Crimson Banners Fly: The Rise of the American Left

[galileo-034]

Another theater to cite, Alaska.

In terms of infrastructures and presence, there wasn't much there standing in 1915 against a Japanese attack. They just had to take Anchorage, Valdez and Juneau, and Alaska would have been lost for good.

 

[galileo-034]

Within days of announcing war, the president launched a lightning attack along the International Boundary. The maneuver propelled dozens of trained regiments across the border and into the neighboring nation whilst simultaneously dispatching a supportive fleet along the Eastern coastline. Unsuspecting British-Canadian police could not withstand the influx of American troops, and in the opening days of the offensive often surrendered without conflict. Canadian Minister of Defence Sam S. Hughes scurried to awaken those soldiers present nearest to the border and organized a swift, though disordered, defensive line.

With the numbers I found, I hardly expect these regiments to have found only police forces against them.

I'm even more dubious about the "within days" mention of delay. Wouldn't it rather be hours ? Days of delay would have been a critical mistake if the Canadian forces are already on alert and increased readiness since the diplomatic crisis broke out in May. Against 150,000 men prepared, even outnumbered 2 or 3 to 1, I hardly see the Americans having a victory as easy as said. At about 20 miles advance per day, Toronto wouldn't be in reach of the invasion forces before a little week. After that, there is a good chance for Canadians to set up a defensive line on the Ottawa river if they are pushed out of the York peninsula.

 

[PyroTheFox]

Also, how is that US forces could operate a build up of the scale required for a blitz invasion of Canada without being noticed. Even with the border locked, leaks are possible and at least the diplomatic crisis would have forced Canada to put its forces on high alert, freezing the deployments to France and putting to use the divisions it was in the process of training and equipping for a deployment in the fall.

It'll be covered a bit in the next part, but it's important to remember that the U.K. did at all not foresee the U.S. entering the war. Relations were salty after the Yellow Rose, but Britain was working diligently to calm tensions up until the last possible moment regardless of TR claiming to break off diplomatic ties. They would have assumed, knowing Roosevelt, that the president was simply spouting off bluster, not realizing the extent of the psychological damage the sinking instilled and the success of the Preparedness movement in rallying support. Canada was none the wiser in predicting the decision-making of the U.S., especially with Sam Hughes at the helm. If Asquith explained the need to keep their deployment shuttle on schedule, I believe Hughes would comply. In my mind, we're dealing with hubris and assumptions of civility, not logic.

Here's a pdf about Canada mobilization during the great war with some specifics:

Forbidden - Canada.ca

www.canada.ca

Recruitment and Conscription (Canada) | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1)

Critical analysis of Canada’s recruitment for the war effort can be grouped around three main themes. The first is the government’s attempt to raise an expeditionary force that proved too large to be maintained by voluntary enlistment. As a result, conscription for overseas service had to be...

encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net

The document from first link does mention that Canada had at the beginning of the war in summer 1914 about 3,000 regular army soldiers and 74,000 men in the militia organized into six divisions, which were all put on war footing afterwards.
Figure 1 from the second link show enlistments during the war in Canada, and by a rough visual approximation, I'd put the average rate at 10,000 volunteers enrolling per month over the August 1914-June 1915 period, so that's a further 110,000 volunteers trained at various degrees on top.

The only force Canada had sent so far to England, that was in late 1914, was about 31,000 strong.
So, by the time Roosevelt declares war on Canada on June 28th of 1915, Canada should have around 150,000 militia and volunteers under arms by OTL standard.

Here, I wouldn't see the US forces having and avantage more than 5:2 without draft, and with the boost of enlistments after the Yellow Rose incident only two months long.

It's important to keep in mind that we're dealing with a very different United States than OTL. The U.S. Military ITTL is far more innovatory and up-to-date than the sort Wilson had in the run up to OTL's U.S. entry. Bolstering the power of the military was one of President Beveridge's prime objectives, as insinuated in the appointment and career of Navy Sec. Alfred T. Mahan. His imperialist vision that eventually culminated in the Philippines War counted on the presence of an expansive standing army capable of establishing control over the Pacific. Perhaps I should have emphasize it more in that section, but Beveridge accomplished that before his death. As I recall, the Navy did not even adopt centralized naval authority until 1915 OTL. That is the type of reform that would have taken place at about 1902 ITTL. Both the Army and Navy were modernized and normalized from that point forward, even under the malaise of Depew. Not to mention, Hearst was leaning into an invasion of Mexico near the end of his term. So, by 1915, we'd have a more militarist and nationalist population wrapped up in Columbian patriotism all but convinced that Britain was robbing the U.S. of its economic liberty. Even without the draft, I think we'd have enlistment figures easily surpass that of Canada.

