So taking a 1D6 or 1D20 (or anything in between) and giving weighed options? E.g. a total reversal to OTL only gets 1 pip, yet OTL's outcome gets more?
No GNW (or “Peter goes South”)
- Thread starter alexmilman
- Start date
Not sure that I got an idea what you are talking about: the chess? I’m just talking about scenario more balanced than in OTL. We know results of the easy victories and extreme luck.
True and from geopolitical perspective it's good for Russia if there's a balance of power in the east while also securing that both local powers appear capable enough to fight of any potential outside powers, or at least aren't easy picking and are of course both friendly to Russia.
Otherwise I can't wait for peace treaty, while Independent Korea is pipe dream I still hope for it.
He speaks about dices (1D6 - "normal" dice with 6 sides, 1D20 - dice with 20 sides). Rolls of dices uses in many role-playing games.
Well, if they keep kicking each other hard enough and long enough then there is an opening for the 3rd party to take whatever it wants with a minimal effort. The problem is that I’m not quite sure what this 3rd party may want to get without such an acquisition backfiring (as in OTL). I have some ideas but so far they are rather vague and I’m pretty much open to the suggestions.
Independent Korea is probably unrealistic.
If Russia is said third party ideal solution for it is a peace where Japan feels indebted and grateful to it while Qing Empire feels dependent and grateful.
Ideally Russia mediates Japanese protectorate over Korea in exchange for its market being a little more open to it and for little extra, well few ports being open to Russia won't hurt. Otherwise I don't know, if Russia views Korean settlers positively then open, but controlled immigration being allowed would be good.
Regarding Qing Empire, besides controlling Chinese immigration in Russian far east I believe that industrialized Russia would like somewhat more favorable trade deals (while otl nothing much came out if the scheme ITTL Russia should probably have some things it can sell to Chinese market), an open ports in China would be a plus.
As for peace itself. Just take Ottoman-Egyptian example with Korea being de jure Qing vassal but de facto under Japanese control, it's possible to achieve if both powers are exhausted enough and have performed good enough, add antagonistic third party trying to fuck over both Qing Empire and Japan and both powers should be on board.
Regarding diplomatic support, well German Kaiser would probably want support for protectorate over Siam (or anywhere in far east, but honestly Siam is least sensitive spot that won't kick off massive mess) so im quite sure that something could be arranged between all interested parties without kicking in partition of Qing Empire in spheres of influence.
Last edited:
That’s obvious but not necessarily feasible because Chinese and Japanese interests are in a direct contradictions.
By that time ITTL it is more or less onvious that, no matter what Qing is agreeds upon, realistic control of the migration is not going to happen both because Qing China does not and will not have an adequate enforcement apparatus and because policy of the current emperor encourages a massive Han resettlement into Manchuria, which both makes control even more difficult and creates unfavorable for Russia regional demographics. From this perspective having mini-Manchugo (OTL one would be much more difficult to establish and, for the “outside parties” to swallow) and Mongolia as independent or at least fully autonomous entities serving as a buffer zone (and each of them severely restricting imigration into their territory) looks as a welcomed scenario even if it excludes any Chinese gratitude.
The open ports can be a plus but I suspect that textiles market is already filled and, taking into an account that population is generally poor, government is probably going to end as a major buyer and the main item will be a modern weaponry, probably the last thing Russia wants to sell to China.
For Japanese government acknowledging vassal status of Korea is acknowledgememt of a defeat regardless de facto influence. The whole thing formally started over this status.
As for the third power, why would it try to screw both China and Japan? This does not make practical sense. It should choose which one is going to be a grateful friend and which one is going to be on a suffering side. Which requires fighting to a bloody stalemate so that a relatively small force of the 3rd power can become a decisive factor. To think about it, there could be the 4th power as well, joining the 3rd one.
The obvious question is why wouldn’t the outside powers try to partition Qing? They pretty much did it in OTL even if in a possibly different way.
War - the first moves #1
307. War - the first moves #1
“The worst thing a general can say is that he didn't foresee something.”
K.J. Parker, ‘Colours in the Steel’
A general is just as good or just as bad as the troops under his command make him."
Douglas MacArthur [1]
“If you build an army of 100 lions and their leader is a sheep, in any fight, the lions will die like a sheep, but if you build an army of 100 sheep and their leader is a lion, all sheep will fight like a lion.”
Napoleon [2]
“No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy forces.”
Moltke
“Hating our opponent benefits us. Underestimating them benefits them.”
Mokokoma Mokhonoana
On land.
Japanese strategic plan was to defeat the Chinese forces fast thus forcing China to capitulate and avoiding a need for prolonged fighting, especially during the winter, to which Japan was not well-prepared economically.
Destruction of the Chinese forces in Korea was the 1st necessary step of that plan. The first couple of encounters were Japanese victories but on a small scale and neither resulted in annihilation of the defeated enemy. It looked like the Chinese were planning to make a stand at Pyongyang and defeat this position trying to prevent Japanese troops from occupying the North Korea. Which was fitting the Japanese plan quite well presenting an opportunity to encircle and annihilate the Chinese force located in Korea. Japanese transportation priority was to bring to Korea troops and artillery and this was creating an obvious question of carrying all types of supplies, especially for the columns which would advance through the ragged terrain without good roads. The solution was to “mobilize” over 10,000 local coolies who would be carrying everything from food to the shells. Of course, the mobilized Koreans were not excited but it did not matter.
From Ye Zhichao’s perspective it was important to assemble the Chinese troops stationed in Korea and not let himself to be destroyed. Pyongyang was a good assembly point both geographically and because it had the considerable fortifications that would allow to defend it for a while: leaving Korea without a descent fight will be considered a high treason and, even if he managed to avoid death penalty his career would be over. Other than that, it was just a point on a map with no special value as far as defense of China was concerned so bringing an army in reasonably good shape to the Yalu was of a much greater importance.
Bringing their forces in Korea to 2nd division (3rd and 5th, 27 thousand), the Japanese on August 31 moved to Pyongyang to destroy the main group of Chinese troops gathered here. Although the Japanese forces were under the overall command of General Yamagata and he was responsible for orchestrating the strategy at Pyongyang, Yamagata did not land with his forces at Chempulo until 12 September. Lieutenant-General Nozu Michitsura commanded the Japanese troops involved in the attack on Pyongyang; which included the Wonson column under Colonel Sato Tadashi (3.75 battalions, ¼ squadron., 12 guns), the Sangnyong column (1½ battalion, 1/4 squadron, 6 guns) under Major-General Tatsumi Naobumi, the Combined Brigade (5¼ battalions, 1 squadron., 12 guns) under Major-General Oshima Yoshimasa and finally the Main Division under Nozu himself. The plan of attack was for the Combined Brigade to make the frontal assault from the south, while the Main Division (4¾ battalions, 1 squadron, 24 guns) was going to attack from the southwest. Flanking actions would then be carried out by the two columns. If the Chinese tried to retreat, the Wonson column was given the duty of intercepting and harrying the enemy as it fled to the northeast.
Nozu's plan cannot but be recognized as somewhat risky: having decided to attack a strengthened position with equal forces, he advances at the front of over 50 km by several independent detachments separated by the river. The whole plan was based upon a seemingly reasonable assumption that the Chinese will limit themselves to a passive defense. [3]
Another important component of Nozu’s plan was another seemingly reasonable assumption that the Chinese will put all their forces to defense of the Southern line of defenses (including the citadel and fortifications across the river) leaving few troops to defend their right flank and little to no troops against the columns advancing to their left flank and the river: advance of these two columns was supposed to be a complete secret with a rather optimistic expectation that they will be able to occupy the heights in Chinese rear without resistance thus cutting off a retreat line. Of course, this would require combination of the Chinese passivity, absence of the reserves and a perfect synchronization of the columns, which was rather difficult to achieve taking into an account a very hard terrain by which these two columns had been marching and their complete isolation from each other and the rest of the Japanese forces. It also heavily depended upon the Tatsumi’s and Sato’s columns achieving surprise thus not giving opponent a time to redeploy his troops.
On paper, the plan looked as shown on the schema below (small squares and diamonds - Chinese fortifications and the arrows - Japanese plan of attacks).
Chinese field fortifications were not, perhaps, too modern [4] but they were ..er.. “solid” with the height of the earthworks being up to 14 feet with the artillery pieces and few machine guns [5]. The Chinese had approximately 15,000 out of which 2,500 had been holding fortifications on other side of the river, 3,500 fortifications on the west («Ойсон» on the map above), 3,000 - fortifications on North-East and 6,000 of the best troops (including cavalry) had been held in reserve, mostly on the heights north of the city.
Small cavalry units had been spread around to discover and report the possible bypass moves by the enemy: Ye Zhichao had not been a great general and allegedly was fond of opium but he was experienced and not naive enough to assume that the enemy is going to do him a courtesy by just launching a frontal attack against the strongest part of his defenses. As a result, Sato’s and Tasumi’s columns were detected well before they approached and most of the reserve troops had been placed to repel them.
The fight started on September 16 at 2am by Oshima on the crossing and then against the eastern group of southern fortifications. The attack was carried out in 3 columns but is mountain guns could not fight Krupp field guns of the fortifications, machine guns and infantry fire. Japanese infantry attacked fiercely but, contrary to the opinion of some military experts, the fire efficiency did matter. The attackers’ losses were crippling and after 10 hours of fighting the attack run out of steam, Oshima was wounded and Japanese had to abandon even a single field fortification they captured. This attack, being completely isolated, had little impact on general situation. From the very beginning it had little chance for success because even if all fortifications in front of the Tai Dong were taken, Oshima’s troops still would have to get across the river by a single bridge which could be easily destroyed. Its main goal was to distract the Chinese attention from the attack coming at their rear.
Attack by the Japanese main force on the western direction, which started simultaneously with Oshima’s attack was only marginally more successful: in 2 hours of fighting it managed to take 3 west-most redoubts and after that attack up the hill could not move further and fighting continued as a shooting duel and a series of the minor attacks and counter-attacks of little importance. Again, short of a very weak Chinese resistance, task of that force was quite difficult because it was attacking uphill 10 reasonably strong redoubts placed in such a way that they could support each other with their fire and, if all of them are taken, there was a citadel on their way of advance. Nozu ended up with a prolonged artillery barrage from his 24 guns but the shells of a relatively low caliber were not very effective against very thick earthworks and well before the time they could cause enough of a destruction, the attack became pretty much pointless due to the events on the North.
The most important fighting was happening on the northern direction. At 5am Sato’s column attacked from the march intending to take fortifications ##6, 5 and 4 while Tatsumi was attacking #3. Neither attack was a surprise and both had been met by a strong fire. Sato’s attack was immediately repelled and he had to set up a battery and start preparing the second one with an artillery barrage that was not very effective because battery placed in #6 held a higher ground and its guns were of a heavier caliber. What’s probably more important, the hill on which #6 was located was hiding location of the Chinese reserves while his own infantry was clearly visible.
