Weren't most wartime promotions temporary or provisional until confirmed after some time had expired and the expected performance seen. If the performance is not as expected simply return him to his permanent rank with the appropriate responsibilities.
AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
Please note correction of the date on the last post, it is Thursday the 15th.
As to who is on the carpet I promise all will be reveled when normal posting operations resume in a week or so. For those who voted in the TD's for this TL.my hearty thank and my congratulations to a very worthy winner in a very tough category.
As to who is on the carpet I promise all will be reveled when normal posting operations resume in a week or so. For those who voted in the TD's for this TL.my hearty thank and my congratulations to a very worthy winner in a very tough category.
Depended, if it was due to action then yes, if it was a planed thing due to say retirement, then no. Duffers tended to be pushed sideways in those cases, however most personnel were classed as "Hostilities Only" and after the war a lot of those had ranks reduced if they wished ( and were accepted ) to stay in the forces.
formion
Banned
It seems that Luftflotte 5 was gutted. In OTL I think they faced quite lighter defences and they lost 23 aircraft. Here the British fighter pilots claim dozens. I wonder what the actual figure would be.
Hope you haven't got too far to travel for the funerals - by road or air, and that it doesn't entail too much of an early start.
Never underestimate the ability of wishful thinking, just as per OTL they will take pilot claims as more accurate than they are and convince themselves the RAF is hurting more than they are. Given the LW can not get independent views , unlike the RAF that can count wrecks, this is not going to sort itself out quickly. So like OTL they will impale themselves until losses are too high thinking one more effort will do it and break Fighter Command.
Some of you might have noticed yet another error in my instalment as posted. I state at the end of it, in the Note that the summary was as per 'the Narrow Margin', this is in fact incorrect as the Luftwaffe losses quoted in 'the Narrow Margin' total seventy Five OTL and ITTL they are listed as being Ninety Five. That is an increase of just over 25%, which is far from minor and will have repercussions.
Has someone thought to include the jokes about "Turn left at the third Junkers, then right at the field with all the Heinkels!"?
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10.09 Serious Damage And Real Concern For The Future
10.09 Serious damage and real concern for the future.
Of all the days that Winston Churchill in his combined roll as both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence could have chosen to visit the Headquarters of Fighter Command, he had to chose this day; when the Luftwaffe had mounted it’s largest aerial assault yet to test and try the air defences of Great Britain. As Air Minister and War Cabinet member, Sir Phillip had also been in attendance at Fighter Command headquarters for the day. His primary concern, other than managing Churchill’s expectations, was to ensure as little interference into the daily operations of the command as possible. Sholto Douglass also took the opportunity to make his presence felt as Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, a post he had only held since April, prior to which he had been assistant CAS and before that had been Director of Staff Duties. It was whilst Sholto Douglass was the Director of Staff Duties, that he and Sir Phillip had first locked horns in the period of 1936 through to 1938, over the treatment of Sir Hugh Dowding and his impending retirement from the active RAF. Sholto Douglas had not actually held an operational post since the Great War and had become the consummate staff officer and civil service manipulator. Now with Newall basically invisible and ineffective, as assistant CAS Sholto was out to promote his own prowess and this certainly did not impress Sir Phillip one jot.
On the other hand, the quiet competence of Sir Douglas Claude Strathern Evill as Dowding’s Senior Staff Officer had always met with Sir Phillips appreciation, as had his working relationship with both of the Dowding brothers in forging a good working relationship with the FAA at the highest level. As an ex-RN officer, he was one of a handful of senior RAF officers who had transferred from the RNAS when the RAF had been formed in 1918 and had remained interested in naval aviation.
As the evening wore on and more and more reports were received at the Air Ministry, Sir Phillip’s concerns increased, for the day’s action had spread far and wide over the Fighter Command Groups. The only Group not to engage in major combat was 14 Group, who’s commander was voicing his dismay that his group had only been faced with the occasional high flying intruder bent on stealing a photographic look at a place of interest. In the South, Eleven Group had been hard pressed at times and for a short period in the afternoon had every single operational squadron under its command committed to the fray. Here the co-operation and interdependency of the Groups as well as the handling of the ‘Bigger Picture’ by the Fighter Command headquarters at Bentley Priory really illustrated the strengths and adaptability the system devised and built under Sir Hugh Dowding’s stewardship.
Sir Phillip and Strathern Evill had quietly explained the strategic thinking and the operational tactics being used by Sir Hugh Dowding to frustrate the Luftwaffe. Two salient points in the day became apparent to the Prime Minister: these were, firstly that Dowding through Sir Keith Park, along with the other Group commanders was determined to oppose every attack before it reached its target and thereby not give the Luftwaffe bombers any easy missions. Secondly’ that it was essential not to over commit forces against any single raid and thereby leave insufficient squadrons to oppose another assault separated by either geography, time or a combination of these. The perils of this situation arising was clearly illustrated during the afternoon when Luftflotte three had attacked the north of England whilst the other German Luftflottes stretched Eleven Group to the absolute limit of its resources. The coordination and cooperation between the Groups was a component of the days conflict that had a marked impression upon Churchill.
