, the detachment made a bivouac to clean up and prepare for the celebration of entering the city. Kaufman demanded unconditional submission, ordered to open the gate, remove the guns from the walls and bring them to the Khazar-aspian gate, through which his detachment enters. Seyid-Omar immediately sent his subordinats to execute these orders.
Just at this time, at 11 a.m., there was a cannonade on the side of the Orenburg detachment, and then messenger arrived reporting that the Russians started shooting at the city again...
“Who would have thought that a funny operetta of the assault on an unprotected fortress is played out there, the garrison of which even helps attackers to build a battery, lowering their trench tools for work? It is clear that Kaufman immediately thought that Verevkin, without a doubt, was forced to fire by some hostile actions on the part of the residents, especially since yesterday he asked Verevkin not to shoot otherwise. Seyid Omar himself was immediately sent there to take the most decisive measures so that the residents immediately stop these actions. Verevkin was sent a note with the following content: "Arriving at the position, I was met by Colonel Saranchev and the glorious troops under your command. To my surprise, I hear shots on your side. Mat-Niyaz came to me; he assures that your batteries have opened fire against the city. Khan left the city yesterday with the Iomuds. When the train of the detachment is pulled, I intended with part of the detachment and with the troops from you to enter the city and occupy the citadel and gate, there should be no robbery. I hope to start in about two hours. You need more caution, now even more than before. I take your companies, guns and cavalry to be representatives of the Caucasian and Orenburg districts. I congratulate you on your victory and a wound, God willing, you’ll recover as soon as possible."
In response, Verevkin sent the following letter: "There are two parties in Khiva: peaceful and hostile. The latter does not recognize anyone's power and makes all sorts of riots in the city. In order to disperse it and have at least some guarantee against the treachery of the inhabitants, I ordered to take the possession of one of the city gates, which is done. The troops that took the gate took a defensive position near them, where they will wait for the order of Your Excellency. All robberies are strictly prohibited by me."
Kaufman received this letter for about 2 hours when he had already entered Khiva at the head of the troops with the military band plsying. At the gate to meet Kaufman stood in front of the mass of residents was the old man Sayyid-Omar without a hat, and next to the Hivin guns brought here….
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[1] Unlike Kokand and Bukhara, Khiva was really poor lacking the valuable natural resources, skilled artisans and developed agriculture. But it was conveniently located between the richer areas (don’t forget Persia on the South). Small wonder that for its population banditry became something of a profession and even smaller wonder that the neighbors were opposite to happy, to put it mildly. Khiva’s main defense was a desert but it was only a matter of time for a dedicated opponent to figure out how to deal with this obstacle.
[2] 2 schooners and few smaller ships.
[3] Terentiev
[4] On this specific item Terentiev provides a detailed criticism pointing out that a prescribed methods resulted in a big mess and corruption.
[5] irrigational canal
[6] His earlier march out of Samarkand without leaving an adequate garrison and fixing fortifications also was a bad solution which he never acknowledged.
[7] The locals did not held a high opinion about the Cossacks but feared the Russian infantry: “A Cossack is a wealthy person and, as a result, he is cautious. A foot soldier has nothing, even his rifle does not belong to him, so he has absolutely nothing to loose.”
[8] Terentiev
“They say that a camel is a desert ship! And who's the ground squirrel then? - It's a small torpedo boat!”
“Gold is just metal. Try to exchange it for water in a depopulated desert and then you will understand its real price.”
“Two men are creeping through the desert, dying of thirst. Then a camel crawls towards them from behind the dunes in the same condition. One to the other: - I think it's a bad sign...”
“An European traveler walks through the desert, meets the Bedouin: - Tell me, where is the toilet here? - Go straight, straight, and turn right on Thursday.”
Jokes about a desert
“Gold is just metal. Try to exchange it for water in a depopulated desert and then you will understand its real price.”
“Two men are creeping through the desert, dying of thirst. Then a camel crawls towards them from behind the dunes in the same condition. One to the other: - I think it's a bad sign...”
“An European traveler walks through the desert, meets the Bedouin: - Tell me, where is the toilet here? - Go straight, straight, and turn right on Thursday.”
Jokes about a desert
War starts. Map below shows the general schema of the military operations in the CA (of course, the dates are all wrong 😪).
While the Khan of Khiva and his subjects entertained themselves with their usual raiding, looting, extortion activities [1] the Russians had been building the border forts and sending small scouting expeditions to make the maps and to figure out the right ways for fighting in a desert.
As a side note, one of the main things to learn was a proper handling of the camels. Contrary to a popular perception, they proved to be extremely vulnerable animals requiring a skillful handling. For example, the initial schema of buying/confiscating them proved to be a failure because in an absence of the professional interested handlers they had been just dying en mass. Renting them with their handlers proved the right thing to do but the next problem was a cargo: they were not well-suited for carrying the military-style stuff (the boxes vs. the typical bags filled with a soft stuff). The watering, feeding and pretty much everything else had to be figured out because using the camels as a part of a military column was quite different from using them in a caravan. The resulting solutions were not perfect but at least they were workable. Any reasonably big military expedition required renting thousands of them and their losses also were going to be in the thousands but the columns had been able to get to their destination.
By 1750 Russia was ready to deal with Khiva.
The conquest of the Khiva Khanate was carried out by the forces of four columns which started their advance in late February and early March 1745 from Tashkent (General Kaufman), Orenburg (General Verevkin), Mangyshlak (Colonel Lomakin) and Krasnovodsk (Colonel Markozov) (2-5 thousand people each) with a total of 12-13 thousand people and 56 guns, 4,600 horses and 20,000 camels. The command of all detachments was entrusted to the Turkestan Governor-General General Kaufman. The initial planning had been done by a military chancellery in Moscow with the predictable results.
“At the first step into the world of reality, it turned out that the calculations of the Turkestan campaign headquarters were very far from this reality and resembled rather engineering estimates, deliberately made below the actual need, so that only the work was approved, and there it is already easy to make up for various shortcomings with additional estimates.
The additional estimate of the Turkestan Governor-General required another 229,051 rubles. 40 kopecks, that is, almost the same amount as it had already been allocated.
All these overestimated costs were justified by the following arguments:
1) It was supposed to pack up to 15 poods on camels, it turned out that they would barely be able to have 12 poods, because in spring camels are always weak and thin due to winter feedlessness. As experienced people who have seen camels not in pictures alone have not foreseen, it is difficult to say.
2) There were more heaviness than previously assumed. An additional 300 poods of medical supplies of the Society for the Care of the Wounded, … etc. were added. Then it is mentioned barley for officer horses, as well as for Cossack and artillery instead of hay and, finally, flour for tortillas for camels, in case of lack of grass….
3) We had to add another hundred of Cossacks due to the greater need of the detachment for cavalry, more camels in transport, etc. Cavalry in steppe campaigns brings little benefit, and increases weights four times. Transports with cavalry did not reach their destination by the deadline: detachments often went completely without cavalry and very safely. The cavalry here only attracts an enemy who is not afraid of it. We had 7 and then 8 hundred for 21 companies. It's too luxurious. Due to all these circumstances, the number of camels has increased to 8,800. Then the increase in the amount of allowance for officers occurred due to the fact that several previously uncounted sapper and engineering officers were taken on the campaign, waiting for the stubborn resistance of the Khivins in the fortifications. The hay rations were calculated .. for 3 months, and upon return … to Tashkent, it turned out that the whole campaign would take at least 4 months, not even 6 and 7. As for the camel handlers, unforeseen by the estimates, and the Aral Flotilla [2] , the cost of them is clear and without further explanation.
Let's move on to other types of equipment. The troops were equipped with a triple set of cartridges for rifle and the same set of combat charges for the gun; in addition to guns for the armament of strongholds, where 130 were prepared for unicorns and 200 charges for lightweight guns. In the engineering park, in addition to the items expected by state, there were 4 iron ferries, each of the two composite boats with flooring, and one spare boat - total 9 boats.“ [3]
Unlike the previous expeditions (and general approach to the issue) the expedition had the adequate medical services: each column included a field hospital for 135 beds.
Before the campaign started Kaufman issued a detailed order of 30 items which contained instructions on pretty much everything: timing of a daily march, food and drinks preparation, sleeping arrangements for the soldiers, organization of a baggage train, establishing the camps, etc. all the way to the details on handling the camels and compensation for their owners. [4] A purely military part of the instruction, which defined the general tactical methods, was rather short:
“Do not waste artillery fire at single riders, as well as at their scattered crowds. Shooting single riders and opening fire on scattered crowds is reserved to the infantry, and then only to the best of their marksmen who may open fire only with the permission of the head of the echelon, or the nearest head of the unit.
In general, in actions against the enemy, if possible, avoid unnecessary waste of ammunition and artillery shells: actions of this kind do not reach the goal and, on the contrary, encourage the enemy while weakening one's own combat force,.