With the situation being more or less stable on the South and South-West, Ye Zhichao felt free to use most of his reserves. The main counter-attack went against Tatsumi’s column, which already was stopped by a flanking fire from the fortifications ##1 and 2, and it was simply crushed by the superior numbers. It had to retreat eastward, being chased by Ye Zhichao’s Mongolian cavalry and leaving Sato’s force isolated and under fire from #6 located on a high ground and attack both against its front and left flank. His artillery helped to repel the first counterattack but situation was getting increasingly desperate and made worse by the fact that retreat to the North by a reasonably good road was a way to nowhere making him not just tactically but strategically isolated inside unfriendly territory. The coolies, whom he used as a “supply train” in his march across the mountaibs, wisely fled (stealing whatever they could carry) and he could not get away too far without abandoning his guns if he was pursued energetically. But this was not the case because Ye Zhichao was reluctant to leave the main line of defense without support: Japanese attacks, at least on the South-West, could resume any time and the troops there needed reinforcements. As a result, Sato was able to make something of an arc in the Eastern direction, join forces with what was left of Tatsumi’s column and eventually retreat to the main forces on the other side of the Tai Dong River. He even managed to save most of his guns but not his supply train.
By the end of the day each side lost between 1,500 and 2,000 by killed and wounded.
Ye Zhichao sent report of a victory but his strategic situation remained not too good because the Japanese had been landing reinforcement into at Chemulpo and because it was demonstrated that even the forces directly opposing him will be able at any moment to outflank him, this time acting together. So, in a long run, remaining at Pyongyang would be a trap. The next two days passed in the half-hearted attempts of attack by the Nozu’s forces and active artillery barrage, which gave Ye Zhichao time to evacuate all supplies he could, blew the bridge across the Tai Dong, prepare demolition of the citadel and start retreat to the Yalu River, where the Chinese had been assembling their forces, on September 19.
He was not chased because Nozu had to figure out how to organize a new supply train and where to get the needed supplies to compensate for those lost by Sato and Tatsumi. However, capture of Pyongyang was clearly a victory duly reported to Tokyo to be properly celebrated with the streets decorated by the flags and numerous painting depicting the heroic deeds of the Japanese soldiers being presented for the excited public to see.
The official BS aside, Pyongyang really was important as a base for the future Japanese operations so it was quite logical to stop there putting logistics in order and waiting for the new troops to arrive: continue offensive with slightly more than 10,000, depleted ammunition, and no proper supply train would be plain foolish.
___________
[1] An interesting way to shift the blame.
[2] An opposing point of view, just for a balance.
[3] The assessment from “Military Encyclopedia”, published by Sytin in 1911-15.
[4] What at that time would pass for a “modern” field fortification I don’t know: in OTL even during the RJW the field fortifications still were mostly the open earthworks oriented to the defense against the low angle artillery fire with no special cover for a personnel besides the trenches.
[5] It is not clear if these were Gatling or Maxim guns.
“The worst thing a general can say is that he didn't foresee something.”
K.J. Parker, ‘Colours in the Steel’
A general is just as good or just as bad as the troops under his command make him."
Douglas MacArthur [1]
“If you build an army of 100 lions and their leader is a sheep, in any fight, the lions will die like a sheep, but if you build an army of 100 sheep and their leader is a lion, all sheep will fight like a lion.”
Napoleon [2]
“No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy forces.”
Moltke
“Hating our opponent benefits us. Underestimating them benefits them.”
Mokokoma Mokhonoana
On land.
Japanese strategic plan was to defeat the Chinese forces fast thus forcing China to capitulate and avoiding a need for prolonged fighting, especially during the winter, to which Japan was not well-prepared economically.
Destruction of the Chinese forces in Korea was the 1st necessary step of that plan. The first couple of encounters were Japanese victories but on a small scale and neither resulted in annihilation of the defeated enemy. It looked like the Chinese were planning to make a stand at Pyongyang and defeat this position trying to prevent Japanese troops from occupying the North Korea. Which was fitting the Japanese plan quite well presenting an opportunity to encircle and annihilate the Chinese force located in Korea. Japanese transportation priority was to bring to Korea troops and artillery and this was creating an obvious question of carrying all types of supplies, especially for the columns which would advance through the ragged terrain without good roads. The solution was to “mobilize” over 10,000 local coolies who would be carrying everything from food to the shells. Of course, the mobilized Koreans were not excited but it did not matter.
From Ye Zhichao’s perspective it was important to assemble the Chinese troops stationed in Korea and not let himself to be destroyed. Pyongyang was a good assembly point both geographically and because it had the considerable fortifications that would allow to defend it for a while: leaving Korea without a descent fight will be considered a high treason and, even if he managed to avoid death penalty his career would be over. Other than that, it was just a point on a map with no special value as far as defense of China was concerned so bringing an army in reasonably good shape to the Yalu was of a much greater importance.
Bringing their forces in Korea to 2nd division (3rd and 5th, 27 thousand), the Japanese on August 31 moved to Pyongyang to destroy the main group of Chinese troops gathered here. Although the Japanese forces were under the overall command of General Yamagata and he was responsible for orchestrating the strategy at Pyongyang, Yamagata did not land with his forces at Chempulo until 12 September. Lieutenant-General Nozu Michitsura commanded the Japanese troops involved in the attack on Pyongyang; which included the Wonson column under Colonel Sato Tadashi (3.75 battalions, ¼ squadron., 12 guns), the Sangnyong column (1½ battalion, 1/4 squadron, 6 guns) under Major-General Tatsumi Naobumi, the Combined Brigade (5¼ battalions, 1 squadron., 12 guns) under Major-General Oshima Yoshimasa and finally the Main Division under Nozu himself. The plan of attack was for the Combined Brigade to make the frontal assault from the south, while the Main Division (4¾ battalions, 1 squadron, 24 guns) was going to attack from the southwest. Flanking actions would then be carried out by the two columns. If the Chinese tried to retreat, the Wonson column was given the duty of intercepting and harrying the enemy as it fled to the northeast.
Nozu's plan cannot but be recognized as somewhat risky: having decided to attack a strengthened position with equal forces, he advances at the front of over 50 km by several independent detachments separated by the river. The whole plan was based upon a seemingly reasonable assumption that the Chinese will limit themselves to a passive defense. [3]
Another important component of Nozu’s plan was another seemingly reasonable assumption that the Chinese will put all their forces to defense of the Southern line of defenses (including the citadel and fortifications across the river) leaving few troops to defend their right flank and little to no troops against the columns advancing to their left flank and the river: advance of these two columns was supposed to be a complete secret with a rather optimistic expectation that they will be able to occupy the heights in Chinese rear without resistance thus cutting off a retreat line. Of course, this would require combination of the Chinese passivity, absence of the reserves and a perfect synchronization of the columns, which was rather difficult to achieve taking into an account a very hard terrain by which these two columns had been marching and their complete isolation from each other and the rest of the Japanese forces. It also heavily depended upon the Tatsumi’s and Sato’s columns achieving surprise thus not giving opponent a time to redeploy his troops.
On paper, the plan looked as shown on the schema below (small squares and diamonds - Chinese fortifications and the arrows - Japanese plan of attacks).
Chinese field fortifications were not, perhaps, too modern [4] but they were ..er.. “solid” with the height of the earthworks being up to 14 feet with the artillery pieces and few machine guns [5]. The Chinese had approximately 15,000 out of which 2,500 had been holding fortifications on other side of the river, 3,500 fortifications on the west («Ойсон» on the map above), 3,000 - fortifications on North-East and 6,000 of the best troops (including cavalry) had been held in reserve, mostly on the heights north of the city.
Small cavalry units had been spread around to discover and report the possible bypass moves by the enemy: Ye Zhichao had not been a great general and allegedly was fond of opium but he was experienced and not naive enough to assume that the enemy is going to do him a courtesy by just launching a frontal attack against the strongest part of his defenses. As a result, Sato’s and Tasumi’s columns were detected well before they approached and most of the reserve troops had been placed to repel them.
The fight started on September 16 at 2am by Oshima on the crossing and then against the eastern group of southern fortifications. The attack was carried out in 3 columns but is mountain guns could not fight Krupp field guns of the fortifications, machine guns and infantry fire. Japanese infantry attacked fiercely but, contrary to the opinion of some military experts, the fire efficiency did matter. The attackers’ losses were crippling and after 10 hours of fighting the attack run out of steam, Oshima was wounded and Japanese had to abandon even a single field fortification they captured. This attack, being completely isolated, had little impact on general situation. From the very beginning it had little chance for success because even if all fortifications in front of the Tai Dong were taken, Oshima’s troops still would have to get across the river by a single bridge which could be easily destroyed. Its main goal was to distract the Chinese attention from the attack coming at their rear.
Attack by the Japanese main force on the western direction, which started simultaneously with Oshima’s attack was only marginally more successful: in 2 hours of fighting it managed to take 3 west-most redoubts and after that attack up the hill could not move further and fighting continued as a shooting duel and a series of the minor attacks and counter-attacks of little importance. Again, short of a very weak Chinese resistance, task of that force was quite difficult because it was attacking uphill 10 reasonably strong redoubts placed in such a way that they could support each other with their fire and, if all of them are taken, there was a citadel on their way of advance. Nozu ended up with a prolonged artillery barrage from his 24 guns but the shells of a relatively low caliber were not very effective against very thick earthworks and well before the time they could cause enough of a destruction, the attack became pretty much pointless due to the events on the North.
The most important fighting was happening on the northern direction. At 5am Sato’s column attacked from the march intending to take fortifications ##6, 5 and 4 while Tatsumi was attacking #3. Neither attack was a surprise and both had been met by a strong fire. Sato’s attack was immediately repelled and he had to set up a battery and start preparing the second one with an artillery barrage that was not very effective because battery placed in #6 held a higher ground and its guns were of a heavier caliber. What’s probably more important, the hill on which #6 was located was hiding location of the Chinese reserves while his own infantry was clearly visible.
With the situation being more or less stable on the South and South-West, Ye Zhichao felt free to use most of his reserves. The main counter-attack went against Tatsumi’s column, which already was stopped by a flanking fire from the fortifications ##1 and 2, and it was simply crushed by the superior numbers. It had to retreat eastward, being chased by Ye Zhichao’s Mongolian cavalry and leaving Sato’s force isolated and under fire from #6 located on a high ground and attack both against its front and left flank. His artillery helped to repel the first counterattack but situation was getting increasingly desperate and made worse by the fact that retreat to the North by a reasonably good road was a way to nowhere making him not just tactically but strategically isolated inside unfriendly territory. The coolies, whom he used as a “supply train” in his march across the mountaibs, wisely fled (stealing whatever they could carry) and he could not get away too far without abandoning his guns if he was pursued energetically. But this was not the case because Ye Zhichao was reluctant to leave the main line of defense without support: Japanese attacks, at least on the South-West, could resume any time and the troops there needed reinforcements. As a result, Sato was able to make something of an arc in the Eastern direction, join forces with what was left of Tatsumi’s column and eventually retreat to the main forces on the other side of the Tai Dong River. He even managed to save most of his guns but not his supply train.
By the end of the day each side lost between 1,500 and 2,000 by killed and wounded.
Ye Zhichao sent report of a victory but his strategic situation remained not too good because the Japanese had been landing reinforcement into at Chemulpo and because it was demonstrated that even the forces directly opposing him will be able at any moment to outflank him, this time acting together. So, in a long run, remaining at Pyongyang would be a trap. The next two days passed in the half-hearted attempts of attack by the Nozu’s forces and active artillery barrage, which gave Ye Zhichao time to evacuate all supplies he could, blew the bridge across the Tai Dong, prepare demolition of the citadel and start retreat to the Yalu River, where the Chinese had been assembling their forces, on September 19.
