10.13, An easier day for the RAF but a day of preparation across the Channel.
Saturday August the 17th.
Day, Activity limited to reconnaissance. Fighter Command faces pilot shortage.
Night, Light Raids midlands , Merseyside, South Wales.
Weather Fine in Channel, haze and some cloud in the east. (1)
With the Luftwaffe needing to rest, rearm and rethink today was a quite day for Fighter Command. Though that did not prevent them from flying some two hundred and eighty eight sorties chasing reconnaissance aircraft and single intruders. For no loss the RAF claimed no less than seven enemy aircraft destroyed and a further half a dozen damaged. Whilst the very high altitude enemy air craft were proving nigh on impossible to intercept and the very low level ones needed to stray into the path of a VLL RDF station some were being intercepted successfully. Those that bumbled along at mid altitudes were by and large tracked successfully with the sector controllers more often than not passing the control of the interception to the relevant PPI station. This had the duel advantage of giving more experience and in fact training to the PPI stations and also dramatically increased the chance of a successful interception due to the faster and direct control of the fighters movements. The success obtained especially on days with heavy cloud cover had given rise to discussions as to the practicality of guiding single seat non RDF equipped fighters for nighty interceptions. Though great strides in night-fighter interception techniques had been made Dowding and all at Fighter Command were aware that if and when the Luftwaffe resorted to mass night raids the system could be overwhelmed. Also it was always good in the minds of Dowding and Sir Phillip to have a second string on one’s bow.
Despite the losses the Luftwaffe had sustained in the last few days including the drubbing received by Luftflotte five the Luftwaffe high command were confident that they had done serious damage to Fighter Command. The confidence of the Luftwaffe Commanders in that they were winning the battle and that one more big push would finish the job was bolstered by the evidence being provided to them via their own intelligence reports. The latest report issued after the days fighting on the sixteenth of August contained the summary that the RAF’s fighter strength had been reduced to less than three hundred operational fighters in Britain. Bolstering this assumption was the claim that between the first of July and the fifteenth of August the Luftwaffe had shot down a total of six hundred and sixty two RAF fighters. This figure being broken down into the following numbers by aircraft type: Spitfires 372, Hurricanes 179, Defiants 12, Reapers 2 and finally 10 Curtis Hawks. If they had known it the last figure and type of aircraft it would have been of great interest to Fighter Command as there were no Curtis Hawks flying with RAF units in Great Britain at that time.
Whilst the claim that the RAF was reduced to less than three Hundred operational fighters was a gross miscalculation, there were in fact just over seven hundred operational fighters available, there was however what could be considered a shortage of pilots. Despite the increase of flow through the OUT’s and the transfer of pilots from others duties the loss of experienced pilots and especially squadron and flight leaders was a cause of concern to Sir Hugh Dowding. The policy of rotating squadron out of 11 Group to rest and make up numbers would continue for the time being but plans would be put in place to alter the system if the fighting qualities of the front line squadrons was eroded any further.
One action to be taken immediately was to commit the squadrons of the Polish Air Contingent to the battle in the south east. After discussions with Sir Keith Park the decision was made to send the four Spitfire Squadrons from the PAC to Duxford and Debden that day to form the Duxford/Debden wing. The Polish Night fighter squadron was also transferred south to replace 25 squadron at Martlesham, going with them were a number of bilingual controllers to be posted as super numeries to the PPI stations that the squadrons would be working with. This meant that 85, 17, 19 and 264 Squadrons would head north to Fourteen group.
There were three newly operational Beaufighter Squadrons, No’s 235,236 and 248 having completed their conversion from the Blenheim aircraft they had been flying. With the co-operation of Coastal Command, who were releasing control of them to Fighter Command, they were now to be stationed at Lossiemouth and Banff where their heavy fighters were more than capable against the un-escorted attacks of Luftflotte Five. This would allow the four squadrons, 85 and 17 from Debden and 19 and 264 from Duxford to take a back seat to rest and reform in Fourteen Group. It also Gave Sir Hugh the option to take three further Squadrons from 13 and 14 Groups to reinforce 10,11 and 12 Group if requires. In discussion with Sir Phillip, Sir Hugh Dowding Expressed his opinion that this would only need to be done if the German invasion fleet sailed. Sir Keith Park was happy with the exchange as he had gained four fresh Spitfire Squadrons who were full of vim and vigour in exchange for four depleted and tired squadrons of Hurricanes. The other factor was that the Polish squadrons were used to acting in concert with each other and had experience of forming up into squadron pairs or even a four squadron wing as they climbed for altitude. This ability if used wisely by the Eleven Group controllers might enable them to bounce a German formation with overwhelming force and inflict serious losses on it.
What was a godsend as far as Sir Hugh was concerned was the steady stream of experienced pilots returning to action having been plucked from the sea or recovering from minor injuries. Sending these pilots to leaven the rookies joining the squadrons in the northern Groups gave Sir Hugh hope, that contingency plans already discussed with Sir Keith Park, whereby his Group’s squadrons would be kept at their full pilot strength by robbing other Group’s squadrons of their best pilots would not become necessary. This would be what Sir Hugh had described to Sir Phillip “as going down hill” and was to be avoided if at all possible but planning for such actions was only wise. However if the Luftwaffe concentrated on the sector stations and the RDF stations in Eleven Group the ability of Fighter Command to keep air superiority over the south coast from the Thames estuary round to the Isle of Wight could be in jeopardy, which in itself could be the harbinger of a German invasion.
(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster