And given the UK's requirements immediately post-Falklands the Tornado fulfils the requirement for the most urgent possible strike role and an RN with a carrier provides the ability to provide tactical air anywhere in the world for weeks, with the added ability to potentially join up with a USN or MN carrier to provide a bigger kick in the event of the most urgent possible strike role.
HMS EAGLE in the Falklands
- Thread starter flasheart
- Start date
Setting aside the Tornado's thrust deficiency (3.5 tons heavier empty and 4.5 tons heavier at MTOW than a Hornet with the same afterburning thrust), a plane that size would probably require a 50,000 to 60,000 ton carrier. You could try to resurrect the CVA-01 plan that was cancelled in the 1966 White Paper, but the later versions of that design were already severely compromised. I doubt the Reagan-era Navy would want to go in on smaller carriers instead of the Nimitzes, but I think a few to replace the two Midways in second-line roles and the Lexington's training role might be a possibility. When Midway retired in 1991, she was carrying three squadrons of Hornets and two of Intruders.
Who said anything about basing Tornado’s on a carrier?
They are talking about using Tornado’s to hit tactical and strategic targets in Europe which they are more then capable of doing while land based.
How tall is the tail on the tornado? I’m assuming you might need to fold it to get it into an aircraft carrier hanger?
They are talking about using Tornado’s to hit tactical and strategic targets in Europe which they are more then capable of doing while land based.
How tall is the tail on the tornado? I’m assuming you might need to fold it to get it into an aircraft carrier hanger?
When I mentioned the most urgent possible strike role it was in reference to the Tornado providing strike capability against a potential Soviet invasion of Western Europe that largely removed the requirement for the Vulcan. I wasn't suggesting that there'd ever be a naval variant of the Tornado.
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Good. I think there was some discussion of navalised Tornados earlier in the thread.
Well its a conversation that needs to be had in both TL's I guess. Although one major difference is that ITTL it should be clear Black Buck wasn't terribly effective compared to tactical strikes from smaller (cheaper) aircraft. That alone should act as ammo for the navy when someone suggests the money goes on heavy bombers instead.
It does leave me wondering what you thought the most urgent possible strike role was that would require a navalised Tornado was.
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I see no reason why the Tornado would be navalised . it would be insanely difficult to do so . The entire frame is unlikely to be able to handle the stress of landing on a carrier . The Gripen when considered as a conversion was only possible due to the STOL requirements laid on it's designers due to Sweden's defence posture and tactics . The BAE ACA mock up would be a better bet . It has good potentials for a bottom up design to meet both RAF and RN demands . It is a good size with excellent power to weight ratio. Even an early version with a pair of AIM-9L and quartet of Sky Flash would be very useful . I would assume early versions would be pure A2A with only dumb bombs for ground attack . As software improves other ASM like Sea Eagle , ALARM and other RAF stores would be added . By 1991 Gulf war the EAP would be a very useful piece of kit and well able to provide AD and strike capability .
And we tend to have more consistent policy as related to funding and what should be built as related to Whitehall which is important for procurement
Firebase Kent
Mount Kent, 25th May, 2300
As the British had become stronger and more dug into their position at San Carlos patrols had been pushing further and further out from the defensive perimeter in all directions. The most immediate objective of these patrols was to get the kind of intelligence and situational awareness within the vicinity of the beach head that only men on the ground could provide. Air reconnaissance can only tell you so much. While good for identifying large formations and movements a photograph taken from the air wouldn’t really be able to tell you how marshy was the ground, what was the climate like, what natural features would visible from the ground that could aid navigation, ect. Worse it was well known to the British based on the capabilities of some of their own men that a small section of men who knew what they were doing and had the right camouflage equipment with time to prepare could avoid detection from the air.
The main effort in regards to these patrols was pushing men out eastwards to scout out the line of advance towards Port Stanley. The next phase of the British campaign was to be an assault on Mount Kent by troops that were to be airlifted into the area. Not wanting to risk losing momentum and taking advantage of the fact that it would take a number of days to get themselves into a position where they would be ready to launch such an assault pretty much as soon as they had landed four days previously a number of patrols had set out on foot eastwards.
The men that made up these patrols were all Royal Marine Commando’s drawn from the Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre operating in their traditional role of brigade reconnaissance. Usually a training unit made up of staff and students this unit had been called upon like so many others at short notice to beef up the British order of battle and plug a hole in 3 COMMANDO Brigade’s capabilities. Being commandos used to operating behind enemy lines with their unique skillsets these men were perfect for the job of operating behind enemy lines in an environment that was almost identical to Dartmoor where these men had spent so much of their recent lives training. Their capabilities being held in such high regard meant that they were also judged to be pretty much the next closest thing to Special Forces.