He was not chased because Nozu had to figure out how to organize a new supply train and where to get the needed supplies to compensate for those lost by Sato and Tatsumi. However, capture of Pyongyang was clearly a victory duly reported to Tokyo to be properly celebrated with the streets decorated by the flags and numerous painting depicting the heroic deeds of the Japanese soldiers being presented for the excited public to see.
The official BS aside, Pyongyang really was important as a base for the future Japanese operations so it was quite logical to stop there putting logistics in order and waiting for the new troops to arrive: continue offensive with slightly more than 10,000, depleted ammunition, and no proper supply train would be plain foolish.
___________
[1] An interesting way to shift the blame.
[2] An opposing point of view, just for a balance.
[3] The assessment from “Military Encyclopedia”, published by Sytin in 1911-15.
[4] What at that time would pass for a “modern” field fortification I don’t know: in OTL even during the RJW the field fortifications still were mostly the open earthworks oriented to the defense against the low angle artillery fire with no special cover for a personnel besides the trenches.
[5] It is not clear if these were Gatling or Maxim guns.
Last edited:
308. War - the first moves #2
China.
China updated its navy in the mid-1880s and at this time it had the strongest navy in the region with its main force being two battleships built in Germany, Dingyuan and Zhenyuan. The contract included a rather hard to implement combination of them being reasonably cheap, having a very good armor, a powerful artillery and being seaworthy. Based upon then prevailing concept (derived from the Battle of Lissa), they were constructed for a “line abreast” formation thus having much more firepower in firing back and forth [1] than in a broadside (4 - 12” and 1 - 6” vs 2 - 12” and 2 - 6”). Another specifics was their main caliber artillery: each of them had the 12” guns in 2 barbettes. These guns were 25 calibers [2], aka rather short and provided a low initial velocity of a projectile (535 m/sec) and a limited range, but this was rather a commonplace at the time and a shell weighting 539kg had a lot of a penetration power. As was demonstrated during the tests in Germany, the ships could do simultaneous salvos from both barbettes without major problems [3]. Comparing to the more modern ships, these battleships and the rest of the Chinese warships had been noticeably short of the mid-range artillery (8”, 6”). Their strong side was armor. They had compound iron/steel armor:14” belt, 3” deck, 12” barbettes and 8” conning tower.
In addition, the Chinese fleet included a protected cruiser built in Germany simultaneously with the battleships, few protected cruisers built in Britain in the late 1880s and some older cruisers. Most of their artillery had the same problem as the main caliber of the battleships: it tended to be short-barreled.
As early as in 1890 it became clear to the fleet leadership that the fleet is getting obsolete and requires modern ships which China could not built on its own wharves but until 1891 Prince Chun was a head of the Naval Commission and consistently rejected any upgrade-related expenses. After his death, the control remained in the hands of the incompetent bureaucrats who kept cutting expenses on the “unnecessary” navy coming with all types of the bright ideas like cutting the trained cadres with expectation that in the case of war they can be replaced with the fishermen.
However, trying to make the best use of what’s available, in 1888 Li Hongzhang issued the instructions by which the Beiyang Navy ships were supposed for the winter, when navigation in the Yellow Sea becomes impossible, to go south and practice interaction with the fleets of the southern provinces in joint campaigns. The battleships spent the winter of 1888-1889 in Shanghai, from where they returned only by March 25, 1889. On March 21, 1890, the Beiyang Fleet armored squadron left Shanghai to the south to "show the flag" in the South Seas. Battleships visited Saigon, Singapore and the Philippine island of Luzon. The visit lasted until April 29, when the squadron returned to the Weihaiwei base. In 1890 Dingyuan visited Vladivostok, in the summer of 1891 the Beiyang fleet visited Japan. In 1892 they sailed to Japan and Korea and in 1893 they had been maneuvering in the Yellow Sea and in the March of 1894 visited Singapore. So, notwithstanding government’s consistent effort to the contrary, the fleet was getting a regular practice.
From the report of commander of the Russian cruiser “Admiral Nakhimov” who watched Chinese exercises near Dalian:
“The warships we saw, number 18, and 6 destroyers, after inspecting them, gave an opportunity to get acquainted with the naval force that may have to be reckoned with... All the vessels I saw are well maintained. During the transition, the alarm and actions on it were done accurately and quickly; for example: an armored squadron of eight vessels, standing in two keelwater column on the signal simultaneously withdrew from the anchors and lined up in one column, using 17 minutes. At night, the alarm was made by an indication of a known number of lanterns, which was rehearsed by all ships. According to the information, the Chinese fleet no longer needs Europeans and has its own commanders and admirals. The commanders I Met received their initial education in America, as a result of which they speak English, and Rear Admiral Lew-Poo-Chin served for five years as a lieutenant in the English Navy.”
Education of the naval cadres was, contrary to “everybody knows” perception, not bad. Li Hongzhang founded a naval school. The course of 4 years included English, geography, chemistry, physics, mathematics, navigation, marine astronomy, hydrostatics, mechanics, kinematics and kinetics. After completing the 4-year course, future officers were assigned to ships for internship, where they served for 2 years. After completing the first year of practice, those who showed their best were awarded the first officer rank. A year later, the cadets returned to the school, where they were trained in artillery and navigation in an additional course for 6 months. After completing the course, they were again assigned to training ships for the final practice, which lasted 3 months.
As of 1890, the school in Tianjin had 270 cadets with 14 teachers. Mine schools were also available in Weihaiwei and Liushunkou. Mechanics were trained in Dougou, at the arsenal. The course of their training differed from the training course of navigators in that the program consisted mainly of mathematics, physics and mechanics. A lot of time was devoted to studying the structure of machines. The best students were sent for an internship abroad. In particular, many officers of the Beiyang Navy had been trained in the United States.
The fire practice made it clear that 150mm artillery needs an upgrade and some funds had been allocated for purchasing more modern guns with a higher fire rate in Britain and Germany but there was no time left.
Another problem was ammunition. Due to the wonderful Chinese bureaucracy, the warehouses had been full of all types of the shells but administration was resisting any inspection of the stocks and was very stingy in allocating the shells for training practices.
Fortunately, with Prince Chun finally being dead, starting from 1892 Li Hongzhang finally was able to “break the wall”, at least in some areas:
Japan.
Unlike China, Japan was not trying to economize on its navy even if its resources had been limited. It could not afford the major battleships but it decided to develop its own shipbuilding industry by building the powerful cruisers. At that point ideology of the French Jeune Ecole looked most promising: it did not require the big ships (and big docks) and a heavy armor (which Japanese iron industry could not produce), while the necessary machinery and guns could be purchased abroad.
Its main striking force had been 3 protected cruisers, Matsushima, Itsukushima, and Hashidate, based on the principles of Jeune École, as promoted by French military advisor and naval architect Louis-Émile Bertin: small, fast, light armor, numerous long-range small caliber guns (12 - 4.7”, 6 - 6 pounder Hotchkiss, 11 - 3-pounder Hotchkiss and four 356-mm torpedo tubes) [5] and a single monstrous 320mm Canet gun.
This gun weighed 67 tons, and had a barrel 12 metres (39 ft) long, firing a 112 cm (44 in) long projectile with weight of 350 kg (770 lb) (or 449 kg (990 lb) high explosive) for an effective range of 8,000 metres (26,000 ft).
Actually, the 320mm gun proved to be not a bright idea. The guns could not be aimed abeam, as their weight would cause the ship to roll over when fired. In combat, gunners were able to fire only around one shot per hour due to the time it took to reload.
The weight of all weaponry made the design dangerously top-heavy, and armor was sacrificed in an attempt to lower the weight. The seaworthiness of the design was poor, and the designed speed of 16.5 knots (30.6 km/h; 19.0 mph) was seldom possible. The armor on the sides was absent, the deck had 2”, turret of the main gun - 12” and the gun shields - 4”. Most of the small caliber guns on these and other Japanese cruisers had been placed in various combinations on the sides, which meant that they will be favoring the line ahead formations allowing maximum usage of the broadsides.
There were also 5 lighter cruisers of various types, 2 old casemate-style battleships built in 1870s and few smaller ships.
The crews had been very well trained and commanders favored an aggressive tactics. In the terms of maneuvers the Japanese were superior to their opponent. However, self-assurance was on a verge of an arrogance, which could backfire.
The fleet was under command of Admiral Itō Sukeyuki.
Moving toward the engagement.
The first task of the Chinese fleet was to protect transports carrying the reinforcements (6,500 - 7,000 troops) to the army concentrating along the Yalu River. On 16 September, at about 1:00 am, the convoy of five transport ships departed from the Dalian Bayunder escort from the main force of the Beiyang Fleet. They reached the mouth of the Yalu River at about 14.00pm. The troops were disembarked and the landing operation lasted until the morning of 17 September. Beiyang Fleet anchored in shallow waters about 7–8 nautical miles (13–15 km) from the shore, south-west of the mouth of the river, where they remained for the rest of the day and the entire night. On 17 September, at 9:20 am, the fleet left its position and conducted a one-and-a-half-hour training exercise before returning to their previous anchorage.
Soon thereafter, at 11:28 am, observers on board the Chinese warships spotted smoke from unknown vessels heading from the south-west.
Admiral Ding Ruchang had under his command 2 battleships. 1 armored cruisers, 7 protected cruisers, including 2 obsolete, and 10 destroyers. At the moment, his main strategic task was to prevent Japanese from attacking the unloading transports.
Intermission. While the fleets are getting to confront each other. Let’s talk a little bit about the geopolitical factors [6]. 😉
To start with, who are the most interested third parties? There are two of them:
__________
[1] Sorry, my naval terminology is rather rudimentary and I’m not going to use to much of it.
[2] Or 20 calibers, depending upon the source.
[3] Actually, on this the reports vary. According to the German newspaper Deutsche Heeres Zeitung, there were minor incidents: several glasses in portholes and skylights burst, and several small bolts were torn off. But the Brits, who were pissed off due to not receiving contract, painted a different picture. “In the correspondence of an English journalist from the Times newspaper, minor incidents during the tests were inflated to a grotesque state - allegedly those present had to plug their ears with cotton wool and hold on to the handrails to stand still and not to deafen from the roar of guns, the deck was constantly covered with coal thrown out of coal pits due to the impact of the salvos, the windows burst, the wooden parts crumbled, spreading the splinters dangerous to the commission and observers around, and the powerful steel handrail, which the members of the commission held on to, was rolled up into a screw by the end of the tests.” Of course, we can’t doubt anything reported by the Times (😉) but it looks like by the time of the Battle of Yalu the problems listed above did not exist so perhaps … no, no, no, how can anyone dare to assume that that this publication was not always a source of a completely unbiased information? 😜
[4] In OTL only 2 (at least at Yalu).
[5] True to itself, wiki has different numbers within the same article so I arbitrary chose one of them.
[6] I still have to figure out how exactly this battle will proceed, who is going to end up with a bloodier nose and what will be the implications, not to mention some technical details and it is already getting late. So there is a relatively short distraction. 😜
“Keep men, lose land: land can be taken again. Keep land, lose men: land and men are both lost.”
Mao Zedong, 1939
“The war has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage.”
Emperor Hirohito, 1945
“Patriotism is a willingness to kill and be killed for the most trivial reasons.”
Bertrand Russell
“Pessimism is a matter of temperament, optimism is a matter of salary.”
