Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
So what should have been a meeting between two gentlemen concerning their respective naval deployments, and Layton saying good-bye to his opposite number, and giving him a heads up regarding his replacement. Has been high jacked by MacArthur, who has once more raised the idea of the British basing their fleet in the Philippines. Given just how underdeveloped the facilities are in Cavite in comparison to Singapore, and the total lack of supplies suitable for the British, which would be the much stronger fleet, this is not going to happen. And tends to show just how delusional Mac has become, not only in his appreciation of the situation, or the fact that what he’s requesting is a decision that is far above his pay grade. Hart is being far more realistic, not only in his appreciation of the ability of the Americans to defend the Philippines at the present time, but also of his former close friends abilities, he realises that there is something very wrong with Mac. He has however made two vital decisions, he has an agreement with the British over combat areas for submarines, and is making destroyer division 58 available to the British. While Layton has promised to keep it in one unit, and not split it up into penny packets, which promise I am sure the British will attempt to honour. And Phillips will be grateful for four extra destroyers, even if they are only ex WWI four stackers, and haven’t exercised with the British. And so haven’t unlike the Dutch worked out joint communication protocols, or an agreed system of battle drills. They are going to be welcomed with open arms, as they provide a small task force that can replace British units in the defence of Singapore, and free them up for fleet deployment. If the British manage to keep their fleet in being and keep the Japanese away from Singapore, while the Americans suffer a major setback in the Philippines. These American destroyers should be able to assist with the evacuation of American personnel from those areas that are not yet occupied by the Japanese. While British, Dutch and American submarines attempt to supply and evacuate from the besieged area in the north.

RR.
 
"Or even Darwin. Geoffrey, is Surabaya going to be any better than Cavite in two months' time? As for Singapore, well. that's stretching my lines of supply even further. The Navy isn't keen on that idea, although Washington might have other ideas."
Was Hart already this defeatist before Pearl Harbour? I always thought it was the destruction of the US fleet there, the quick Japanese advance in the Philippines and his mode of retreat that caused that.
 
Was Hart already this defeatist before Pearl Harbour? I always thought it was the destruction of the US fleet there, the quick Japanese advance in the Philippines and his mode of retreat that caused that.
I think realist is a better description.
 

Driftless

Donor
I think realist is a better description.
Yup. The various iterations of US war plans covering East Asia had the USN retreating from the Philippines, at least till there was sufficient US battlefleet force mustered in California and/or Hawaii to fight the Japanese on winning terms. The US Asiatic fleet was a weak deterrent at best and maybe a trip wire
 
1941, Friday 05 December;

They had arrived on Thursday, about half past six in the evening. The big Catalina, one of five newly acquired by RAF 205 Squadron, touched down in Manila Bay at the end of a 12-hour flight from Singapore. It taxied over to a mooring buoy, where a harbour launch waited, engines idling. The launch took Vice Admiral Layton, his CoS, Capt Collins RAN, and Phillip's Staff Officer, Plans, Cmdr Goodenough RN, to a quayside. There an aide was waiting with a car to take them to the Comandancia, a hotel chosen by Admiral Hart.

A couple of hours later, shaved and showered, and in clean clothes, they were driven to the Manila Hotel where Hart was based. They met him in a private dining room, where he greeted them, first formally by salute, then with a warm smile and handshakes. Hart's other guest was Lt General Douglas MacArthur, C-in-C of US Army forces in the Philippines. It had been a pleasant meal, an ice breaker, to make everyone comfortable, with easy light conversation. Then Hart bade them all goodnight, and let them retire to their hotel, to sleep off the long journey.

The conference, held in the Marsman building, was supposed to start at 11.30 AM the next morning, after a late breakfast, but had been delayed, not convening until nearly 1 PM. The meeting had been born out of the idea, from both Roosevelt and Churchill, that the two navies needed to work together where they could, although Hart and Layton had met before. Layton and his aides were ushered into the room by a US Marine. All present were in their dress uniforms, the whites of the naval officers contrasting with the blood stripe down the blue trouser legs of the Marine orderlies. Besides Admiral Hart and his Navy staff, and the British trio, General MacArthur and a small Army staff were also present. The Dutch had been invited but the short notice meant they hadn't been able to attend.