While the SF men of the SAS and SBS would be more than capable of such a mission and many of whom were already at that point in time manning various OP’s in the field there were a number of issues preventing their deployment. The first was that pretty much all of the SF men that had come along on Operation CORPORATE were already committed to various tasks. Between the men already on missions on various parts of the Falklands, men still on or returning from Pebble Island and men resting after returning from missions there wasn’t really anyone available to be sent.
Secondly most of the SF men in the OP’s had been in the field for nearly three weeks now. Rations were beginning to be exhausted, fatigue brought on by living outdoors in a harsh environment was setting in and the longer they remained in proximity to the enemy the more the odds of discovery went against them. The men would also likely be starting to be affected by their relative isolation. For operational reasons radio communication between the OP’s and any other British forces was kept to an absolute minimum and the men were very aware of just how far away they were from friendly territory or any kind of relative safety. There was a reason why SF selection had such a fearsome reputation for testing a man’s physical and mental strength.
Some of these SF teams had already begun the process of exfiltrating from their positions. Some would head away from any Argentine forces to somewhere judged to be suitably remote to allow them to be picked up by helicopter (whether they would be flown to San Carlos or a ship at sea would depend on what aircraft could be made available). Those unlucky to be “close” to friendly forces would still have an extremely long walk ahead of them.
The use of Commando’s from the San Carlos beach head for forward reconnaissance and patrolling would in part compensate for the loss of up to date intelligence gathering capability as a result of the withdrawal of special forces teams.
One such team of Marines was an 18 man team led by Captain Rod Boswell RM. Their objective was an isolated building called Top Marlow House.
Sat about half way between San Carlos and the mountains that surrounded Port Stanley the house was the only structure for miles around and sat pretty much right in the middle of the planned air corridor that would have to be established between San Carlos and the forces that would be operating in the mountains to the east.
Due to the frequent snowstorms and heavy rainfall it made sense that any Argentines in the area being almost certainly from a much hotter climate and unused to this cold weather would even if only temporarily seek to make use of this building for shelter.
Having travelled from San Carlos on foot it had taken Captain Boswell’s team a few days to arrive. Wary of the possibility of Argentine observation positions trying to provide early warning for anyone garrisoning the house Boswell had sent four handpicked men ahead to scout for any such dangers. The men had returned having not found any evidence of Argentines in the immediate vicinity and had been able to lead the rest of the force along the safe route they had scouted.
Boswell’s orders upon reaching the house had been to check if it was occupied and if not occupy it himself and keep out any unwanted guests. Basically, denying the use of the position to the enemy. In the last few hours of daylight on the 25th the marines crawling across the ground on their bellies and using the inclement weather for cover had been able to get close enough to the house to conclude that it was indeed occupied by an enemy force.
The Argentine forces occupying the house were a 12 man section from 602 Commando Company. The Argentines were now treating the mountains that surrounded Port Stanley as effectively their “Front Line” a number of Commandos had been sent forward into the ground between the mountains and the British beach head at San Carlos into what was now in effect “no man’s land”. The force at Top Malo House was one of the most forward Argentine positions. And had been chosen for largely the same reason as the British with it being ideally placed in the expected British line of advance to provide early warning. Though they had initially tried to conduct local patrols many times as with this occasion the inclement weather had made them take shelter in the house. Navigation in the largely featureless terrain had proved difficult in reduced visibility if not impossible when mist had set in. The Argentine Commando’s had found themselves having to expend so much energy just battling the hostile environment that actually scouting for a British advance was often beyond their capabilities. Frequently they had decided that it would be better just to remain in the relative protection of the house and observe from there. They reasoned that a sentry who was inside and warm would be much better able to stay alert and keep watch and that in the event of an attack they would have much better odd if they fought from the cover of a building rather than in the open terrain.
Fatally they reasoned that any British forces in the area must also be handicapped like them for the same reasons. For the Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre the fact that they could operate where others simply couldn’t go was a complete vindication of their training.
Observing the house from a distance of a little over half a mile Captain Boswell weighed up his options. While he reckoned his men could successfully assault and capture the building, he would almost certainly take some casualties in the process and if his men didn’t move with enough speed an assault could easily turn into a prolonged firefight. While the option of ground assault was viable it wouldn’t be justifiable until all over options had been ruled out. Withdrawing away from the house and rejoing the men who had remained further away including the signaller Boswell decided to see if he could get some outside help to permanently deal with the threat posed by Top Malo House. He knew he was out of range of both naval and land based artillery support but there just might be enough daylight left for air support.
Despite the heavy losses the Argentines were known to have suffered the fact that British forces were now ashore on the Falklands was putting extra pressure on the Phantoms and Sea Harriers who now as well as still providing CAP for the carrier group out to sea now had to provide air cover for the forces ashore. This had only been achieved by reducing the number of aircraft covering the carrier to allow some to be retasked to this new role. Aware that the task force only carried a finite and slowly depleting quantity of jet fuel British planners had decided to get the most out of the aircraft they had. This meant that the Phantoms providing air support for ground forces were carrying only half of their usual compliment of air to air missiles with the saved space being used for SNEB 68mm rocket pods. This meant that the Phantoms were now capable of providing a degree of close air support and saved fuel as it meant that there was now no requirement to keep Buccaneer’s in the air over the Falklands to fulfil this role. One such aircraft was retasked in response to Captain Boswell’s request.
Proudly sporting the silhouettes of Argentine Mirage’s on the side of their cockpit the Phantom crew having made contact with marines and advised them to keep their heads down had proceeded to launch the first air to ground Phantom strike of the conflict utterly obliterating the house along with its occupants and in the process churning up quite a lot of mud around the building. Having confirmed a successful strike and thanking the Phantom crew the Royal Marine Sgt acting as a forward air controller sent the Phantom on its way. Looking at the burning remains of their objective he turned to Captain Boswell and asked the question “Well sir what do we do now?”
This little skirmish while having been spectacular to watch had in the grand scheme of things been just a little distraction from the main event of that night.
Mount Kent is approximately 1400 feet high. Overlooking Mount Challenger to the South and substantially higher than Two Sisters and Mount Longdon to the east whoever holds the various peaks that make up the mountain would be afforded an excellent view of and effectively dominate the surrounding area. From a military point of view the British viewed the mountain as the key to the eastern approaches to Port Stanley and an ideal location for a forward base that could serves as a starting point for further operations and advances eastwards.
Originally the mountain had been held by men of the 12th Infantry Regiment. A four man SAS patrol had been tasked with carrying out reconnaissance and intelligence gathering on the mountain and had had a degree of success in this. The SAS men had been able to observe the conscripts as they had moved around their bunkers and trenches and also at night when they had frequently showed lights from hand torches and cooking stoves. The SAS observers had considered this to be an appalling lapse in field discipline highlighting the difference between the standards of conscript and professional troops. Many Argentine’s would never know just how many times they had literally been in someone’s crosshairs or how many times they had literally been just meters away from instant death. However, when air attacks against Argentine troop concentrations had started The SAS men had been forced to withdraw to more distant position to avoid the risk of becoming collateral damage as a result of the frequent use of area weapons such as rockets and cluster munitions. Though Mount Kent wasn’t subjected to the same frequency or intensity of air attacks as other locations on the island the SAS men did note that Argentine patrol activity did seem to be dropping off. Surviving Argentines would later recount that while not inflicting much in the way of casualties the air attacks had had the effect of making the young and poorly trained and disciplined Argentine conscripts increasingly reluctant to emerge from their bunkers and trenches and patrol the rocks and windswept grass on top of the mountain much to the utter fury of their officers and NCO’s.
Earlier in the day the men of the 12th Infantry Regiment had withdrawn eastwards. The Argentine commanders in Port Stanley had decided that Mount Kent was too isolated and far away from other Argentine positions to be realistically defendable. In keeping with his new strategy of making sure that all his positions were strong enough to ensure that the British would not be able to isolate and destroy them piecemeal Brigadier Menendez had withdrawn the 12th Regiment to reinforce the garrisons on the mountains further to the east. Such had been the haste with which the men had been withdrawn earlier that day that some men accidentally had left behind many items of personal equipment including vital sleeping bags.
In their place had come a detachment of 601 and 602 Commando Companies. These commandos were effectively now using Mount Kent as a position from which to provide screening from the main Argentine defensive line to the east. Their orders were to observes and conduct reconnaissance to locate the inevitable British advance. It was recognised that they ultimately would not be able to hold Mount Kent in which case their orders were to hold out for as long as possible delaying the British timetable, inflicting losses and gathering intelligence before ultimately withdrawing when the situation became untenable. Making the British bleed as much as they could.
The task of assaulting Mount Kent had fallen to 42 Commando. This operation had been planned for a while but as always, a spanner had been thrown into the works at the last minute when the SAS OP had reported that the Argentines seemed to be replacing the garrison for some reason. The original plan had been for almost the entire battalion to assault the mountain in one go however with this new information and also the air movements officer almost point blank refusing to make the required number of helicopters available as they were already in extremely high demand for other taskings a new plan had been devised for a smaller and quitter company sized probing and assault followed by rapid reinforcement. Packing themselves into the three available passive night vision equipped Sea King HC.4’s the men of K company had the honour of being the spearhead company. The three aircraft slightly overloaded with the extra ammunition, 81mm mortars and over equipment that the Marines were bringing flew low and hugged the terrain as the made their approach. They disgorged their passengers at a specially selected LZ about two miles away from the summit behind a ridgeline which not only gave them some cover but also helped to screen some of the noise of the helicopter engines. As the aircraft departed to go and pick up the next wave the men of K company without making a sound split up into their individual platoons and set off in the darkness towards their objective at the summit.
Unfortunately for the men of K Company while the Argentine coscripts may have been reluctant to patrol the surrounding area the professionals of 601 Commando Company certainly were not. One such patrol had heard what sounded a lot like a helicopter. Unable to see much in the darkness and unsure if it was simply a case of the wind playing tricks on them the men had radioed back to the CP on the summit that they were moving to investigate suspected movement to the west. This led to a chance encounter between the British and Argentine commandos when the four man Argentine team almost literally bumped into a platoon of Royal Marines. It is unclear exactly who saw who first but both sides opened fire at roughly the same time. In the ensuing fire fight, which lasted less than a minute the four man Argentine team was wiped out while the British lost one man the marine who had been on point at the head of the platoon. The noise of the firefight had been audible more than a mile away on the summit of the mountain and had alerted the commandos to be ready for something.
The assault on the mountain proper and subsequent firefight was initiated when the same platoon that had encountered the Argentine four man patrol had approached the rocky outcrop that formed the summit from the SW and come under fire. Gradually the fire fight had become larger and larger as the British platoons approaching from the west and NW joined in. Having been conveniently left a number of well placed dug in defensive positions by the men of 12th Regiment the Argentine commander Captain Villarruel had initially been confident of his position. However, as the summit had come under attack from multiple directions, he had become concerned. Despite his use of multiple machine guns the British were easily matching the weight of fire he was throwing at them (it was easy to judge this by looking at the different coloured tracer flying through the air) indicating a significant force. Also, rather than attempting to pin down and destroy his positions the British were actively fighting their way towards them. Clearly this was not a special forces raid or some sort of reconnaissance mission gone wrong or probing of his positions. Based on the size and behaviour of the opposing force Captain Villarruel concluded that this must be the vanguard of the main British force. Still his orders were to hold this position for as long as he could and inflict as many casualties as possible. Right now, he felt confident in his ability to accomplish that objective.
That all changed when the British mortar section finished setting up and joined the fun. The first round was an 81mm illuminating round which burned brightly in the air above the argentines clearly illuminating them to anyone who cared to look. The Royal Marines immediately took advantage. Firstly, now clearly able to see their targets the GPMG gunners brought the Argentines under now very accurate suppressing fire. Secondly taking advantage of the fact that the Argentine MG positions were now suppressed and of the fact the Argentines would have just had their night vison destroyed while the British had the way ahead clearly lit for them the Marines took the opportunity to charge forward and close with the Argentines.
For Captain Villarruel this was a complete game changer. Now almost completely to see in the dark after the illumination round had burnt out, he was aware that the British were now nearly on top of his positions which were now coming under mortar fire and had been designed to be defended by a much larger regular infantry force than the small effectively light infantry force he had at his disposal Villarruel decided enough was enough. He was outnumbered and rapidly becoming out gunned. Being attacked on three sides left only one line of retreat open to him. If the British commander was smart, he may recognise this himself and move to cut of Villarruel’s force, therefore he needed to get moving now. Giving the order to withdraw to a designated rally point on the eastern slope of the mountain the Argentines began their pre-planned move. Four men remained behind as a rear-guard force to cover the retreat. At first these men did a pretty impressive job and it took a few minutes for the Marines to notice that while the machine guns were still firing the rifle fire had stopped. Once they had worked out what this likely meant the men of K company had decided to press the issue and the four man Argentine rear guard had quickly found themselves surrounded and seeing that there was no way out and that by this point their deaths would achieve nothing them men individually decided that it was better to live to fight another day and slightly worried that they may be shot in the process raised their hands and climbed out of their positions.
Arriving at the top of Mount Kent the British commander had been a little disappointed to not to find an Argentine flag that he could lower but all the same had reported back to 3 Commando Brigade HQ in San Carlos that they had successfully taken Mount Kent. He reported having engaged an Argentine force and, in his words, had “malleted them”.
The men of 42 Commando were rather intrigued to discover that their six prisoners (two more Argentines had been wounded by a mortar shell and gunshot wound respectively and been unable to evacuate) were Argentine special forces. The men were marines were quite proud of the fact that they had just taken on and bested the best troops that the enemy had to offer.
However, in the process they had had seven of their own number killed with a further six wounded. Of the Argentines six had been captured alive and the bodies of another four had been recovered. The rest of the Argentine reckoned to be a reinforced platoon in strength had withdrawn down the eastern slope.
Over the remainder of the night and the next day the rest of 42 Commando was airlifted to Mount Kent. Rather than concentrating on the summit the Battalion was spread far and wide as they moved to secure Mount Challenger and the other surrounding hills. While many of these positions were garrisoned again and again the Argentines saw that they would be outnumbered and an order was sent out from 601/602’s HQ element for a general withdrawal back to friendly lines.
With Mount Kent largely secure the process of setting up a forward base began.
Chinook helicopters lifted an entire battery of 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery to the area in one go with each helicopter carrying three guns and crew internally and 300 105mm shells in underslung containers. Brigadier Thompson wanted the battery set up and ready to urgently in case the Argentines tried any sort of counter attack. Admiral Woodward wanted the guns set up as once they were able to start putting shells down onto the enemy positions it meant that his issue with rapidly dwindling air weapons stocks would no longer be as critical. Throughout the course of the day of the 26th almost every helicopter that the British had at their disposal was used to transport almost the entirety of the fighting element of 3 Commando Brigade to the Mount Kent area. The Guardsmen and Gurkhas of 5 Brigade were now beginning to arrive ashore at San Carlos freeing up the Para’s and Marines for an air move to their brand new forward operating base and the next phase of the campaign.
At Midday on the 26th of May the first British artillery shells landed on the outskirts of Port Stanley and the Argentine positions on the mountains in between began to come under regular sustained fire. The noose had now been placed around the necks of the Argentine force on the islands. In the next phase of the operation the British would tighten that noose if not open the trapdoor under the Argentines.
As the British had become stronger and more dug into their position at San Carlos patrols had been pushing further and further out from the defensive perimeter in all directions. The most immediate objective of these patrols was to get the kind of intelligence and situational awareness within the vicinity of the beach head that only men on the ground could provide. Air reconnaissance can only tell you so much. While good for identifying large formations and movements a photograph taken from the air wouldn’t really be able to tell you how marshy was the ground, what was the climate like, what natural features would visible from the ground that could aid navigation, ect. Worse it was well known to the British based on the capabilities of some of their own men that a small section of men who knew what they were doing and had the right camouflage equipment with time to prepare could avoid detection from the air.
The main effort in regards to these patrols was pushing men out eastwards to scout out the line of advance towards Port Stanley. The next phase of the British campaign was to be an assault on Mount Kent by troops that were to be airlifted into the area. Not wanting to risk losing momentum and taking advantage of the fact that it would take a number of days to get themselves into a position where they would be ready to launch such an assault pretty much as soon as they had landed four days previously a number of patrols had set out on foot eastwards.
The men that made up these patrols were all Royal Marine Commando’s drawn from the Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre operating in their traditional role of brigade reconnaissance. Usually a training unit made up of staff and students this unit had been called upon like so many others at short notice to beef up the British order of battle and plug a hole in 3 COMMANDO Brigade’s capabilities. Being commandos used to operating behind enemy lines with their unique skillsets these men were perfect for the job of operating behind enemy lines in an environment that was almost identical to Dartmoor where these men had spent so much of their recent lives training. Their capabilities being held in such high regard meant that they were also judged to be pretty much the next closest thing to Special Forces.
While the SF men of the SAS and SBS would be more than capable of such a mission and many of whom were already at that point in time manning various OP’s in the field there were a number of issues preventing their deployment. The first was that pretty much all of the SF men that had come along on Operation CORPORATE were already committed to various tasks. Between the men already on missions on various parts of the Falklands, men still on or returning from Pebble Island and men resting after returning from missions there wasn’t really anyone available to be sent.
Secondly most of the SF men in the OP’s had been in the field for nearly three weeks now. Rations were beginning to be exhausted, fatigue brought on by living outdoors in a harsh environment was setting in and the longer they remained in proximity to the enemy the more the odds of discovery went against them. The men would also likely be starting to be affected by their relative isolation. For operational reasons radio communication between the OP’s and any other British forces was kept to an absolute minimum and the men were very aware of just how far away they were from friendly territory or any kind of relative safety. There was a reason why SF selection had such a fearsome reputation for testing a man’s physical and mental strength.
Some of these SF teams had already begun the process of exfiltrating from their positions. Some would head away from any Argentine forces to somewhere judged to be suitably remote to allow them to be picked up by helicopter (whether they would be flown to San Carlos or a ship at sea would depend on what aircraft could be made available). Those unlucky to be “close” to friendly forces would still have an extremely long walk ahead of them.
The use of Commando’s from the San Carlos beach head for forward reconnaissance and patrolling would in part compensate for the loss of up to date intelligence gathering capability as a result of the withdrawal of special forces teams.
One such team of Marines was an 18 man team led by Captain Rod Boswell RM. Their objective was an isolated building called Top Marlow House.
Sat about half way between San Carlos and the mountains that surrounded Port Stanley the house was the only structure for miles around and sat pretty much right in the middle of the planned air corridor that would have to be established between San Carlos and the forces that would be operating in the mountains to the east.
Due to the frequent snowstorms and heavy rainfall it made sense that any Argentines in the area being almost certainly from a much hotter climate and unused to this cold weather would even if only temporarily seek to make use of this building for shelter.