Don Aminado
The Navies (to minimize confusion, in this part Italics are OTL, a normal font - ITTL)Mao Zedong, 1939
“The war has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage.”
Emperor Hirohito, 1945
“Patriotism is a willingness to kill and be killed for the most trivial reasons.”
Bertrand Russell
“Pessimism is a matter of temperament, optimism is a matter of salary.”
Don Aminado
China.
China updated its navy in the mid-1880s and at this time it had the strongest navy in the region with its main force being two battleships built in Germany, Dingyuan and Zhenyuan. The contract included a rather hard to implement combination of them being reasonably cheap, having a very good armor, a powerful artillery and being seaworthy. Based upon then prevailing concept (derived from the Battle of Lissa), they were constructed for a “line abreast” formation thus having much more firepower in firing back and forth [1] than in a broadside (4 - 12” and 1 - 6” vs 2 - 12” and 2 - 6”). Another specifics was their main caliber artillery: each of them had the 12” guns in 2 barbettes. These guns were 25 calibers [2], aka rather short and provided a low initial velocity of a projectile (535 m/sec) and a limited range, but this was rather a commonplace at the time and a shell weighting 539kg had a lot of a penetration power. As was demonstrated during the tests in Germany, the ships could do simultaneous salvos from both barbettes without major problems [3]. Comparing to the more modern ships, these battleships and the rest of the Chinese warships had been noticeably short of the mid-range artillery (8”, 6”). Their strong side was armor. They had compound iron/steel armor:14” belt, 3” deck, 12” barbettes and 8” conning tower.
In addition, the Chinese fleet included a protected cruiser built in Germany simultaneously with the battleships, few protected cruisers built in Britain in the late 1880s and some older cruisers. Most of their artillery had the same problem as the main caliber of the battleships: it tended to be short-barreled.
As early as in 1890 it became clear to the fleet leadership that the fleet is getting obsolete and requires modern ships which China could not built on its own wharves but until 1891 Prince Chun was a head of the Naval Commission and consistently rejected any upgrade-related expenses. After his death, the control remained in the hands of the incompetent bureaucrats who kept cutting expenses on the “unnecessary” navy coming with all types of the bright ideas like cutting the trained cadres with expectation that in the case of war they can be replaced with the fishermen.
However, trying to make the best use of what’s available, in 1888 Li Hongzhang issued the instructions by which the Beiyang Navy ships were supposed for the winter, when navigation in the Yellow Sea becomes impossible, to go south and practice interaction with the fleets of the southern provinces in joint campaigns. The battleships spent the winter of 1888-1889 in Shanghai, from where they returned only by March 25, 1889. On March 21, 1890, the Beiyang Fleet armored squadron left Shanghai to the south to "show the flag" in the South Seas. Battleships visited Saigon, Singapore and the Philippine island of Luzon. The visit lasted until April 29, when the squadron returned to the Weihaiwei base. In 1890 Dingyuan visited Vladivostok, in the summer of 1891 the Beiyang fleet visited Japan. In 1892 they sailed to Japan and Korea and in 1893 they had been maneuvering in the Yellow Sea and in the March of 1894 visited Singapore. So, notwithstanding government’s consistent effort to the contrary, the fleet was getting a regular practice.
From the report of commander of the Russian cruiser “Admiral Nakhimov” who watched Chinese exercises near Dalian:
“The warships we saw, number 18, and 6 destroyers, after inspecting them, gave an opportunity to get acquainted with the naval force that may have to be reckoned with... All the vessels I saw are well maintained. During the transition, the alarm and actions on it were done accurately and quickly; for example: an armored squadron of eight vessels, standing in two keelwater column on the signal simultaneously withdrew from the anchors and lined up in one column, using 17 minutes. At night, the alarm was made by an indication of a known number of lanterns, which was rehearsed by all ships. According to the information, the Chinese fleet no longer needs Europeans and has its own commanders and admirals. The commanders I Met received their initial education in America, as a result of which they speak English, and Rear Admiral Lew-Poo-Chin served for five years as a lieutenant in the English Navy.”
Education of the naval cadres was, contrary to “everybody knows” perception, not bad. Li Hongzhang founded a naval school. The course of 4 years included English, geography, chemistry, physics, mathematics, navigation, marine astronomy, hydrostatics, mechanics, kinematics and kinetics. After completing the 4-year course, future officers were assigned to ships for internship, where they served for 2 years. After completing the first year of practice, those who showed their best were awarded the first officer rank. A year later, the cadets returned to the school, where they were trained in artillery and navigation in an additional course for 6 months. After completing the course, they were again assigned to training ships for the final practice, which lasted 3 months.
As of 1890, the school in Tianjin had 270 cadets with 14 teachers. Mine schools were also available in Weihaiwei and Liushunkou. Mechanics were trained in Dougou, at the arsenal. The course of their training differed from the training course of navigators in that the program consisted mainly of mathematics, physics and mechanics. A lot of time was devoted to studying the structure of machines. The best students were sent for an internship abroad. In particular, many officers of the Beiyang Navy had been trained in the United States.
The fire practice made it clear that 150mm artillery needs an upgrade and some funds had been allocated for purchasing more modern guns with a higher fire rate in Britain and Germany but there was no time left.
Another problem was ammunition. Due to the wonderful Chinese bureaucracy, the warehouses had been full of all types of the shells but administration was resisting any inspection of the stocks and was very stingy in allocating the shells for training practices.
Fortunately, with Prince Chun finally being dead, starting from 1892 Li Hongzhang finally was able to “break the wall”, at least in some areas:
- Inspection found that in many cases explosives in the shells were partially or completely missing, sometimes being replaced with the sand or cement, that there was a wide variety of the shells for the battleships’ main caliber, most of them useless for a naval battle. The bad ones had been used for the firing practices and mostly replaced by the good ones: Chinese munition industry was not vary good but still could produce enough explosive shells of a reasonably good quality. As a result by the start of the war the navy at least had the shells which would explode.
- While the Chinese could not build the major ships they could relatively easily build small destroyers and Beiyang Fleet had 12 of them, each with 2 or 3 6- or 3-pounder fast-firing Hotchkiss guns and 3 torpedo apparatuses. [4]
Japan.
Unlike China, Japan was not trying to economize on its navy even if its resources had been limited. It could not afford the major battleships but it decided to develop its own shipbuilding industry by building the powerful cruisers. At that point ideology of the French Jeune Ecole looked most promising: it did not require the big ships (and big docks) and a heavy armor (which Japanese iron industry could not produce), while the necessary machinery and guns could be purchased abroad.
Its main striking force had been 3 protected cruisers, Matsushima, Itsukushima, and Hashidate, based on the principles of Jeune École, as promoted by French military advisor and naval architect Louis-Émile Bertin: small, fast, light armor, numerous long-range small caliber guns (12 - 4.7”, 6 - 6 pounder Hotchkiss, 11 - 3-pounder Hotchkiss and four 356-mm torpedo tubes) [5] and a single monstrous 320mm Canet gun.
This gun weighed 67 tons, and had a barrel 12 metres (39 ft) long, firing a 112 cm (44 in) long projectile with weight of 350 kg (770 lb) (or 449 kg (990 lb) high explosive) for an effective range of 8,000 metres (26,000 ft).
Actually, the 320mm gun proved to be not a bright idea. The guns could not be aimed abeam, as their weight would cause the ship to roll over when fired. In combat, gunners were able to fire only around one shot per hour due to the time it took to reload.
The weight of all weaponry made the design dangerously top-heavy, and armor was sacrificed in an attempt to lower the weight. The seaworthiness of the design was poor, and the designed speed of 16.5 knots (30.6 km/h; 19.0 mph) was seldom possible. The armor on the sides was absent, the deck had 2”, turret of the main gun - 12” and the gun shields - 4”. Most of the small caliber guns on these and other Japanese cruisers had been placed in various combinations on the sides, which meant that they will be favoring the line ahead formations allowing maximum usage of the broadsides.
There were also 5 lighter cruisers of various types, 2 old casemate-style battleships built in 1870s and few smaller ships.
The crews had been very well trained and commanders favored an aggressive tactics. In the terms of maneuvers the Japanese were superior to their opponent. However, self-assurance was on a verge of an arrogance, which could backfire.
The fleet was under command of Admiral Itō Sukeyuki.
Moving toward the engagement.
The first task of the Chinese fleet was to protect transports carrying the reinforcements (6,500 - 7,000 troops) to the army concentrating along the Yalu River. On 16 September, at about 1:00 am, the convoy of five transport ships departed from the Dalian Bayunder escort from the main force of the Beiyang Fleet. They reached the mouth of the Yalu River at about 14.00pm. The troops were disembarked and the landing operation lasted until the morning of 17 September. Beiyang Fleet anchored in shallow waters about 7–8 nautical miles (13–15 km) from the shore, south-west of the mouth of the river, where they remained for the rest of the day and the entire night. On 17 September, at 9:20 am, the fleet left its position and conducted a one-and-a-half-hour training exercise before returning to their previous anchorage.
Soon thereafter, at 11:28 am, observers on board the Chinese warships spotted smoke from unknown vessels heading from the south-west.
Admiral Ding Ruchang had under his command 2 battleships. 1 armored cruisers, 7 protected cruisers, including 2 obsolete, and 10 destroyers. At the moment, his main strategic task was to prevent Japanese from attacking the unloading transports.
Intermission. While the fleets are getting to confront each other. Let’s talk a little bit about the geopolitical factors [6]. 😉
To start with, who are the most interested third parties? There are two of them:
- Britain. After India, China is the biggest investment area and Britain accounts to 29-30% of all foreign investments. Most of its investments are going to Shanghai. Hundreds of British firms and thousands of residents present in China being engaged in retail and whole- sale trade operations, banking to finance the trade, insurance to cover trade risk, shipyards to repair ships, and railroads to provide land-based transportation. Britain would like to expand into the mining area (especially coal mining), which so far is almost completely closed to the foreigners. One of the big British companies was Jardine, Matheson and Company trading firm. From its head office in Hong Kong and with branches in every major port, it not only controlled its trade operations, but also managed other activities such as the operation of the 41 Yangtze steamers of its affiliate, the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company, the large Shanghai and Hongkew Wharf Company, the Ewo Cotton Mill, and a silk filature in Shanghai. If the war is going on close to the border and, preferably, ends soon, it is OK with Britain and perhaps it will even result in softening China’s position regarding concessions. However, if it goes far and long enough to hurt the British economic interests, Britain may decide to get involved. An additional consideration is that Japan, judging by the trade with Korea, has ambitions regarding growing into the major and independent exporting regional power and this may eventually start interfering with the British interests.
- Russia. So far, it is complicated. Russian trade interests in China are predominantly related to packing and exporting tea. China starts buying increasing volumes of the Russian kerosine but, taking into an account the distances involved, it is much more profitable to sell it to Persia, Ottoman Empire, around Mediterranean and to Germany and Northern Europe. There is ongoing discussion regarding feasibility of creating a “buffer belt” of Mongolia and Northern part of Manchuria but there is no consensus on what these territories should end up to be, the “independent” states under the Russian protection (aka, de Russian de jure vassals) or China vassals (or autonomous regions) with Russia having certain rights regarding their administration and other minutiae (like concessions, right to keep troops, etc,). Potential benefits are seemingly not worthy of going into a major war but if there are some local anti-Qing uprisings or some other suitable framework, then it may make sense to try. Definitely, a victory, especially a decisive victory, by China would not be in the Russian interests because it would make Russia-China war almost inevitable. OTOH, unchecked strengthening of Japan also has its problems: so far it is friendly but what if it will become excessively self-assured and territorially ambitious? After all, Vladivostok is very close to the Korean border. There is something to say in a favor of the ongoing war being long, exhausting and indecisive. Or at least exhausting. For both sides.
