HMS EAGLE in the Falklands
- Thread starter flasheart
- Start date
That might slow the approach to Port Stanley. Presumably the British forces are prepared for them.
Good update - nice, realistic changes from OTL (Top Malo house got pounded even worse ITTL!). Mount Kent is indeed in a great position to command the land approaches to Stanley - I remember having a look around from the radar site there (that was a good few years after the war, though).
In some cases it did in others the ground was too frozen and they did not work
When the Argentine commanders at South Georgia were intending to surrender they apparently diliberately did so in a fashion that forced the British delegation to unknowningly cross a minefield
Fortunately the ground was frozen and none of mines went off.
However I know at least 1 attack - I think 45 Commando's - was only detected when a RM JNCO trod on one
Most of the deliberate attacks were only conducted after several days of intensive patrolling and I understand that many of the minefields were found and the assault plans modified accordingly
If my memory recalls, H.M.S Eagle is still lacking 1 Fairey Gannet AEW right? What are the chances we can replace it with one of these bad boys?
A Breguet Alize. The French Navy flew these off their carriers Foch and Clemenceau up to the 90s. They helped serve in a basic AEW, and ASW similar to the Gannet. I'm sure the French government/Marine Nationale would discreetly lend one for temporary use.
A Breguet Alize. The French Navy flew these off their carriers Foch and Clemenceau up to the 90s. They helped serve in a basic AEW, and ASW similar to the Gannet. I'm sure the French government/Marine Nationale would discreetly lend one for temporary use.
Not to mention getting the plane and it's spares & tools down there. It would take severall days. At this point, it's not really worth it.
The Road to Stanley
Firebase Kent, 25th – 29th May
When capital punishment was still practised in Britain hangmen used to carefully measure out the length of rope to be used. The aim was to allow for a long enough drop to create enough momentum to cause what was known as a hangman’s fracture. This term meant a catastrophic fracture of the spinal column at the neck causing instantaneous and hopefully painless death. If the hangman made a mistake the most likely outcome was a slower and painful death from strangulation.
In the years following the Falklands conflict the events in the South Atlantic were naturally studied by academics, scholars and staff colleges the world over. It is not known exactly where the Falklands – Hangman analogy originated from but it stuck as it is still a hot topic of debate as to whether the Argentine defence of the heights around Port Stanley resulted in instantaneous death due to a one or more points of catastrophic damage as in a hangman’s fracture or a slower death as a result of the British noose slowly strangling them.
Following the taking of Mount Kent for the next few days Mount Kent and Mount Challenger were abuzz with activity as the British prepared for the next phase of the advance westwards towards Port Stanley. The plan was for a brigade sized assault eastward towards the main objective of Port Stanley by way of taking the various mountain strongpoints that were effectively the lynchpins of the Argentine defensive perimeter.
The amount of preparatory work for such an operation was why it had taken until the night of the 29th before the first British troops left their starting positions.
despite having nearly 60 helicopters now at their disposal it had taken days just to transport nearly the entirety of 3 COMMANDO Brigade and the lions share of 5 Brigade forwards from the Beach head at San Carlos forward to the new forward operating base on Mount Kent that had grown at an alarming rate. First had come the marines of 42 Commando whose K Company had taken the summit of Mount Kent after a vicious firefight that had dislodged the Argentine commandos who had been occupying the position. Following on behind had come the rest of 42 COMMANDO who had moved to secure the rest of Mount Kent and the adjacent Mount Challenger to the south and prepared to fend of any Argentine counter attack. Following on had come the first battery of field guns which had gone into action almost immediately upon their arrival. This first battery would eventually be joined by others from both 29 Commando Regiment RA and 5 Brigades 97 Battery for a total of 24 105mm L118 light guns.
The men of 42 COMMANDO had found themselves eventually joined not only by their comrades in 40 and 45 COMMANDO’s and their mortal enemies in the form of 2 and 3 PARA’s but also the fighting elements of 5 Brigade in the form of 2nd SCOTS GUARDS, 1st WELSH GUARDS and elements from the 7th DUKE OF EDINBURGHS OWN GURKHA RIFLES. Sustaining more than 7 infantry battalions had required the airlift of numerous support units and enormous amounts of supplies. Moving the sheer number of men and quantity of supplies forward from San Carlos had been a truly herculean task. The four Chinooks of 18 squadron proved that they were worth their weight in gold due to their very large lift capability. Indeed the reason why the 5 batteries of artillery had been able to get themselves established so quickly had was the Chinooks ability to carry three guns (along with the gun crews) internally along with an underslung container filled with 300 shells.
Many of the British commanders and planners found themselves dearly wishing that they had brought more of these impressive machines down south.
Of course, having nearly 60 helicopters on paper doesn’t equate to having them all available all the time. The needs of the machines to be maintained and the men to be rested had to be factored into the air movements plans. Nevertheless an almost continuous stream of helicopters flew between San Carlos and the forward operating base at Mount Kent while the other aircraft were maintained and fuelled either at the helicopter operating base that had been established at San Carlos or in the case of the navy aircraft HMS HERMES which was operating just north of the islands in order to be able to provide the services of her hanger facilities and aircraft engineers.
It wasn’t just a case of moving the men and equipment forward. To sustain the reinforced brigade sized force also required vast quantities of supplies. Due to the frequency of artillery actions it was a constant headache for logistics planners who had to allocate flight after flight to the task of bringing forward yet more shells. The NW slope of Mount Kent and flat ground between Mount Kent and the tiny settlement of Estancia was the destination of nearly all of the helicopter flights. The main exceptions were the artillery guns and shells which had to be airlifted directly into position.