MacArthur had started the meeting, firstly apologising on behalf of Admiral Hart for the delay, and then sidelining him, by beginning to detail the defences, both provided and planned for the Philippines. His assessment was that the air danger was small, the American and US trained Filipino army could cope with an invasion, and the Japanese could mount one only operation at a time, Malaya or the Philippines. Furthermore, the planned expansion of his forces over the next few months would make them even stronger by next spring. If the Japanese tried it, he'd make them sorry. It was mostly a monologue from MacArthur, although Layton had spoken when asked if the British had considered basing their fleet here in Manila with the US Navy. Leyton had diplomatically replied "We will surely look to take full advantage of any offer if events allow." Thankfully, MacArthur finished with the clock striking 4.30 PM, exclaiming that he'd love to stay but important pressing matters were dragging him away. Everyone stood as MacArthur rose to leave, shook Layton's hand and nodded to Hart, then departed with his aides.

Hart now took over. "Gentlemen, we'll take refreshment now, papers away please. Lieutenant Dawsey, you may call the waiters in. It's only a buffet, and I'm afraid we've lost a bit of time. So with your blessing I'd like to try and gain some back as we've a lot to do. We'll reconvene at 5 PM sharp. Admiral Layton, may I have a word in private with you, please?"

Hart took Leyton's arm and gently led him to an adjourning room, closing the door behind them. "Geoffrey, I can only apologize. Douglas and I have been friends for more years than I'd care to remember, but I'm afraid this command of his has somewhat brought about a regrettable change in him. He didn't use to be so overbearing."

"My dear Tommy, that's quite all right. I understand: I had some inkling that he was somewhat difficult from what Lord Gort told me after he was here last. Thankfully, I don't really have much to do with the chap, that's Gort's affair. I don't think what goes on with the Army should spoil our relationship. We're good friends and we think alike. However, as you said out there, there is quite a lot to get through today, and events are pressing forward at pace, even as we speak."

"Yes, just my thoughts too. Come over here by the window, let me open these two, and enjoy some fresh air. There's Manila Bay, Geoffrey, crammed with merchant shipping. Twenty-eight miles in front of you, at the neck of the bay, lies Corregidor Island, with Fort Mills on it. Along with the other smaller forts, it commands the entrance to the bay. Nothing comes in or goes out without Fort Mills' say-so. Now if you look left, the coastline runs about ten miles before it curls back a couple of miles on the peninsula, so eight miles from us is the Cavite naval dockyard. That is where MacArthur is proposing you station your fleet."

Hart gave a small sign, and gently shook his head. "Geoffrey, what I am about to tell you now must remain between us. If MacArthur, or even Roosevelt, hears of it, I'm finished, up on the beach."

"Not a word shall reach the wrong ear, Tommy. You have my word, not just as a fellow sailor, but as a friend: mum's the word, as we say."

"Thank you. It's complete madness, Geoffrey. The fact is I'm moving everything I can out of here. Otherwise the bay will become the graveyard of the Asiatic Fleet. The defences MacArthur so loudly trumpets are pitiful. He's completely delusional. If the Japanese attack, we're gonna take a hammering. And I don't buy into his idea that the Japanese have to choose one of us. The fact is I think they can take on both of us.

"I'm not saying that Manila could never be used. In time, if we have it, the planned Army, and most importantly Air Force reinforcements, along with an established early warning system with these new radar sets they're sending us, could provide us with a good defence. But as it is, pretty much all my surface fleet is away, a few ships still to go, either in southern Philippine waters, or over off the east coast of Borneo, with the Dutch. I'm still keeping the submarines and their supporting vessels here. I think over a fairly short period of time, their bite will really be felt. We need to confirm our areas of operations. It wouldn't do to have either of us sink the other's submarine."