__________
[1] Sorry, my naval terminology is rather rudimentary and I’m not going to use to much of it.
[2] Or 20 calibers, depending upon the source.
[3] Actually, on this the reports vary. According to the German newspaper Deutsche Heeres Zeitung, there were minor incidents: several glasses in portholes and skylights burst, and several small bolts were torn off. But the Brits, who were pissed off due to not receiving contract, painted a different picture. “In the correspondence of an English journalist from the Times newspaper, minor incidents during the tests were inflated to a grotesque state - allegedly those present had to plug their ears with cotton wool and hold on to the handrails to stand still and not to deafen from the roar of guns, the deck was constantly covered with coal thrown out of coal pits due to the impact of the salvos, the windows burst, the wooden parts crumbled, spreading the splinters dangerous to the commission and observers around, and the powerful steel handrail, which the members of the commission held on to, was rolled up into a screw by the end of the tests.” Of course, we can’t doubt anything reported by the Times (😉) but it looks like by the time of the Battle of Yalu the problems listed above did not exist so perhaps … no, no, no, how can anyone dare to assume that that this publication was not always a source of a completely unbiased information? 😜
[4] In OTL only 2 (at least at Yalu).
[5] True to itself, wiki has different numbers within the same article so I arbitrary chose one of them.
[6] I still have to figure out how exactly this battle will proceed, who is going to end up with a bloodier nose and what will be the implications, not to mention some technical details and it is already getting late. So there is a relatively short distraction. 😜
Interesting, I admit unsure of how this war will go as both sides are not exactly rolling 6s, however that suits the other great powers just fine.
Britain would like to expand their influence into China's markets and a strong stable China is not their best chance but shaking the status quo to much may just wreck it altogether plus by the sound of it Britain's '''balance of power'' senses are starting to tingle when it comes to Japan which is a bad sign.
Russia's certainly favoring a war that ideally saps them both as well, both could support well temporary stabilizing both sides through loans, selling supplies ect to ensure it goes long enough.
Down side though both Russia and Britain two different ideas of what a ideal outcome would both, British press and propaganda has a way of turning from such into actually being believed by elites and China and Japan are not a chessboard. The longer it goes on the harder it will for them to predict and control.
Britain would like to expand their influence into China's markets and a strong stable China is not their best chance but shaking the status quo to much may just wreck it altogether plus by the sound of it Britain's '''balance of power'' senses are starting to tingle when it comes to Japan which is a bad sign.
Russia's certainly favoring a war that ideally saps them both as well, both could support well temporary stabilizing both sides through loans, selling supplies ect to ensure it goes long enough.
Down side though both Russia and Britain two different ideas of what a ideal outcome would both, British press and propaganda has a way of turning from such into actually being believed by elites and China and Japan are not a chessboard. The longer it goes on the harder it will for them to predict and control.
War - the first moves #3
309. War - the first moves #3
General situation:
Late in the morning Japanese fleet approached the Chinese who had been holding their position. The Japanese were in column formation with the flying squadron in front, followed by the main squadron.
Upon the approach the flying squadron moved around the right flank of the Chinese formation but as soon as it closed to open fire on Chaoyong and Yangwei, its flagship was attacked Yoshino was attacked by the destroyers approaching at the angle which made most of its artillery useless. The line ahead formation prevented the following cruisers from supporting ot and Yoshino had to make a sharp turn to avoid being torpedoed. With the idea of getting behind the Chinese fleet into the Yalu clearly failing, the flying squadron turned back to reform. On both sides the damage was minimal.
The main Japanese squadron also was initially planning to get behind the Chinese fleet but, with the Chinese cruisers not moving ahead, this was technically impossible and Ito led his column to attack the Chinese battleships holding the forward position. Firing at the long range at the heavily armored battleships was not productive and Ito led his column to engage at a closer range. Dingyuan on the left so the column met it first. The distance was close and Matsushima immediately got 2 12” inch shells into its unprotected hull one of which exploded in its boiler room killing and wounding everyone in it and seriously damaging the boiler. The second caused a major fire. Ship had to get out of the line leaving making column for a short while leaderless. The column continued on its course with small armored cruiser Chiyoda now being on the lead.
There were good news and bad news. The good news were that Chiyoda had an armor and its main guns, being 40 calibers long, had a long range . But the bad news were that this armor (belt of 3.2 - 3.6 inches) was absolutely inadequate against the 12” and even 6” guns and that the cruiser as its main caliber guns were only 4.7”. It managed to pass by Dingyuan but it just meant that the next will be Zhenyuan. At the close range Chiyoda, which was almost two times smaller than the main Japanese cruisers, simply had no chance to survive hits from two 12” guns from Dingyuan’s right turret and two 12” guns of Zhenyuan’s left turret and started sinking.
Itsukushima and Hashidate made sharp turns to the left increasing distance and making fire from the Chinese battleships inefficient. Ito, who transferred his flag on Itsukushima, had to rethink his tactics in a few of the obvious fact that encirclement idea did not work out.
The rest of engagement passed in Japanese firing from the greater distances. Effectiveness of their fire was from time to time lowered due to the sorties of the Chinese destroyers: of course, they were not getting into the suicidal attacks but pretense of an attack was forcing the Japanese cruisers to rearrange their positions and deflected some of their fire.
Eventually, when Japanese fleet started getting low on ammunition, Ito ordered to turn and sail to the base. By that time Matsushima was repaired enough to make it home. It was slow but the Chinese did not pursue.
Japanese shells set four Chinese vessels ablaze, destroying two, obsolete Chaoyong and Yangwei. Both those vessels burst into flames, because of their heavily varnished and polished wooden surfaces. However, firefighting was well organized on the Chinese vessels and and on other ships the fires had been dealt with. Cruiser Zhiyuan was seriously damaged. Damage to other Chinese ships was not too serious because most of the Japanese fire had been concentrated on two battleships not being able to do the noticeable damage to their armored belt (photo below) and giving birth to a theory that the Japanese had been using the solid shot.
In total, Chinese sunk two Japanese warships including their only armored cruiser and one of their old ironclads, severely damaged two and lightly damaged two others. The Japanese flagship Matsushima suffered the worst single-ship loss, with more than 100 dead or wounded.
Both fleets sailed to their bases for the extensive repairs and both admirals declared a victory. For the public consumption both nations issued huge number of the paintings depicting a battle as it should be [3] with a lot of explosions, smoke and the enemy ships getting down in the numbers exceeding sizes of their fleets.
Enthusiasm of the masses had to be maintained so there must be as many dead enemies as would fit into a painting. And, of course, personages on “our side” has to strike the heroic poses or at least look calm and professional. To give credit where it is due, the government of Japan had been much better in this area because majority of the Japanese had been dutifully following the events while an overwhelming majority of China’s population were not giving a blip or probably was not even aware of a going war unless there were some new taxes involved or something else which was directly impacting them.
Strategically, the battle was Chinese victory because Ito failed on both of his goals. However, overall situation was not cheerful:
While still in charge, Li Hongzhang was trying to do whatever he could both in assembling and preparing the land forces at the Yalu and in finding at least few newer 6” guns to install on the ships of Beiyang Fleet. He got some time because the Japanese had been busy transporting more troops to the Korean Peninsula and repairing their ships after their “glorious victory”.
_______________
[1] The obvious question: what if the enemy also known himself and you?
[2] One of these stories was tale of captain Togo (future admiral) about the Chinese using the barrels of their main guns for drying the laundry. Taking into an account that this story belongs to the same visit about which the Russian captain of a cruiser wrote in his official report that the Chinese ships are maintained in a good order (and the Russian naval officers tended to be freaks on this account), it is quite possible that the stories of that type had been put in circulation to boost a public morale and quite often influence of a propaganda ends up spreading beyond the intended audience.
[3] Which is called “socrealism”. 😂
“You may not be interested in strategy, but strategy is interested in you.”
Leon Trotsky
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War [1]
“…it is easier to use theory to organize, plan, and conduct an engagement than it is to use it in determining the engagement’s purpose.”
Clausewitz
"Only that nation has the right and power to hold in their hands the seas that can defend them.”
Stolypin
“The strength of any fleet consists mainly of two elements: the art and morale of the personnel and the number and quality of its constituent ships.“
N.L. Klado
Leon Trotsky
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War [1]
“…it is easier to use theory to organize, plan, and conduct an engagement than it is to use it in determining the engagement’s purpose.”
Clausewitz
"Only that nation has the right and power to hold in their hands the seas that can defend them.”
Stolypin
“The strength of any fleet consists mainly of two elements: the art and morale of the personnel and the number and quality of its constituent ships.“
N.L. Klado
General situation:
- The main task of the Japanese fleet was to prevent transporting the Chinese troops to the place of their concentration. Based upon the earlier experience, Admiral Ito did not know if the Chinese transports are going to be accompanied by a big convoy or just by a few ships (as was the case earlier). However, a possibility of the first option was high due to the increased importance of the task. So he decided to go with the whole combined fleet in a hope that with some luck he will catch and destroy not just the transports but the Chinese fleet as well, which would be a nice bonus. If not, destroying just the transports also would be a great strategic victory. Strictly speaking, he was already late in achieving the main goal because the transports already were well up the river and unloading. Taking into an account that unloading was a long process which lasted until the next day, if there was no meaningful opposition, he could send few of his lighter ships up the river and try to cause as many losses as possible (if there was no meaningful Chinese artillery on the banks). Now this was not possible but, on a positive side, he still could destroy the Chinese fleet using advantages that he had (faster ships, better trained crews and a greater weight of a broadside salvo). He was also, as most of the Japanese naval personnel, had a deep disdain of the Chinese navy caused not only by the factual assessment but also by the Japanese own chauvinistic propaganda spreading all types of the stories about the Chinese sloppiness [2]. Tactically, the Japanese Combined Fleet consisted of two formations. A flying squadron, composed of the four fast cruisers Yoshino, Takachiho, Akitsushima, and Naniwa, was under the command of Tsuboi Kōzō. The main fleet consisted of the cruisers Matsushima (flagship), Chiyoda, Itsukushima, Hashidate, the ironclads Fusō, and Hiei, under the command of Admiral Itō Sukeyuki.
- On the Chinese side, the main task was to protect the transports and disembarking of the troops. The first part of the task was accomplished: transports arrived to Yalu without the losses. Now, the task was not to allow the Japanese to steam up the river. Admiral Ding Ruchang was well-aware of the relative advantages and disadvantages of his and Japanese situation. The Japanese would have an advantage in the open water due to their high speed so he placed his ships close to the shallow waters which would allow the Chinese destroyers to act but prevent the Japanese cruisers from encircling his ships and, in general, decrease their freedom of maneuver. Chinese cruisers were placed between the small islands Ta Tung Kon on the left and Ta Lu Tau on the right with the destroyers between Ta Lu Tau and mouth of the Yalu River. As a result, Chinese fleet was arranged in a wedge like formation with two battleships forward in the center and the cruisers protecting their backs. Certain measures had been taken to decrease vulnerability of his ships.