Having travelled from San Carlos on foot it had taken Captain Boswell’s team a few days to arrive. Wary of the possibility of Argentine observation positions trying to provide early warning for anyone garrisoning the house Boswell had sent four handpicked men ahead to scout for any such dangers. The men had returned having not found any evidence of Argentines in the immediate vicinity and had been able to lead the rest of the force along the safe route they had scouted.
Boswell’s orders upon reaching the house had been to check if it was occupied and if not occupy it himself and keep out any unwanted guests. Basically, denying the use of the position to the enemy. In the last few hours of daylight on the 25th the marines crawling across the ground on their bellies and using the inclement weather for cover had been able to get close enough to the house to conclude that it was indeed occupied by an enemy force.
The Argentine forces occupying the house were a 12 man section from 602 Commando Company. The Argentines were now treating the mountains that surrounded Port Stanley as effectively their “Front Line” a number of Commandos had been sent forward into the ground between the mountains and the British beach head at San Carlos into what was now in effect “no man’s land”. The force at Top Malo House was one of the most forward Argentine positions. And had been chosen for largely the same reason as the British with it being ideally placed in the expected British line of advance to provide early warning. Though they had initially tried to conduct local patrols many times as with this occasion the inclement weather had made them take shelter in the house. Navigation in the largely featureless terrain had proved difficult in reduced visibility if not impossible when mist had set in. The Argentine Commando’s had found themselves having to expend so much energy just battling the hostile environment that actually scouting for a British advance was often beyond their capabilities. Frequently they had decided that it would be better just to remain in the relative protection of the house and observe from there. They reasoned that a sentry who was inside and warm would be much better able to stay alert and keep watch and that in the event of an attack they would have much better odd if they fought from the cover of a building rather than in the open terrain.
Fatally they reasoned that any British forces in the area must also be handicapped like them for the same reasons. For the Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre the fact that they could operate where others simply couldn’t go was a complete vindication of their training.
Observing the house from a distance of a little over half a mile Captain Boswell weighed up his options. While he reckoned his men could successfully assault and capture the building, he would almost certainly take some casualties in the process and if his men didn’t move with enough speed an assault could easily turn into a prolonged firefight. While the option of ground assault was viable it wouldn’t be justifiable until all over options had been ruled out. Withdrawing away from the house and rejoing the men who had remained further away including the signaller Boswell decided to see if he could get some outside help to permanently deal with the threat posed by Top Malo House. He knew he was out of range of both naval and land based artillery support but there just might be enough daylight left for air support.
Despite the heavy losses the Argentines were known to have suffered the fact that British forces were now ashore on the Falklands was putting extra pressure on the Phantoms and Sea Harriers who now as well as still providing CAP for the carrier group out to sea now had to provide air cover for the forces ashore. This had only been achieved by reducing the number of aircraft covering the carrier to allow some to be retasked to this new role. Aware that the task force only carried a finite and slowly depleting quantity of jet fuel British planners had decided to get the most out of the aircraft they had. This meant that the Phantoms providing air support for ground forces were carrying only half of their usual compliment of air to air missiles with the saved space being used for SNEB 68mm rocket pods. This meant that the Phantoms were now capable of providing a degree of close air support and saved fuel as it meant that there was now no requirement to keep Buccaneer’s in the air over the Falklands to fulfil this role. One such aircraft was retasked in response to Captain Boswell’s request.
Proudly sporting the silhouettes of Argentine Mirage’s on the side of their cockpit the Phantom crew having made contact with marines and advised them to keep their heads down had proceeded to launch the first air to ground Phantom strike of the conflict utterly obliterating the house along with its occupants and in the process churning up quite a lot of mud around the building. Having confirmed a successful strike and thanking the Phantom crew the Royal Marine Sgt acting as a forward air controller sent the Phantom on its way. Looking at the burning remains of their objective he turned to Captain Boswell and asked the question “Well sir what do we do now?”
This little skirmish while having been spectacular to watch had in the grand scheme of things been just a little distraction from the main event of that night.
Mount Kent is approximately 1400 feet high. Overlooking Mount Challenger to the South and substantially higher than Two Sisters and Mount Longdon to the east whoever holds the various peaks that make up the mountain would be afforded an excellent view of and effectively dominate the surrounding area. From a military point of view the British viewed the mountain as the key to the eastern approaches to Port Stanley and an ideal location for a forward base that could serves as a starting point for further operations and advances eastwards.
