Was what? Also, I do see the Americans not necessarily helping the Central Powers, but be co-belligerents. I do suspect trouble will happen in the Philippines. However, breakdowns of American and Japanese relations would let Sun Yat-Sen possibly try and bring China closer to the Americans...
Crimson Banners Fly: The Rise of the American Left
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Was what? Also, I do see the Americans not necessarily helping the Central Powers, but be co-belligerents. I do suspect trouble will happen in the Philippines. However, breakdowns of American and Japanese relations would let Sun Yat-Sen possibly try and bring China closer to the Americans...
Yeah and they are in France when America declares war. Canada has few troops in North America.
The number is a total for the war, and actually, only above 400,000 actually went to Europe I read. It's only June 1915, and conscription has not been introduced yet IOTL. I haven't found a good OoB, but I found that the Canadian Corps, part of the CEF, was only a single division strong until reinforced by a second division in september 1915, and by a third around december.
Evolution of the Canadian Corps - Library and Archives Canada
Evolution of the Canadian Corps - Library and Archives Canada
If we take French mobilization rate in 1914 when general mobilization was enacted, 3.87 million men mobilized on the field for 41.63 million people, we would have relative to Canada 7.9 million population about 730,000 men under flags.
That said, it remains to be seen if all of them can be effectively equipped and armed on existing stocks (I guess that they still have some stock of arms, ammo and clothing items meant for Europe at the time and haven't been shipped out, perhaps).
Against them, we have an American army that only can rely on volunteers and soldiers drafted from national guards and the standing army, and whose ability to tap into manpower reserves is severly hindered by lack of conscription; IOTL, that was 125,000 soldiers in early 1914, and I guess that with an earlier and more effective preparedness movement, we can arrive somewhere above 200,000, just for an idea.
Even if Canada and the British would have had some prior standing plans taking into account TTL more German friendly stance of the US, I don't think that they will mobilize quickly enough a force large enough to match American numbers here, but since they are defending home soil, conscription wouldn't be an issue, so they have a good reserve of draftees pouring in to make up for losses and increase strength overtime, while at the same time, US forces can't rely on draft to make up for losses and with trench warfare dragging on, even with censorship, finding enough volunteers to keep invading will be hard, and it looks the issue of draft risk making the headlines during the elections of 1916.
The US can introduce conscription after the war starts. Besides most of the Canadain population is very close to the American boarder and can be quickly occupied. I'd doubt Roosovelt would start a war when Canada has a bigger army then the US.
Part 6: Chapter XXI - Page 135
Benedict Crowell, Co-Architect of the Canadian Plan, c. 1915 - Source: Wiki Commons
Chapter XXI: In Service of the Nation: Breaking the Washington Doctrine
Officially embroiled in the Great War as of June 28th, the United States required nimble reflexes and a quick wit in order to gain an early upper hand. President Roosevelt authorized mass mobilization of the armed forces and put into motion a military operation meticulously constructed by his team long before entering the fray. Via secret diplomatic channels, the U.S. government was later revealed to have communicated back-and-forth with the German Foreign Office in the weeks preceding the passage of war declaration in Congress. Secretary of State James Garfield and German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Gottlieb von Jagow partook in this series of coded telegraph conversations through May of 1915, articulating their strategies and hypothesizing how best to bushwhack the overconfident Entente. This channel provided for the exclusive, direct input from President Roosevelt, Assistant War Secretary Benedict Crowell, and General John J. Pershing at the outset. Knowing Secretary Leonard Wood's objection to binding relations with Germany, the president deliberately kept him out of the loop on this matter. Shortly after the U.S. declared war on the United Kingdom, Roosevelt reassigned Wood to a co-commanding position under Pershing and, thereafter, called on Crowell to serve in Wood's place.
The Roosevelt Administration established these links with the German government for military as well as commercial purposes. According to historians dedicated to understanding the events leading up to the U.S. entering the war, the president primarily aspired to supply the Central Powers with much-requested export goods like steel, copper, and wheat. Collapsing the British blockade would be the easiest and most straightforward way to accomplish such an aim, but an overt combined naval offensive would likely spell disaster for all parties. A mutually beneficial economic assistance program counted on either discovering an alternative trade route or otherwise dismantling the Royal Navy's dominance of the seas. In cooperating with the German Empire, Roosevelt settled on, perhaps, the only available path to overcome the hurdle outlined above.