Having the British occupied mountains between the Argentine “front line” and the LZ would help to shield the British movements from Argentine observers and hopefully provide a degree of protection from possible Argentine artillery strikes. The various support facilities including a forward first aid post set themselves up in this area. The infantry battalions while sending detachments forward to occupy forward positions between Mount Kent and Mount Challenger would remain on the western slopes of the mountains awaiting the orders to move forward to their starting positions.
The first contact had been an artillery exchange coming not long after 42 COMMANDO had taken Mount Kent. The Argentines had been forced to disperse their artillery as a measure against continuous British airstrikes and as luck would have it a battery of two guns had been in range of Mount Kent and thought that they might try their luck. The catalyst for this had come when the first British artillery shells had started to impact around Argentine positions. The Argentinian gunners had therefore been ordered to conduct a counterfire mission with their pair of 105mm guns.
Normally when moving into a new position artillery gunners will dig themselves into a gunpits to provide protection to both the guns and crews and also the ammunition piles. In this particular engagement and on the Falklands in general both sides had found this nearly impossible. The British up on the high ground had found that rather than digging deep into earth once they had cleared away the top layer of grass the ground was impenetrable bedrock while the Argentines on lower ground had ages ago discovered that the water table was so high that any hole deeper than a foot instantly flooded. For both sides digging a pit big enough to protect a field gun was out of the question.
The alternative was to build up earth revetments around the guns. This meant stripping away the turf around the area which left enormous brown scars on the green landscape and unfortunately for the Argentines signposted the location of the artillery guns to the prowling British aircraft.
To compensate for their inability to fortify their position the British had been making almost excessive use of camouflage netting to conceal their guns. Contact had been initiated when the Argentines had opened fire not long after dawn on the morning of the 26th. A big disadvantage the Argentine gunners had was that they didn’t know exactly where the British artillery guns were located and so attempted to saturate the eastern slope of Mount Kent with shells in the hopes of covering the most likely locations. Only one shell came close to the British guns. One Commando Gunner was sustained shrapnel injuries to his right arm and one of the British guns was temporarily put out of action due to impacts from shrapnel. A specialist from the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineer support detachment was rapidly brought up to the battery and after examining the gun had concluded that there was no real damage to the barrel or mount and the weapon was same to continue firing. Two Royal Marines also sustained shrapnel injuries during the brief engagement and along with the injured gunner quickly found themselves being evacuated back to the field hospital at San Carlos.
The British field guns and range finding equipment were much more modern and newer than the second hand Italian made guns the Argentines were using. Also, the British gunners being well practised professionals with many years’ service were much more skilled in the use of their equipment than the Argentine conscript gunners. Despite the initial shock at coming under artillery fire the British were quick to react. They quickly tracked the trajectory of the argentine shells back to the point where they were estimated to have originated from and quickly launched a counter battery fire mission. The British artilleries superior weight of fire and superior accuracy quickly won out and silenced both Argentine guns.
Pretty much from the moment they had landed days previously the British artillery had been early constantly firing, hence the high demand for shells. There were numerous reasons for this. The most obvious was to soften up the Argentine defences in anticipation of the planned infantry assaults by causing material damage and casualties. There was also the need to take pressure off of the rapidly dwindling stocks of air dropped weapons. These were now to be saved for preplanned strikes only and a supply ready in case of an emergency situation.
The fire missions occurred day and night at seemingly random intervals. The night fire missions were partially intended to deprive the Argentines of sleep to hopefully get them exhausted before the infantry attacks. There was also an effort to try and reduce the Argentinian defenders state of readiness and reaction speeds. It was hoped that if the Argentines found themselves repeatedly coming under short but vicious bombardments of the type that would usually precede and cover for an attack without such an attack materialising then when the real thing did come the Argentines just might be slow to recognise it as an actual attack as opposed to yet another artillery barrage and as a result slower in their reactions.
Another reason the British took their time before advancing was the need to allow sufficient time for adequate reconnaissance. While the mountains had been extensively photographed by air reconnaissance this method had it limitations and the battalion commanders who would soon have to lead their men into these areas wanted as much on sight intelligence as was possible. Far to many times in their history the British armed forces had neglected the need for adequate reconnaissance and had suffered for it. Already the recon detachments that had pushed forward from the western slope of Mount Kent had made discoveries that had justified their efforts. The most important of these discoveries was proof that the Argentines were taking things seriously. Landmines were in play.
Its estimated that during their occupation of the Falklands the Argentinians laid approximately 30,000 land mines in over 140 separate minefields. The majority of these had been placed on the beaches around Port Stanley and on Stanley Common where the Argentines had initially assessed as the most likely British landing site. The units garrisoning the heights that the British would now have to assault had had their own allocation of landmines and had put them to good use mostly attempting to secure their flanks.
In what they would describe as possibly the most dangerous missions they undertook in the entire campaign SAS men had during the nights working in pairs moved silently through the darkness to examine the minefields. Slowly moving forward and probing the ground ahead of them with special nonmagnetic trowels their objectives were to try and get some idea of the extent of the minefields and of what sort of mines were present. A total of 9 different types of Mine were identified with the most common being Italian made SB-33 anti-personnel devices. In some cases, it was found that the frozen ground had had an adverse impact on the placing and condition of the mines meaning that there was a chance that they may not function correctly.
Something that was of particular interest to the men carrying out recon tasking were the Argentine patrols. Rather than just sitting on top of their respective mountains staring at each other both the British and Argentinians had sent patrols down into the valley between the mountains which was now a sort of no mans land to guard against attacks by the other side.