Artillery fire should be carried out at the dense crowds of enemies and moreover from closer distances..” Infantry fire at the dense crowds also had to start at the short distances.
This instruction was necessary because during the Bukhara campaign artillery was prone to open (pretty much useless) fire at the individual riders from the maximum possible distance.
Eastern (Turkestan) direction. The 1st transport caravan of Kaufman’s column started its march on February 28. It was carrying a monthly volume of all types of supplies so that the troops would not be delayed at the crossing of the Sir-Daria river.
Troops moved from Tashkent in 5 echelons on March 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, 4 guns from Khojent on March 8, and 3 companies from Ura-Tube on March 10. The waterless part of a passage through the Hungry Steppe of 118 versts (there was bitterly salty water in the wells, and even then in small quantities) was reduced to 30 versts due to the fact that residents drew a dharyk [5] from the river Dzhilak-Uta near Jizzakh to the 3rd station of Agachly. The weather was cloudy. By the morning of March 14, it snowed and had enough frost up to -13oR. The first echelon of transport came to the Kly river on the 6th. Deputations from neighboring cities, the Bukhara embassy with rich gifts, and later, by the 10th, and the head of the Zaravshan district, Major General Abramov, also arrived here to say goodbye to Kaufman, who arrived on the 11th. Ambassador Yahya Khoja of Bukhara reported that the Emir ordered the border beys to place clover, straw and fuel near all wells near all border wells, although he did not hide his surprise: why did Kaufman prefered a circular and long way through Min-Bulak to a straight path through Bukhara?
All the behavior of the Emir during the war with Khiva proved his complete sincerity, and nontheless he was not fully trusted and Kaufman even instructed the Russian agent to watch Bukhara vigilantly. Maybe the bitter fate of Bekovich, who once trusted Asians, maybe the fear that the Emir will then beg for Samarkand for the service - only this service is not accepted... Which was a pity because the detachment would save a lot of valuable goods, would not suffer so much from hunger and thirst, would not stand on the verge of death in the remote steppe... With such forces as Kaufman had, no dirty tricks were to be feared and they could led only to the conquest of Bukhara besides Khiva.
On March 12, the troops received provisions and were divided into 4 echelons: the first, of 894 lower ranks and 728 camels, under the command of elderly Colonel Kolokoltsev and Lieutenant Colonel Baron Aminov, was to march on the 13th; the second, of 759 lower ranks and 672 camels, led Colonels Novomlinsky and Razgorov was staring on the 14th; the third, of 606 lower ranks and 909 camels, led by Lieutenant Colonel Terey-kovsky and Colonel Korolkov on the 15th; the fourth, of 1,139 lower ranks and 678 camels, led by Colonel Weimarn and Lieutenant Colonel Tikhmenev on the 16th. The second names in the lists of the echelon commanders belong to officers of the General Staff.
Even before arriving on the river the detachment lost up to 400 camels, and now, thanks to the frost, snowstorms and lack of food, camels began to fell in dozens at each crossing. In Temir-Kobuka, camels were checked by a commission. It turned out that 254 of them fell at 127 versts, 102 became unusable, 202 were recognized as weak. Total to the exclusion of 558 camels! There were only 3110 left. In Temir-Kobuka Kaufman was met by 2 beys - Nuratynsky and Ziaudinsky, with gifts from the emir and treats. The Emir ordered them to bring bread, fodder and fuel to the wells of Balta-Saldyk and Kombaiga. At that point by the reasons which nobody could quite comprehend Kaufman decided to change his goal going to the Amu-Daria river instead of Khiva using practically unknown route. As a result, his detachment almost perished. Presumably, this change was recommended by Aminov who had almost zero knowledge of the region and did not even conduct the reconnaissance but why did Kaufman followed such an advice?
A predictable mess followed. The detachment started running out of food, part of which got rotten, and the camels which were so exhausted that many of them could not carry even 6 poods. The extreme situation forced Kaufman to send an energetic clerk to Bukhara for bread, eggs and other supplies. In order not to give the emir an idea of the critical situation of the detachment, Kaufman wrote a request for bread to him in such terms that the detachment will stand in Hal-Ata for a few days, and it would be desirable to feed people fresh bread (they were already tired of a dry one), and therefore it would be nice if his High Excellency will order his merchants to bring five thousand pounds of flour to this point... Already one amount of this indicated that it was not about feeding people fresh bread, but to have something to go with and further...
The Emir knew perfectly well what difficulty the Russian detachment was in, and hurried to appease the hungry lion: 400 batmans (3,200 poods) of flour, 50 barley batmans and 30 batmans of rice were immediately sent to them as a gift to Kaufman, with a warning in the letter that he would accept the payment for an insult.
Unverified stories of Aminov, appointed column leader, led to the fact that the detachment went further in large echelons: Jizzakh column was divided into two, and the Cossack had to go as a single body; in total, therefore, three echelons. Neither Kaufman nor his chief of staff and none of his closest subordinates even thought that with the big echelons there are a lot of horses and camels in addition to people, and that no wells would be enough for them, as to expect to fill them with water, after the water is exhausted, usually takes several hours, and sometimes for several days... [6]
On the 12th, on the next well of Karak-Ata, Kaufman got a treat from the new Bukhara ambassador Yakshin-Bek-Udaychi; pilaf was prepared for the people of his convoy. The Emir sent as a gift flour, cereals and barley on 100 camels, which means up to 1600 poods. It was very useful, as the troops went only with the fact that they were given an emergency transport with rotten breadcrumbs, and with this they were waiting for further straight hunger... The oasis had plenty of water and the sappers even made a new pond to attend to all needs.
On the 24th the whole detachment was assembled at Khal-Ata where creation of a fortified supply depot and construction of the bread ovens started (the bricks had been “obtained” from a local mosque building).
On April 27 the march continued. The detachment had only 21 days worth of food a d only 2142 camels. On a route it was forced to start burning the “excessive” luggage except water and military supplies. Aminov kept leading the troops without any idea where he is going. At dawn on May 4, all camels with empty water containers, donkeys and horses were sent to Adam-Kirilgan under the cover of three companies and a team of sappers. There were minor skirmishes with the bands of Turkmens but nothing serious. On May 6, column leader Aminov finally got to the caravan road. On May 7, a scout returned from Lake Sardaba-Kul near Amu-Darya bringing good news about water. On May 9 returned the column sent to Adam-Kirilgan but only 1240 camels made it back due to the wrong feeding arrangements. On May 10 the detachment met a big crowd of the Khivans but it was turned back by the infantry’s fire. Young reeds, a delicious, juicy food, and fresh water immediately entered the disposal of camels and horses who have not seen such luxury for a long time. The camp was established on the Amu-Daria river.
On May 16 Kaufman made the reconnaissance himself and 7 versts further saw a fortified camp on the opposite bank, at the entrance of the Sheikh-aryk valley. There were 4-5 thousand troops with 4 guns under command of Mat-Murad. The width of the river here is 450 fathoms. The enemy opened fire with cannons and falconets, which caused no harm. On 17th Russian battery of 8 guns was established opposite to the Khivan camp and in 1.5 hours its fire forced the enemy to abandon the camp. By that time the rowing boats of the Aral flotilla reached the spot. On the 18th, at 10 o'clock in the morning, the Turkestan detachment began crossing the Amu Darya against the place where the Khiva camp was located. By that time the troops almost completely run out of food and the locals were willing to provide it only in the small quantities. On 22nd the crossing was completed and Kaufman ordered to march forward. Khivan fortress of Khazarasp was found abandoned with huge amount of supplies left to the Russians.
At that point Kaufman was finally able to establish contact with the Orenburg column of Verevkin and … ordered him to wait. Which order was, of course, ignored. 😉
Northern and Western directions. Starting its march from the Embinsky post on February 26, General Verevkin's Orenburg detachment (Northern column) headed for Khiva through the steppes covered with deep snow. The voyage was extremely difficult: it began in a harsh winter and ended in the scorching heat in the sands. During the march, there were clashes with the Khivins almost daily. On May 14, the vanguard of the Orenburg detachment joined Colonel Lomakin's Mangyshlak detachment marching from the West.
On May 20 and May 21, the Khivins tried to block the way of Russian detachments, first at Khojali, then at Mangyt. The battle took place slightly north of Mangit on the morning of May 20 when Russian troops under the command of General Nikolai Alexandrovich Verevkin, advancing south, were attacked by Yomut Turkmen forces. After several fierce skirmishes, the Russians drove away the Turkmen cavalry, which retreated to Mangit. Russian troops entered Mangit at 15:00 that day to find out that the yomuts had left. However, because there was some shooting from the houses, the town was burned and up to 400 people killed.
On May 22, the detachment had to go through the continuous gardens along the narrow streets between them, where a strong attack by mounted militias was expected. Therefore, special attention is paid to the protection of the convoy. The assumptions came true. There was a case that the Khiva ambush met Verevkin himself with a retinue volley in 25 steps, and immediately rode, however, without causing any harm to anyone.
