Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
The Japanese used their tanks to great effect despite this talk about terrain.
The paradigm for mounted warfare changes in most of the PTO. Where operations in Africa and Europe frequently saw massed armor enabled by infantry as the decisive maneuver element in combined arms warfare, infantry was frequently enabled by armor in the pacific. This is due in part to terrain (a five tank platoon could be reduced to a single tank frontage), enemy tactics (concealed infantry and AT in close country can require infantry to “pull” the tanks through while being over watched by the tank), and logistics/force structure (often there were very small numbers of tanks on both sides). That said, a single tank still represents mobile, protected firepower in a package impervious to most threats. A single tank firing its weapons and crushing bunkers, seemingly impervious to your weapons while it snorts and claws its way through your position is a gut-liquefying experience for many.
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Yes I much prefer the subtle approach.
The Japanese are on a countdown to running out of oil.
Every day the British and Dutch can hold on is a day closer to the Japanese war machine collapsing.
A stalemate in Malaya and the DEI could see that happen by 1944.
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Fatboy Coxy
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Research can be a very boring dry affair, and one bonus of writing this TL is while working on it, I'm improving my knowledge of the whole historical 'Loss of Singapore' campaign. A little rabbit hole I've run down is the guns issued to Australian 2/4 Anti Tank Regt RAA, which served with the Australian 8th Division in Malaya & Singapore. Their most famous moment was probably when a two gun 2-pdr section ambushed five Japanese tanks advancing down the road to Bakri, during the Muar battle in Johore.
Historically only the 13th Bty arrived, attached to the 22nd Bde, in February 1941, but what guns they had at that time, I don't know. The rest of the regiment arrived in August, I think, along with the 27th Infantry Brigade, except the 14th Bty, which remained in Australia, earmarked for service with the 23rd Bde. The regiment was equipped with only 12 2-pdr AT guns, of Australian manufacture (I believe) and was given 24 75mm pack howitzers, the 14th Bty having no guns. I think I'm right in saying the 75mm pack howitzer was actually a British built 2.95-inch mountain gun, bought by the US before World War One, relabelled as 75mm, now lent back, mounted on a 18 pounder carriage.
Wikipedia has a nice article on the 2/4 Regt here, although, as with many of their articles, there may be errors. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2/4th_Anti-Tank_Regiment_(Australia)
Later, in January 1942 I guess, more 2-pdr guns arrived, I'm assuming Australian made, otherwise the 125th AT Regt RA, which lost all her AT guns in the sinking merchant ship Empress of Asia might have nabbed them. Also mentioned at this time is the 47mm Breda AT gun, a number of which were captured in either the East or North African campaigns from the Italians and shipped over pre 7 Dec 41 to Malaya. Some of these were used by either or both, the British 80th AT Regt RA and the Indian 22nd Mountain Regt in an ad hoc battery, but some were also used by the Australians.
In my Timeline the 14th Bty have also come, but remain at the Australian base at Malacca, awaiting guns. The other three batteries, allocated one to each infantry brigade, are composted of four 2-pdrs, and 8-75mm pack guns each. In a further post I will talk a little bit about the 2-pdr action close to Bakri.
Historically only the 13th Bty arrived, attached to the 22nd Bde, in February 1941, but what guns they had at that time, I don't know. The rest of the regiment arrived in August, I think, along with the 27th Infantry Brigade, except the 14th Bty, which remained in Australia, earmarked for service with the 23rd Bde. The regiment was equipped with only 12 2-pdr AT guns, of Australian manufacture (I believe) and was given 24 75mm pack howitzers, the 14th Bty having no guns. I think I'm right in saying the 75mm pack howitzer was actually a British built 2.95-inch mountain gun, bought by the US before World War One, relabelled as 75mm, now lent back, mounted on a 18 pounder carriage.
Wikipedia has a nice article on the 2/4 Regt here, although, as with many of their articles, there may be errors. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2/4th_Anti-Tank_Regiment_(Australia)
Later, in January 1942 I guess, more 2-pdr guns arrived, I'm assuming Australian made, otherwise the 125th AT Regt RA, which lost all her AT guns in the sinking merchant ship Empress of Asia might have nabbed them. Also mentioned at this time is the 47mm Breda AT gun, a number of which were captured in either the East or North African campaigns from the Italians and shipped over pre 7 Dec 41 to Malaya. Some of these were used by either or both, the British 80th AT Regt RA and the Indian 22nd Mountain Regt in an ad hoc battery, but some were also used by the Australians.
In my Timeline the 14th Bty have also come, but remain at the Australian base at Malacca, awaiting guns. The other three batteries, allocated one to each infantry brigade, are composted of four 2-pdrs, and 8-75mm pack guns each. In a further post I will talk a little bit about the 2-pdr action close to Bakri.
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The 75mm's in the PI were WW1 vintage British 18lb QFs chambered for french 75mm ammunition (75mm M1917). There were also units equipped with the 2.95" Mountain Gun- sometimes within the same division. Any port in a storm, but if was the senior logistician and senior gunner for Malaya Command I'd be working hard to get a pure fleet of calibers if only for the sake of smoother resupply and ease of calculations.
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No, it's been worked on in 2023, so it's eligible and I've therefore nominated it, here: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-nominations-and-seconds.550784/post-24866021
Please feel free to second (note that only one person needs to second) and then to vote once the voting threads are up...