The SAS men who had managed to map out where the western edges of the minefields were had observed the Argentine patrols and crucially had noticed that these patrols were operating west of the minefields. That meant that somewhere there must be at least safe route through or around the minefields.
Working out where this safe path was became the reconnaissance efforts top priority as if there was a potential way to negate the danger posed by the landmines it could save a lot of lives and greatly increase the chances of success.
The most obvious way of doing this was to observe the Argentine patrols as they left and eventually returned to their positions up on the heights. Unfortunately, it seemed that someone on the Argentinian side had foreseen this possibility as patrols would only leave their positions in the darkness before dawn and not return until after dark when it was nearly impossible for them to be observed from a distance.
There had been a few incidents of contact and resulting firefights between the British and Argentine patrols. These had mostly been encounter engagements where patrols had happened to run into each other and had opened fire with the result being neither side unwilling to press the issue and the firefight ending as both sides withdrew towards the protection of their respective lines partially in the hopes of luring the other into the sights of their comrades.
It was decided that the best solution to the question of locating the safe paths through the minefields was to send out a strong force of about platoon strength to locate and attack one of the patrols. Hopefully the patrol would be obliged to withdraw from the fight against a superior opponent and in doing so reveal the safe paths from their pattern of retreat.
The first such operation of this type saw a strong force from 42 COMMANDO engage an Argentine section in the valley between Mount Wall and Mount Harriet. Rather than taking the most route up the mountain where thus far few mines had been discovered the Argentines withdrew southwards and followed the base of the mountain around to the SE covered by indirect machine gun fire. This single piece of information would be crucial in 42 COMMANDO’s O/C Lt Col Nick Vaux’s planning for his upcoming operation.
Feeling emboldened by the success of this operation the British began to mount probing attacks in which platoons of Marines or Paras would cross the stream which marked the rough halfway point between the British and Argentine fronts and attempt to close with and provoke the Argentines into opening fire. While this was a dangerous game to play it did have a pay off which made it worthwhile. A second force comprising just a section of four men would accompany the probing force but would remain a good distance to the north or south and do rather than engaging would do everything possible to disguise their presence. Their job was to act as observers and attempt to map the Argentine firing positions and estimate the enemy’s strength based upon the weight of fire received. These missions would always end with the commander of the probing force calling in artillery or mortar support to cover his withdrawal. Numerous such missions were mounted for two reasons. The first was for continuing reconnaissance and intelligence gathering purposes. The second was a continuation of the efforts to lower the Argentinians readiness and increase their response times. Probing attacks were often made in conjunction with the artillery barrages. Again, the hope was that the enemy would get so used to coming under artillery and small arms fire that when the actual push came, they would be slow to recognise it as such and slower to react effectively.
Finally, as darkness began to fall on the 29th everything was ready to go and H hour was fast approaching. The commanding officers had earlier gathered in Brigadier Thompson’s command post and been briefed. The ambitious plan called for three battalion sized night assaults on the first line of Argentine strong points in its first phase followed by a similar operation on the strongpoints behind. The British ORBAT was as follows:
The southernmost strongpoint of Mount Harriet was to be taken by 40 COMMANDO led by Lt Col Hunt. 40 COMMANDO were now moving to their starting position on the eastern shoulder of Mount Challenger. The battalion commanders had also briefed their individual plans of attack. Lt Col Hunt was planning a direct company sized assault on the western slope of Mount Harriet while another two companies would attempt to move to the south of the mountain and using the safe route that had been plotted through the minefield attempt to flank the defenders.
Two Sisters to the north which formed a ridgeline with Mount Harriet was to be assaulted by 45 COMMANDO led by Lt Col Andrew Whitehead. 45 COMMANDO were already formed up just below the top of the reverse side of the ridgeline between Mount Kent and Challenger where the men were making their final preparations and taking this last opportunity to eat something. Not being able to outflank the enemy due to the geography of the heights he was moving to take Lt Col Whitehead’s plan was for a more direct approach by stealth. His men would get as close as they could and once the Argentines realised what was happening rely on murderous amounts of fire support and his marines training and skill in up close and personal fighting.
For this reason, Whitehead had worked out his plan in conjunction with Lt Col Hunt to ensure coordination and maximise the chances of success (or at least minimize the chances of something going wrong). 45 COMMANDO who would be relying on a stealthy approach would make their assault slight ahead of 40 COMMANDO as it was felt that if the assault on Mount Harriet which was going to be rather more overt went ahead first this would almost certainly alert the defenders on Two Sisters.
Lt Col Herbert Jones’s 2 PARA would have a very long walk to even reach their objective of Mount Longdon to the NE. The reason for this operation was to secure the northern flank of the Marines on Harriet and Two Sisters and potentially provide a good position from which to move on Mount Tumbledown from the north or even potentially bypass it and make a move on Port Stanley. Effectively tightening the noose and cutting off a potential avenue of retreat or reinforcement for the enemy. Due to its distance from the battles that would be taking place on Two Sisters by the time his men had been able to complete the estimated four hour march it would take for them to get to the western slope of Mount Longdon Jones was hoping to be able to use an element of surprise. The Argentine defences in this area were already known from air recon to be facing north to guard against an assault from that direction. Therefore, by attacking from the west he would be able to flank his opponent and hopefully role up the defensive line before the Argentines could reposition themselves to face him. Lt Col Jones was expecting some heavy fighting and so would have the support of not only an entire artillery battery but also a support (Heavy Weapons) company beefed up by men and equipment from 3 PARA who would be following on behind. The Mount Longdon operation had the potential to become a very difficult and messy job which was why 2 PARA famed for their aggression had been chosen. While some things could be said about his leadership and command style there was certainly no doubting Lt Col H. Jones bravery and ability to get the job done.
Following behind 40 COMMANDO would be the Welsh Guards led by Lt Col John Rickett. If all went to plan once Mount Harriet had been captured the Welsh Guards would relive the marines and maintain the strategic momentum by using it as a starting point for their own assault on Mount Tumbledown to the east the following evening. If things went badly or the Argentines decided to counter attack they would support 40 COMMANDO.
The Scots Guards under Lt Col Michael Scott would be following on behind 45 COMMANDO up onto Two Sisters where like their Welsh counterparts they would relive the expectedly exhausted marines and launch their own assault on the next Argentine strongpoint on Mount Tumbledown. There was still a lingering concern about the capabilities of the Guards units. Unlike the Paras and Marines who were kept at a very high state of readiness anyway as a matter of routine the guards had come straight from public duties in London and hadn’t had the chance to go through much in the way of refresher training or work up. They had only been chosen for this operation because they were the only infantry units that had been available at the time. Between the units allocated to its NATO commitments in Germany and the counterterrorist effort in Northern Ireland and now this little show in the South Atlantic the British Army was really feeling overstretched.
3 PARA under Lt Col Hew Pike would be hot on the heels of 2 PARA in moving towards Mount Longdon and indeed had lent some of its men to support 2 PARA’s assault. If it turned into a slugging match it was felt that the combined might of 2 and 3 PARA would be enough to overwhelm the Argentine defenders. If all went to plan however and 2 PARA was able to get the job done alone 3 PARA would move onto Mount Longdon and then depending on how the situation developed either move eastwards to take Wireless Ridge or south to support the Guards attack on Mount Tumbledown.
The Gurkhas that had been airlifted to Mount Kent were not at full battalion strength. Led by Lt Col Morgan their main role so far in this campaign had been platoon and company strength detachment duties such as defending the beaches at San Carlos, guarding prisoners, lines of communication troops ect. However enough men were still available to form a pretty capable force and had been brought here to either act as a reserve if needed or else take part in the planned second phase assault on Tumbledown. The Gurkhas who coming from a climate and terrain similar to that found on the Falklands had been in their absolute element as soon as they had arrived. They had initially been extremely upset when they had been told that the battalion was to be broken up and used for guarding and security duties as they felt that they were being unfairly denied the opportunity to gain some regimental glory and battle honours. Now that some of them had been brought out here and tod to prepare themselves for some action the Nepalese warriors could barely contain their excitement at the prospect of being able to mix it up with the enemy and cover themselves in glory.
Gurkhas are none for nearly constantly having a smile on their face even when there was no obvious reason for it. Right now, everyone who saw their enormous grins understood why and felt a slight chill and pity for the men on the other side if the valley to the east.
42 COMMANDO under Lt Col Nick Vaux much to their disdain would remain on Mount Kent and Challenger to provide local security to the artillery batteries, LZ, field hospital and supply dumps. The Falklands campaign is interesting from a strategic point of view as it was the first conventional campaign where the British thought in terms of strongpoints as opposed to territory held and front lines at a strategic level. Whereas the positioning of the Argentine forces facing them did allow for a rough “front line” to be marked the British planners were treating this almost like a counter insurgency campaign similar to that which had been experienced in Northern Ireland and other places. Strong positions were established and forces operated from and returned to these where the emphasis was focused on locating and destroying the enemy as opposed to taking and holding ground. The exception to this was the overall objective of advancing towards and taking Port Stanley.
At this point British commanders felt that there were two big threats to Operation Corporate. The first was the nights attacks on the Argentine strongpoints failing and resulting in heavy losses. While bad this wouldn’t be catastrophic as from a military perspective it would just stall the campaign as opposed to ending it and they would just have to try again later perhaps using the guards and a lot more bombs next time.
The second risk while actually less likely to be realised was actually more worrying. With the overwhelming majority of the British fighting units now on the eastern part of East Falkland the defence of the vital beachead at San Carlos was now left to a few companies of Gurkhas and simple geography. The only force of any significance on East Falkland that wasn’t now caught in the British noose was the garrison at Goose Green. While the airfield had been put out of action by heavy air attacks and the garrison assessed to have sustained significant casualties as a result British commanders were still worried about the prospect of this force attempting to move north to attack the beachead approximately 20 miles away. While the garrison was known to be intended and equipped for defensive operations to hold their ground and given the losses, they had taken unlikely to do such a thing if the beacheads were cut off or destroyed it would potentially end the entire operation then and there until supply lines could be re-established. To guard against this the remaining cluster bombs and quite a few other bits of ordinance aboard HMS EAGLE had been set aside to be ready to respond to such a move. AN SAS observation post was located just NE of Goose Green where they would likely spot any Argentine movements north. If they or one of the frequent photorecon fights spotted such movement the Argentines would be hit with nearly every remaining cluster bomb and rocket in the now alarmingly depleted British arsenal. If they did make it close enough to San Carlos then the warships still in the harbour would fire on them with their 4.5 inch guns. If it came to that point Major General Moore had already made it clear that he would call an immediate halt to offensive operations in the east and rush to have 42 COMMANDO or whoever else was available airlifted back to San Carlos to counter attack.