 

[PyroTheFox]

With the numbers I found, I hardly expect these regiments to have found only police forces against them.

I'm even more dubious about the "within days" mention of delay. Wouldn't it rather be hours ? Days of delay would have been a critical mistake if the Canadian forces are already on alert and increased readiness since the diplomatic crisis broke out in May. Against 150,000 men prepared, even outnumbered 2 or 3 to 1, I hardly see the Americans having a victory as easy as said. At about 20 miles advance per day, Toronto wouldn't be in reach of the invasion forces before a little week. After that, there is a good chance for Canadians to set up a defensive line on the Ottawa river if they are pushed out of the York peninsula.

We can change it to hours, I suppose. Figured they would reach Toronto in July, maybe the wording on that wasn't clear?

 

[galileo-034]

Still, even if that's 3 or 4 to 1, they are still going to face at least 150,000 soldiers in defending position. Also I think we have to distinguish between British and Canadian decision makers here. London may not worry, but it's likely that Canadian government, with the US at their doorstep, will behave a bit more nervous and paranoid. The Canadian confederation was even founded in no small part because they feared American invasion in the first place. And they were autonomous in the matters of their own defense.

 

[galileo-034]

On another theme, I guess this guy would have his way in this TL's Murdoch Mysteries ^^

 

[moopli]

I think a stronger Canadian defense could still fit within what I imagine is your goal of having an American occupation of Canada as a source of radicalization. Moreover, I'm not sure if the plan outlined is the most effective means to achieve victory - I'd think they might be better off without a full advance into southern Ontario, but rather seizing naval control over the great lakes, capturing Halifax, Winnipeg, and Vancouver to disconnect Canada, and then pushing to occupy key targets like Sudbury (through sault ste-marie), the Niagara power stations, the Hamilton industrial works, perhaps key railroad junctions like Moncton (which was suggested in war plan red), etc.

I don't think the sheer sweeping-through of southern Ontario, the densest-populated part of Canada and historically a home of proud rural loyalists (with ancestors who fled the 13 colonies during the American revolutionary war, who defeated the Americans in the war of 1812), is plausible without further elaboration. There are many economic cross-border ties, and those kinds of ties carry rumours, rumours like sudden military buildup near the border. If there's a break in diplomatic ties, even if the British think that it's simply posturing, then the border would have to be closed to prevent this kind of information leakage, and I have no doubt that a border closure would make Canadian government alert - they would immediately cry out for a resumption of trade, and even push for Britain to come to the table for an accommodation with America. London, meanwhile, would be passing great numbers of coded messages back and forth between America and Germany through diplomatic cable... coded messages which they had no trouble (either morally or technically) cracking and snooping on OTL, like with the Zimmerman telegram.

Realistically, I don't see any way for Britain and Canada to be caught with their pants down, but with the American preparedness movement, with an American military that's seen greater investment in recent decades, and with a better invasion plan (and some good luck) I can see America capture some key centers and assert naval control of the great lakes, but quickly start having difficulty trying to expand control, maintain logistical networks, etc. But if the invasion plan relies largely on overland advance in more-densely-populated territory then it could get bogged down in trench warfare before they even reach Hamilton. Trench warfare benefits the defenders so much that it could be a massive meatgrinder, even though American munitions production would be able to drastically outpace what's available to Canada as the war continues.

I understand that you probably don't want to do major retcons since I'm sure you have some exciting story arcs planned, but maybe the invasion of southern Ontario focuses more on naval dominance and capturing key locations, many of which are right across the border or on one of the lakes themselves. Then, I think you could have the kinds of successes you're aiming for, in perhaps a slightly longer timeframe. Moreover, if the invasion is based on control of the lakes, then the invasion preparations can be staged much further from the borders, for example with lakeboat bases on the north shore of upstate new york, somewhere in Michigan, somewhere in Wisconsin, etc.

 

[ChadMachine999]

Realistically, I don't see any way for Britain and Canada to be caught with their pants down

Because America it ten times more populated then Canada and has an economy ten times bigger then Canada's. Also most of Canada's army is in France.

 

[moopli]

Because America it ten times more populated then Canada and has an economy ten times bigger then Canada's. Also most of Canada's army is in France.

I didn't say they'd have the resources to keep America from overwhelming them, I said they wouldn't be caught with their pants down. My point is that they would know that there is danger afoot and act accordingly. That likely means diplomatic efforts to ensure peace as well as preparation and alertness to be ready for trouble. They would not need the minister of defence, a political appointee, to be running around organizing the marshalling of troops to defend the country, they would instead have a plan for trouble, because not only would Canada be able to tell that there's something fishy going on during the lead-up to the invasion, but Britain would have decoded the telegrams between America and Germany.