Late in the morning Japanese fleet approached the Chinese who had been holding their position. The Japanese were in column formation with the flying squadron in front, followed by the main squadron.
Upon the approach the flying squadron moved around the right flank of the Chinese formation but as soon as it closed to open fire on Chaoyong and Yangwei, its flagship was attacked Yoshino was attacked by the destroyers approaching at the angle which made most of its artillery useless. The line ahead formation prevented the following cruisers from supporting ot and Yoshino had to make a sharp turn to avoid being torpedoed. With the idea of getting behind the Chinese fleet into the Yalu clearly failing, the flying squadron turned back to reform. On both sides the damage was minimal.
The main Japanese squadron also was initially planning to get behind the Chinese fleet but, with the Chinese cruisers not moving ahead, this was technically impossible and Ito led his column to attack the Chinese battleships holding the forward position. Firing at the long range at the heavily armored battleships was not productive and Ito led his column to engage at a closer range. Dingyuan on the left so the column met it first. The distance was close and Matsushima immediately got 2 12” inch shells into its unprotected hull one of which exploded in its boiler room killing and wounding everyone in it and seriously damaging the boiler. The second caused a major fire. Ship had to get out of the line leaving making column for a short while leaderless. The column continued on its course with small armored cruiser Chiyoda now being on the lead.
There were good news and bad news. The good news were that Chiyoda had an armor and its main guns, being 40 calibers long, had a long range . But the bad news were that this armor (belt of 3.2 - 3.6 inches) was absolutely inadequate against the 12” and even 6” guns and that the cruiser as its main caliber guns were only 4.7”. It managed to pass by Dingyuan but it just meant that the next will be Zhenyuan. At the close range Chiyoda, which was almost two times smaller than the main Japanese cruisers, simply had no chance to survive hits from two 12” guns from Dingyuan’s right turret and two 12” guns of Zhenyuan’s left turret and started sinking.
Itsukushima and Hashidate made sharp turns to the left increasing distance and making fire from the Chinese battleships inefficient. Ito, who transferred his flag on Itsukushima, had to rethink his tactics in a few of the obvious fact that encirclement idea did not work out.
The rest of engagement passed in Japanese firing from the greater distances. Effectiveness of their fire was from time to time lowered due to the sorties of the Chinese destroyers: of course, they were not getting into the suicidal attacks but pretense of an attack was forcing the Japanese cruisers to rearrange their positions and deflected some of their fire.
Eventually, when Japanese fleet started getting low on ammunition, Ito ordered to turn and sail to the base. By that time Matsushima was repaired enough to make it home. It was slow but the Chinese did not pursue.
Japanese shells set four Chinese vessels ablaze, destroying two, obsolete Chaoyong and Yangwei. Both those vessels burst into flames, because of their heavily varnished and polished wooden surfaces. However, firefighting was well organized on the Chinese vessels and and on other ships the fires had been dealt with. Cruiser Zhiyuan was seriously damaged. Damage to other Chinese ships was not too serious because most of the Japanese fire had been concentrated on two battleships not being able to do the noticeable damage to their armored belt (photo below) and giving birth to a theory that the Japanese had been using the solid shot.
In total, Chinese sunk two Japanese warships including their only armored cruiser and one of their old ironclads, severely damaged two and lightly damaged two others. The Japanese flagship Matsushima suffered the worst single-ship loss, with more than 100 dead or wounded.
Both fleets sailed to their bases for the extensive repairs and both admirals declared a victory. For the public consumption both nations issued huge number of the paintings depicting a battle as it should be [3] with a lot of explosions, smoke and the enemy ships getting down in the numbers exceeding sizes of their fleets.
Enthusiasm of the masses had to be maintained so there must be as many dead enemies as would fit into a painting. And, of course, personages on “our side” has to strike the heroic poses or at least look calm and professional. To give credit where it is due, the government of Japan had been much better in this area because majority of the Japanese had been dutifully following the events while an overwhelming majority of China’s population were not giving a blip or probably was not even aware of a going war unless there were some new taxes involved or something else which was directly impacting them.
Strategically, the battle was Chinese victory because Ito failed on both of his goals. However, overall situation was not cheerful:
- Japanese had better docking and repairing facilities.
- It became obvious to those who had a clue (which excluded the whole Chinese government) that in the open sea engagement Chinese fleet will be doomed because the Japanese ships had a higher speed and artillery with a longer range. Ding Ruchang was lucky being attacked in a position which allowed him to fight in the best case scenario and had to get credit for using this scenario properly but an experienced admiral like Ito was not going to make the same mistake twice.
While still in charge, Li Hongzhang was trying to do whatever he could both in assembling and preparing the land forces at the Yalu and in finding at least few newer 6” guns to install on the ships of Beiyang Fleet. He got some time because the Japanese had been busy transporting more troops to the Korean Peninsula and repairing their ships after their “glorious victory”.
_______________
[1] The obvious question: what if the enemy also known himself and you?
[2] One of these stories was tale of captain Togo (future admiral) about the Chinese using the barrels of their main guns for drying the laundry. Taking into an account that this story belongs to the same visit about which the Russian captain of a cruiser wrote in his official report that the Chinese ships are maintained in a good order (and the Russian naval officers tended to be freaks on this account), it is quite possible that the stories of that type had been put in circulation to boost a public morale and quite often influence of a propaganda ends up spreading beyond the intended audience.
[3] Which is called “socrealism”. 😂
Truly the battlefield might be safer than politics in a lot of militaries.
Let us hope Li Hongzhang does not get executed after this war.
Let us hope Li Hongzhang does not get executed after this war.
Keep in mind that, strictly speaking, there are no uniform “Chinese”. There are Manchu, forming a government and considering themselves entitled to be a ruling class and there are Han who are representing an overwhelming majority and, besides being a majority, include the upstarts like Li Hongzhang and others. The government’s “cadres” policy in the navy was trying to address this issue by getting rid of the Chinese officers under the guise of economy (also demonstrated degree of emperor’s (in)competence). Cherry on the top, the emperor’s new policy is opening the Manchurian lands to the Han settlers and gives them equal rights in competing to the administrative positions. There are also the Mongols and Muslims on the fringes and neither are excessively happy.
Plus, regardless of the ethnicity, there are complicated relations between governors of various provinces and Li Hongzhang formally is just one of them and, so far the war is being conducted by the land and naval forces of his territories while his colleagues are waiting on the sidelines and the government is being torn between intention to win (or not to lose) a war and intention not to make him to become too powerful. His main supporter on the top, Cixi, is “in retirement” and the young emperor is an inexperienced idiot full of the …er… “good intentions” going against the existing culture, traditions and numerous individual and clan interests. Not to mention some minor details like all administration from top to bottom being thieves and the all-powerful bureaucratic apparatus having a multi-century (or -millennia?) tradition of sticking to the instructions no matter what.
You don’t need any extra factors for them to be bitten at the ass: it would make a miracle for them not being bitten too hard and their credit of the miracles is already being stretched.
End of the miracles
310. End of the miracles
So far, on the land and the sea Chinese forces managed to avoid the major defeats mostly due to a pure luck but the luck rarely continues forever. And neither does euphoria from the phony reports. Even “victory” on the Yalu, while preventing the major disaster, demonstrated that Chinese navy can confront Japanese only under the very fortunate set of the circumstances and even then in a purely defensive manner while any attempt to do so in the open sea will result in a complete disaster because the Japanese will sunk most of it from a safe distance. On the land, yes, the Pyongyang was a rather successful rearguard action but Korea was lost and, again, Japanese demonstrated a much better skill in maneuvering while the Chinese could keep a well-entrenched position for just few days. But the government in Pekin was too busy intriguing and too inept to do something efficient and, to be fair, did not have people capable of doing so. Even Li Hongzhang was more of an administrator than a field commander and it was his navy that proved to be not up to date (of course, the details like him being robbed out of the funds were conveniently forgotten) so there was a mounting pressure to remove him from the picture.
By September 21 the Chinese troops had been lined along the right bank of the Yalu River. They included troops from various provinces and the troops which retreated from Korea (some of those marched over 600 km). Their total number was up to 24,000. For the next week they were busy creating a defensive line along the river. The scenario, as formulated by Li Hongzhang, looked reasonable: fortify area by all means possible, dig full profile trenches, prepare covered artillery positions, don’t go into hand-to-hand combat, don’t use machine guns and rifles until enemy comes within a pistol range. What could get wrong? This is, of course, a purely rhetorical question.
To start with, due to the fact that the troops on Yalu consisted not just of the contingents of the Northern Army, the government sent an order to the Administrator of the Northern Affairs to assign a commander of this army. The first candidate, who was a popular general, declined due to the old age (he was over 70) and ill health (he was suffered from malaria), the Emperor made his own pick, general Song Qing, who was first made a councilor of the North Army commander and, within a week, commander of the troops in Korea and Southern part of Mukden Province. Only Manchurian contingent remained independent. The appointment had been made bypassing Li Hongzhang, which was an indication of weakening of his position. Song Qing had reputation of a brave person and definitely had experience but this did not mean that he had a clue how to fight the Japanese. To be fair, neither of the available alternatives was noticeably better and Ye Zhichao got relatively lucky at Pyongyang mostly due to the mistakes of the Japanese commanders. Anyway, by the end of retreat from Pyongyang his troops were in a bad shape both physically, due to the hard ill-organized march and in spirit: their commander could report whatever he wanted but the fact remained that they were lucky to escape and had been retreating since then.
Then, of course, there is more than one way of following the instructions, especially when the person who issued them is not in charge anymore. Under the leadership of Song Qing the Chinese did, indeed, a lot of a digging but it was all on a very narrow sector of a river bank and nobody eve bothered to send the cavalry detachments to watch the enemy’s moves and attempts to cross elsewhere. Or to have the reserves capable of repelling such an attempt or, God forbid, to spend some time training the troops to maintain the fire discipline (which was one of the critical parts of Li Hongzhang’s instructions issued while he still was in charge.
Not too surprisingly, the troops, seeing the leadership being quite lethargic and not being kept busy doing something [2], were not being optimistic, to put it mildly. And, taking into an account that being “China’s best troops” meant little beyond being “best of the worst”, the longer was waiting for the Japanese approaching, the lesser were the chances of them putting a decent defense.
After General Oshima's wound, General Yamagata Aritomo took command of the Japanese group. He was a very famous person in Japan, whom absolutely everyone knew. He came from the ancient samurai family and in 1870s was sent to study the military affairs to France and Russia. In 1873 he became Minister of War, in 1877 he was one of the main figures in suppression of Satsuma Uprising, from 1878 - commander of the imperial guards and chief of the General Staff, in 1885 - 91 - Minister of the Interior and in 1889 - Prime Minister. After being replaced by Ito, he became Chairman of the Privy Council and in 1894 - commander of the 1st Army. The Main Headquarters Directive, received by Yamagata on September 20, prescribed to cross the Yalu River with the troops and, developing the offensive, occupy the Liaodong Peninsula and the entire coast of the Pecheli Bay, which would provide a base for the further advancement into China’s interior and will deprive China of all naval bases in Lushun (Port Arthur) and Weihaiwei.