"Yes, I quite agree," Layton replied. "When hostilities break out, I'll pull back my two submarines currently basing out of Hong Kong, and we'll work on the old agreement. Everything north and east of Vung Ro Bay, just above Cam Ranh Bay, is yours, everything below, mine. And I say 'when', Tommy, because that big convoy of transports, covered by an impressive task force, is not coming down south for tea. The Japanese very much mean business. Phillips has ordered Hong Kong cleared of all merchant ships as a precaution, and he's also asked Helfrich for the two promised Dutch submarines."

"So, you all think war's coming too Geoffrey. Ah, it must be, surely. I mean, by god, what other reason would they be doing it for, occupying Thailand?"

"Well, that's Gort's nightmare, simply an occupation of Thailand, and nothing more, goading us to make a wrong move, become the aggressor, and start a war with Japan, with you still sitting on the sidelines. Would Roosevelt declare war? Could he? Would the American people support that? There's still a strong isolationist movement in your country!"

"The idea of the US defending the British Empire, propping it up, doesn't sit well with many too, Geoffrey. Roosevelt made it quite clear: no American boys fighting other people's wars!"

"Christ, what a mess, Tommy. How did we get here? The only thing I can say with certainty is I won't be worrying about it much longer. Now that Tom Thumb has arrived, I'm being recalled. Quite what their Lordships have in mind for me, I don't know yet, but it won't be running the Navy out here. What about you? Will you stay here?"

"I'm not sure to be honest. So long as I have an operational base here, I guess I will, but I have no idea how long that will be."

"And then, full back to Singapore, or Surabaya?"

"Or even Darwin. Geoffrey, is Surabaya going to be any better than Cavite in two months' time? As for Singapore, well. that's stretching my lines of supply even further. The Navy isn't keen on that idea, although Washington might have other ideas."

"How much will you send south, Tommy?"

"Well, the reason for us delaying today's meeting was the arrival this morning, of two China gunboats, Oahu and Luzon, with Rear Adm Glassford aboard. I was down at Cavite with Rear Adm Rockwell, my new Naval District commander, to meet him. The boats took a battering sailing through a typhoon; I'm half surprised he didn't lose them. Nevertheless, it's yet more work for Rockwell's Naval Base. I told him 'Get as many ships seaworthy as possible, cut corners where you can.' We got Houston away to Panay Island nice and quickly, but only half her planned upgrade was done. Four 1.1" anti-aircraft quad-mounts were added, but the radar unit and four searchlights had to be left unfitted. The four destroyers of DesDiv 59 are in various stages of refit. Now he's trying to get them ready."

"Destroyers, well now, they're on my list of things to ask about, Tommy. Phillips is desperately short of them, and few of them are modern, Force Z is barely covered. Are you able to help in this matter?"

"Yes, I can help, Geoffrey. But first let me reiterate: if I lend him a division of my old four-stackers, they must remain together, and not be disproportionally put at risk. I can't let the Royal Navy fight to the last US destroyer."

"I fully understand, and if the shoe was on the other foot, would propose that myself. The help won't be abused."

There was a knock on the door, and a young ensign entered and saluted. "Begging your pardon, Admiral Hart, Sir, but I have a signal from Singapore for Admiral Layton." Hart nodded, and the ensign handed the paper to Layton, saluted again and left. Layton waited for the door to close, then turned to Hart and asked "Do you mind me reading it now, Tommy?"

"No, not at all," Hart replied. "Be my guest, Geoffrey."

Layton opened the envelope, and read the message, then looked up at Hart. "We have moved to a first degree of readiness; Phillips has put Thracian on a four-hour notice to sail from Hong Kong with the last military personnel to be evacuated. Force Z may sail in the next 24 hours!"

Hart looked thoughtful, and said, "Geoffrey, I'll order the sailing of DesDiv 58 for Singapore immediately, for service under Phillip's command, if I have your word they'll be used as one unit and you don't spare your own destroyers. And tell Phillips, if he sails, I wish him luck."