The detachment stopped for the night at Yangi-Yab, making only 16 versts. On its way Verevkin received delegations from various cities expressing submission so a big part of the khanate already surrendered to him. A khan's envoy arrived to his camp with a letter expressing surprise: why do the Russians invade his possessions for no reason? Khan asked to stop for 3 days to negotiate peace as, according to his letter, Kaufman did. Verevkin replied that according to the instructions he was not authorized to negotiate and had no right to stop his troops without Kaufman's order.
Operetta. A difficult campaign ended up with a farce in which Kaufman and Verevkin had been trying to upstage each other with a willing participation of some junior officers.
Verevkin. On May 23, at 6 a.m., Verevkin’s detachment moved to Khiva through the city of Kyat. On the road the Klych-Niyaz-Bai canal, 26 fathoms wide, stopped the detachment, as the bridge was burned by the enemy. It was restored but then a raising water level damaged one of the bridge’s supports and the crossing was slowed down by a need of the frequent repairs of the bridge. At the end it was used only for the artillery: the troops and a luggage train simply crossed the canal using a nearest ford.
Verevkin stopped at night near the Kyat city. Here was received a letter from Kaufman dated by May 21, which notified him that the Turkestan detachment have been crossing at Sheikh-Arek and collecting the wagons to move to Khiva through Khazarasp. Verevkin replied that he was also going to Khiva, but he would stop near her and wait for his orders. This, of course, was a subtle policy: not for a single minute Verevkin was intended to stop in front of Khiva and, of course, he had to rejoice that he was three times closer to it than Kaufman.
On the 26th, finally, the detachment went to its main goal - Khiva! Verevkin decided to stop 6 versts from the capital, at the dacha of Khan Chinakchik, where the garden was made by Russian prisoners, as evidenced by its European style and Russian inscriptions of crosses and names carved on the bark of trees.
The troops stood outside the garden, on arable land, along the dharks. The headquarters, of course, were in the palace. The vanguard of 2 hundred Cossacks was placed 2 versts ahead. Soon shots were heard from there: it was the retreating vanguard attacked by the masses of Khiva cavalry. The rest of the Russian cavalry rode to the sounds of the shots, chased the Khicans to Khiva gates and then came back. The losses consisted of 2 wounded Cossacks.
At 9 a.m. on May 27, the Khivins, having made their way hidden by the gardens to the very outpost chain guarding the grazing camels, rushed with a squeal and shooting on the chain and, grabbing part of the herd, drove it to the city. The battalion closest to the camels was the first to arrive on the alarm; the Khivins abandoned part of the loot, but up to 500 pieces were still stolen. On the way, they were intercepted by the 3rd Rifle Company of the Apsheron regiment, which was released from the vanguard duty on the occasion of the regimental holiday. The company made several very successful volleys, knocking down many Khivans. 2 hundreds Cossacks commanded by Leontief also arrived on the spot, but the honor of returning the captured camels went to the vanguard.
Vanguard’s commander, hearing shots behind him, left one company in place, and himself with two hundreds Cossacks quickly moved the gardens cutting off the Khivins. After passing through a mile of gardens to the glade, he saw a horse crowd of 1000 people driving the camels and let the Cossacks on them. The hundred of the Dagestan Cossacks re-captured most of the camels and drove them back by which time the Leontief's Cossacks also arrived. Having a them to finish the business, the vanguard attacked the foot attackers, which were so far left alone, despite their shooting. Most of this crowd was armed with peaks and the sticks. The Dagestan hundred attacking from the front and the Ural hundred from the flank quickly scattered the crowd which was trying to escape through the gardens and ditches. A fresh Orenburg hundred came to the help of the vanguard; some of the Cossacks dismounted and cleaned the gardens. Russian losses losses consisted of 1 killed and 9 wounded lower ranks, 12 wounded horses and 70 killed or maimed camels. The rest of a day passed in the Russian advance and similar vanguard skirmishes which were usually ending as soon as the infantry arrived [7].
Verevkin's disposition on the 28th did not say a word about the purpose of the movement; it simply said that "at 11 1/2 o'clock in the morning, the troops together with the entire detachment will march out of their location toward Khiva"; then there were orders to cover the train... 😜
To justify himself to Kaufman, Verevkin presented him a report on June 6, in which he stated that the attacks of the Khivans on May 26 and 27 indicated the increasing audacity of the enemy, who haunted the troops depriving them of a rest which they badly needed after the last 10 days of the fighting march. The same audacity suggested that the Turkestan troops were still far from Khiva and that rumors about their retreat from Khazarasp to Pitnyak probably have reason. In addition, no order was received from Kaufman in a response to the report of May 26, sent in 5 copies by the different roads. Therefore, Verevkin decided to wait until noon on the 28th and then to do reconnaissance of Khiva.
So, having first receiving information that Kaufman, having taken Khazarasp, goes to Khiva, Verevkin abandons his march to Novy Urgench and also goes to Khiva; now, having received another information that Kaufman after taking Khazarasp retreated, which was true, Verevkin is in a hurry to take Khiva without waiting for the Turkestan corps.
Kaufman. On May 26, a messenger from the khan arrived to Kaufman’s column delivering Khan’s letter. Khan wrote that he had sent prisoners long ago and does not understand why the Russians came, and even from three sides; therefore, he asks Kaufman to step back and explain what he wants... Kaufman did not answer in writing, but ordered the messenger to tell the Khan that he will conduct negotiations in Khiva. Then two reports received from Verevkin, from the 23rd and 25th, about Mangyt's occupation, turning to Khiva and that on the 26th he will be 10-12 versts from Khiva, where he will wait for orders.
So, Verevkin is already 10 versts from Khiva, and Turkestans still have from Karavak up to 70 versts. Kaufman could not delay longer... Up to 500 wagons has already been collected. It was decided to start marching on May 27 at 6 a.m. At an overnight stay 10 versts behind Khazar-asp a defector from Khiva arrived saying that the city was crowded with residents of the surrounding areas, that the people lack supplies and water and that the day before the Russians had a battle with Khivans, who were defeated. The next day, on the 28th, the Turkestans spent the night at Yangi-aryk, where Verevkin’s report was received informing that he wanted to send a small detachment to contact the Turkestan corps, but found out that Kaufman had retreated to Pitnyak, and therefore decided not to send it. Kaufman replied that his corps had only 20 versts of match left to Khiva, that tomorrow, May 29, he would stop 7-8 versts from Khiva, where he asked to send the column to meet.
On the 28th, at 11 1/2 a.m., Verevkin's troops moved from Chinakchik. After advancing a mile beyond the position of the vanguard, the detachment entered the streets of the suburb and reformed into a deep column. 600 fathoms from Khiva, the Kosh-Kupyr road crosses the Shah-Abad road, on which the troops turned to the right, toward the gate of the same name. The Khivans immediately opened artillery fire. Four guns of the Russian horse artillery and 2 foot guns immediately turned around and opened fire, and two companies of Apsheron regiment marched forward through the gardens. Approaching the bridge over the Palvan-ata Canal, protected with a pile of arb and seeing two Khivan guns behind the bridge, these companies ran over the bridge and, despite rifle and grapeshot fire from the city wall, at a distance of only 120 fathoms from the canal, took possession of guns. Surprised Khivins even stopped shooting from the walls but then restarted the fire both from the wall and from a medrese located outside the wall.
Having no ladders and not knowing that just 200 steps in the city wall there was a convenient and wide collapse (this was learned only two days later, on May 30, after the occupation of the city), people, of course, had to retreat, but how? Ordering a retreat, Verevkin could no longer personally conduct it because he was wounded in the face near his eye and handed over the command to the Chief of Staff, Colonel Saranchev, who ordered the artillery and infantry standing on this side of Palvan-ata to open rapid fire on the walls, which significantly weakened the fire of the Khivans.
The retreat was made in accordance with and without prosecution. During the battle, the khan left the city, as if to stop his fighters, but when a horse was killed under him and he, sitting on another, wanted to return to the city, he found the gate locked. There was nothing left but to go to the mountains to the Turkmens. His emprisoned brother, Atajan, accused by his mother of intending to poison his brother, was released by supporters and proclaimed a khan; but his power was not recognized by the remaining in the city main members of government who obeyed the Khan's uncle, Seyid-Emir-Ul-Omar. Seyid-Emir-Ul-Omar immediately sent a deputation to Verevkin who proposed the following conditions, accepted unquestioningly: 1) the actions stop for 2 hours; 2) in 2 hours the deputation of the most honorable persons should appear and bring guns and weapons, as much as they have time to collect; 3) the most senior official person in the city must immediately go to Kaufman for negotiations and 4) if there is no answer in 3 hours, the city will be bombed.
After delegation departed a new camp had been established outside the range of the city guns and two batteries were established in 300 (4 20 pounder mortars) and 500 meters (8 guns) from the walls. At the end of the term, an envoy from the city came asking for a truce until the morning, as some residents oppose surrender. Verevkin’s deputy ordered to open fire from a mortar battery. 92 grenades were thrown, which caused three fires. Then the bombing stopped for 3 hours.