However, the implementation of the directive was hampered by the situation in the rear of Japanese troops. The officers storming Pyongyang told the general that if the defense had been continued for at least a week, the Japanese would have had to retreat, as each soldier had only a two-day supply of food with him. The requisition of horses and the hiring of Korean porters were not going well, and those who were forced to work sabotaged this effort in every possible way. Most often, they just threw the cargo and disappeared in the mountains. In addition, seeing the consequences of Japanese "help from Chinese dominance", the quieted tonhaks revived again, and the guerrilla war in the vicinity of Seoul and Chollado broke out with renewed vigor. Particularly serious was the situation in the mountainous areas between Seul and Busan, where Japanese troops could only move in significant groups with protection. Telegraph line Seul-Pusan had to be guarded by the force of five cavalry squadrons because the wires had been cut and the poles broken daily. It was not enough to remove the Chinese from Korea: it was necessary to "convince" the Koreans that this was being done for their benefit. Almost a month since the capture of Pyongyang was needed to create garrison teams totaling almost 20,000 people. Japanese local self-government advisers were appointed to each Korean province, major cities and ports. The rear disturbed the Japanese command no less, and sometimes more, than the fighting, because everything in the rear was much more incomprehensible than in battle.
The army was supplied in the following way. Food, ammunition, equipment and fodder were delivered from Hiroshima to the mouth of Taitong, where they had been unloaded on a barely equipped coast. From this place, the cargo had to be delivered to the location of the troops - at a distance of 120 to 200 kilometers. The hope of the Japanese army to feed itself at the expense of the Koreans was in vain: the harvest was meager, there was nothing to take. In addition, there were local “Robin Hoods” operating on Pyongyang road trying to steal rice. Which meant that the supply trains needed armed convoys and their task was not an easy one.
The "Korean train" was made up of small hand carts urgently delivered from Japan. Each of them had been pushing/pulling by three porters. Peasants were hired to perform this task, and every eighth cart of provisions they received as payment for their work; this system greatly improved cooperation. The route had been divided into the segments with the reloading places and placed under control of a general with his own staff which included a chief of staff, 2 General Staff officers, interpreters, doctor and few civilian officials. This organization was given a special team of repairmen, which repaired the damaged carts every day. But even wood had to be delivered from Japan for repair. Each segment had its officer in charge with his own team. The segments had been linked by a telegraph line with battalion of engineers assigned for its protection and maintenance.
Need to organize and move the huge baggage train slowed down the march but on October 4 troops of general Nodzu reached Chinese-Korean border on the Yalu River and pushed the Chinese troops out of Wiju (see map above), the last settlement on the Korean side they were holding.
With the Chinese leadership being at least a little bit less lethargic, this would end badly for Nodzu because he had in his disposal a single 18th infantry regiment with the attached cavalry but no artillery, which would arrive only two weeks later with the main force of the 1st army.
First of all, General Nozu sent cavalrymen and engineers up and down the river for a thorough reconnaissance. The river was very wide, in some places - more than a kilometer. There were no bridges. The right Chinese coast was steep, all the dominant heights were occupied by Chinese observers who could see all Japanese moves. It took 20 days to find the suitable crossing while the Chinese kept digging lazily instead of, knowing the river well, start attacking the small Japanese detachments, which would be easy with their superior cavalry.
On October 22 Japanese found a crossing at the village of Sukuchin, 25 km upriver from Wiju. On October 24 3 Japanese companies crossed the river, kicked Chinese garrison out of a nearby village and took a defensive position covering crossing. The same day the whole 1st Army (2 divisions, 28,000) approached Wiju. On October 26 all troops of the 1st Army crossed the river without facing any Chinese opposition and immediately attacked to prevent being pushed to the river by the Chinese counter-attack … which was not happening.
One Japanese division had been attacking at the front and another bypassing Chinese left flank. All Li Hongzhang’s instructions had been forgotten and Chinese opened disorderly and ineffective fire from a long distance and when the Japanese approached launched the bayonet charges on their own initiative. Song Qing did not even try to control the events and after three hours of fighting the Chinese left their positions and, whatever left out of their army kept retreating opening the way to Inner Manchuria. The soldiers had been deserting by the thousands and to save situation the Emperor put in charge of the foreign policy, naval and army affairs … Prince Gong who had zero military qualifications.
Li Hongzhang fell from the grace, was deprived of his three-eye peacock feather and of any influence upon the ongoing fighting.
Under inspiring leadership of Prince Gong the government found itself without the troops of defensive positions between Japanese and Peking. Situation was “catastrophic but not serious”. At least not serious enough for the government to try to mobilize troops from other provinces. Of course, most of these troops had been even worse than those already defeated but, at least in theory, there should be a lot of them (presumably over 600,000). The main remaining hope was that the Japanese will stop fighting in the winter.
In a meantime a hostile attitude towards the Europeans was growing inside the country: the authorities secretly taught the people that it was the white barbarians who pushed the Japanese to attack China, gave them weapons and taught them how to use them. [3] Pogroms and robberies of Europeans began in some cities. A Chinese warship captured the British steamer Rathant in the Taiwan Strait, suggesting that it was delivering weapons and ammunition to Japan. The ship was escorted to Kilung, after the trial the scandal was hushed up. Newspaper “Vladivostok” was reporting: “The situation of coastal cities where foreigners live is becoming serious. In Beijing and Tianjin, Europeans are insulted daily by soldiers and mobs... In Beijing, the streets are teeming with soldiers hostile to foreigners. Many Europeans from neighboring districts have arrived in Tianjin, Europeans are taking defensive measures in Tianjin itself.”
The international situation was getting increasingly nervous as well. In Yokohama commander of the Russian naval squadron staying there was forced to sound a battle alarm when the British warship started dangerously close maneuvers near his ships and moved away only after the signal “will use weapons” had been raised. Discussion between the Russian and British admirals followed and, thanks to the fact that both sides extensively used the “sailor’s language”, mutual understanding was achieved. But the general situation remained complicated because both Russian and British press had been accusing the other side in all types of a devious behavior. The Brits were accusing Russia in the intention to join a war on Japanese side while the Russians were talking about the British intention to send troops to China and strengthen naval presence in the Chinese waters.
The less vocal but quite active side was Germany. The German officers had been training Chinese sailors, there were German ships in the Yellow Sea and there was a serious financial interest: Deutsche Bank recently opened a big credit to China.
So far, Russia was not openly committed to any side but while the Brits were the old competitor on the Far East, Russian-German relations had been traditionally good, which created certain dilemma with who is going to be wagging whom. And it just happened that while Germany had colonial interests, Russia had territorial issue called “The Sixty-Four Villages East of the River”, a group of Manchu, Daur and Han-inhabited villages located on the left (north) bank of the Amur River (Heilong Jiang) opposite of Heihe, and on the east bank of Zeya River opposite of Blagoveshchensk.The area totaled 3,600 square kilometers (1,400 sq mi).
By the Aigun Treaty the area went to the Russian Empire but the Chinese subjects retained right to live there under authority of Manchu government. The problem, from the Russian perspective, was two-fold:
What other excuse would one need? The local police and volunteers rounded the local Chinese, most of whom had nothing to do with the incident, and forced them to cross the river, in a process of which the lucky ones had been able to cross the river and unlucky ones (majority) drowned because the Chinese did not know how to swim. More accidents happened in other parts of the region and the area had been “cleansed”.
The predominant assessment of the events in the Russian society was the attitude to the event as a "tragic result of exceeding the measures of necessary self-defense in a situation of a deadly threat." But the fact that the Qing authorities ordered attack on the Russian territory provided government with a carte blanch, which even the Brits would be forced to recognize as valid. The question was how exactly to use it with a minimal risk and maximum profit.
______________
[1] “Everyone fancies himself a strategist seeing the battle from the side.”
[2] A huge mistake. To keep troops in a fighting spirit while staying idly waiting for the unpleasant things to happen, you need to keep them permanently occupied with one of the numerous time-honored activities, the most popular of which are being “spit and polish”, digging (no matter what) “from here to dinner” and marching in a formation. Of course, the list is much longer but even with these three you can’t miss. OTOH, the soldiers left on their own, have enough time to get engaged in the most dangerous activities, thinking. The dangerous because there s a high possibility that they’ll come to a well-founded conclusion (with the exception of the rare cases when some charismatic personality is in charge, but these personalities usually smart enough to keep them occupied) that they are being led by a bunch of the incompetent morons who will have them killed. Which, of course, is not conductive to maintaining a high moral. 😉
[3] Of course, the obvious question why didn’t Chinese learn all these things never was asked. The answer would be obvious: “Because”. Probably followed by some very unpleasant type of an execution.
[4] Did happen during the Boxer rebellion few years later.
“Каждый мнит себя стратегом видя бой со стороны” [1]
Шота Руставели, ‘Витязь в тигровой шкуре’
“Victory has a thousand fathers, and defeat is always an orphan.”
Tacitus
“Fool’s bravery - Bold behavior of a person who simply does not realize the degree of danger to which he is exposed.”
Definition
“In strategy it is important to see distant things as if they were close and to take a distanced view of close things.”
“…attack with a feeling of constantly crushing the enemy, from first to last.”
Miyamoto Musashi
“…the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.”
Sun Tzu
Шота Руставели, ‘Витязь в тигровой шкуре’
“Victory has a thousand fathers, and defeat is always an orphan.”
Tacitus
“Fool’s bravery - Bold behavior of a person who simply does not realize the degree of danger to which he is exposed.”
Definition
“In strategy it is important to see distant things as if they were close and to take a distanced view of close things.”
“…attack with a feeling of constantly crushing the enemy, from first to last.”
Miyamoto Musashi
“…the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.”
Sun Tzu
So far, on the land and the sea Chinese forces managed to avoid the major defeats mostly due to a pure luck but the luck rarely continues forever. And neither does euphoria from the phony reports. Even “victory” on the Yalu, while preventing the major disaster, demonstrated that Chinese navy can confront Japanese only under the very fortunate set of the circumstances and even then in a purely defensive manner while any attempt to do so in the open sea will result in a complete disaster because the Japanese will sunk most of it from a safe distance. On the land, yes, the Pyongyang was a rather successful rearguard action but Korea was lost and, again, Japanese demonstrated a much better skill in maneuvering while the Chinese could keep a well-entrenched position for just few days. But the government in Pekin was too busy intriguing and too inept to do something efficient and, to be fair, did not have people capable of doing so. Even Li Hongzhang was more of an administrator than a field commander and it was his navy that proved to be not up to date (of course, the details like him being robbed out of the funds were conveniently forgotten) so there was a mounting pressure to remove him from the picture.
By September 21 the Chinese troops had been lined along the right bank of the Yalu River. They included troops from various provinces and the troops which retreated from Korea (some of those marched over 600 km). Their total number was up to 24,000. For the next week they were busy creating a defensive line along the river. The scenario, as formulated by Li Hongzhang, looked reasonable: fortify area by all means possible, dig full profile trenches, prepare covered artillery positions, don’t go into hand-to-hand combat, don’t use machine guns and rifles until enemy comes within a pistol range. What could get wrong? This is, of course, a purely rhetorical question.