Layton gave a small smile. "Thanks, Tommy. Let's shake on it. Your help is much appreciated."

"I suppose we'd best get back to our meeting, Geoffrey. There's a lot of planning to do, and little time to do it."
About the only thing missing was referring to the fact that DesDiv 58 and their tender Black Hawk ,was already enroute toward Singapore and almost to Surabaya where they had the option of a port call, if no request from the British was forthcoming. Perhaps a reference to the fact that the Black Hawk was the Asiatic Fleets only Destroyer tender, and was caring for 13 destroyers when she was designed to service 8 in the field. IMO MacArthur would have been more arrogant then you described. When in private , prior to Layton receiving the cable from Singapore, Layton and Hart would have had a final discussion on radio intercepts and their beliefs on time frame for the attack. Also when you referenced the destroyers under repair, there were also 3 subs under refit.
 
Was Hart already this defeatist before Pearl Harbour? I always thought it was the destruction of the US fleet there, the quick Japanese advance in the Philippines and his mode of retreat that caused that.
Hart was never a defeatist, he was a realist who knew what was coming at him from Japan, and what he had to defend the Philippines was inadequate and that the army and USAAC would not protect his fleet.
 
So what should have been a meeting between two gentlemen concerning their respective naval deployments, and Layton saying good-bye to his opposite number, and giving him a heads up regarding his replacement. Has been high jacked by MacArthur, who has once more raised the idea of the British basing their fleet in the Philippines. Given just how underdeveloped the facilities are in Cavite in comparison to Singapore, and the total lack of supplies suitable for the British, which would be the much stronger fleet, this is not going to happen. And tends to show just how delusional Mac has become, not only in his appreciation of the situation, or the fact that what he’s requesting is a decision that is far above his pay grade. Hart is being far more realistic, not only in his appreciation of the ability of the Americans to defend the Philippines at the present time, but also of his former close friends abilities, he realises that there is something very wrong with Mac. He has however made two vital decisions, he has an agreement with the British over combat areas for submarines, and is making destroyer division 58 available to the British. While Layton has promised to keep it in one unit, and not split it up into penny packets, which promise I am sure the British will attempt to honour. And Phillips will be grateful for four extra destroyers, even if they are only ex WWI four stackers, and haven’t exercised with the British. And so haven’t unlike the Dutch worked out joint communication protocols, or an agreed system of battle drills. They are going to be welcomed with open arms, as they provide a small task force that can replace British units in the defence of Singapore, and free them up for fleet deployment. If the British manage to keep their fleet in being and keep the Japanese away from Singapore, while the Americans suffer a major setback in the Philippines. These American destroyers should be able to assist with the evacuation of American personnel from those areas that are not yet occupied by the Japanese. While British, Dutch and American submarines attempt to supply and evacuate from the besieged area in the north.

RR.
As of 1500 hours on 8 December the USAAC had conceded air superiority to the Empire of Japan and had only 1 mobile radar unit(SCR-270), the USMC unit ,hijacked by MacArthur and moved from Cavite to Batangas, 100 miles South of Cavite. On the 10th when Cavite was bombed out of existence over a 2 hour period only 4 P-40s showed up at the very end of the raid, doing minor damage to Japanese aircraft. The USAAC's standard operational altitude was 15,000 feet, the Japanese Bombers operated at 20,000 feet,
 
Yes, just my thoughts too. Come over here by the window, let me open these two, and enjoy some fresh air. There's Manila Bay, Geoffrey, crammed with merchant shipping. Twenty-eight miles in front of you, at the neck of the bay, lies Corregidor Island, with Fort Mills on it. Along with the other smaller forts, it commands the entrance to the bay. Nothing comes in or goes out without Fort Mills' say-so. Now if you look left, the coastline runs about ten miles before it curls back a couple of miles on the peninsula, so eight miles from us is the Cavite naval dockyard. That is where MacArthur is proposing you station your fleet."
He isn’t wrong about the bay I sailed into it during the pandemic to try and return crew it was jam packed then and my dad and grand farther said the same about it as well, the fort can lock it down pretty tight but the Japanese can pretty much crack those eggs with air power and some long ranged gunnery on their part. The Japanese at this point haven’t suffered any skill degrade yet and do have some very good gunners.

also MacArthur is a fool no way at this time will the RN move to the sort of exposure the army idiot is proposing to send them into.
 