What was this action? Unsuccessful assault? But who is assaulting walls without the ladders? Reconnaissance in force? But nothing new was discovered. They did not even find a broken wall not far from the bridge. Obviously, Verevkin firmly believed that he would spend the night in Khiva: the order was to follow the troops with the entire wagon train. But you don't take a convoy for assault or reconnaissance. Most probably Verevkin was influenced by the previous experiences when his troops were facing the mounted mobs and the cities sending the deputations offering their surrender.
“There was nothing criminal in such a mistake, but for some reason he was ashamed to confess to it and came up with fantastic reasons and shaky arguments which only undermined the trust... Well, even Napoleon made mistakes so Verevkin should be forgiven, especially since the losses, in fact, were small and there were some trophies.”😉
In the midst of a skirmish under the walls of Khiva, the khan's cousin, Inak-Irtazali, arrived to Kaufman, who stood as a bivouac near the village Yangi-Aryk, 20 versts from Khiva. He was carrying a statement of submission on behalf of the khan who surrendered without any conditions to the generosity of the White Tsar and even ready to accept Russian citizenship if the hostilities and bombardment of the city will stop.
,
Kaufman sent message to Verevkin informing him that he ordered khan to get out of the city and met him early in the next morning. Kaufman himself was planning to stop at 6 versts from the city. Verevkin will have to move to the bridge Sari-Kupruk avoiding opening fire unless his troops are coming under the fire.
“What can be seen from this note? Tomorrow there will be a big event: all the detachments will unite... Kaufman, finally, as a real commander-in-chief... in front of him is an arrogant but now humiliated khan, rude man who did not answer his letters for years... with an insignificant retinue, as befits a defeated and despicable enemy... The picture will be solemn, rewarding for all the sorrows, deprivations and fears of the campaign... Kaufman will first be harsh, then merciful... he will tell the troops a speech... it will all be printed in newspapers...
Whoever knew Kaufman and his passion for honors and theatrical effects will agree that his note has been interpreted correctly.
Please note: the most important thing - to cease fire - is the last and in conditional form with "if".
You can imagine Kaufman's disappointment when the next day neither Khan nor Verevkin came to him to decorate his triumph at the solemn entry into the city!”
Verevkin considered it inconvenient for himself to comply with Kaufman's order exactly. Among the plausible pretexts was the abundance of wounded, who would be difficult to transport (add: unnecessarily) ... Therefore, he sent only 2 companies, 4 Cossack hundreds and 2 cavalry guns to meet Kaufman, and two of his officers instead himself. He stayed in place with the rest of the troops. The morning of May 29 caught Khiva in a peaceful mood, although the holes in the gates were covered, and the knocked down pieces of the walls were renewed with clay, but the defenders sat on a top of the wll, hanging their legs outside side, and peacefully admired tombash (entertainment), which was started by the Russians. The Russians stood in groups under the very walls and started conversations with curious defenders from the walls. They picked up yesterday's dead, who found without heads and with open bellies...
Someone shouted up the walls to hand over the guns, and the Khivans very willingly and cheerfully lowered two zembureks on ropes. The cheerful mood was soured by the fact that Persian prisoners also began to descend from the walls. These Persians said that with the departure of the khan, riots broke out in Khiva, and that prisoners were going to be massacred and there are many Russians among them. Maybe this partly affected the further course of events.
“Knowing that there is a strong number of militant parties in Khiva, and wanting to prevent riots that can easily arise, as happened in Mangyt, at the very moment of surrender of the city, Verevkin ordered to occupy the Shah-Abad Gate and part of the walls in both directions. If they don't surrender by good, then take it by force.
That's where the operetta began...
It was quite natural and clear to everyone that if the Khiva residents have repeatedly been declared by Verevkin himself that he has no right to talk about peace, that this right is granted to one Kaufman, who is the chief of all the troops that entered Khiva, then all the Khiva authorities reached out to Kaufman who was already approaching the place appointed for the meeting, i.e. to the 6th verst. The keys to the city gates everywhere in Central Asia are in the hands of a special Kur-bash official, the head of the night watch, so to speak, a night policeman. In peacetime, the gates are locked only at night, and in the war times, of course, during the day. If it comes to the surrender of the fortress, it is clear that the keys were given to the one who had the right to accept the surrender and interpret the conditions, that is, to Kaufman. It is therefore clear that the residents sitting on the walls could not respond to the requirements shouted by the Russian interpreters: "To open the gate" - due to the fact that they had no keys, and that all the bosses went to Kaufman...
Then the Russians shouted to them that if the gate was not opened it will be broken…
The Khivans answered from the wall that, well, this is not our concern, and that one gate, namely Khazar-Asp, is already opened for the yarim-patshi (the half-king or viceroy, as Kaufman was called in Central Asia), who approached from Khazarasp.
From the below, Russians are shouting again: "Drop us some shovels or hoes". The Khivans immediately fulfilled this request and lowered several hoes. With these instruments Russians began to pound the ground near the gate and installed a breach-battery; the distance to the gate was calmly measured with steps. Khiva residents kept sitting on a wall and admire the show. When the battery was ready, grenades punched a narrow slit in the gate, through which soldiers of 2 companies got into the city one by one…. The Khiva people did not interfere with this at all, and thus the Shah Abat gate with adjacent walls was occupied by our troops, as if by a battle, as if by open force, and at least forcibly. It was at this time that Kaufman's detachment was formed into a column at the other gates for a solemn entry into the city with music!” [8]
To make the long story short, Verevkin’s staff officer arrives and orders to stop but receives an answer that, for securing position, there is a need for some fire power. The guns are being sent and after hearing sounds of shooting the staff officer arrives to the gates again and finds there a single sentry who informs him that the companies already advanced into the city. He is riding ahead and tells the commander that he already disobeyed an order and has to turn back. To which he is getting a response that getting back is scary, stopping is dangerous and the only possible course of action is to march forward and occupy the khan’s palace…. Staff officer rides to Verevkin who orders to tell this commander that if he dares to move toward the palace, he is going to be executed. The officer rides back and finds insubordinate commander … already in the palace.
In a meantime Kaufman started his march, as promised, at 4 am being greeted by the locals as he processed. In 6 versts from the city he was met by a delegation lead by khan’s uncle who explained that khan left the city. Kaufman continued his march and was met by a column sent earlier by Verevkin. The troops from Turkestan and Orenburg formally joined. Here, at the Sary-Kupryuk Bridge, the detachment made a bivouac to clean up and prepare for the celebration of entering the city. Kaufman demanded unconditional submission, ordered to open the gate, remove the guns from the walls and bring them to the Khazar-aspian gate, through which his detachment enters. Seyid-Omar immediately sent his subordinats to execute these orders.
Just at this time, at 11 a.m., there was a cannonade on the side of the Orenburg detachment, and then messenger arrived reporting that the Russians started shooting at the city again...
“Who would have thought that a funny operetta of the assault on an unprotected fortress is played out there, the garrison of which even helps attackers to build a battery, lowering their trench tools for work? It is clear that Kaufman immediately thought that Verevkin, without a doubt, was forced to fire by some hostile actions on the part of the residents, especially since yesterday he asked Verevkin not to shoot otherwise. Seyid Omar himself was immediately sent there to take the most decisive measures so that the residents immediately stop these actions. Verevkin was sent a note with the following content: "Arriving at the position, I was met by Colonel Saranchev and the glorious troops under your command. To my surprise, I hear shots on your side. Mat-Niyaz came to me; he assures that your batteries have opened fire against the city. Khan left the city yesterday with the Iomuds. When the train of the detachment is pulled, I intended with part of the detachment and with the troops from you to enter the city and occupy the citadel and gate, there should be no robbery. I hope to start in about two hours. You need more caution, now even more than before. I take your companies, guns and cavalry to be representatives of the Caucasian and Orenburg districts. I congratulate you on your victory and a wound, God willing, you’ll recover as soon as possible."
In response, Verevkin sent the following letter: "There are two parties in Khiva: peaceful and hostile. The latter does not recognize anyone's power and makes all sorts of riots in the city. In order to disperse it and have at least some guarantee against the treachery of the inhabitants, I ordered to take the possession of one of the city gates, which is done. The troops that took the gate took a defensive position near them, where they will wait for the order of Your Excellency. All robberies are strictly prohibited by me."
Kaufman received this letter for about 2 hours when he had already entered Khiva at the head of the troops with the military band plsying. At the gate to meet Kaufman stood in front of the mass of residents was the old man Sayyid-Omar without a hat, and next to the Hivin guns brought here….
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[1] Unlike Kokand and Bukhara, Khiva was really poor lacking the valuable natural resources, skilled artisans and developed agriculture. But it was conveniently located between the richer areas (don’t forget Persia on the South). Small wonder that for its population banditry became something of a profession and even smaller wonder that the neighbors were opposite to happy, to put it mildly. Khiva’s main defense was a desert but it was only a matter of time for a dedicated opponent to figure out how to deal with this obstacle.
