…By the time testing for the two AMST candidates was successfully completed in 1977, the program was already under threat. As part of the post-Vietnam redevelopment of the United States military, there was a growing recognition of the importance of operations outside of the United States and Europe, where supplies were not already prepositioned and divisions already prepared to fight. Deploying soldiers and their equipment to locations as far-flung as Africa, Southeast Asia, or the Middle East would require aircraft with large payloads and long ranges, but not necessarily STOL capabilities, the exact opposite of the AMST requirements. Compounding this shift in direction was the aging of the C-141 fleet, procured in the early 1960s and worked hard since then, which needed to be replaced by a new aircraft. The Air Force Chief of Staff, David C. Jones, inquired as early as 1976 whether the AMST aircraft could be modified to handle the strategic mission as well as the tactical mission, and initially it seemed as though the program might be headed for the scrapheap of changes in military requirements.
However, this interest in a new generation of strategic airlifter quickly subsided. Since its introduction in 1969, the C-5 Galaxy had demonstrated its effectiveness in lifting heavy and oversized cargo, and although production had stopped in 1975 Lockheed promised that it could relatively cheaply resume building the giant aircraft. Although the C-5 would have relatively high operating costs compared to other aircraft, its load was large enough that it still seemed competitive on price with the alternatives of a modified civilian aircraft or an entirely new military design. With the decision to procure a second batch of C-5s in early 1979, the AMST resumed its attempt to decide between the Boeing YC-14 and the McDonnell Douglas YC-15 as an eventual replacement for the venerable C-130 Hercules. Although the decision was made difficult by the fact that both aircraft had met or exceeded testing requirements, ultimately Air Force leadership narrowly decided that the YC-14 was the superior choice in late 1979, awarding a contract to Boeing with the expectation that 500 or more aircraft might eventually be ordered. At the same time, the new aircraft was officially named the “Stratofreighter II,” after the earlier Boeing transport, the C-97 Stratofreighter.
Boeing, like the rest of the military-industrial complex, benefited greatly from the military build-up of the Reagan years. Although funding for new tactical airlifters was last in priority behind new fighters, bombers, strategic transports, and other assets, Boeing was nevertheless able to carve out a larger amount of pie than had appeared likely under Carter. Although there were accidents and incidents during the testing program, by and large C-14 development went smoothly, with the first production examples being delivered to the Air Force in late 1984, allowing the standing up of the first operational squadron in early 1985.
The C-14 has seen wide use since then, with the first combat usage being in 1989, during Operation Just Cause, when the type was used as part of the assault on Omar Torrijos Airport. The next major combat usage came during Operation Desert Storm…
…Originally slated for 500 or more orders, to completely replace the C-130 fleet, orders were slashed in the wake of the Cold War as part of the so-called “Peace Dividend”. Higher-than-expected acquisition costs, combined with relatively high operational costs associated with the complex lift augmentation systems, had led to diminishing enthusiasm for the type’s advantages over the Hercules. Plans for a complete replacement of the Hercules fleet were abandoned in favor of a smaller order of 110 aircraft intended only to supplement them with a faster, heavier, and more nimble aircraft.
To compensate for the loss of Air Force orders, Boeing immediately began to seek out foreign and commercial customers for the type. There was some interest among specialty firms in the possibility of using the C-14 to lift time-sensitive cargo to remote locations, such as oil wells, but the availability of much cheaper ex-Soviet An-72s, which failed to find much of a market, soon crushed the hopes of the Boeing 730. Instead, the first non-Air Force customer for the type was the Royal Saudi Air Force, which had been impressed with its performance during Operation Desert Storm and was less concerned with strategic range than the United States. Orders from other close American allies soon followed, then orders from other nations…
…By the mid-1990s, the initial euphoria that followed the end of the Cold War had begun to fade, replaced by a new awareness of continuing security challenges. In this environment, procuring more C-14s seemed to make more sense than it had in 1990, and a second batch of 27 aircraft was ordered in 1995. Further orders followed in 1999, 2001, and 2004, when shutdown of the production line was scheduled for 2009. Congress intervened and ordered a final batch of 9 aircraft, ultimately extending production until 2011. A total of 207 aircraft were purchased by the United States Air Force…
…The most common nickname for the C-14 in American service is “Mickey,” and crew members are often called “Mickeys” by the rest of the United States Air Force. Initially a derogatory reference to the plane’s frontal appearance, the name was soon appropriated as a badge of pride by pilots, who recalled Mickey’s ability to triumph over seemingly stronger and more powerful foes. References to other jug-eared characters are also fairly common, and the 155th Airlift Squadron has the unofficial motto “What, me worry?” in reference to Alfred E. Neuman, the mascot of MAD magazine…
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This is a little idea I've had sort of noodling around my head for a long while but only got around to writing up after discussing it with
@e of pi a few days ago. The PoD, which is not terrifically obvious from the write-up, is basically that C-5 development goes smoothly, with few troubles. Therefore, the Air Force decides to procure more C-5s in the late 1970s instead of developing an entirely new strategic airlifter, the C-17, to replace the C-141, as mentioned in the second paragraph. They sort of did this OTL, with the C-5B, but not quite as much as ITTL.