I think realist is a better description.
Yup. The various iterations of US war plans covering East Asia had the USN retreating from the Philippines, at least till there was sufficient US battlefleet force mustered in California and/or Hawaii to fight the Japanese on winning terms. The US Asiatic fleet was a weak deterrent at best and maybe a trip wire
Hart has the Houston, Marblehead and 13 four-pipers to face the entire Imperial Japanese Navy.

He's being realistic.
Hart was never a defeatist, he was a realist who knew what was coming at him from Japan, and what he had to defend the Philippines was inadequate and that the army and USAAC would not protect his fleet.

Defeatist: an attitude of accepting, expecting, or being resigned to defeat. One can be both realist and defeatist at the same time.

Don't get me wrong, OTL Hart was one of the more competent commanders in a theatre that was filled with incompetents, and when he was made ABDAFLOAT commander he had every reason to advocate the realist option of retreating to Australia - though it doesn't help the battle if one expresses his (defeatist) doubts to his subordinates. However, that was when the Pacific fleet was in shambles, Force Z had been sunk, the forces in the Philipines defeated in all but name and the battle in Malaya clearly going the wrong. Here Hart is already talking about giving up the fight not only in the Philipines but also the whole Malay Barrier! That's why I wondered if Hart was already of this opinion at that point in history.
 
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Defeatist: an attitude of accepting, expecting, or being resigned to defeat. One can be both realist and defeatist at the same time.

Don't get me wrong, OTL Hart was one of the more competent commanders in a theatre that was filled with incompetents, and when he was made ABDAFLOAT commander he had every reason to advocate the realist option of retreating to Australia - though it doesn't help the battle if one expresses his (defeatist) doubts to his subordinates. However, that was when the Pacific fleet was in shambles, Force Z had been sunk, the forces in the Philipines defeated in all but name and the battle in Malaya clearly going the wrong. Here Hart is already talking about giving up the fight not only in the Philipines but also the whole Malay Barrier! That's why I wondered if Hart was already of this opinion at that point in history.
Isn't he just executing the Asiatic Fleet's part of Orange?
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Tom Thumb = Admiral Tom Phillips? Tom Thumb doesn't sound like a term of compliment, even as nickname....
Hi Driftless, no Tom Thumb wasn't complimentary, I don't know who gave him that nickname, but I believe it was quite well known in Royal Naval circles, and I'd expect Phillips to be aware of that fact.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Was Hart already this defeatist before Pearl Harbour? I always thought it was the destruction of the US fleet there, the quick Japanese advance in the Philippines and his mode of retreat that caused that.
Hi HJ Tulp, that's an interesting point you raise, but as I understand it, and I'm sure Butchpfd and others will correct me if I'm wrong, Hart's decision to send his surface fleet south, to live to fight another day was done with the knowledge and blessing of the USN, which didn't view the defence of the Philippines with the same rose coloured glasses that MacArthur wore and had convinced others in Washington to see it. The US anchorages in the Philippines were very poorly defended, leaving the Asiatic Fleet in Manila harbour would have created another iron bottom sound. What Hart did do was leave his submarines, and he had a lot of them, to make the offensive strikes against the Japanese invasion fleets. Why that didn't happen was due to a number of reasons, a lack of time to plan, train and prepare, and the dismal failure of the famous torpedo, being two of the main ones. So are we to conclude the USN was defeatist, no I don't think so. With regard to what happened to Hart, I think a number of factors were at play, too complex to label him with a single characteristic, but we can look at him more, later as the campaign unfolds.