[2] 2 schooners and few smaller ships.
[3] Terentiev
[4] On this specific item Terentiev provides a detailed criticism pointing out that a prescribed methods resulted in a big mess and corruption.
[5] irrigational canal
[6] His earlier march out of Samarkand without leaving an adequate garrison and fixing fortifications also was a bad solution which he never acknowledged.
[7] The locals did not held a high opinion about the Cossacks but feared the Russian infantry: “A Cossack is a wealthy person and, as a result, he is cautious. A foot soldier has nothing, even his rifle does not belong to him, so he has absolutely nothing to loose.”
[8] Terentiev
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Khiiva - final stages
111. Khiva - final stages
Khiva was in the Russian hands, all Russian troops finally came under his command but Kaufman still was facing a dilemma: with whom is he going to sign a peace treaty? Of course, there was a new khan, Atajan-Turya (younger brother of one that escaped) but Kaufman did not like him. Either because he did not take the leading role during the meeting near Khiva thus implying that he is reluctant to usurp position of his elder brother or because he was tall, thin and ugly or by some other reason, nobody could tell for sure. Whatever the reason, Kaufman did not want to deal with him and kept demanding the appearance of the fleeing khan and his acknowledgement of being guilty. It is very possible that without this public appearance and humiliation of the legitimate ruler, Kaufman considered the victory incomplete, since in his proclamations to the Khivans he repeatedly stated that he was waging war with one khan, not with the people. In this case, until the khan himself appeared and declared himself defeated, the war does not seem to be over. It is also very possible that Kaufman doubted the irrevocable removal of Sayyid-Muhammad-Rahim Khan from the throne and the strength of the election of his brother, and in this case the peace treaty concluded with the latter would be non-binding for the first when he gets his throne back. In Central Asia, this policy was practiced all the time.
On his part, the khan feared that he is going to be executed for his earlier actions and, understandably, was not eager to appear. Only when Kaufman wrote him a letter on June 1, with advice to return "to power that passed to you from your ancestors" and promised not to do him any harm, the Khan appeared on the evening of the 2nd. To preserve at least a shadow of dignity, although he approached Kaufman's headquarters without a hat, but immediately, without an invitation, sat down on the carpet. Which was recorded by the Russian side as “he knelled down”.
On June 6 the Khan was permitted to go to Khiva and Kaufman provided the khanate with some kind of a constitution: the Khan is responsible only for the judicial activities while the administrative power is given to the “divan” 4 members of which are being appointed by Kaufman and 3 by the Khan. The former “bad advisors” had been arrested and sent to Kaluga.
Atadzhan-Turya asked for premission to go to Mecca, but then changed his mind asked to be allowed to serve in the Tver Dragoon Regiment. [1]
About semantics. Now, according to the instruction, Kaufman had to leave the khanate territory: “On the punishment of Khiva, her possessions must be immediately cleared by our troops".
OK, the Khan was punished by confiscation of all valuables found in his palace. His advisors had been punished by confiscation of all their properties and exile. Can this be considered the punishment of Khiva, meaning not the city itself, but the whole khanate? Residents engaged in agriculture and trade treated the Russians more or less calmly, and nomads, especially Turkmens, who are mainly engaged in cattle breeding and robbery, were always the core of every guerrilla party that disturbed the Russian detachments. And they never were punished in any serious way.
How to punish Turkmen for obeying their lord? In addition, the last troops approached by July... and the main forces of the Turkestan corps, in fact, did not have a single serious case. It is impossible to consider the shelling of the Khiva camp near the Sheikh-aryk, across the river, as something serious... When one is looking for an excuse, an excuse usually is going to be found.
Turkmen counted up to 35,000 families or up to 175,000 people total . They had been robbing everyone they could reach, and they did not obey the khan. On June 3, Kaufman announced to the assembled Turkmen that he would not tolerate more robberies and disobedience to their khan, otherwise "there will be no mercy to you". Then the “divan” decided that the entire population, not excluding Turkmen, should deliver food to the Russian camp at the prescribed price. Where can a nomad who does not sow, does not reap and does not collect in the barns, and in case of need takes bread from the farmer get the grain? It is forbidden to rob... It was easy to predict that even semi-sedentary Turkmens will not fulfill such a requirement, since, of course, last year's sowing was almost completely eaten by themselves, and the new one has not yet ripe.
Then, on June 18 Khan's manifesto regarding release of slaves was announced. Turkmens cultivated part of their land mainly for livestock’s fodder and very little for bread, but not by themselves. They completely relied upon the slaves (mostly Persians) labor in the land cultivation and maintaining the irrigation system and they had to ride for the hundreds of versts to capture these slaves! Pf course, the Turkmens didn't let a single slave go...
For these two disobediences, Kaufman imposed a fine on them "so that, without ruining them completely, it will be big enough to weaken their strength and arrogance, to make it impossible to recover soon and thereby bring them into subordination and dependence on the khan."
So the real goal now was to punish the Turkmens “Otherwise the goal of the entire expedition would not have been achieved, and Russian troops would not be able to leave the territory of the khanate, which would be contrary to His Imperial Majesty’s will: to punish Khiva.”
The contribution was imposed in the amount of 600,000 rubles. Half were to be made by the Khazawat Turkmens. 100,000 were to be paid in 10 days, from July 7 to 17, and 200,000 in the next 5 days. That is, by the 22nd, everything should be over... Kaufman couldn't postpone it, because the troops had to go home in August. Only few elders came to receive the news and most of them had been detained as the hostages. This is also an original measure: to put under arrest the same people who were supposed to collect the money. Obviously, nothing was missed in the task of causing an unrest. Even before the Turkmens refused to pay the contribution, a punishing expedition had been formed and sent to their territory. Kaufman wrote an instruction [2] which prescribed, if there is any suspicion that the Turkmens are not collecting the money, “To subject these nomadic iomuds and their families to complete and total ruin and extermination, and their property, herds, etc. - confiscation”. A terrible indiscriminate massacre followed. The survivors, of course, obeyed the demand of the indemnity, but could not collect it in the prescribed amount so Kaufman agreed to accept part of a payment by the camels and to take gold and silver jewelry. The truth was that Kaufman was desperately short of the funds to pay troops’ salaries and to buy provision: he took with him the sums for 3 months of campaigning and operation already lasted for almost 5 months. Still, only a third of the intended amount could be squeezed from the destroyed area by the time most of the Russian troops had been leaving the Khanate.
Before leaving Kaufman signed with Khan a peace treaty which contained 18 items by which Khan acknowledged himself to be vassal of the Russian Empire with no right to conduct a foreign policy, promised to pay 2,200,000 rubles, transferred to Russia all lands on the right bank of the Amu-Darya River and pretty much allowed the Russian subjects to do whatever they want on khanate territory (settle where they want, free travel, trade without the taxes, etc.).
The Khan was left with the Russian “Guards” for his own security. These troops had been placed along the right (Russian) bank of Amu-Darya. Of course as soon as other troops left, situation went back to its pre-war status .
The Turkmens, after giving a subject of the reparations some thinking, came to the conclusion that the indemnity should have been recovered not from them alone, but from other residents of the khanate. Wishing to correct this mistake and the injustice of the Russians, they distributed their losses between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz and began to recover indemnity from them just as strictly as the Russians had been earlier extracting money from them. They kept ignoring the Khan’s orders. Ne had no means to humble them, and beyond the river the Russian “gendarme team” was inactive because its assigned task was protection of the population on the Russian side of the river.
Kaufman got St.George 2nd Class. He was promoted to engineer-general (aka, became a full general), made commander of the Turkestan Military District and kept there for the following years. Opinion “in Moscow” was that his exploits against “the natives” do not warrant elevation into fieldmarshal (in which opinion Emperor Alexey was fully-heartedly supported by the fieldmarshals Munnich and Rumyantsev). During his tenure he was quite energetic in opening schools and economic development of the region.
On a practical side, it was decided to take advantage of the good horsemen (and good horses) by forming Turkmen irregular militia which was later expanded into Tekinsky cavalry regiment.
The Akhal-Teke horses had been widely used in the Russian cavalry and for improvement of the domestic breeds.
_________
[1] He was accepted as an ensign into Emperor’s personal convoy.
[2] Later his apologists had been arguing that this was instruction and not an order.