Meeting completed and having synchronised their watches the officers had returned to their respective battalions. It is often said that the worst part of any battle is the waiting. The men who like the professionals they were had finished their preparations ages ago and now in full battle order had nothing to do but sit and wait at their unit’s respective start lines for the order to advanced. In some places the men felt like what they thought their forebearers in the trenches had thought during the night before the battle of the Somme.
Finally, H Hour arrived and silently three battalions of paratroopers and marines stood up and silently descended from the mountains to the west into the darkness and silence below. It would not stay silent for long.
When capital punishment was still practised in Britain hangmen used to carefully measure out the length of rope to be used. The aim was to allow for a long enough drop to create enough momentum to cause what was known as a hangman’s fracture. This term meant a catastrophic fracture of the spinal column at the neck causing instantaneous and hopefully painless death. If the hangman made a mistake the most likely outcome was a slower and painful death from strangulation.
In the years following the Falklands conflict the events in the South Atlantic were naturally studied by academics, scholars and staff colleges the world over. It is not known exactly where the Falklands – Hangman analogy originated from but it stuck as it is still a hot topic of debate as to whether the Argentine defence of the heights around Port Stanley resulted in instantaneous death due to a one or more points of catastrophic damage as in a hangman’s fracture or a slower death as a result of the British noose slowly strangling them.
Following the taking of Mount Kent for the next few days Mount Kent and Mount Challenger were abuzz with activity as the British prepared for the next phase of the advance westwards towards Port Stanley. The plan was for a brigade sized assault eastward towards the main objective of Port Stanley by way of taking the various mountain strongpoints that were effectively the lynchpins of the Argentine defensive perimeter.
The amount of preparatory work for such an operation was why it had taken until the night of the 29th before the first British troops left their starting positions.
despite having nearly 60 helicopters now at their disposal it had taken days just to transport nearly the entirety of 3 COMMANDO Brigade and the lions share of 5 Brigade forwards from the Beach head at San Carlos forward to the new forward operating base on Mount Kent that had grown at an alarming rate. First had come the marines of 42 Commando whose K Company had taken the summit of Mount Kent after a vicious firefight that had dislodged the Argentine commandos who had been occupying the position. Following on behind had come the rest of 42 COMMANDO who had moved to secure the rest of Mount Kent and the adjacent Mount Challenger to the south and prepared to fend of any Argentine counter attack. Following on had come the first battery of field guns which had gone into action almost immediately upon their arrival. This first battery would eventually be joined by others from both 29 Commando Regiment RA and 5 Brigades 97 Battery for a total of 24 105mm L118 light guns.
The men of 42 COMMANDO had found themselves eventually joined not only by their comrades in 40 and 45 COMMANDO’s and their mortal enemies in the form of 2 and 3 PARA’s but also the fighting elements of 5 Brigade in the form of 2nd SCOTS GUARDS, 1st WELSH GUARDS and elements from the 7th DUKE OF EDINBURGHS OWN GURKHA RIFLES. Sustaining more than 7 infantry battalions had required the airlift of numerous support units and enormous amounts of supplies. Moving the sheer number of men and quantity of supplies forward from San Carlos had been a truly herculean task. The four Chinooks of 18 squadron proved that they were worth their weight in gold due to their very large lift capability. Indeed the reason why the 5 batteries of artillery had been able to get themselves established so quickly had was the Chinooks ability to carry three guns (along with the gun crews) internally along with an underslung container filled with 300 shells.
Many of the British commanders and planners found themselves dearly wishing that they had brought more of these impressive machines down south.
Of course, having nearly 60 helicopters on paper doesn’t equate to having them all available all the time. The needs of the machines to be maintained and the men to be rested had to be factored into the air movements plans. Nevertheless an almost continuous stream of helicopters flew between San Carlos and the forward operating base at Mount Kent while the other aircraft were maintained and fuelled either at the helicopter operating base that had been established at San Carlos or in the case of the navy aircraft HMS HERMES which was operating just north of the islands in order to be able to provide the services of her hanger facilities and aircraft engineers.
It wasn’t just a case of moving the men and equipment forward. To sustain the reinforced brigade sized force also required vast quantities of supplies. Due to the frequency of artillery actions it was a constant headache for logistics planners who had to allocate flight after flight to the task of bringing forward yet more shells. The NW slope of Mount Kent and flat ground between Mount Kent and the tiny settlement of Estancia was the destination of nearly all of the helicopter flights. The main exceptions were the artillery guns and shells which had to be airlifted directly into position.
Having the British occupied mountains between the Argentine “front line” and the LZ would help to shield the British movements from Argentine observers and hopefully provide a degree of protection from possible Argentine artillery strikes. The various support facilities including a forward first aid post set themselves up in this area. The infantry battalions while sending detachments forward to occupy forward positions between Mount Kent and Mount Challenger would remain on the western slopes of the mountains awaiting the orders to move forward to their starting positions.
The first contact had been an artillery exchange coming not long after 42 COMMANDO had taken Mount Kent. The Argentines had been forced to disperse their artillery as a measure against continuous British airstrikes and as luck would have it a battery of two guns had been in range of Mount Kent and thought that they might try their luck. The catalyst for this had come when the first British artillery shells had started to impact around Argentine positions. The Argentinian gunners had therefore been ordered to conduct a counterfire mission with their pair of 105mm guns.
Normally when moving into a new position artillery gunners will dig themselves into a gunpits to provide protection to both the guns and crews and also the ammunition piles. In this particular engagement and on the Falklands in general both sides had found this nearly impossible. The British up on the high ground had found that rather than digging deep into earth once they had cleared away the top layer of grass the ground was impenetrable bedrock while the Argentines on lower ground had ages ago discovered that the water table was so high that any hole deeper than a foot instantly flooded. For both sides digging a pit big enough to protect a field gun was out of the question.