Edit: https://commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1915_Canada_railway_map_page39_40.pdf
This is a map of the Canadian railway system in 1915 - the invasion could advance effectively along the railways even under, probably, the heaviest resistance Canada can put up under short notice, so even with Canada ready to resist they could push through, but my point is that Canada would not be taken by surprise and would indeed have defensive forces ready (reinforcements not shipped out yet, and organized defensive militia).

 

[PyroTheFox]

Wallace Morgan's "American Soldiers on the March," September 18th, 1915 - Source: Smithsonian​

As the United States dizzied Canada and barreled its way into the Pacific, the British Empire was forced to reckon with the frightening new reality of a new front in the Western Hemisphere. Prime Minister Asquith had tasked a squad of foreign policy professionals to ease tensions with President Roosevelt in the aftermath of the Yellow Rose catastrophe, specifically naming the British Ambassador to the U.S., Cecil S. Rice, responsible if all should fail. Rice was a close personal friend of Theodore Roosevelt for decades, perfectly illustrated when the former served as the latter's best man during his 1886 marriage to Edith Carow. Their bond kept U.S.-U.K. relations afloat despite the destructive outcome of the Morocco ordeal, but it could not deter Roosevelt's eventual decision to declare all-out war. The diplomat did everything possible to decelerate the process and soothe the wailing president, but his breath was ultimately wasted. Asquith sacked Rice for it, and thereby braced for the sudden stoppage of goods arriving from the West.

Asquith anticipated economic war, and though he did indeed receive that, he was also greeted with news of the American shock offensive. The economic state of the United Kingdom slipped into one of destitution over the course of the year. British GDP shrunk by about 3% by 1915, the London Stock Exchange stayed shuttered, and the nation became saddled with increasing loads of debt. Private credit was thoroughly shattered. Domestic production remained on schedule, however, as the country continuously reported greater shares of its industry focusing on munitions. Still, whereas Britain once depended heavily on some measure of trade from the Americas (especially in oil, lumber, and food) the Entente power prayed that local materials, as well as supplies imported from France and Italy, could withstand its war effort. By all accounts, the clock was ticking for the British Empire as a productivity powerhouse, and France fared no better.

Militarily, the status of the European War was an abject deadlock. Soldiers on both sides of the conflict sunk deep into abysmal trench warfare along the Western Front with no clear end in sight. Strong defense systems made possible through technological advances at the turn of the century kept the stalemate steady. Neither the Central Powers nor the Entente had the capability to break through enemy lines, with occasional advances only serving to raise the death count. During the late-September Second Battle of Champagne, for instance, French forces worked to penetrate German ground and force a breakthrough. Infantry led by XXXIII Corps Commander Philippe Pétain managed to briefly gain the upper hand, but reinforcements courtesy of German reserves plugged any gaps in their lines and drove back the assault. For their tried-and-failed offensive, the French Army suffered extremely high casualties (commonly numbered at around 145,000).

The Entente, a coalition plagued with tunnel-vision honed in on Europe, severely underestimated the potential of the United States to expand the war. "The Allied leadership," wrote Altmin, "foolishly discarded Theodore Roosevelt's bravado and any early signs of a supposable mobilization. That Old Guard was said to have disbelieved reports which did not fall into their preconceived stereotypes of a plucky, backwater U.S. military. Plenty knew better, and advised accordingly, but they were an overruled minority. General Henri Putz, if the tale is to be believed, guffawed in the face of his subordinates at the thought of the United States as a worthy foe. 'Let us see the Rough Riders gallop through the trenches,' he is said to have remarked. Affable anglophile Sam Hughes was no less guilty of forsaking sensibilities for the benefit of a pat on the back by British high command. The clues were in their midst, if only they cared to look closer." As one may imagine, the war in North America burdened Britain much more so than it did France. Not only did London need worry for their soldiers falling by the thousands in the death spiral of Europe, but now a perilous occupation of lower Canada seemed a genuine possibility. They miscalculated the risk once. They now pledged to never do so again.

Grand Fleet Commander and Admiral John Jellicoe issued the final order to divert ships away from the Blockade of Europe in a tactical decision to aid the Canadian counter march. This, of course, meant partial segmentation of the patrolling fleet. He knew this endangered dictatorial blockade effectiveness, but Jellicoe nonetheless settled on that choice as the best course of action. Portions of the British Grand Fleet sailed out of their reinforced seas in small, chaperoned columns. For Germany, the dumbfounding predictability of the Royal Navy was a surprise, to be sure, but a welcome one. Intervening in Britain's fallback maneuver, German U-boats took flight. The submarine campaign in the English Channel and the Celtic Sea took full advantage of the situation at hand, resulting in the total annihilation of several ships as well as seriously damaging multiple vessels beyond repair.