Originally the mountain had been held by men of the 12th Infantry Regiment. A four man SAS patrol had been tasked with carrying out reconnaissance and intelligence gathering on the mountain and had had a degree of success in this. The SAS men had been able to observe the conscripts as they had moved around their bunkers and trenches and also at night when they had frequently showed lights from hand torches and cooking stoves. The SAS observers had considered this to be an appalling lapse in field discipline highlighting the difference between the standards of conscript and professional troops. Many Argentine’s would never know just how many times they had literally been in someone’s crosshairs or how many times they had literally been just meters away from instant death. However, when air attacks against Argentine troop concentrations had started The SAS men had been forced to withdraw to more distant position to avoid the risk of becoming collateral damage as a result of the frequent use of area weapons such as rockets and cluster munitions. Though Mount Kent wasn’t subjected to the same frequency or intensity of air attacks as other locations on the island the SAS men did note that Argentine patrol activity did seem to be dropping off. Surviving Argentines would later recount that while not inflicting much in the way of casualties the air attacks had had the effect of making the young and poorly trained and disciplined Argentine conscripts increasingly reluctant to emerge from their bunkers and trenches and patrol the rocks and windswept grass on top of the mountain much to the utter fury of their officers and NCO’s.
Earlier in the day the men of the 12th Infantry Regiment had withdrawn eastwards. The Argentine commanders in Port Stanley had decided that Mount Kent was too isolated and far away from other Argentine positions to be realistically defendable. In keeping with his new strategy of making sure that all his positions were strong enough to ensure that the British would not be able to isolate and destroy them piecemeal Brigadier Menendez had withdrawn the 12th Regiment to reinforce the garrisons on the mountains further to the east. Such had been the haste with which the men had been withdrawn earlier that day that some men accidentally had left behind many items of personal equipment including vital sleeping bags.
In their place had come a detachment of 601 and 602 Commando Companies. These commandos were effectively now using Mount Kent as a position from which to provide screening from the main Argentine defensive line to the east. Their orders were to observes and conduct reconnaissance to locate the inevitable British advance. It was recognised that they ultimately would not be able to hold Mount Kent in which case their orders were to hold out for as long as possible delaying the British timetable, inflicting losses and gathering intelligence before ultimately withdrawing when the situation became untenable. Making the British bleed as much as they could.
The task of assaulting Mount Kent had fallen to 42 Commando. This operation had been planned for a while but as always, a spanner had been thrown into the works at the last minute when the SAS OP had reported that the Argentines seemed to be replacing the garrison for some reason. The original plan had been for almost the entire battalion to assault the mountain in one go however with this new information and also the air movements officer almost point blank refusing to make the required number of helicopters available as they were already in extremely high demand for other taskings a new plan had been devised for a smaller and quitter company sized probing and assault followed by rapid reinforcement. Packing themselves into the three available passive night vision equipped Sea King HC.4’s the men of K company had the honour of being the spearhead company. The three aircraft slightly overloaded with the extra ammunition, 81mm mortars and over equipment that the Marines were bringing flew low and hugged the terrain as the made their approach. They disgorged their passengers at a specially selected LZ about two miles away from the summit behind a ridgeline which not only gave them some cover but also helped to screen some of the noise of the helicopter engines. As the aircraft departed to go and pick up the next wave the men of K company without making a sound split up into their individual platoons and set off in the darkness towards their objective at the summit.
Unfortunately for the men of K Company while the Argentine coscripts may have been reluctant to patrol the surrounding area the professionals of 601 Commando Company certainly were not. One such patrol had heard what sounded a lot like a helicopter. Unable to see much in the darkness and unsure if it was simply a case of the wind playing tricks on them the men had radioed back to the CP on the summit that they were moving to investigate suspected movement to the west. This led to a chance encounter between the British and Argentine commandos when the four man Argentine team almost literally bumped into a platoon of Royal Marines. It is unclear exactly who saw who first but both sides opened fire at roughly the same time. In the ensuing fire fight, which lasted less than a minute the four man Argentine team was wiped out while the British lost one man the marine who had been on point at the head of the platoon. The noise of the firefight had been audible more than a mile away on the summit of the mountain and had alerted the commandos to be ready for something.
The assault on the mountain proper and subsequent firefight was initiated when the same platoon that had encountered the Argentine four man patrol had approached the rocky outcrop that formed the summit from the SW and come under fire. Gradually the fire fight had become larger and larger as the British platoons approaching from the west and NW joined in. Having been conveniently left a number of well placed dug in defensive positions by the men of 12th Regiment the Argentine commander Captain Villarruel had initially been confident of his position. However, as the summit had come under attack from multiple directions, he had become concerned. Despite his use of multiple machine guns the British were easily matching the weight of fire he was throwing at them (it was easy to judge this by looking at the different coloured tracer flying through the air) indicating a significant force. Also, rather than attempting to pin down and destroy his positions the British were actively fighting their way towards them. Clearly this was not a special forces raid or some sort of reconnaissance mission gone wrong or probing of his positions. Based on the size and behaviour of the opposing force Captain Villarruel concluded that this must be the vanguard of the main British force. Still his orders were to hold this position for as long as he could and inflict as many casualties as possible. Right now, he felt confident in his ability to accomplish that objective.