The alternative was to build up earth revetments around the guns. This meant stripping away the turf around the area which left enormous brown scars on the green landscape and unfortunately for the Argentines signposted the location of the artillery guns to the prowling British aircraft.
To compensate for their inability to fortify their position the British had been making almost excessive use of camouflage netting to conceal their guns. Contact had been initiated when the Argentines had opened fire not long after dawn on the morning of the 26th. A big disadvantage the Argentine gunners had was that they didn’t know exactly where the British artillery guns were located and so attempted to saturate the eastern slope of Mount Kent with shells in the hopes of covering the most likely locations. Only one shell came close to the British guns. One Commando Gunner was sustained shrapnel injuries to his right arm and one of the British guns was temporarily put out of action due to impacts from shrapnel. A specialist from the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineer support detachment was rapidly brought up to the battery and after examining the gun had concluded that there was no real damage to the barrel or mount and the weapon was same to continue firing. Two Royal Marines also sustained shrapnel injuries during the brief engagement and along with the injured gunner quickly found themselves being evacuated back to the field hospital at San Carlos.
The British field guns and range finding equipment were much more modern and newer than the second hand Italian made guns the Argentines were using. Also, the British gunners being well practised professionals with many years’ service were much more skilled in the use of their equipment than the Argentine conscript gunners. Despite the initial shock at coming under artillery fire the British were quick to react. They quickly tracked the trajectory of the argentine shells back to the point where they were estimated to have originated from and quickly launched a counter battery fire mission. The British artilleries superior weight of fire and superior accuracy quickly won out and silenced both Argentine guns.
Pretty much from the moment they had landed days previously the British artillery had been early constantly firing, hence the high demand for shells. There were numerous reasons for this. The most obvious was to soften up the Argentine defences in anticipation of the planned infantry assaults by causing material damage and casualties. There was also the need to take pressure off of the rapidly dwindling stocks of air dropped weapons. These were now to be saved for preplanned strikes only and a supply ready in case of an emergency situation.
The fire missions occurred day and night at seemingly random intervals. The night fire missions were partially intended to deprive the Argentines of sleep to hopefully get them exhausted before the infantry attacks. There was also an effort to try and reduce the Argentinian defenders state of readiness and reaction speeds. It was hoped that if the Argentines found themselves repeatedly coming under short but vicious bombardments of the type that would usually precede and cover for an attack without such an attack materialising then when the real thing did come the Argentines just might be slow to recognise it as an actual attack as opposed to yet another artillery barrage and as a result slower in their reactions.
Another reason the British took their time before advancing was the need to allow sufficient time for adequate reconnaissance. While the mountains had been extensively photographed by air reconnaissance this method had it limitations and the battalion commanders who would soon have to lead their men into these areas wanted as much on sight intelligence as was possible. Far to many times in their history the British armed forces had neglected the need for adequate reconnaissance and had suffered for it. Already the recon detachments that had pushed forward from the western slope of Mount Kent had made discoveries that had justified their efforts. The most important of these discoveries was proof that the Argentines were taking things seriously. Landmines were in play.
Its estimated that during their occupation of the Falklands the Argentinians laid approximately 30,000 land mines in over 140 separate minefields. The majority of these had been placed on the beaches around Port Stanley and on Stanley Common where the Argentines had initially assessed as the most likely British landing site. The units garrisoning the heights that the British would now have to assault had had their own allocation of landmines and had put them to good use mostly attempting to secure their flanks.
In what they would describe as possibly the most dangerous missions they undertook in the entire campaign SAS men had during the nights working in pairs moved silently through the darkness to examine the minefields. Slowly moving forward and probing the ground ahead of them with special nonmagnetic trowels their objectives were to try and get some idea of the extent of the minefields and of what sort of mines were present. A total of 9 different types of Mine were identified with the most common being Italian made SB-33 anti-personnel devices. In some cases, it was found that the frozen ground had had an adverse impact on the placing and condition of the mines meaning that there was a chance that they may not function correctly.
Something that was of particular interest to the men carrying out recon tasking were the Argentine patrols. Rather than just sitting on top of their respective mountains staring at each other both the British and Argentinians had sent patrols down into the valley between the mountains which was now a sort of no mans land to guard against attacks by the other side.
The SAS men who had managed to map out where the western edges of the minefields were had observed the Argentine patrols and crucially had noticed that these patrols were operating west of the minefields. That meant that somewhere there must be at least safe route through or around the minefields.
Working out where this safe path was became the reconnaissance efforts top priority as if there was a potential way to negate the danger posed by the landmines it could save a lot of lives and greatly increase the chances of success.
The most obvious way of doing this was to observe the Argentine patrols as they left and eventually returned to their positions up on the heights. Unfortunately, it seemed that someone on the Argentinian side had foreseen this possibility as patrols would only leave their positions in the darkness before dawn and not return until after dark when it was nearly impossible for them to be observed from a distance.
There had been a few incidents of contact and resulting firefights between the British and Argentine patrols. These had mostly been encounter engagements where patrols had happened to run into each other and had opened fire with the result being neither side unwilling to press the issue and the firefight ending as both sides withdrew towards the protection of their respective lines partially in the hopes of luring the other into the sights of their comrades.