The Autumn U-Boat Campaign. An obvious ploy in hindsight. Rescuing Canada from a brutish invasion was never in question. Neither was the inevitability of German submarines. The mission undoubtedly necessitated this calculated loss, yet it was just that: Calculated. A touch morbid, perhaps, but scores of men died at sea as a consequence for Jellicoe's gambit. Today we may view this as confirmation of the ironfisted nature of Old World naval command, a relic of a bygone age. Thousands, abiding by their orders, clung to the hope of survival, all the while knowing certain death loomed ahead. Whether it be at the hands of a U-boat operator or an American infantryman, the reaper was on call. Gallantry or misplaced obedience - you decide.​

George E. Smith, "War is Hell: The Great War", American Review, 2005​

By the end of October, the Canadian offensive slowed to a standstill. The arrival of British ships along the Eastern seaboard led to a brief, albeit painful, naval battle betwixt the warring fleets. Admiral Sims conducted as efficient of a campaign that the outclassed American Navy could hope to accomplish, but the Battle of Cape Breton ended in a stalemate with equal losses apiece. Thereafter, several British divisions (as well as a bundle of returned Canadian veterans and new enlistees eager for revenge) disembarked at Quebec City and raced to join their comrades-in-arms at the Northern Front. Reinforced and reorganized defensive lines on the outskirts of Campbellford, a township mere miles from the strategically advantageous Prince Edward county and the much-coveted metropolis of Kingston, dug in and pushed back hard against the U.S. Army, promptly resulting in a complete deadlock. Eastern Ontario became the chief battleground in Canada for the remainder of the year with supplementary, immobile contests fought on the far side of Lakes Superior and Huron and the westernmost part of the 49th parallel. The Great War had indeed come to North America, bringing with it all associated idiosyncrasies, tactics, and nightmares.

 

[ChadMachine999]

several British divisions (as well as a bundle of returned Canadian veterans and new enlistees from Halifax) disembarked at Quebec City and raced to join their comrades-in-arms at the Northern Front

This can't be good for the Western Front.

 

[moopli]

Perhaps I should have held my criticism on the previous update - this one makes it clear that, while a colossal screwup in the British leadership, it could well have happened.

Now that the Americans have decidedly failed to capture Halifax, will they prepare a land offensive into new Brunswick or Quebec?

 

[Taimur500]

Oh my, this is good

 

[galileo-034]

Though I see very well that dispatching naval forces to Canada would weaken the blockade, I don't see anti submarine efforts going for such a bad turn here since that involved mostly light units I think, not ones I'd think largely affected by the deployment to North America unlike for heavier units.

Now, I could see the British adopting early three key measures they did adopt IOTL but later.

1. Formally instating convoy system. For various reasons, it didn't happen until 1917 IOTL, but it proved relatively efficient. It mostly requires light units that shouldn't have a major impact on any commitment to the blockade in the North Sea or in Canada and can be supported in part by French naval assets.
2. Setting up a war cabinet. That wasn't done until December 1916 IOTL. The dire situation in North America is a very strong impetus for such a move, and could provide for a more effective war leadership. It wouldn't be unlikely that the catastrophe of US entry into the war leads to Asquith being pushed out just as IOTL.
3. Introducing conscription. That happened in January 1916, but here again, the new situation with North America doesn't leave much choice.

After, since this is still 1915 and Russia is in the war, the situation isn't yet critical on this front. And as I said before, there is ways to spare troops and ships, by seriously scaling down the commitment in Mesopotamia (could free up 15 to 18 divisions while leaving a strong garrison to defend the oil fields in southern Iraq and Persian Khuzestan), and stripping the Mediterranean fleet of its assets and leave Italy and France patrol its waters (by that point, Austro Hungarian and Ottoman navies are not much of a threat and are bottled up).

Here's a source for British naval assets during WW1. I'll make later a post once I see what units the British could have spared here.

http://www.naval-history.net/WW1NavyBritishShips-Locations01LB.htm

 

[ChadMachine999]

I'm guessing that Britain will not be able to do the Gallipoli campaign.

 

[galileo-034]

I don't think so. It would have still been considered a good shot at pushing the Ottomans out of the war, especially with the entry of the US in the war. Besides, they don't have to strip it all. Between it and its allies' navies, there is room to spare ships.