Of course the question over Hart's performance in those few early months is always clouded with the tag of a loser, as was pretty much all the British and Dutch senior commanders in that disastrous campaign. Well we know that life isn't simply so black and white, and there are always other factors to consider, which by playing out what if scenario's, can be exposed and perhaps enlighten why the original decision was made.

Simply playing it in a black and white world, you can argue Hart ran away fro the fight, while Doorman threw away his force in a vain glorious effort. Hart could have taken Doorman's route, and we'd criticise him with wasting his fleet just like we criticise Doorman. Or how about Phillips and Force Z, another inglorious waste! we belittle Tom Thumb (pun intended), but if things had played out differently, he might have been the hero, who had the guts to take the fight to the Japanese. But by twists of fate, all three could have had very different careers.

We also have the nuance of what they were fighting for. In Harts view the Philippines wasn't the be all and end all, living to fight another day was very sensible and pragmatic. Phillips found himself compromised, and a 300 year old Royal Nay tradition didn't help, along with tryin to defend part of the British Empire, I personally don't think he could have done anything else, he had to sail north and try to disrupt the Japanese landings. And for Doorman, he was fighting for his home, a last ditch effort, and many of his men would have thought that as well.

I tend to think its always harder to shine, commanding a force in a losing situation, than one in a winning one. Your weak characteristics are highlighted and label you, where as a leader in a successful campaign has his hidden, and is less likely to receive bad criticism, sometimes its jut about being in the right place at the right time, or not.
 
Isn't he just executing the Asiatic Fleet's part of Orange?
Yes, Hart was. If you read the biographies of Hart, which can get detailed, Hart was a diarist, His diaries over his USN and Senate careers cover 34 volumes, at deck log level of detail. Adm Stark had also instructed Hart to as much as possible to preserve the ships and men of the Asiatic Fleet. Once the Americans lost any semblance of air cover Hart had no option to withdraw. Within 10 days from the outbreak of the war, Pat Wing 10 had lost through mechanical or combat loss 60% of it's PBYs,This cut available recon assets, plus of the surviving planes half had been shifted to transport role.
 
Hi HJ Tulp, that's an interesting point you raise, but as I understand it, and I'm sure Butchpfd and others will correct me if I'm wrong, Hart's decision to send his surface fleet south, to live to fight another day was done with the knowledge and blessing of the USN, which didn't view the defence of the Philippines with the same rose coloured glasses that MacArthur wore and had convinced others in Washington to see it.
This, very much this. The US pre-war planning for the Philippines was always hopelessly incoherent. The Philippines could not be abandoned - politically unthinkable! - but the US Navy resisted sending ships to what they viewed as an indefensible outpost, the US Army had no units to send, Congress was unwilling to fund defences in a place that would be independent in a few years anyway and the USAAF had ambitious plans but (as yet) few bombers to implement them. Rather than decide which horn of the dilemma to land on, Washington's response was to send for SuperMac and assume he would solve everything. And them MacArthur came up with a plan that required two years more than he had and, Japanese-like, assumed that the enemy would conform to it.

It's easy to criticise MacArthur, but it's worth remembering that right up until the final days, his estimate of the Japanese capabilities and timetable matched what was coming out of US Intelligence and the State Department and so was both what Washington believed and what Washington wanted to hear. The South-East Asian disaster, like so many others, happened slowly and then it happened very fast.

Of course the question over Hart's performance in those few early months is always clouded with the tag of a loser, as was pretty much all the British and Dutch senior commanders in that disastrous campaign. Well we know that life isn't simply so black and white, and there are always other factors to consider, which by playing out what if scenario's, can be exposed and perhaps enlighten why the original decision was made.
Also this. Hart, like Doorman, and Phillips (and MacArthur and Percival and ...) was ultimately handed an unwinnable battle and we criticise them in hindsight for not solving the insoluble problem. The options they chose led to disaster, so the alternatives must have been better - right?