It was decided that the best solution to the question of locating the safe paths through the minefields was to send out a strong force of about platoon strength to locate and attack one of the patrols. Hopefully the patrol would be obliged to withdraw from the fight against a superior opponent and in doing so reveal the safe paths from their pattern of retreat.
The first such operation of this type saw a strong force from 42 COMMANDO engage an Argentine section in the valley between Mount Wall and Mount Harriet. Rather than taking the most route up the mountain where thus far few mines had been discovered the Argentines withdrew southwards and followed the base of the mountain around to the SE covered by indirect machine gun fire. This single piece of information would be crucial in 42 COMMANDO’s O/C Lt Col Nick Vaux’s planning for his upcoming operation.
Feeling emboldened by the success of this operation the British began to mount probing attacks in which platoons of Marines or Paras would cross the stream which marked the rough halfway point between the British and Argentine fronts and attempt to close with and provoke the Argentines into opening fire. While this was a dangerous game to play it did have a pay off which made it worthwhile. A second force comprising just a section of four men would accompany the probing force but would remain a good distance to the north or south and do rather than engaging would do everything possible to disguise their presence. Their job was to act as observers and attempt to map the Argentine firing positions and estimate the enemy’s strength based upon the weight of fire received. These missions would always end with the commander of the probing force calling in artillery or mortar support to cover his withdrawal. Numerous such missions were mounted for two reasons. The first was for continuing reconnaissance and intelligence gathering purposes. The second was a continuation of the efforts to lower the Argentinians readiness and increase their response times. Probing attacks were often made in conjunction with the artillery barrages. Again, the hope was that the enemy would get so used to coming under artillery and small arms fire that when the actual push came, they would be slow to recognise it as such and slower to react effectively.
Finally, as darkness began to fall on the 29th everything was ready to go and H hour was fast approaching. The commanding officers had earlier gathered in Brigadier Thompson’s command post and been briefed. The ambitious plan called for three battalion sized night assaults on the first line of Argentine strong points in its first phase followed by a similar operation on the strongpoints behind. The British ORBAT was as follows:
The southernmost strongpoint of Mount Harriet was to be taken by 40 COMMANDO led by Lt Col Hunt. 40 COMMANDO were now moving to their starting position on the eastern shoulder of Mount Challenger. The battalion commanders had also briefed their individual plans of attack. Lt Col Hunt was planning a direct company sized assault on the western slope of Mount Harriet while another two companies would attempt to move to the south of the mountain and using the safe route that had been plotted through the minefield attempt to flank the defenders.
Two Sisters to the north which formed a ridgeline with Mount Harriet was to be assaulted by 45 COMMANDO led by Lt Col Andrew Whitehead. 45 COMMANDO were already formed up just below the top of the reverse side of the ridgeline between Mount Kent and Challenger where the men were making their final preparations and taking this last opportunity to eat something. Not being able to outflank the enemy due to the geography of the heights he was moving to take Lt Col Whitehead’s plan was for a more direct approach by stealth. His men would get as close as they could and once the Argentines realised what was happening rely on murderous amounts of fire support and his marines training and skill in up close and personal fighting.
For this reason, Whitehead had worked out his plan in conjunction with Lt Col Hunt to ensure coordination and maximise the chances of success (or at least minimize the chances of something going wrong). 45 COMMANDO who would be relying on a stealthy approach would make their assault slight ahead of 40 COMMANDO as it was felt that if the assault on Mount Harriet which was going to be rather more overt went ahead first this would almost certainly alert the defenders on Two Sisters.
Lt Col Herbert Jones’s 2 PARA would have a very long walk to even reach their objective of Mount Longdon to the NE. The reason for this operation was to secure the northern flank of the Marines on Harriet and Two Sisters and potentially provide a good position from which to move on Mount Tumbledown from the north or even potentially bypass it and make a move on Port Stanley. Effectively tightening the noose and cutting off a potential avenue of retreat or reinforcement for the enemy. Due to its distance from the battles that would be taking place on Two Sisters by the time his men had been able to complete the estimated four hour march it would take for them to get to the western slope of Mount Longdon Jones was hoping to be able to use an element of surprise. The Argentine defences in this area were already known from air recon to be facing north to guard against an assault from that direction. Therefore, by attacking from the west he would be able to flank his opponent and hopefully role up the defensive line before the Argentines could reposition themselves to face him. Lt Col Jones was expecting some heavy fighting and so would have the support of not only an entire artillery battery but also a support (Heavy Weapons) company beefed up by men and equipment from 3 PARA who would be following on behind. The Mount Longdon operation had the potential to become a very difficult and messy job which was why 2 PARA famed for their aggression had been chosen. While some things could be said about his leadership and command style there was certainly no doubting Lt Col H. Jones bravery and ability to get the job done.
Following behind 40 COMMANDO would be the Welsh Guards led by Lt Col John Rickett. If all went to plan once Mount Harriet had been captured the Welsh Guards would relive the marines and maintain the strategic momentum by using it as a starting point for their own assault on Mount Tumbledown to the east the following evening. If things went badly or the Argentines decided to counter attack they would support 40 COMMANDO.
The Scots Guards under Lt Col Michael Scott would be following on behind 45 COMMANDO up onto Two Sisters where like their Welsh counterparts they would relive the expectedly exhausted marines and launch their own assault on the next Argentine strongpoint on Mount Tumbledown. There was still a lingering concern about the capabilities of the Guards units. Unlike the Paras and Marines who were kept at a very high state of readiness anyway as a matter of routine the guards had come straight from public duties in London and hadn’t had the chance to go through much in the way of refresher training or work up. They had only been chosen for this operation because they were the only infantry units that had been available at the time. Between the units allocated to its NATO commitments in Germany and the counterterrorist effort in Northern Ireland and now this little show in the South Atlantic the British Army was really feeling overstretched.