I'm still doing a bit of research on the naval orders of battle in 1914/1915 from wikipedia as well as the sources :

naval encyclopedia

warships and naval warfare from antiquity to this day

www.naval-encyclopedia.com

http://www.naval-history.net/WW1NavyBritishShips-Locations01LB.htm

And in a rough comparison, with few guesses* about alternate schedules in the US for naval buildup, and combining one Entente side the numbers of British, French, Japanese, Italian and Russian navies, and on the Central Powers side the numbers of the US, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, I arrive to the following partial oob in late 1914**:

PRE DREADNOUGHT BATTLESHIPS
113 _ UK(51) France(22) Japan(13) Italy(13) Russia(14)
68 _ US(25) Germany(29) Turkey(2) AH(12)

DREADNOUHT BATTLESHIPS
38 _ UK(22) France(4) Japan(2) Italy(6) Russia(4)
24 _ US(8) Germany(13) AH(3)

BATTLECRUISERS
14 _ UK(9) Japan(5)
6 _ Germany(5) Turkey(1)

CRUISERS
251 _ UK(136) France(35) Italy(27) Japan(34) Russia(19)
81 _ US(37) Germany(28) Turkey(3) AH(13)

DESTROYERS
459 _ UK(142) France(120) Italy(32) Japan(62) Russia(103)
224 _ US(45) Germany(143) Turkey(9) AH(27)

** Not counting any ship still under construction and that will add up to these numbers later on
* I supposed Bryan and Hearst presidencies were not seeing a great push for naval buildup. And though Beveridge may have been very proactive in naval matters, I don't see this affecting the overall order of battle in 1915 a lot; I considered earlier launch of the construction of ships ordered OTL during WW1, but considering that between laying down the ship and the commission of battleships, the delay is most of the time above two years, even three sometimes, the preparedness movement isn't going to produce an effect on the naval balance of power before 1917/1918. I'll develop on that once I finish my digging on that.

Here, we can note that even with the entry in the war of the US on Germany's side, the Entente retains a clear, even huge numerical superiority.
It's even more interesting to note that except for a slight inferiority in battleships, Japan is a match to the US navy; but keeping in mind that the US are fighting the war on two oceans, against both Japanese and British navies (not to mention any probable involvement of the French in the Carribean/West Indies area), so I doubt Japan would have so much reluctance as they are shown to have; rather, if there is a constant in Japanese policies at the time, it was to seek every opportunity to expand, and since European possessions are out of question, the American possessions in the Pacific, Philippines and Hawaii, became unexpectedly the big prize of this war (way more valuable than the German possessions they did already capture). Plus given this naval balance of power in the Pacific and the American decision to move the bulk of their Pacific fleet to the Philippines, American positions in the area are exposed to attack in detail (Alaska and Hawaii are likely victims for Japanese coups de main).
The superiority in destroyers and cruisers is probably being less meaningful since lot of them are going to be absorbed by convoy duties in the Mediterranean sea and in the South Atlantic ocean, from Madeira to Dakar and Brasil.

 

[ChadMachine999]

Japan is a match to the US navy

All the US needs is to have ten or so dreadnoughts in the pacific fleet to scare away Japan. Also this gap is only gonna grow as Canadian steel is sued to build American dreadnaughts.

 

[galileo-034]

All the US needs is to have ten or so dreadnoughts in the pacific fleet to scare away Japan. Also this gap is only gonna grow as Canadian steel is sued to build American dreadnaughts.

They would only have 8 at hand by June 1915. And if they send all of them to the Pacific, they virtually abandon the East Coast to British battleships.
And these ten or so dreadnoughts are not coming into the fray before 1917 at least (counting those which have already been laid down since Roosevelt second term began).

Meanwhile, the British would have added another 11 dreadnought battleships, the French would have added 3, Japan another 2, the Italians another 1, the Russians another 3, and I'm only counting those which were already well advanced by May 1915, and another 3 (2 by Japan laid down in May 1915 and a Revenge class which was laid down in 1913 but only launched in 1916 OTL); so in the end, we have between 20 and 23 more dreadnoughts on the Entente side by late 1916 (I see most of the dreadnoughts built here were laid down before the war, and there were very few constructions started during it).
On the other side, the Germans would have launched another 6 dreadnoughts, and my minimum estimate on US naval expansion based on OTL numbers and a voluntarist Roosevelt administration from 1913 onward gives another 15 planned or already laid down by early 1915 and to be commissioned between late 1915 and early 1918 (2 New York-class battleships in late 1915, 2 Nevada-class and 2 Pennsylvania-class BBs by mid to late 1916, 2 Tennessee-class BBs and 3 New Mexico-class BBs by mid 1917, and 4 Colorado-class BBs by mid 1918). We have here 21 new dreadnought battleships on the Central powers side at least.