I tend to think its always harder to shine, commanding a force in a losing situation, than one in a winning one. Your weak characteristics are highlighted and label you, where as a leader in a successful campaign has his hidden, and is less likely to receive bad criticism, sometimes its just about being in the right place at the right time, or not.
I think it's often less a matter of victory/defeat than of expectation. A general who is expected to win in a walkover will be condemned if he loses a single battle (and condemned again as "over-cautious" if he designs his plans to avoid losing a single battle). A commander who is known to be outmatched can be hailed as a hero even if all he manages is a valiant last stand. Consider the standard narrative of the Boer War - the British generals are all arrogant ignorant clueless brutal bunglers while the Boer commanders are skillful, energetic, inventive and inspiring. The fact that the British stamped the Boers flat is a detail. They should (we are told) have done so in far less time at a far lower cost.

In South-East Asia, the Allies saw their prized colonial possessions, garrisoned by tens of thousands of troops, hundreds of aeroplanes and dozens of ships, fall, swiftly and humiliatingly, to a numerically inferior force of Japanese (little yellow Orientals!). Obviously, everyone in command was completely incompetent. How else could such a thing have happened?
 
Isn't he just executing the Asiatic Fleet's part of Orange?
AFAIK Plan Orange did stipulate the Asiatic Fleet to evacuate once its part in the defense of the Philipines was untenable. It did not specify where to.
Hi HJ Tulp, that's an interesting point you raise, but as I understand it, and I'm sure Butchpfd and others will correct me if I'm wrong, Hart's decision to send his surface fleet south, to live to fight another day was done with the knowledge and blessing of the USN, which didn't view the defence of the Philippines with the same rose coloured glasses that MacArthur wore and had convinced others in Washington to see it. The US anchorages in the Philippines were very poorly defended, leaving the Asiatic Fleet in Manila harbour would have created another iron bottom sound. What Hart did do was leave his submarines, and he had a lot of them, to make the offensive strikes against the Japanese invasion fleets. Why that didn't happen was due to a number of reasons, a lack of time to plan, train and prepare, and the dismal failure of the famous torpedo, being two of the main ones. So are we to conclude the USN was defeatist, no I don't think so. With regard to what happened to Hart, I think a number of factors were at play, too complex to label him with a single characteristic, but we can look at him more, later as the campaign unfolds.
I don't critisize OTL Hart for his decision to retreat the Asiatic Fleet towards the south, hell I don't even critisize OTL for his wish to pull back the Allied forces to Australia, for that was the most sound military decision that could be made in that situation. I do critisize OTL Hart for failing to instill confidence in his subordinates by openly advocating retreat and I certainly critisize ATL Hart for advocating retreat to Australia before a shot has been fired and a ship has been sunk!
Yes, Hart was. If you read the biographies of Hart, which can get detailed, Hart was a diarist, His diaries over his USN and Senate careers cover 34 volumes, at deck log level of detail. Adm Stark had also instructed Hart to as much as possible to preserve the ships and men of the Asiatic Fleet. Once the Americans lost any semblance of air cover Hart had no option to withdraw. Within 10 days from the outbreak of the war, Pat Wing 10 had lost through mechanical or combat loss 60% of it's PBYs,This cut available recon assets, plus of the surviving planes half had been shifted to transport role.
Again, I am not critisizing Harts retreat from the Philipines, I am critisizing the proposal to retreat all the way to Australia before the was has even started.
 
Hi Driftless, no Tom Thumb wasn't complimentary, I don't know who gave him that nickname, but I believe it was quite well known in Royal Naval circles, and I'd expect Phillips to be aware of that fact.
Perhaps there could be a disparaging nickname thread?!? "That man in the White House" - FDR; "Peanut" - Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek; "Tom Thumb" - VADM Phillips;
"Dugout Doug"...Guess who? Segue to "American General. Stay away from me. Filipino Field Marshal. Please let me be. Don't come knocking on Maria Velez' door. We don't see your face no more. You have no war machine. We don't need your PI scene... With many humble apologies to that great Canadian band...
 
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