Khiva was in the Russian hands, all Russian troops finally came under his command but Kaufman still was facing a dilemma: with whom is he going to sign a peace treaty? Of course, there was a new khan, Atajan-Turya (younger brother of one that escaped) but Kaufman did not like him. Either because he did not take the leading role during the meeting near Khiva thus implying that he is reluctant to usurp position of his elder brother or because he was tall, thin and ugly or by some other reason, nobody could tell for sure. Whatever the reason, Kaufman did not want to deal with him and kept demanding the appearance of the fleeing khan and his acknowledgement of being guilty. It is very possible that without this public appearance and humiliation of the legitimate ruler, Kaufman considered the victory incomplete, since in his proclamations to the Khivans he repeatedly stated that he was waging war with one khan, not with the people. In this case, until the khan himself appeared and declared himself defeated, the war does not seem to be over. It is also very possible that Kaufman doubted the irrevocable removal of Sayyid-Muhammad-Rahim Khan from the throne and the strength of the election of his brother, and in this case the peace treaty concluded with the latter would be non-binding for the first when he gets his throne back. In Central Asia, this policy was practiced all the time.
On his part, the khan feared that he is going to be executed for his earlier actions and, understandably, was not eager to appear. Only when Kaufman wrote him a letter on June 1, with advice to return "to power that passed to you from your ancestors" and promised not to do him any harm, the Khan appeared on the evening of the 2nd. To preserve at least a shadow of dignity, although he approached Kaufman's headquarters without a hat, but immediately, without an invitation, sat down on the carpet. Which was recorded by the Russian side as “he knelled down”.
On June 6 the Khan was permitted to go to Khiva and Kaufman provided the khanate with some kind of a constitution: the Khan is responsible only for the judicial activities while the administrative power is given to the “divan” 4 members of which are being appointed by Kaufman and 3 by the Khan. The former “bad advisors” had been arrested and sent to Kaluga.
Atadzhan-Turya asked for premission to go to Mecca, but then changed his mind asked to be allowed to serve in the Tver Dragoon Regiment. [1]
About semantics. Now, according to the instruction, Kaufman had to leave the khanate territory: “On the punishment of Khiva, her possessions must be immediately cleared by our troops".
OK, the Khan was punished by confiscation of all valuables found in his palace. His advisors had been punished by confiscation of all their properties and exile. Can this be considered the punishment of Khiva, meaning not the city itself, but the whole khanate? Residents engaged in agriculture and trade treated the Russians more or less calmly, and nomads, especially Turkmens, who are mainly engaged in cattle breeding and robbery, were always the core of every guerrilla party that disturbed the Russian detachments. And they never were punished in any serious way.
How to punish Turkmen for obeying their lord? In addition, the last troops approached by July... and the main forces of the Turkestan corps, in fact, did not have a single serious case. It is impossible to consider the shelling of the Khiva camp near the Sheikh-aryk, across the river, as something serious... When one is looking for an excuse, an excuse usually is going to be found.
Turkmen counted up to 35,000 families or up to 175,000 people total . They had been robbing everyone they could reach, and they did not obey the khan. On June 3, Kaufman announced to the assembled Turkmen that he would not tolerate more robberies and disobedience to their khan, otherwise "there will be no mercy to you". Then the “divan” decided that the entire population, not excluding Turkmen, should deliver food to the Russian camp at the prescribed price. Where can a nomad who does not sow, does not reap and does not collect in the barns, and in case of need takes bread from the farmer get the grain? It is forbidden to rob... It was easy to predict that even semi-sedentary Turkmens will not fulfill such a requirement, since, of course, last year's sowing was almost completely eaten by themselves, and the new one has not yet ripe.
Then, on June 18 Khan's manifesto regarding release of slaves was announced. Turkmens cultivated part of their land mainly for livestock’s fodder and very little for bread, but not by themselves. They completely relied upon the slaves (mostly Persians) labor in the land cultivation and maintaining the irrigation system and they had to ride for the hundreds of versts to capture these slaves! Pf course, the Turkmens didn't let a single slave go...
For these two disobediences, Kaufman imposed a fine on them "so that, without ruining them completely, it will be big enough to weaken their strength and arrogance, to make it impossible to recover soon and thereby bring them into subordination and dependence on the khan."
So the real goal now was to punish the Turkmens “Otherwise the goal of the entire expedition would not have been achieved, and Russian troops would not be able to leave the territory of the khanate, which would be contrary to His Imperial Majesty’s will: to punish Khiva.”
The contribution was imposed in the amount of 600,000 rubles. Half were to be made by the Khazawat Turkmens. 100,000 were to be paid in 10 days, from July 7 to 17, and 200,000 in the next 5 days. That is, by the 22nd, everything should be over... Kaufman couldn't postpone it, because the troops had to go home in August. Only few elders came to receive the news and most of them had been detained as the hostages. This is also an original measure: to put under arrest the same people who were supposed to collect the money. Obviously, nothing was missed in the task of causing an unrest. Even before the Turkmens refused to pay the contribution, a punishing expedition had been formed and sent to their territory. Kaufman wrote an instruction [2] which prescribed, if there is any suspicion that the Turkmens are not collecting the money, “To subject these nomadic iomuds and their families to complete and total ruin and extermination, and their property, herds, etc. - confiscation”. A terrible indiscriminate massacre followed. The survivors, of course, obeyed the demand of the indemnity, but could not collect it in the prescribed amount so Kaufman agreed to accept part of a payment by the camels and to take gold and silver jewelry. The truth was that Kaufman was desperately short of the funds to pay troops’ salaries and to buy provision: he took with him the sums for 3 months of campaigning and operation already lasted for almost 5 months. Still, only a third of the intended amount could be squeezed from the destroyed area by the time most of the Russian troops had been leaving the Khanate.
Before leaving Kaufman signed with Khan a peace treaty which contained 18 items by which Khan acknowledged himself to be vassal of the Russian Empire with no right to conduct a foreign policy, promised to pay 2,200,000 rubles, transferred to Russia all lands on the right bank of the Amu-Darya River and pretty much allowed the Russian subjects to do whatever they want on khanate territory (settle where they want, free travel, trade without the taxes, etc.).
The Khan was left with the Russian “Guards” for his own security. These troops had been placed along the right (Russian) bank of Amu-Darya. Of course as soon as other troops left, situation went back to its pre-war status .
The Turkmens, after giving a subject of the reparations some thinking, came to the conclusion that the indemnity should have been recovered not from them alone, but from other residents of the khanate. Wishing to correct this mistake and the injustice of the Russians, they distributed their losses between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz and began to recover indemnity from them just as strictly as the Russians had been earlier extracting money from them. They kept ignoring the Khan’s orders. Ne had no means to humble them, and beyond the river the Russian “gendarme team” was inactive because its assigned task was protection of the population on the Russian side of the river.
Kaufman got St.George 2nd Class. He was promoted to engineer-general (aka, became a full general), made commander of the Turkestan Military District and kept there for the following years. Opinion “in Moscow” was that his exploits against “the natives” do not warrant elevation into fieldmarshal (in which opinion Emperor Alexey was fully-heartedly supported by the fieldmarshals Munnich and Rumyantsev). During his tenure he was quite energetic in opening schools and economic development of the region.
On a practical side, it was decided to take advantage of the good horsemen (and good horses) by forming Turkmen irregular militia which was later expanded into Tekinsky cavalry regiment.
The Akhal-Teke horses had been widely used in the Russian cavalry and for improvement of the domestic breeds.
_________
[1] He was accepted as an ensign into Emperor’s personal convoy.
[2] Later his apologists had been arguing that this was instruction and not an order.
Where next for Russia? We know the planned polish division, but after that, where? Central Asia is conquered or vassalized, the western border will be secure, and it seems pretty difficult to expand further at this time vs. the Qing. Is it time to look at the Caucasus, or a long period of peace?
Why expansion should be the main goal? In OTL Paul I hold an opinion that Russia is already too big and the most important thing is to put the domestic affairs in order. CII with her expansionism left Russia with a huge foreign debt, terrible administrative mess and economy which was technologically lagging behind the leading European countries. So, unless a much greater attention is paid to the technological progress, Russia finds itself in the same s—t as by the end of the reign of NI. And the industrial (and pre-industrial) development needs a capital which OTL Russia was lacking both on the state and individual level. And “capital” implies the financial institutions capable to provide credit.
The CA was meaningful economically as a market for the Russian manufactured goods and because it was providing at least some markets further in Asia. The Caucasus at that time provided very little except major headache and never-ending waste of the resources. Plus, its conquest meant wars with the Ottomans and Persia. The 1st IITL is a valuable trade partner and “enabler” pf the Russian trade on the Med. The 2nd is of a lesser value mostly because of the domestic political turmoil but as soon as situation in Persia is stabilized, it also becomes a reasonably valuable market. Caucasus itself offers very little in the terms of the available goods and the trade is difficult because the area is split into the countless political “entities” (down to a single village) which are at war with each other so you can’t achieve a meaningful conquest until all of them are subdued.
Further expansion at Qing expense also does not make too much sense until communications with the Russian Far East are greatly improved both by land and by the ocean (and it should take at least few decades before circumnavigation becomes a routine travel for the Russian sailors). The Amur is a convenient border (well, on paper, not if you look at a detailed map) but as a transport artery it is good mostly for going downstream and this is not going to change until the age of steam. But expanding nomenclature of the trade may bring more capital into the country.