To start with, due to the fact that the troops on Yalu consisted not just of the contingents of the Northern Army, the government sent an order to the Administrator of the Northern Affairs to assign a commander of this army. The first candidate, who was a popular general, declined due to the old age (he was over 70) and ill health (he was suffered from malaria), the Emperor made his own pick, general Song Qing, who was first made a councilor of the North Army commander and, within a week, commander of the troops in Korea and Southern part of Mukden Province. Only Manchurian contingent remained independent. The appointment had been made bypassing Li Hongzhang, which was an indication of weakening of his position. Song Qing had reputation of a brave person and definitely had experience but this did not mean that he had a clue how to fight the Japanese. To be fair, neither of the available alternatives was noticeably better and Ye Zhichao got relatively lucky at Pyongyang mostly due to the mistakes of the Japanese commanders. Anyway, by the end of retreat from Pyongyang his troops were in a bad shape both physically, due to the hard ill-organized march and in spirit: their commander could report whatever he wanted but the fact remained that they were lucky to escape and had been retreating since then.
Then, of course, there is more than one way of following the instructions, especially when the person who issued them is not in charge anymore. Under the leadership of Song Qing the Chinese did, indeed, a lot of a digging but it was all on a very narrow sector of a river bank and nobody eve bothered to send the cavalry detachments to watch the enemy’s moves and attempts to cross elsewhere. Or to have the reserves capable of repelling such an attempt or, God forbid, to spend some time training the troops to maintain the fire discipline (which was one of the critical parts of Li Hongzhang’s instructions issued while he still was in charge.
Not too surprisingly, the troops, seeing the leadership being quite lethargic and not being kept busy doing something [2], were not being optimistic, to put it mildly. And, taking into an account that being “China’s best troops” meant little beyond being “best of the worst”, the longer was waiting for the Japanese approaching, the lesser were the chances of them putting a decent defense.
After General Oshima's wound, General Yamagata Aritomo took command of the Japanese group. He was a very famous person in Japan, whom absolutely everyone knew. He came from the ancient samurai family and in 1870s was sent to study the military affairs to France and Russia. In 1873 he became Minister of War, in 1877 he was one of the main figures in suppression of Satsuma Uprising, from 1878 - commander of the imperial guards and chief of the General Staff, in 1885 - 91 - Minister of the Interior and in 1889 - Prime Minister. After being replaced by Ito, he became Chairman of the Privy Council and in 1894 - commander of the 1st Army. The Main Headquarters Directive, received by Yamagata on September 20, prescribed to cross the Yalu River with the troops and, developing the offensive, occupy the Liaodong Peninsula and the entire coast of the Pecheli Bay, which would provide a base for the further advancement into China’s interior and will deprive China of all naval bases in Lushun (Port Arthur) and Weihaiwei.
However, the implementation of the directive was hampered by the situation in the rear of Japanese troops. The officers storming Pyongyang told the general that if the defense had been continued for at least a week, the Japanese would have had to retreat, as each soldier had only a two-day supply of food with him. The requisition of horses and the hiring of Korean porters were not going well, and those who were forced to work sabotaged this effort in every possible way. Most often, they just threw the cargo and disappeared in the mountains. In addition, seeing the consequences of Japanese "help from Chinese dominance", the quieted tonhaks revived again, and the guerrilla war in the vicinity of Seoul and Chollado broke out with renewed vigor. Particularly serious was the situation in the mountainous areas between Seul and Busan, where Japanese troops could only move in significant groups with protection. Telegraph line Seul-Pusan had to be guarded by the force of five cavalry squadrons because the wires had been cut and the poles broken daily. It was not enough to remove the Chinese from Korea: it was necessary to "convince" the Koreans that this was being done for their benefit. Almost a month since the capture of Pyongyang was needed to create garrison teams totaling almost 20,000 people. Japanese local self-government advisers were appointed to each Korean province, major cities and ports. The rear disturbed the Japanese command no less, and sometimes more, than the fighting, because everything in the rear was much more incomprehensible than in battle.
The army was supplied in the following way. Food, ammunition, equipment and fodder were delivered from Hiroshima to the mouth of Taitong, where they had been unloaded on a barely equipped coast. From this place, the cargo had to be delivered to the location of the troops - at a distance of 120 to 200 kilometers. The hope of the Japanese army to feed itself at the expense of the Koreans was in vain: the harvest was meager, there was nothing to take. In addition, there were local “Robin Hoods” operating on Pyongyang road trying to steal rice. Which meant that the supply trains needed armed convoys and their task was not an easy one.
The "Korean train" was made up of small hand carts urgently delivered from Japan. Each of them had been pushing/pulling by three porters. Peasants were hired to perform this task, and every eighth cart of provisions they received as payment for their work; this system greatly improved cooperation. The route had been divided into the segments with the reloading places and placed under control of a general with his own staff which included a chief of staff, 2 General Staff officers, interpreters, doctor and few civilian officials. This organization was given a special team of repairmen, which repaired the damaged carts every day. But even wood had to be delivered from Japan for repair. Each segment had its officer in charge with his own team. The segments had been linked by a telegraph line with battalion of engineers assigned for its protection and maintenance.
Need to organize and move the huge baggage train slowed down the march but on October 4 troops of general Nodzu reached Chinese-Korean border on the Yalu River and pushed the Chinese troops out of Wiju (see map above), the last settlement on the Korean side they were holding.
With the Chinese leadership being at least a little bit less lethargic, this would end badly for Nodzu because he had in his disposal a single 18th infantry regiment with the attached cavalry but no artillery, which would arrive only two weeks later with the main force of the 1st army.
First of all, General Nozu sent cavalrymen and engineers up and down the river for a thorough reconnaissance. The river was very wide, in some places - more than a kilometer. There were no bridges. The right Chinese coast was steep, all the dominant heights were occupied by Chinese observers who could see all Japanese moves. It took 20 days to find the suitable crossing while the Chinese kept digging lazily instead of, knowing the river well, start attacking the small Japanese detachments, which would be easy with their superior cavalry.
On October 22 Japanese found a crossing at the village of Sukuchin, 25 km upriver from Wiju. On October 24 3 Japanese companies crossed the river, kicked Chinese garrison out of a nearby village and took a defensive position covering crossing. The same day the whole 1st Army (2 divisions, 28,000) approached Wiju. On October 26 all troops of the 1st Army crossed the river without facing any Chinese opposition and immediately attacked to prevent being pushed to the river by the Chinese counter-attack … which was not happening.
One Japanese division had been attacking at the front and another bypassing Chinese left flank. All Li Hongzhang’s instructions had been forgotten and Chinese opened disorderly and ineffective fire from a long distance and when the Japanese approached launched the bayonet charges on their own initiative. Song Qing did not even try to control the events and after three hours of fighting the Chinese left their positions and, whatever left out of their army kept retreating opening the way to Inner Manchuria. The soldiers had been deserting by the thousands and to save situation the Emperor put in charge of the foreign policy, naval and army affairs … Prince Gong who had zero military qualifications.
Li Hongzhang fell from the grace, was deprived of his three-eye peacock feather and of any influence upon the ongoing fighting.
Under inspiring leadership of Prince Gong the government found itself without the troops of defensive positions between Japanese and Peking. Situation was “catastrophic but not serious”. At least not serious enough for the government to try to mobilize troops from other provinces. Of course, most of these troops had been even worse than those already defeated but, at least in theory, there should be a lot of them (presumably over 600,000). The main remaining hope was that the Japanese will stop fighting in the winter.
In a meantime a hostile attitude towards the Europeans was growing inside the country: the authorities secretly taught the people that it was the white barbarians who pushed the Japanese to attack China, gave them weapons and taught them how to use them. [3] Pogroms and robberies of Europeans began in some cities. A Chinese warship captured the British steamer Rathant in the Taiwan Strait, suggesting that it was delivering weapons and ammunition to Japan. The ship was escorted to Kilung, after the trial the scandal was hushed up. Newspaper “Vladivostok” was reporting: “The situation of coastal cities where foreigners live is becoming serious. In Beijing and Tianjin, Europeans are insulted daily by soldiers and mobs... In Beijing, the streets are teeming with soldiers hostile to foreigners. Many Europeans from neighboring districts have arrived in Tianjin, Europeans are taking defensive measures in Tianjin itself.”
The international situation was getting increasingly nervous as well. In Yokohama commander of the Russian naval squadron staying there was forced to sound a battle alarm when the British warship started dangerously close maneuvers near his ships and moved away only after the signal “will use weapons” had been raised. Discussion between the Russian and British admirals followed and, thanks to the fact that both sides extensively used the “sailor’s language”, mutual understanding was achieved. But the general situation remained complicated because both Russian and British press had been accusing the other side in all types of a devious behavior. The Brits were accusing Russia in the intention to join a war on Japanese side while the Russians were talking about the British intention to send troops to China and strengthen naval presence in the Chinese waters.
The less vocal but quite active side was Germany. The German officers had been training Chinese sailors, there were German ships in the Yellow Sea and there was a serious financial interest: Deutsche Bank recently opened a big credit to China.
So far, Russia was not openly committed to any side but while the Brits were the old competitor on the Far East, Russian-German relations had been traditionally good, which created certain dilemma with who is going to be wagging whom. And it just happened that while Germany had colonial interests, Russia had territorial issue called “The Sixty-Four Villages East of the River”, a group of Manchu, Daur and Han-inhabited villages located on the left (north) bank of the Amur River (Heilong Jiang) opposite of Heihe, and on the east bank of Zeya River opposite of Blagoveshchensk.The area totaled 3,600 square kilometers (1,400 sq mi).
By the Aigun Treaty the area went to the Russian Empire but the Chinese subjects retained right to live there under authority of Manchu government. The problem, from the Russian perspective, was two-fold:
- This was a gap through which a part of the illegal Chinese migration into the Russian Empire was happening and even in this region the “Chinese” spread beyond these villages settling even in Blagoveschensk itself while defying the Russian authorities.
- Population of the villages (plus “newcomers”) had been engaged in all types of the illegal activities outside the villages including running unlicensed gold mining, contraband and conducting attacks on the Russian settlements and administrative posts.
What other excuse would one need? The local police and volunteers rounded the local Chinese, most of whom had nothing to do with the incident, and forced them to cross the river, in a process of which the lucky ones had been able to cross the river and unlucky ones (majority) drowned because the Chinese did not know how to swim. More accidents happened in other parts of the region and the area had been “cleansed”.
The predominant assessment of the events in the Russian society was the attitude to the event as a "tragic result of exceeding the measures of necessary self-defense in a situation of a deadly threat." But the fact that the Qing authorities ordered attack on the Russian territory provided government with a carte blanch, which even the Brits would be forced to recognize as valid. The question was how exactly to use it with a minimal risk and maximum profit.
______________
[1] “Everyone fancies himself a strategist seeing the battle from the side.”
[2] A huge mistake. To keep troops in a fighting spirit while staying idly waiting for the unpleasant things to happen, you need to keep them permanently occupied with one of the numerous time-honored activities, the most popular of which are being “spit and polish”, digging (no matter what) “from here to dinner” and marching in a formation. Of course, the list is much longer but even with these three you can’t miss. OTOH, the soldiers left on their own, have enough time to get engaged in the most dangerous activities, thinking. The dangerous because there s a high possibility that they’ll come to a well-founded conclusion (with the exception of the rare cases when some charismatic personality is in charge, but these personalities usually smart enough to keep them occupied) that they are being led by a bunch of the incompetent morons who will have them killed. Which, of course, is not conductive to maintaining a high moral. 😉
[3] Of course, the obvious question why didn’t Chinese learn all these things never was asked. The answer would be obvious: “Because”. Probably followed by some very unpleasant type of an execution.
[4] Did happen during the Boxer rebellion few years later.