"...which of course, by the mid-1870s, found Moscow in being in the awkward position of having only Germany as their reliable friend in Europe. This stemmed mostly from a position less of anger at expansionism, as with the "Iron Triangle" arrayed against the Germans, than one of no particular interlining interests. Russia was Orthodox and backwards, her government totalitarian in a way that even autocrats in Berlin, Vienna and increasingly Istanbul found gauche. She was of Europe and not of Europe, isolated from the court of Paris where world diplomacy still seemed to orbit despite the decline in France's hard power since 1815. Britain feared Russian encroachment on India via Central Asia; Imperial Paris had romantic sympathies still for the plight of the Poles, crushed so ruthlessly in 1864; the Austrians and Ottomans feared Russian designs on the Balkans in the name of Pan-Slavism, the ideology du jour in the Tsar's inner circle; and as for Germany's Bismarck, he viewed Russia as a means to an end, a way to prevent Austria from getting any ideas about meddling in Catholic South Germany, a mutual guarantee against Polish nationalism and a way to begin pushing for his newest diplomatic balancing act in Scandinavia [1].
What finally put the wheels in motion then, in 1875, was the twin defaults that spring [2] of the Ottoman and Egyptian governments, a watershed moment in the Middle East that threw the Tanzimat reforms into question and had a dramatic effect on the balance of power. It was Societe Generale that parachuted in on both effects, buying the remaining shares of the Suez Canal Company from the bankrupt Khedive Ismail of Egypt and then shortly thereafter agreed to purchase and restructure much of the Ottoman sovereign debt. In one fell swoop, this made the large Parisian bank the biggest creditor of the Middle Eastern governments (in 1876 the bank would extend its influence in Tunis and Tripoli as well) and secured French interests near-total ownership of the strategically critical Suez Canal, leaving British banks with a miniscule minority interest [3]. In London, the incident was an outrage - as one Liberal politician notably put it, "Carnarvon is too busy drawing lines on maps in South Africa, shooting Irishmen and having bobbies knock textile workers' heads together to notice Bonaparte turn the Mediterranean Sea into a bloody French lake!" [4] By now tying the fortunes of Istanbul inextricably to Paris, and giving France - and by extension, the rapidly expanding French Navy - decisive control of the most important seaway to the East, the geopolitical calculations of Europe changed effectively overnight. For Russia, their desires of expanding Balkan influence were essentially evaporating before their eyes, for now it would be France, and her ally Austria, that dictated the fate of Christian Southeast Europe, especially with a vice on the Ottoman purse. London may have been sailing into the fog in 1875, but it was Moscow that reeled and suddenly faced the threat of being boxed out of Europe entirely..."
- The Gathering Storm: The Prelude to the Eastern Crisis 1856-1876 (Columbia University Press, 1991)
[1] More on this later
[2] Timetable moved up due to earlier Great Depression
[3] Huge butterfly of no Disraeli
[4] Who knew reactionary assholes made poor long-term strategic thinkers
What finally put the wheels in motion then, in 1875, was the twin defaults that spring [2] of the Ottoman and Egyptian governments, a watershed moment in the Middle East that threw the Tanzimat reforms into question and had a dramatic effect on the balance of power. It was Societe Generale that parachuted in on both effects, buying the remaining shares of the Suez Canal Company from the bankrupt Khedive Ismail of Egypt and then shortly thereafter agreed to purchase and restructure much of the Ottoman sovereign debt. In one fell swoop, this made the large Parisian bank the biggest creditor of the Middle Eastern governments (in 1876 the bank would extend its influence in Tunis and Tripoli as well) and secured French interests near-total ownership of the strategically critical Suez Canal, leaving British banks with a miniscule minority interest [3]. In London, the incident was an outrage - as one Liberal politician notably put it, "Carnarvon is too busy drawing lines on maps in South Africa, shooting Irishmen and having bobbies knock textile workers' heads together to notice Bonaparte turn the Mediterranean Sea into a bloody French lake!" [4] By now tying the fortunes of Istanbul inextricably to Paris, and giving France - and by extension, the rapidly expanding French Navy - decisive control of the most important seaway to the East, the geopolitical calculations of Europe changed effectively overnight. For Russia, their desires of expanding Balkan influence were essentially evaporating before their eyes, for now it would be France, and her ally Austria, that dictated the fate of Christian Southeast Europe, especially with a vice on the Ottoman purse. London may have been sailing into the fog in 1875, but it was Moscow that reeled and suddenly faced the threat of being boxed out of Europe entirely..."
- The Gathering Storm: The Prelude to the Eastern Crisis 1856-1876 (Columbia University Press, 1991)
[1] More on this later
[2] Timetable moved up due to earlier Great Depression
[3] Huge butterfly of no Disraeli
[4] Who knew reactionary assholes made poor long-term strategic thinkers