IITL Russia needs peace, money and the technological competence. On a balance, an “absolute” peace is impossible because it will almost inevitably led to the military stagnation (like was the case with Prussians in 1806) so there is going to be some involvement in the future European wars but I did not think about the specifics, yet.
Exactly. And if in OTL the Ottomans were predominantly “just an enemy”, IITL they are a valuable trade partner allowing to expand trade further to the Med and beyond. Persia is going to become a growing market for the Russian goods.
IITL Russia is penetrating the Asiatic markets well ahead of the schedule and ahead of the Brits. India is only marginally accessible by the caravans (from Bukhara) and eventually the Brits are going to kill this trade but, with Kashgar in the Russian hands, the regional situation is different from one of OTL in the terms of access to the “inner Asia”.
Expansionism aside, does anybody has an idea what were the trade policies and realities in the French and Spanish colonies? Was trade with the foreigners prohibited (as in the British colonies), somewhat limited or free? As I understand, the Spanish laws were rather restrictive but more or less ignored in the colonies. What about France?
I don't think that comparison of Central Asia and the Caucasus is correct in a mid-18th century context. To be sure, Russia's expansion in the Caucasus never paid off but there was potential and this is alternate history. The region could grow the sort of warm country cash crops that were profitable at the time. Today's Azerbaijan was a good cotton region and OTL Peter's conquests along the South Caspian included the premier silk growing area of Persia as well as fields for the supremely popular product of sugar. Equally importantly, the region could be accessed with the maritime technology of the day - Georgia from the Black Sea and the Caspian provinces from the Caspian.
Central Asia, on the other hand, was effectively inaccessible before the railway. Trade is not going to move beyond the level of traditional luxuries until there's a better way to move commodities and unfortunately the rivers don't extend far enough North. Even if the goal of direct trade with India is achieved, the cost of transportation compared to the alternative sea routes is going to make it marginal in a European context, although probably interesting in a cultural sense.
The point of conquer Central Asia is not because the region has any inherent value but simply to get rid of raiders. The weakness of historical Russia was that it had to keep fighting small wars on its frontier, which made it unable to develop it. Austria ahead the same problem in Hungary, but their solution was the military frontiers districts, with the removal of the Crimean Khanate and the Central Asian states, Russia can now develop Don, the Lower Volga and the fertile triangle in Siberia, fundamental a region the size of Poland-Lithuania is now able to be developed into agricultural land.
In Moscow
112. In Moscow
1746. The year started with the good news, domestic and foreign.
The good domestic news were:
It was quite logical for the Grand Duchess Sophia to worry about well-being of her beloved brother Fritz but her (and her husband’s) unwillingness to accept the fact that Russia is going to remain neutral and that now she is, first and foremost, the Grand Duchess of Russia, was quite irritating. In the long run, this was a major source of Alexey’s worries. He was not getting younger and who could guarantee that after his death this couple of the overly-enthusiastic idiots will not sacrifice the Russian interests to those of Prussia getting Russia involved in some new Fritz’s military adventure? The only thing that he could do was to ensure that his grandson Peter Petrovich is going to get a proper education and indoctrination regarding the Russian interests. But at least the immediate pain in the butt was over, thank God for the small favor. 😉
So there was a good time for the celebration on all levels from the formal state balls
to the more modest domestic events.
The so-called quiet balls were popular. They usually happened when somebody decided to celebrate “angel”s day” [2{ by arranging such a "quiet", that is, without announcement and invitations, ball, and everyone who came to congratulate during the day received an invitation from the valet. "In the evening all Moscow came to welcome Nebolsina. The lines of carriages stretched on both sides of Povarskaya to the Arbat Gate. The hostess knew how to receive guests: whether it was the commander-in-chief or a student, a bow to everyone, an affectionate word to everyone. Do whatever you want - play, talk, be silent, walk, sit, "just don't argue too loudly and with passion; the hostess is afraid of it."”
The way of life of nobles was as hospitable, as the wealth and rank were permitting; almost everyone had dining tables for their acquaintances and subordinates; the bachelors leading idle life found it difficult only to choose where to dine or spend the evening with pleasure.
With the construction of the Noble Assembly building, Moscow became famous for its balls throughout Russia. Every year on the eve of Christmas, the nobility of neighboring Moscow provinces with their families went from villages to Moscow accompanied by long convoys with piglets, geese, chickens, cereals, flour and butter. Zamoskvorechye hospitably welcomed the long-awaited owners of unpretentiously cleaned, gardened houses, whose owners usually did not seek close communication with neighbors if they did not belong to the same province.
On Thursdays, everyone united in a large circle of the Noble Assembly: "Here they will see state ladies with portraits [3], the ladies-in-waiting with monograms [4] , and how many ribbons, how many crosses, how many rich clothes and diamonds. There's something to talk about in the county for nine months! And all this with surprise, without envy: they admired the unattainable for them status of a high nobility as a traveler admires the brilliant peak of Elbrus."
The nobles could attend court private and public balls. The court balls were attended by persons who were in one of the four first classes according to the table of ranks, the senior officers of the guards regiments with wives and daughters, young officers as "dancers", people having the court rank and persons included by the special instructions of the emperors.
The contingent of private balls depended solely on the desire of the owners of the house. A nobleman, deoending on his social status, occupied a certain place in the ballroom space: "The dancer had to return after the dance to the place assigned to his social group. This rule concerned even purely noble balls, at which the dignitary nobility always took a position on the opposite side of the orchestra, around which young officials gathered.”
All high society was fond of theater, and young people willingly arranged home performances. Entire groups of high-society amateurs were formed; there were theaters of Princess Dolgorukova, Countess Golovnina, and theater in the Apraksin' house. However, it was rather difficult to compete with Count Peter Borisovich Sheremetev who had two domestic theaters, in Kuskovo and Ostankino, with a troupe of actors raised among his serfs trained by the famous tutors.
“The reputation of the Sheremetev stage was great. Many noble theatergoers preferred Kuskovo performances to everyone else, including the productions of the Petrovsky Theater, where excellent actors played at that time. Medox complained to the city authorities that his fees were falling, as the count distracts the public.”
The Young Court. Taking into an account that the Young Court was seemingly “incurable” and to stop the never-ending flow of information going from it to Berlin, Alexey was steadily isolating it from the Russian politics. Grand Duke Peter was presented with the estate near St-Petersburg (away from Moscow) and allowed him to keep and train his own military unit of one infantry company and one cavalry squadron. The Grand Duchess was not too happy but the Grand Duke was excited and had been spending all his time (to be more precise, the time free of drinking) training this mini-army Prussian style and inventing and reinventing the new uniforms.
Unlike her husband, the Grand Duchess Sophia had some intellectual interests and, besides communications with her brother, was also engaged in the letters exchange with the various European celebrities and was a talented composer. Under the different circumstance Alexey would be glad to see her at the court on a permanent but her firm intention to serve as eyes and ears for her brother in Moscow was a killer of any good will. Of course, she was not permitted to travel to Berlin and all these things taken together did not improve relations with Frederick of Prussia who tended to see the world exclusively from his own perspective.
Objectively, just as it was the case with Saxony, Prussia was only a marginally relevant member of the Baltic League, which was mostly based upon the alliance of Russia, Sweden and Denmark as the main factors in the Baltic trade, and to a certain degree its policy of encouraging the immigration was at odds with the Russian policy of doing the same. The same goes for Frederick’s policy of developing the local manufacturing thus reducing the country’s need for importing goods and preventing the Prussian gold and silver from going outside of the borders. To sum it up, Prussia was not a significant trading partner either in exports or in imports, and as such rather irrelevant in the economic framework of the Baltic League, and its fast militarization combined with the just demonstrated aggressiveness and easiness with which Frederick was making and breaking peace treaties ignoring interests of his allies warranted a cautiousness in the area of the military alliances. Of course, the close family relations still could not be discounted but they should not be a dominating consideration in the League’s foreign policies. There was no need in the open hostility, even if just because Sweden’s economic interests in Memel and Elblag still were dependent upon Prussian cooperation, but there was no reason for making any binding obligations either. And, keeping in mind Frederick’s rather unconventional modus operandi, the military and naval forces had to be kept in a status of readiness.
At least as far as Alexey was involved, providing the Baltic Fleet with a purpose for its existence and putting it out of its habitual state of a relaxation was a good thing. 😉
This was going to be the first big readjustment in the initial framework of the Baltic League.
______________
[1] Actually, this is a portrait of Peter III and Catherine. 😉
[2] In Russia celebration was not of a birthday but of the patron saint’s (one by which the person is being named) day but, by whatever reason, it was called “angel’s day”.
[3] A miniature with the emperor’s empress’ portrait was a sign of a personal imperial favor to be worn just as a state award.
[4] The ladies-in-waiting had been wearing a bejeweled monogram of the empress’ name as a sign of their court position.
“Give me a good policy and I'll give you good finances.”
