Before analysing the reforms carried out by Lee Hwon in the first few years as his rule as king, it is necessary to explore why the two Japanese invasions of Korea were so detrimental, so completely destructive of society. Three main reasons can be identified: the severe lack of training and experience by the Korean soldiers; the structural problems within the Korean military that persisted throughout the war; and the constant lack of supplies, in terms of either foodstuffs or weaponry.
1. Before and throughout the war, the majority of the battles were fought by Korean archers. Unlike a musketeer, an archer can easily claim the life of his foe with complete disregard to the weather and terrain; preparation for attack can be done in complete silence and darkness, unlike the Japanese. However an archer needs at least an year of thorough and rigorous training to be competent in the battlefield; training to use a musket merely needs a week. While the Koreans were struggling to produce even ten archers, the Japanese were already pumping out hundreds, possibly even thousands, of completely replaceable warriors onto the peninsula.
2. Any organisation and institution, whether it be an entourage of actors or an expansive empire, is naturally structured in a pyramidical shape: there lies numerous subordinates at the bottom, and one at the top. This system, despite its inherent problems, also possesses three main qualities that make it naturally the most efficient method of rule:
- It is easy to keep each other in check and putting the entire system under surveillance. Equals keep each other form making mistakes, while superiors can keep an eye on his subordinates with ease. While the system can consolidate power too much on the top, it has almost no possibility of failing to serve whatever purpose it may possess.
- It is the most efficient way in gaining and spreading information. Intelligence from the bottom spreads most quickly and without error to the top if there is a clear hierarchy and only one pathway it needs to follow - bottom to top, up the ladder. And false intelligence is more fatal than having no intelligence at all.
- It is, finally, the easiest way to transfer knowledge and wisdom over long period of time; a member who has climbed up the rungs of the institution will, when at the top, be able to both use the philosophy his superiors have passed down to him and spread down such knowledge himself.
These characteristics were the exact ones that were lacking in the Korean military of the time. Multiple records point to "every man capable of wielding a sword or arrow" declaring themselves generals and corporals, then proceeding all command a small group of soldiers and often using them to garner wealth or power. Even on the top there were several military forces, either being commanded by the central government, the board of Marshals, the defence ministry, or the King himself. It is impossible to pinpoint whether the structural paradox arose due to the dire circumstances of the war and the need for individuals to try gain access to as much foods as possible(rice was centrally controlled by the government) or the opposite was the case. However it is possible to state that this myriad of issues, overlooked during the centuries of relative peace and stability, became all more evident as Joseon as a society slowly crumbled to a halt during the seven long years of war.
3. Korea was a peninsula that was, at this time, feeding a population of around 10 million. This meant that vast tracts of land, either producing rice or other types of grain, were being carefully tended to around the clock. During the war it became evident however that Korea had not the capabilities to even feed ten thousand soldiers; a complete scourging of the entire northwestern provinces only led to a collection of ten bags of rice(enough to feed ten soldiers for a day). The issue of lack of foodstuffs became even more apparent as Ming infantry divisions began pouring in and demanded food from Korea.
From this it becomes clear why the first series of reforms - designed by Ryu Sung-ryong, promulgated and enacted by Lee Hwon - were of military nature: the military was the bulwark of the state against foreign invaders, the military was the representation of national strength, and the military was inspiration for a certain sense of discipline and morale amongst the people. Furthermore, the military allowed room for centralisation of power towards the king, which was more than necessary in pushing for reforms on grander scales than the first one.
The reforms were of the following:
- Establishment of Scouting units, both on foot and on horseback, who will make sure the local commander is aware of hostile troop movements up to 200 li (~50 miles);
- Annual reports analysing potential enemy forces and comparison of strengths and weaknesses against Korea's;
- Restructuring of the army by military units of Sa-Cho-Ki-Dae-Wo(3000-900-300-100-50 individual soldiers);
- Emphasis in training for defensive warfare on a flat battlefield(moats, mud forts, caltrops);
- Reconstruction of all forts and castles with constant maintenance for accommodation of at least one cannon and munitions;
- Emphasis in training for firing arrows in formation, ensuring continued fire even when on the move;
- Enforcements of scorched earth tactics when in strategic retreat;
- Establishment of a two-armies grenadier system, one guarding the capital and one guarding other parts of Korea, to ensure trained soldiers leading the army into battle and breaking enemy lines.
The final reform deserves further analysis. During the course of the war a formation of seasoned, ferocious front-line soldiers was shown to greatly impact the morale of an army and therefore the course of battles; these soldiers, originally picked from some of the better fighters of the Righteous Armies(guerrilla units during the war), were to excel in strength and agility, skilled in hand-to-hand combat and always leading massed armies to war. 20,000 of these soldiers were to be trained for a year and be stationed in garrisons, 10,000 within the capital and another 10,000 along the border and guarding strategic posts. Loyal only to the monarch and the direct chain of command, these were to act as vanguards of the Kingdom at all times.
During the first months of the reforms it is most likely that the government, particularly Lee, was uncertain of their success. The bureaucracy was up in arms against any concept of militarisation for fear of an armed coup, the people were barely living off anything nature could offer them, and the military was beyond repair in the eyes of all. The issue particularly lay with the lack of tax revenue - corruption was growing unchecked and revenue was abysmally small, and a reform would only make matters worse. Therefore Lee Hwon attempted something that was only a sign of desperation at the time and prescient at the present day: he began opening the borders of Korea to international trade with tariffs.
The Korean royal court was aware of the amount of trade Japan was making with various "barbaric nations" and how much wealth it was garnering off them. They were also aware of fears regarding the spread of "heathen religions" by the merchants and priests. However Lee Hwon strongly brushed off criticisms of his new policy, arguing that "our superior ideology will stand steadfast against theirs"; it was agreed however to put "anti-foreigner signs" along road intersections and in the middle of cities to inspire the people from being influenced by them.
Two main towns were to be open as intermediary harbours for Korean and foreign merchants to interact in an orderly fashion: Koje and Jindo; being on the end of major trade routes and far from the capital, both areas were considered "safe" and easy places to put foreign influence at the minimum. Trading posts and harbours were set up, and regular trade began from spring of 1601. German, Iberian, and Chinese merchants began entering the Korean economy, helping keep Korean merchants competitive in their trade of porcelain, oiled paper and ginseng against their silk, cotton and other exotic rarities. In particular, strange items such as "wheel-lock firearms", "potatoes" or "corn" became introduced to Korea...