3 PARA under Lt Col Hew Pike would be hot on the heels of 2 PARA in moving towards Mount Longdon and indeed had lent some of its men to support 2 PARA’s assault. If it turned into a slugging match it was felt that the combined might of 2 and 3 PARA would be enough to overwhelm the Argentine defenders. If all went to plan however and 2 PARA was able to get the job done alone 3 PARA would move onto Mount Longdon and then depending on how the situation developed either move eastwards to take Wireless Ridge or south to support the Guards attack on Mount Tumbledown.
The Gurkhas that had been airlifted to Mount Kent were not at full battalion strength. Led by Lt Col Morgan their main role so far in this campaign had been platoon and company strength detachment duties such as defending the beaches at San Carlos, guarding prisoners, lines of communication troops ect. However enough men were still available to form a pretty capable force and had been brought here to either act as a reserve if needed or else take part in the planned second phase assault on Tumbledown. The Gurkhas who coming from a climate and terrain similar to that found on the Falklands had been in their absolute element as soon as they had arrived. They had initially been extremely upset when they had been told that the battalion was to be broken up and used for guarding and security duties as they felt that they were being unfairly denied the opportunity to gain some regimental glory and battle honours. Now that some of them had been brought out here and tod to prepare themselves for some action the Nepalese warriors could barely contain their excitement at the prospect of being able to mix it up with the enemy and cover themselves in glory.
Gurkhas are none for nearly constantly having a smile on their face even when there was no obvious reason for it. Right now, everyone who saw their enormous grins understood why and felt a slight chill and pity for the men on the other side if the valley to the east.
42 COMMANDO under Lt Col Nick Vaux much to their disdain would remain on Mount Kent and Challenger to provide local security to the artillery batteries, LZ, field hospital and supply dumps. The Falklands campaign is interesting from a strategic point of view as it was the first conventional campaign where the British thought in terms of strongpoints as opposed to territory held and front lines at a strategic level. Whereas the positioning of the Argentine forces facing them did allow for a rough “front line” to be marked the British planners were treating this almost like a counter insurgency campaign similar to that which had been experienced in Northern Ireland and other places. Strong positions were established and forces operated from and returned to these where the emphasis was focused on locating and destroying the enemy as opposed to taking and holding ground. The exception to this was the overall objective of advancing towards and taking Port Stanley.
At this point British commanders felt that there were two big threats to Operation Corporate. The first was the nights attacks on the Argentine strongpoints failing and resulting in heavy losses. While bad this wouldn’t be catastrophic as from a military perspective it would just stall the campaign as opposed to ending it and they would just have to try again later perhaps using the guards and a lot more bombs next time.
The second risk while actually less likely to be realised was actually more worrying. With the overwhelming majority of the British fighting units now on the eastern part of East Falkland the defence of the vital beachead at San Carlos was now left to a few companies of Gurkhas and simple geography. The only force of any significance on East Falkland that wasn’t now caught in the British noose was the garrison at Goose Green. While the airfield had been put out of action by heavy air attacks and the garrison assessed to have sustained significant casualties as a result British commanders were still worried about the prospect of this force attempting to move north to attack the beachead approximately 20 miles away. While the garrison was known to be intended and equipped for defensive operations to hold their ground and given the losses, they had taken unlikely to do such a thing if the beacheads were cut off or destroyed it would potentially end the entire operation then and there until supply lines could be re-established. To guard against this the remaining cluster bombs and quite a few other bits of ordinance aboard HMS EAGLE had been set aside to be ready to respond to such a move. AN SAS observation post was located just NE of Goose Green where they would likely spot any Argentine movements north. If they or one of the frequent photorecon fights spotted such movement the Argentines would be hit with nearly every remaining cluster bomb and rocket in the now alarmingly depleted British arsenal. If they did make it close enough to San Carlos then the warships still in the harbour would fire on them with their 4.5 inch guns. If it came to that point Major General Moore had already made it clear that he would call an immediate halt to offensive operations in the east and rush to have 42 COMMANDO or whoever else was available airlifted back to San Carlos to counter attack.
Meeting completed and having synchronised their watches the officers had returned to their respective battalions. It is often said that the worst part of any battle is the waiting. The men who like the professionals they were had finished their preparations ages ago and now in full battle order had nothing to do but sit and wait at their unit’s respective start lines for the order to advanced. In some places the men felt like what they thought their forebearers in the trenches had thought during the night before the battle of the Somme.
Finally, H Hour arrived and silently three battalions of paratroopers and marines stood up and silently descended from the mountains to the west into the darkness and silence below. It would not stay silent for long.
Great update but surely I gotta ask isn't a grinning Gurkha an attempted war crime somewhere?
I think there was a story from the OTL Falklands conflict: an Argentine officer asked his British counterpart why the Gurkhas were always smiling. The British officer replied to the effect of: "they only smile at you like that if they want to eat you".
Well to the Gurkha it's probably less a fight to the death more like a Jolly Boys Outing.
That F-4 with all the rocket pods? One of the first 1:72 models I ever built!
Great update - the (relative) calm before the storm!
Happy Easter to you too.
Happy Easter to you too.
Lovely update @flasheart - and thanks for the photos.
You’d think if the Gurkha’s where such an effective fighting force they would be on the frontline rather than held back.
You’d think if the Gurkha’s where such an effective fighting force they would be on the frontline rather than held back.