That all changed when the British mortar section finished setting up and joined the fun. The first round was an 81mm illuminating round which burned brightly in the air above the argentines clearly illuminating them to anyone who cared to look. The Royal Marines immediately took advantage. Firstly, now clearly able to see their targets the GPMG gunners brought the Argentines under now very accurate suppressing fire. Secondly taking advantage of the fact that the Argentine MG positions were now suppressed and of the fact the Argentines would have just had their night vison destroyed while the British had the way ahead clearly lit for them the Marines took the opportunity to charge forward and close with the Argentines.
For Captain Villarruel this was a complete game changer. Now almost completely to see in the dark after the illumination round had burnt out, he was aware that the British were now nearly on top of his positions which were now coming under mortar fire and had been designed to be defended by a much larger regular infantry force than the small effectively light infantry force he had at his disposal Villarruel decided enough was enough. He was outnumbered and rapidly becoming out gunned. Being attacked on three sides left only one line of retreat open to him. If the British commander was smart, he may recognise this himself and move to cut of Villarruel’s force, therefore he needed to get moving now. Giving the order to withdraw to a designated rally point on the eastern slope of the mountain the Argentines began their pre-planned move. Four men remained behind as a rear-guard force to cover the retreat. At first these men did a pretty impressive job and it took a few minutes for the Marines to notice that while the machine guns were still firing the rifle fire had stopped. Once they had worked out what this likely meant the men of K company had decided to press the issue and the four man Argentine rear guard had quickly found themselves surrounded and seeing that there was no way out and that by this point their deaths would achieve nothing them men individually decided that it was better to live to fight another day and slightly worried that they may be shot in the process raised their hands and climbed out of their positions.
Arriving at the top of Mount Kent the British commander had been a little disappointed to not to find an Argentine flag that he could lower but all the same had reported back to 3 Commando Brigade HQ in San Carlos that they had successfully taken Mount Kent. He reported having engaged an Argentine force and, in his words, had “malleted them”.
The men of 42 Commando were rather intrigued to discover that their six prisoners (two more Argentines had been wounded by a mortar shell and gunshot wound respectively and been unable to evacuate) were Argentine special forces. The men were marines were quite proud of the fact that they had just taken on and bested the best troops that the enemy had to offer.
However, in the process they had had seven of their own number killed with a further six wounded. Of the Argentines six had been captured alive and the bodies of another four had been recovered. The rest of the Argentine reckoned to be a reinforced platoon in strength had withdrawn down the eastern slope.
Over the remainder of the night and the next day the rest of 42 Commando was airlifted to Mount Kent. Rather than concentrating on the summit the Battalion was spread far and wide as they moved to secure Mount Challenger and the other surrounding hills. While many of these positions were garrisoned again and again the Argentines saw that they would be outnumbered and an order was sent out from 601/602’s HQ element for a general withdrawal back to friendly lines.
With Mount Kent largely secure the process of setting up a forward base began.
Chinook helicopters lifted an entire battery of 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery to the area in one go with each helicopter carrying three guns and crew internally and 300 105mm shells in underslung containers. Brigadier Thompson wanted the battery set up and ready to urgently in case the Argentines tried any sort of counter attack. Admiral Woodward wanted the guns set up as once they were able to start putting shells down onto the enemy positions it meant that his issue with rapidly dwindling air weapons stocks would no longer be as critical. Throughout the course of the day of the 26th almost every helicopter that the British had at their disposal was used to transport almost the entirety of the fighting element of 3 Commando Brigade to the Mount Kent area. The Guardsmen and Gurkhas of 5 Brigade were now beginning to arrive ashore at San Carlos freeing up the Para’s and Marines for an air move to their brand new forward operating base and the next phase of the campaign.
At Midday on the 26th of May the first British artillery shells landed on the outskirts of Port Stanley and the Argentine positions on the mountains in between began to come under regular sustained fire. The noose had now been placed around the necks of the Argentine force on the islands. In the next phase of the operation the British would tighten that noose if not open the trapdoor under the Argentines.
This might be a good time for an "accident" to happen to the Argentine ammo supplies. "We fought to the last bullet, honest! Except someone had an accident with a grenade and we sort of lost most of it before the British even turned up..."
I highly doubt cold conscripts really want to fight for a scrap of land after seeing their comrade in the AAF and Navy decimated and we know their leader doesn't. Any fanatical lower ranked officers? Well if they're lucky the men might leave a pin on their pillow as warning. If unlucky the grenade is tossed in first thing...
I highly doubt cold conscripts really want to fight for a scrap of land after seeing their comrade in the AAF and Navy decimated and we know their leader doesn't. Any fanatical lower ranked officers? Well if they're lucky the men might leave a pin on their pillow as warning. If unlucky the grenade is tossed in first thing...