In this conservative estimate, we have a parity in the buildup of dreadnought strength. Of course, I think the US will probably lay down more dreadnoughts as the war begins, but these won't enter commission before at least mid 1918; here, they would need to lay at least 14 more battleships to achieve parity with the Entente (if the balance of power on the seas shifts in a more decided way, that will probably be for units that are faster to build, from cruisers down, and that can hit hard Entente trade).

In the meantime, the war keeps going on, all while the US navy remains inferior in numbers for the time being. If by the election of 1916, American foreign trade has totally collapsed and that Alaska, Hawaii have been lost to the Japanese, Porto Rico and Cuba to the a Franco-British squadron and that the Pacific Fleet is bottled up in the Philippines because the US navy was still unable to seriously contest Entente hold of the seas while the invasion of Canada has degenerated into a bloody trench warfare stalemate (I'm saying a possible worst case scenario for the Americans here), then Roosevelt and Progressives' prospects at reelection are looking quite dim, no matter how many battleships the US are in midst of building.
Worst case still, a pro peace Bryan Democrat could then win in 1916 and the US make a separate peace in 1917, which the Entente would hardly be in a position to refuse, and incidentally, a separate peace with the US leaves the door open for another with Austria-Hungary as it would avoid the hardline stance of OTL at this point ITTL.
Russia would still be embroiled in revolution, but the exit of Austria-Hungary would trigger a domino effect as Romania which I suspect staying out of the war unlike OTL (incidentally alleviating the burden put on Russian forces that were required to reinforce the Romanian front) could enter the fray now in an opportunistic manner, in turn pushing Bulgaria towards the exit. That leaves the path towards Constantinople wide open as the Turks can still resist if determined: their southern fronts are less critical since ITTL because of troops requirements for North America and Western Front grow more urgent, the British would have limited their actions to strict defense of the Suez canal (possibly still a limited campaign in the Sinai but no advance into Palestine) and of the oil fields in Lower Mesopotamia and Khuzestan (no further push to Baghdad after the disaster at Kut, perhaps even no disaster at Kut if the OTL 1915 autumn push to Baghdad isn't ordered), Russian advance into Anatolia has largely stalled and is on verge of collapse because of the revolutions in Russia proper; all in all, they can try to bolster the Catalja line and turn it into a formidable Gallipoli defense if the collapse of Bulgaria leaves them time to do so.

Besides, less battleships and a less pronounced superiority in the North Sea during an ATL Jutland doesn't necessarily mean the British will lose it.

 

[galileo-034]

So, here's a first estimate of which ships could be available for a North American task forces :

• by July 1915 : 5 dreadnought battleships, 3 battlecruisers, 15 pre-dreadnought battleships
• 2 dreadnoughts by October 1915, 2 dreadnoughts by February 1916
• a French detachment of 8 pre-dreadnought battleships and a further 3 dreadnoughts (by March 1916), probably to be deployed to the Antillas and support actions in defense of the Bahamas and Jamaica or against Porto Rico, Cuba and Nicaragua (while the British focus on Canada)

I've so far only searched for heavy units, and I still have research on cruisers and destroyers to do.

Meanwhile, while the Americans would have 8 dreadnoughts and 25 pre-dreadnoughts by July 1915 and another 2 New York-class dreadnought by the fall, they would be split between the Atlantic and the Pacific to face the Japanese too. In the proposed oob, by March 1916 once British and French latest ships are counted in, we get 10 dreadnoughts and 25 pre-dreadnoughts on the US' side against a combined 15 dreadnoughts, 7 battlecruisers and 36 pre dreadnoughts.

The gap won't start closing in before late 1916 with 4 new dreadnoughts (2 Nevada-class and 2 Pennsylvania-class), plus 2 out of 6 Lexington-class battlecruisers (I imagine Roosevelt administration planning for them in 1913, with 2 laid down by late 1913/early 1914 for delivery in the second half of 1916).
Since most of these were being built on the eastern seaboard (I figured that Beveridge and Roosevelt would have developped the shipyards on West Coast a little more with Mare Island and Union Iron Works in California producing a New York-class dreadnought by late 1915 and one of the two Lexington-class battlecruisers delivered in late 1916), that will only really impact the balance in the Atlantic, which is problematic if the Pacific fleet in the Philippines isn't strong enough against Japan (which would have with 3 dreadnoughts and 4 battlecruisers).
I can't say beyond 1916 as I've not yet computed all constructions in, but for 1915 and 1916, the naval balance of power looks bad for the US.