Insofar as the military-centric details of the communications were concerned, the two de facto allies covered a range of subjects. Crowell urged Germany more stringently monitor its submarine movements via tighter restrictions and discipline. He also recommended German troops focus their fight almost entirely on the Western Front while leaving the Eastern Front to the other Central Empires. More so than all else, the powers discussed the manifestation of the Canadian offensive. Crowell and Pershing conceived of a rapid, northward campaign tactic that could be developed and jump-started without interception by British officers. It was inspired, in part, by Alfred von Schlieffen's envelopment strategy as well as the German advance in Belgium. Due to Canada's lower base population and the shipping off of much of its military forces to engage on the tumultuous European front, the northerly neighbor of the United States was left vulnerable. Britain had not ended its diplomatic efforts to calm American leadership until June 28th, thus leaving more than enough room for the U.S. to prepare its clever play in secrecy.
Within hours of announcing war, the president launched a lightning attack along the International Boundary. The maneuver propelled dozens of trained regiments across the border and into the neighboring nation whilst simultaneously dispatching a supportive fleet along the Eastern coastline. Unsuspecting British-Canadian police could not withstand the influx of American troops, and in the opening days of the offensive often surrendered without conflict. Canadian Minister of Defence Sam S. Hughes scurried to awaken those soldiers present nearest to the border and organized a swift, though disordered, defensive line. In July, a section of the U.S. Army under direction of Generals LeRoy Eltinge and William H. Carter broke through the last of the often-criticized "hodgepodge of a garrison" and reached the city limits of Toronto, Ontario. Canadian military personnel stationed around Toronto managed to stall the American advance for roughly four days with pluming artillery fire, allowing for the evacuation of city residents. It was a true and honest effort, but the sheer abundance of practiced U.S. regiments easily overwhelmed the defenders. Military historian John Altmin summed up the engagement as a "shellacking of epic proportions. The decisive U.S. victory set the tone for the Northern Front as their lightning warfare thundered on through the provinces." Southeastern Ontario was fully captured and occupied by Carter and Eltinge's battalion within weeks, as were portions of Manitoba and Saskatchewan in a joint assault.
The invasion of Canada was swift, unforgiving, and viewed by contemporaneous war-skeptics as an unnecessary onslaught. It resulted in relatively few U.S. deaths, but did end in massive casualties on the Canadian side (a fact mostly censored in the United States press). Still, these American victories on the battlefield, secured far ahead of schedule, boosted morale among the soldiers and fed into Roosevelt's projection of an unstoppable and unafraid league of warriors. Accompanying the ground assault was an active portion of the U.S. Navy commanded by Admiral William Sowden Sims. Sims' Northern Armada protected soldiers as they passed beyond the border into Canada and interrupted the North American supply route to Great Britain. Standing alongside Sims was fellow Admiral Hugh Rodman, a veteran of the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars and an individual well-experienced in naval combat. Rodman and Sims recognized that the amplification of the Navy was a work in progress, and not enough time had passed since the enactment of Preparedness to sincerely benefit from the law's advantages. Victory on the open seas against the Royal Navy, for instance, was an absolute pipe dream. The sheer number of British armored cruisers and destroyers outsized that of the U.S. almost 5 to 1. All depended upon a smart strategy.
Admiral Rodman oversaw a secondary operation: one built out of necessity rather than shock-and-awe. On the West Coast of the U.S., fortified naval bases constructed during the Beveridge and Depew presidencies launched a separate fleet of warships and cruisers to protect its Pacific territories and holdings - specifically, its puppet government in the Philippines. Rodman guided the mission throughout, ensuring the safe passage of his navy to the archipelago. The U.S. Pacific Fleet met with a small contingent of aggressive Australian cruisers en-route to Manila, but the U.S. vessels handily defeated them. Following that brief morning of combat and the hasty retreat of the Australian vessels, Rodman's crew safely entered Manila docks. The now-bolstered island brigades were now free to plot their next move. That aspect, one of a sitting tiger in the Philippines, terrified an Entente hyper-focused on the war effort in Europe.
With Rodman's naval contingent muddling the security of the British East Indies and the summer overrun of Toronto imminent, London had little choice but to divert a branch of their blockade to reinforce Canada. Elsewise, they risked total capitulation in North America. Britain too called upon its Pacific allies, Japan as well as dominion governments in Australia and New Zealand, to prepare defensive campaigns. British Admiral of the Fleet John Fisher originally proposed to Japan a counter-offensive from a presupposed base in British Columbia, but news of the U.S. naval advance scuttled such plans. The speed at which the U.S. forces descended upon the East Indies left Japan scrambled. Japanese officials had no interest in dedicating troops to a rag-tag venture in Western Canada if that risked ongoing occupations in German-leased Shandong settlements and the German Marshall Islands.