Coxy, I believe that is the type gun referred to in the equipment lists in the Pensacola convoy, a " 20 British 75 mm guns". These were over and above the standard 75mm pack Howitzer, 75 and 105 mm guns used by the American artillery units carried in the convoy. I imagine the ones in Malaya were sent earlier .
The British 75mm s in the PI, were assigned to Philippine Army and PS (23rd FA, 86th FA Bat. )units. Some Philippine Scouts artillery units (24thFA and 88th were all equipped as Regular U.S. Army units, with 75mm pack Howitzer and 75mm M 1897/ M-2 Carriage guns or 155mm M1918 How.
Pearl & Dean takes me back to a misspent youth, sneaking into the pictures as a kid….
When did the US first make its HEAT round for the 75mm pack howitzer? Did the British have an equivalent round that they might have provided to Singapore, and/or might the US have somehow sent a few rounds across the Pacific...say, for the Aussies to evaluate?
The US also had a WP round for the 75mm pack. Very useful in jungle fighting, if only as a particularly fearsome round for direct fire against bunkers across clearings...not requiring direct hits on hard-to-spot embrasures, due to the choking/blinding and eventually lethal effect of immersion in the WP smoke. Also good as an impromptu final-defense AT round, since it blinded any tank it hit until the crew got out and cleaned the smoke deposits off their optics and vision blocks. Maybe the British had some of those WP rounds as well?
The US also had a WP round for the 75mm pack. Very useful in jungle fighting, if only as a particularly fearsome round for direct fire against bunkers across clearings...not requiring direct hits on hard-to-spot embrasures, due to the choking/blinding and eventually lethal effect of immersion in the WP smoke. Also good as an impromptu final-defense AT round, since it blinded any tank it hit until the crew got out and cleaned the smoke deposits off their optics and vision blocks. Maybe the British had some of those WP rounds as well?
Against the majority of Japanese tanks an 75mm HEAT is overkill. A regular HE 75mm shell should destroy most deployed Japanese tanks on a direct hit.
The 17th Ordanance Company of 50 T2 Motor gun gun carriages 9 Platoons of 5 plus HQ 5 M3 Halftracks trucks, and 3/4 ton White scout cars, and 5 MGCs; attached to the 2 tank battalions had the 75 mm M 1897 mounted on a an M3 Chassis . This became the 1st U.S> SP Tank destroyer. It could use AP and HE ammunition; or any other if available.
The "British 75" was known as the M1917, and along with the 2.95" Mountain Gun was the mainstay of Artillery in the PI. The Army history The Fall of the Philippines mentions 10 M1 75mm Pack Howitzers and a number of 75mm (presumably the M1917, not the M1897 based on references to British 75mms) were diverted from the Canal Zone to the PI, but is silent on their subsequent use. There were 155s with the coast artillery, but the M1917 GPFs that would be assigned to Bataan were orphans of the ill-fated inland seas defense project) . Records show the The M1897 ("French 75") coming to the islands mounted on the M3 gun motor carriage (halftrack) as Self Propelled Mounts (SPMs)- according to the U.S. Army history Fall of the Philippines, MacArthur had requested 288 of them modified for high speed towing as guns for the PA. So, there was a lot of equipment without crewing.
Whitman's "The Guns of Bataan" in the 1995 issue of Army History lays out how the problem of crewing the SPMs was addressed by forming a composite organization post-initiation of hostilities from coast artillery AAA crews, Philippine recruits, some experienced Scout Artillerymen, and other "found" personnel. Ironically, MacArthur had requested the 37mm AT guns which were TOE for PA infantry regiments and had instead received the M3 SPMs. Similarly, an artillery regiment (155mm GPF) and a coast artillery (AA) regiment (MG/37mm/Searchlight) were also formed.
Overall, both Japanese and US sources indicate the USAFFE/USFIP Artillery performed admirably. However, the lesson for any reinforcement of Malaya is in the shortfalls. Artillery pieces (SPM and British 75s especially) were shipped without panoramic sights or fire control equipment in some cases. As a result, Wainwright's 1946 report the defense devotes detail to the impacts in efficiency and survivability on the artillery force of fire direction by base piece shoot against preregistered targets, the limitations of telephone or even courier corrections, and insufficient survey and met data for the guns to rapidly reposition and resume fire. As important as it is to bring the guns to Malaya, it's as or more important to bring the fire direction equipment and personnel, communications, and support elements that enable rapid effects and speedy transitions between targets.
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My sources were the regimental histories of the PS units. The GMCs were supposed to support the tanks. What actually happened was what should have been planned the tank Battalions had platoons attached Ad Hoc, and eventually a Squadron of the 26th Cavalry operated with the 192ndTank Batt and the GMCs
Yep- the SPM/GMC fielding was “problematic”. The kit arrived without crews, crews were formed out of hide and attached under an ordnance unit, and doctrine and tactics were worked out on the fly. This photo always sums up the hodgepodge of kit and units in the PI for me.
Another point on Field Artillery is the early Loss of Ft Stostenberg, the Armor Cavalry and Artillery Depot. All spare parts repair equipment extra ammunition and supplies were abandoned, only minimal destruction was accomplished. as the IJA and IJAF were able to move in almost immidiatly after the Americans withdrew.