Spoiler: Detail

In matter of dreadnought battleships, the British could have immediatly 5 under hand : HMS Queen Elizabeth (to be withdrawn from Dardanelles), HMS Warspite, HMS Erin and HMS Agincourt (both seized from Ottomans in 1914), and HMS Neptune. They can expect quickly two others with the HMS Canada and HMS Barham due to enter service in October (purchased from Chile), and another two with the entry in service of HMS Valiant and HMS Malaya in January and February 1916, bringing the total up to 9.
While this move could weaken the strength of the Grand Fleet, it remains possible for London to arrange for France to transfer all its 4 Courbet-class dreadnoughts from the Mediterranean sea to the Channel and the North Sea to relieve the British forces here.

We can add the three battlecruisers of the 3rd Battlecruiser squadron (Invicible, Inflexible and Indomitable), two of which had returned from Falklands and been detached to Gallipoli and the third had seen action in Dogger Bank.

As for pre dreadnought battleships, counting mostly battleships from the Mediterranean and a few patrolling the North Sea, we can have 2 Lord Nelson-class battleships (Agamemnon, Lord Nelson), 3 King Edward VII-class (Africa, Hibernia, Zealandia), 5 Duncan-class (Albermale, Cornwallis, Duncan, Exmouth, Russell), 4 Canopus-class (Albion, Canopus, Glory, Vengeance) and 1 Majestic-class (Caesar). That's still provisional since the Canopus and Majestic class ships are a bit old, so I'm still looking other more recent battleships that can be switched with these without affecting too much the balance of power.
On French side, since Italy has taken up the blockade of the Otranto straits, it could spare 8 out of its sixteen pre dreadnoughts, 2 Liberté-class (Justice, Démocratie) and all 6 Danton-class (Condorcet, Danton, Diderot, Mirabeau, Vergniaud, Voltaire). These were ships that later went to cover Salonika and pressure Greece, but they were not present during the Dardanelles campaign

At this point, Turkey's most powerful surface unit is the battlecruiser Yavuz (ex Goeben) after its two pre dreadnought battleships were damaged beyond repair during the Dardanelles. And to precise about Greece, I assumed that the US wouldn't have sold them the Mississippi and Idaho battleships, so their most powerful ship remains the armored cruiser Georgios Averof. That leaves the Entente with at minimum 8 French pre dreadnought battleships to cover Salonika and to exert pressure on Greece (I've not yet fully checked all British pre dreadnought battleships).

To come back to the ongoing Dardanelles campaign, the proposed reaffectations still left a good portion of the supporting fleet intact. While it loses its only dreadnought and 2 battlecruisers out of three, counting the French pre dreadnoughts, there would be still 17 pre dreadnought battleships out of 28 (9 British and 8 French).

 

[PyroTheFox]

The U.S.S. San Diego Led the Cruiser Vanguard and Symbolized U.S. Strength at Sea, 1915 - Source: Wiki Commons​

The United States dove headfirst into a war-centric economy as its people worked strenuously to supply the front with all necessary resources. Production in the latter half of 1915 fixated in totality on the needs of the front over all else. Munitions and food supplies were indispensable for the soldiers in the field, and the federal government ensured that productive authorities of said stock doubled, or tripled, factorial efficiency. Soldiers served on the battlefield while workers served in their factories, and those unable to do either contributed elsewhere. Older Americans unfit to join the military and middle-class families uninterested in joining assembly lines committed on an individual basis. Some fostered economical "victory gardens" to reduce domestic demand on the nation's food supply. Others cheerfully purchased celebrity-endorsed liberty bonds to assist in U.S. finances. All the intricacies of the war economy, from top to bottom, were laced with a hefty serving of patriotism that hoped to instill in American civilians the sense that the national interest was too their interest. "Abide by your patriotic duty" a common advertisement for war bonds read.

Local and state governments significantly ramped up recruitment efforts as trained men were shipped off to the Northern Front. With the popularity of intervention ever-growing, enlistment offices in well-populated areas filled to the brim with young men eager to fight as well as women ready to serve as military nurses. This phenomenon had an inverse effect on the labor supply, as men joining the front left behind empty positions at their workplaces. These gaps were, in turn, speedily filled with scores of working women ready and willing to take jobs along factorial assembly lines that were typically, exclusively designated for male employees. Women were already a sizable portion of the total domestic workforce, especially so by the 1910s, but their share increased dramatically in virtually every industry from weapons manufacturing to grain harvesting. Synchronous with this development was a stark, month-by-month drop in unemployment rates that came to epitomize this moment of near-full employment.