At the close of August 1915, the United States, having made its rambunctious debut on the global stage, successfully jostled a rather hubristic Entente. In the words of President Roosevelt, "It is futile to speak softly while the world howls. Our lungs may be untested, but will produce a mighty roar."
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Hopefully this update clears the air a bit on TTL's position on Canada and the extent of Preparedness =)
The border cities are taken but what about the interior @PyroTheFox
Is the population density too low to bother or will the US be pushing north?
Is the population density too low to bother or will the US be pushing north?
Poor Canada indeed.
I'm still a bit dubious over the progresses made by the preparedness movement given the OTL performance of the US to mobilize and equip its forces between springs of 1917 and 1918 when war had broken out, excluding the two years since the Lusitania sinking and the Mexican intervention in between, especially knowing most of US forces were equipped from French stocks.
And regarding Japan, the strength of their own fleet compared to that of the Americans and their confidence after smashing the Russian fleet in 1904/1905 hardly justifies lack of confidence and boldness that were Japanese features at the time. And the Philippines are for Japan an incredibly valuable target if they can capture it to extend their domination of East Asia. I would be surprised if they don't make a serious effort at conquering the Philippines (which would put an end to American ambitions in Asia).
I'm still a bit dubious over the progresses made by the preparedness movement given the OTL performance of the US to mobilize and equip its forces between springs of 1917 and 1918 when war had broken out, excluding the two years since the Lusitania sinking and the Mexican intervention in between, especially knowing most of US forces were equipped from French stocks.
And regarding Japan, the strength of their own fleet compared to that of the Americans and their confidence after smashing the Russian fleet in 1904/1905 hardly justifies lack of confidence and boldness that were Japanese features at the time. And the Philippines are for Japan an incredibly valuable target if they can capture it to extend their domination of East Asia. I would be surprised if they don't make a serious effort at conquering the Philippines (which would put an end to American ambitions in Asia).
Given the slightly more bloody experiences of the ITTL military and the institutional knowledge cultivated through those conflicts, I don't think it's too far off that the US (with the right administration involved) and the proper incentives could do better than OTL.
Rushing off to backup a stalemated war against a power that isn't much a threat to the country (Germany) and preparing for a war against an as of yet undetermined opponent could produce a more developed response.
If you're seeing enemies on all sides (or at least the Federal government is) the impulse to slack off and half-ass things is countered by the very real chance that you'll be being shelled from the Chesapeake Bay if you don't do things right.
I don't think Norther Canada has the logistical capacity to hold any army units bigger then a cavalry battalion.
Still, since the divisions anticipated for deployment to France haven't been shipped to France, since they didn't deploy until the autumn, I'd say the Canadians must have at least one, perhaps two divisions, worth of troops in midst of training and equipment phase in lower Canada.
How many divisions the Americans did field for the invasion?
How many divisions the Americans did field for the invasion?
Only Toronto so far. The Canadian Plan does involve pushing further North, but this war won't be decided in the Yukon
So under TTL's Philippines Organization Act, the Filipino population is able to elect representatives to a (horrifically corrupt) bicameral legislature, but the U.S. still appoints a position similar to Governor-General. In 1915 we'd have TR-appointee Seth Low as the chief executive of the Philippines, while Benito Legarda serves in his fourth term as the President of the Senate and de facto leader of the legislature. When Legarda dies in August, the Majority Leader would inevitably take control - maybe José Clarin?
I'm not sure what the exact number would be. I'd imagine the total number of permanent divisions would be similar to OTL, give or take.
I'm guess the Americans will push to Quebec City then stop, not much point pushing further North. Correct me if I'm wrong, but in 1915 that was Canada's most northern port.Only Toronto so far. The Canadian Plan does involve pushing further North, but this war won't be decided in the Yukon
There is still Halifax and in the Pacific, the British should still have Prince Rupert, a deep seaport (actually I read the third deepest natural harbor in the world) connected to the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway that had just opened in 1914. Geography alone makes it very unlikely an American invasion would have captured it so far.
Also, how is that US forces could operate a build up of the scale required for a blitz invasion of Canada without being noticed. Even with the border locked, leaks are possible and at least the diplomatic crisis would have forced Canada to put its forces on high alert, freezing the deployments to France and putting to use the divisions it was in the process of training and equipping for a deployment in the fall.