Turgot
“The sheep and the wolf understand the word "freedom" differently, which is the essence of the disagreements prevailing in human society.”
Lincoln
“Any ram considers the shepherd a genius and the dog to be the protector of the herd, although the owner and the dog eat more sheep than wolves.”
Adam Smith
Turgot
“The sheep and the wolf understand the word "freedom" differently, which is the essence of the disagreements prevailing in human society.”
Lincoln
“Any ram considers the shepherd a genius and the dog to be the protector of the herd, although the owner and the dog eat more sheep than wolves.”
Adam Smith
1746. The year started with the good news, domestic and foreign.
The good domestic news were:
- Conclusion of the operations in the khanates of the CA. Russian Souther borders in the region were fixed and secured as much as this could be achieved in the inherently unstable area. Markets of Bukhara and Khiva had been open for the Russian exports and the caravans of Bukhara had been carrying them further into the CA.
- Further to the East Emperor Qianlong resigned himself to accepting the agreed upon borders and allowed to open a new trade channel through the Russian-held Hama. Nomenclature of the Russian exports was slowly but steadily expanding and an additional guarantee of a prolonged peace were the never-ending wars, all the way to Burma and Vietnam, and the uprisings which kept Qianlong busy.
- Russian metallurgy was booming and so were the exports of iron and other goods so the Russian state finances were in a good shape and both Russian nobility and merchant class were getting good money for the stuff they were selling.
It was quite logical for the Grand Duchess Sophia to worry about well-being of her beloved brother Fritz but her (and her husband’s) unwillingness to accept the fact that Russia is going to remain neutral and that now she is, first and foremost, the Grand Duchess of Russia, was quite irritating. In the long run, this was a major source of Alexey’s worries. He was not getting younger and who could guarantee that after his death this couple of the overly-enthusiastic idiots will not sacrifice the Russian interests to those of Prussia getting Russia involved in some new Fritz’s military adventure? The only thing that he could do was to ensure that his grandson Peter Petrovich is going to get a proper education and indoctrination regarding the Russian interests. But at least the immediate pain in the butt was over, thank God for the small favor. 😉
So there was a good time for the celebration on all levels from the formal state balls
to the more modest domestic events.
The so-called quiet balls were popular. They usually happened when somebody decided to celebrate “angel”s day” [2{ by arranging such a "quiet", that is, without announcement and invitations, ball, and everyone who came to congratulate during the day received an invitation from the valet. "In the evening all Moscow came to welcome Nebolsina. The lines of carriages stretched on both sides of Povarskaya to the Arbat Gate. The hostess knew how to receive guests: whether it was the commander-in-chief or a student, a bow to everyone, an affectionate word to everyone. Do whatever you want - play, talk, be silent, walk, sit, "just don't argue too loudly and with passion; the hostess is afraid of it."”
The way of life of nobles was as hospitable, as the wealth and rank were permitting; almost everyone had dining tables for their acquaintances and subordinates; the bachelors leading idle life found it difficult only to choose where to dine or spend the evening with pleasure.
With the construction of the Noble Assembly building, Moscow became famous for its balls throughout Russia. Every year on the eve of Christmas, the nobility of neighboring Moscow provinces with their families went from villages to Moscow accompanied by long convoys with piglets, geese, chickens, cereals, flour and butter. Zamoskvorechye hospitably welcomed the long-awaited owners of unpretentiously cleaned, gardened houses, whose owners usually did not seek close communication with neighbors if they did not belong to the same province.
On Thursdays, everyone united in a large circle of the Noble Assembly: "Here they will see state ladies with portraits [3], the ladies-in-waiting with monograms [4] , and how many ribbons, how many crosses, how many rich clothes and diamonds. There's something to talk about in the county for nine months! And all this with surprise, without envy: they admired the unattainable for them status of a high nobility as a traveler admires the brilliant peak of Elbrus."
The nobles could attend court private and public balls. The court balls were attended by persons who were in one of the four first classes according to the table of ranks, the senior officers of the guards regiments with wives and daughters, young officers as "dancers", people having the court rank and persons included by the special instructions of the emperors.
The contingent of private balls depended solely on the desire of the owners of the house. A nobleman, deoending on his social status, occupied a certain place in the ballroom space: "The dancer had to return after the dance to the place assigned to his social group. This rule concerned even purely noble balls, at which the dignitary nobility always took a position on the opposite side of the orchestra, around which young officials gathered.”
All high society was fond of theater, and young people willingly arranged home performances. Entire groups of high-society amateurs were formed; there were theaters of Princess Dolgorukova, Countess Golovnina, and theater in the Apraksin' house. However, it was rather difficult to compete with Count Peter Borisovich Sheremetev who had two domestic theaters, in Kuskovo and Ostankino, with a troupe of actors raised among his serfs trained by the famous tutors.
“The reputation of the Sheremetev stage was great. Many noble theatergoers preferred Kuskovo performances to everyone else, including the productions of the Petrovsky Theater, where excellent actors played at that time. Medox complained to the city authorities that his fees were falling, as the count distracts the public.”
The Young Court. Taking into an account that the Young Court was seemingly “incurable” and to stop the never-ending flow of information going from it to Berlin, Alexey was steadily isolating it from the Russian politics. Grand Duke Peter was presented with the estate near St-Petersburg (away from Moscow) and allowed him to keep and train his own military unit of one infantry company and one cavalry squadron. The Grand Duchess was not too happy but the Grand Duke was excited and had been spending all his time (to be more precise, the time free of drinking) training this mini-army Prussian style and inventing and reinventing the new uniforms.
Unlike her husband, the Grand Duchess Sophia had some intellectual interests and, besides communications with her brother, was also engaged in the letters exchange with the various European celebrities and was a talented composer. Under the different circumstance Alexey would be glad to see her at the court on a permanent but her firm intention to serve as eyes and ears for her brother in Moscow was a killer of any good will. Of course, she was not permitted to travel to Berlin and all these things taken together did not improve relations with Frederick of Prussia who tended to see the world exclusively from his own perspective.
Objectively, just as it was the case with Saxony, Prussia was only a marginally relevant member of the Baltic League, which was mostly based upon the alliance of Russia, Sweden and Denmark as the main factors in the Baltic trade, and to a certain degree its policy of encouraging the immigration was at odds with the Russian policy of doing the same. The same goes for Frederick’s policy of developing the local manufacturing thus reducing the country’s need for importing goods and preventing the Prussian gold and silver from going outside of the borders. To sum it up, Prussia was not a significant trading partner either in exports or in imports, and as such rather irrelevant in the economic framework of the Baltic League, and its fast militarization combined with the just demonstrated aggressiveness and easiness with which Frederick was making and breaking peace treaties ignoring interests of his allies warranted a cautiousness in the area of the military alliances. Of course, the close family relations still could not be discounted but they should not be a dominating consideration in the League’s foreign policies. There was no need in the open hostility, even if just because Sweden’s economic interests in Memel and Elblag still were dependent upon Prussian cooperation, but there was no reason for making any binding obligations either. And, keeping in mind Frederick’s rather unconventional modus operandi, the military and naval forces had to be kept in a status of readiness.
At least as far as Alexey was involved, providing the Baltic Fleet with a purpose for its existence and putting it out of its habitual state of a relaxation was a good thing. 😉
This was going to be the first big readjustment in the initial framework of the Baltic League.
______________
[1] Actually, this is a portrait of Peter III and Catherine. 😉
[2] In Russia celebration was not of a birthday but of the patron saint’s (one by which the person is being named) day but, by whatever reason, it was called “angel’s day”.
[3] A miniature with the emperor’s empress’ portrait was a sign of a personal imperial favor to be worn just as a state award.
[4] The ladies-in-waiting had been wearing a bejeweled monogram of the empress’ name as a sign of their court position.
Yes, an exactly by that reason IITL Russia is acting differently from OTL where it got itself into a bloody mess which lasted close to a century a provided minuscule benefits until Baku oil became a valuable commodity.
It could not and it would not because the “region” had to be conquered first (see above how long it took). The “region” was not something uniform and most of its population was hostile to Russian conquests.
Russian soldiers in these areas had been dying at such a high rate that holding them became untenable. The cotton could be (and had been) grown in much greater volumes in the conquered areas of the CA.
“Georgia” (as in 3 tsardoms and few minor entities) did not have an access to the Black Sea and definitely not from the Caspian Sea and the schema needed a war with both Ottomans and Persia.
Except for the fact that it was. 😂
Did I say that this was a goal? I just mentioned a relatively small scale caravan trade from Bukhara.
A big scale sea trade with India would be a complete fantasy for the 18 century Russia and don’t over-estimate its value, anyway. The Brits made India truly relevant by occupying it and enforcing the trade schema which was profitable for them. AFAIK, even in the mid-XVIII the European trade with the Indian states tended to have a negative balance because the locals were not interested in the European goods.
Yes, but some parts of the CA had economic value, like a fertile part of Bukhara (cotton) and Kashgar.