Apart from a progressively nationalistic American populace, an overall economy on the rebound rejoiced with the latest news. Government demand for war goods greatly assisted thousands of businesses as well as umbrella industries like steel and lumber, but now a glistening new prize was finally within the nation's grasp. Late-breaking news of the division of the British blockade opened the doors to Roosevelt's fabled export boom. Indeed, plentiful and somewhat exaggerated reports of apparent holes in the fortification reached U.S. shores before long. Navigating either the North Sea or the English Channel was still a plenty dangerous voyage with British fleets breathing down the necks of most transports, but the columns were not quite as secure as they once were. Due to the slightly reduced and newly porous Northern Patrol, over a dozen commercial vessels (ten of which stemming from the United States) made their way through once-impenetrable waters from September to November, 1915. The brunt of the blockade stayed close to chief German ports along the Wadden Sea, but unsuspecting port towns like Husum in Southern Schleswig became prime game for international trade. When British patrols adjusted formations to compensate, new gaps appeared at the mouth of the Skagerrak strait, therefore allowing trade into Kiel and Flensburg in Northern Germany.

True profits generated from these early treks were not particularly remarkable by any means, but the simple rebirth of U.S.-German trade unlocked an avenue few believed possible. The British roadblock starved Germany of foodstuffs and other rations for over a year. In that time, the total percentage of imports halved. German children suffered from malnutrition on a scale never before documented, and illnesses began to spread in urban communities. The deprivation of staple goods harmed the civilian population both physically and psychologically, but that period waned with the arrival of fresh imports from the U.S. and other countries. The gradual dissipation of food shortages coincided with a slight uptick in the Central Powers' munitions stockpile as the tide of imports inflated (Britain's greatest fear realized), and its end result led to refreshed confidence in the war effort in addition to heightened morale among the troops themselves. A similar spirit spread to Prime Minister Carl Zahle of Denmark, who in 1916 answered the plea of U.S. commercial interests to open their port cities for trade goods destined for Germany. Denmark itself pledged neutrality in the war, but its resistance to interfere with the trade restriction vanished with the blockade's impermeable reputation.

For this, President Roosevelt reached record public approval and favorable opinion on the armed conflict met its highest mark. War coverage had been exclusively positive whether it be regarding Europe or the Northern Front (an initiative demanded by the United States Information Council). News media, insistent on its optimistic message, kept the limelight on victories in Canada long after the advance in Ontario slowed. There was no shortage of coverage when Roosevelt unveiled the completion of five new destroyers on Christmas Eve: a solid victory for U.S. naval power as well as the steel industry. Distilling patriotic imagery and pressing it hard onto the public, the narrative was unmoving, thereby ensuring virtually no dissent apart from the occasional pacifist rally or anarchist agitator. Little news arrived from the Pacific, however, where progress was nonexistent and seafaring forces struggled to keep a lock on the Philippines, but that subject was often relegated to the editorial dustbin.

The United States' operation was proceeding satisfactorily at the close of the year. Roosevelt signed new legislation in the December session of Congress that marginally and temporarily raised the national tax rate on incomes over $100,000. Proceeds from the tax hike were directed squarely to better fund the war, namely, to expand the scope of supplies purchasable by the U.S. government. It also provided for a variety of improvements to existing military bases along the American coastlines and in states bordering Canada. Camp Grayling, a recently constructed National Guard training facility in Grayling, Michigan, received a hefty federal grant in 1916, as did Fort Drum in New York and Camp Perry in Ohio. These funding initiatives were applauded in near unanimity by Congress, as even the strictest Southern conservatives would not allow themselves to appear unpatriotic with an election around the corner.

Confident in the Canadian advance and comforted by overwhelming public approval, Roosevelt began floating to his Cabinet the idea of sending an expeditionary force into the Western Front. Pershing, restless as usual, advocated in favor of the plan and, furthermore, volunteered to lead an auxiliary squadron abroad. Critics like Garfield profusely recommended against it once the stun of disbelief wore off, and brought to the president's attention the obvious risk of stretching assets and manpower too thin. "Objectionists" in the Cabinet warned that expanding hostilities was a mighty gambit considering the plausibility for a drawn-out conflict along the Northern Front (and the death it would inevitably bring). The president was persuaded of the need to hold off for the time being, but the cloud of uncertainty hung over his head as the New Year rang in. Optimism and self-assuredness, in the end, can only bring one so far before reality rears its ugly head. Fortunately for Roosevelt, that occurred sooner rather than later.