Here's a pdf about Canada mobilization during the great war with some specifics:
www.canada.ca
encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net
The document from first link does mention that Canada had at the beginning of the war in summer 1914 about 3,000 regular army soldiers and 74,000 men in the militia organized into six divisions, which were all put on war footing afterwards.
Figure 1 from the second link show enlistments during the war in Canada, and by a rough visual approximation, I'd put the average rate at 10,000 volunteers enrolling per month over the August 1914-June 1915 period, so that's a further 110,000 volunteers trained at various degrees on top.
The only force Canada had sent so far to England, that was in late 1914, was about 31,000 strong.
So, by the time Roosevelt declares war on Canada on June 28th of 1915, Canada should have around 150,000 militia and volunteers under arms by OTL standard.
Here, I wouldn't see the US forces having and avantage more than 5:2 without draft, and with the boost of enlistments after the Yellow Rose incident only two months long.
Of note, it is mentionned in the first source that Canadian forces had already a good experience of warfare from the contingent that was sent to fight in South Africa against the Boers. I think that experience outweighs that on American side of the war with Spain. That also provides the Canadians with a blueprint for asymmetrical warfare if need be; and if that goes so far, and the Americans react as they did in the Philippines, they will have a very hard time occupying Canada.
Also, how is that US forces could operate a build up of the scale required for a blitz invasion of Canada without being noticed. Even with the border locked, leaks are possible and at least the diplomatic crisis would have forced Canada to put its forces on high alert, freezing the deployments to France and putting to use the divisions it was in the process of training and equipping for a deployment in the fall.
Here's a pdf about Canada mobilization during the great war with some specifics:
Forbidden - Canada.ca
Recruitment and Conscription (Canada) | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1)
Critical analysis of Canada’s recruitment for the war effort can be grouped around three main themes. The first is the government’s attempt to raise an expeditionary force that proved too large to be maintained by voluntary enlistment. As a result, conscription for overseas service had to be...
encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net
The document from first link does mention that Canada had at the beginning of the war in summer 1914 about 3,000 regular army soldiers and 74,000 men in the militia organized into six divisions, which were all put on war footing afterwards.
Figure 1 from the second link show enlistments during the war in Canada, and by a rough visual approximation, I'd put the average rate at 10,000 volunteers enrolling per month over the August 1914-June 1915 period, so that's a further 110,000 volunteers trained at various degrees on top.
The only force Canada had sent so far to England, that was in late 1914, was about 31,000 strong.
So, by the time Roosevelt declares war on Canada on June 28th of 1915, Canada should have around 150,000 militia and volunteers under arms by OTL standard.
Here, I wouldn't see the US forces having and avantage more than 5:2 without draft, and with the boost of enlistments after the Yellow Rose incident only two months long.
Of note, it is mentionned in the first source that Canadian forces had already a good experience of warfare from the contingent that was sent to fight in South Africa against the Boers. I think that experience outweighs that on American side of the war with Spain. That also provides the Canadians with a blueprint for asymmetrical warfare if need be; and if that goes so far, and the Americans react as they did in the Philippines, they will have a very hard time occupying Canada.
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To expand upon the second source, there's the list of eligible males for enlistment and actual enlistment rates.
The source makes two comments on that table that could be relevant to how Canada mobilizes.
First that the number of eligible males in western, prairie provinces, ie born here before 1896, doesn't match actually the potential pool of enlistment, precising much growth had occured in between as a result of migration and immigration. That still leaves room for volunteers and militia to be raised. Equipment may be problematic though if the Americans captured Winnipeg and cut the transcontinental railroad, but that allows local defenders to make up for losses.
Second, in Quebec, between anti catholic sentiment and attachment to land (farmers and else), there wasn't much motivation, but with invasion happening, we can expect more fighting spirit from these categories of people who weren't forthcoming IOTL since they would defend their homes.
The source makes two comments on that table that could be relevant to how Canada mobilizes.
First that the number of eligible males in western, prairie provinces, ie born here before 1896, doesn't match actually the potential pool of enlistment, precising much growth had occured in between as a result of migration and immigration. That still leaves room for volunteers and militia to be raised. Equipment may be problematic though if the Americans captured Winnipeg and cut the transcontinental railroad, but that allows local defenders to make up for losses.
Second, in Quebec, between anti catholic sentiment and attachment to land (farmers and else), there wasn't much motivation, but with invasion happening, we can expect more fighting spirit from these categories of people who weren't forthcoming IOTL since they would defend their homes.
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