The importance of the combined information from the GCI stations giving accurate almost real time plotting of both enemy and friendly aircraft over the bulk of the British Isle, joined with the ability of the Observer Corps to advise on the type and number of aircraft in any given raid, weather and time permitting of course, was today made self-evident. The subsequent analysis of the day’s actions by both operational research at Bentley Priory and the Air Ministry linked with the Intelligence and after action reports meant much would be learnt.
However, all of that would take time and time was something Sir Phillip and Sir Hugh were playing for as they knew that they had only a few precious hours to prepare for the next onslaught by the Luftwaffe, expected the following day. The intelligence services were striving as hard as they could to see beyond ‘the hill’ and divine the enemies’ intentions but at the moment there was precious little hard information that they could give. Signal intelligence from the Y Station intercepts by the still hush hush process of Signal Analysis was the most useful single source of information to Dowding’s planning staff at the current time.
Of the day’s events, several were causing Sir Phillip and Sir Hugh Dowding particular angst. This was primarily the attack on the RDF sites and on the sector stations. Damage to these though disruptive had not yet become critical. Though if the Luftwaffe continued to hit the vulnerable south coast RDF stations and concentrated on the vital sector stations, the situation could quickly deteriorate. In an attempt to lessen the impact that the loss of a sector station would have, Sir Keith Park had been having Eleven Group controllers practicing using the CGI stations to control fighters directly as an alternative to giving instructions via the sector stations. One unintended consequence of these trials had been the realisation that the GCI stations could actually handle more squadrons and guide them in real time to interceptions than the sector station controllers were able to do.
Recently, Sir Phillip had discussions with Sir Hugh and agreed that placing the sector control rooms actually at the sector stations had proven to be a mistake and that as soon as possible they would be moved off the RAF stations to dedicated hardened locations. Though of course this was rather a case of shutting the stable door.
The other factor really exercising the Air Ministry and RAF Fighter Command at this juncture of the current battle was the situation regarding fighter pilots. Whilst the flying schools and OTU’s were doing their utmost to produce the necessary replacement pilots, the quality of the pilots was inevitably decreasing as the more experienced pre-war cadre was whittled away. Sir Phillip daily counted the reports of pilots saved from death and debilitating injury by the armour plate and self-sealing fuel tanks that were now factory fitted in every new fighter. Adding to this was the increasing number of pilots plucked from the waters around the shores of Britain and he daily gave thanks to the Air Sea Rescue Service and others who were returning so many pilots to the battle.
In fact, that evening Sir Phillip had the pleasant personal task of signing an Official Air Ministry Letter of Commendation and thanks to a certain Miss Prince, who on the early morning of the fourteenth of August had sallied forth in a small canoe into the Channel to rescue one of the crew of a Bomber Command Blenheim that had ditched as it returned from the raid on Turin. Fortunately, a fishing boat had also managed to rescue the other two crew members. Whilst approving of the efforts of Miss Prince, the same could not be said of the current head of Bomber Command. As far as Sir Phillip was concerned, Portal was getting his priorities all wrong, sending a handful of Blenheim bombers carrying an insignificant bombload all the way to Italy to attack what were currently irrelevant aircraft factories. This was in Sir Phillip’s view a gross error of judgement whilst there were invasion barges and Luftwaffe airfields just across the channel to be attacked that were at this juncture far more important targets for Britain’s survival. So it was mixed thoughts that Sir Phillip finally left the Air Ministry for the night. On one hand hew was impatient to read the more detailed reports of the days air fighting and to look at the analysis provided by his tame boffins. On the other hand he was very concerned that if tomorrow brought the Luftwaffe in such force again, especially against Eleven Group then the system might break. With Churchill intending to visit Sir Keith Park at his Group Headquarters the next day it would only add to the pressure.
Of all the days that Winston Churchill in his combined roll as both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence could have chosen to visit the Headquarters of Fighter Command, he had to chose this day; when the Luftwaffe had mounted it’s largest aerial assault yet to test and try the air defences of Great Britain. As Air Minister and War Cabinet member, Sir Phillip had also been in attendance at Fighter Command headquarters for the day. His primary concern, other than managing Churchill’s expectations, was to ensure as little interference into the daily operations of the command as possible. Sholto Douglass also took the opportunity to make his presence felt as Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, a post he had only held since April, prior to which he had been assistant CAS and before that had been Director of Staff Duties. It was whilst Sholto Douglass was the Director of Staff Duties, that he and Sir Phillip had first locked horns in the period of 1936 through to 1938, over the treatment of Sir Hugh Dowding and his impending retirement from the active RAF. Sholto Douglas had not actually held an operational post since the Great War and had become the consummate staff officer and civil service manipulator. Now with Newall basically invisible and ineffective, as assistant CAS Sholto was out to promote his own prowess and this certainly did not impress Sir Phillip one jot.
On the other hand, the quiet competence of Sir Douglas Claude Strathern Evill as Dowding’s Senior Staff Officer had always met with Sir Phillips appreciation, as had his working relationship with both of the Dowding brothers in forging a good working relationship with the FAA at the highest level. As an ex-RN officer, he was one of a handful of senior RAF officers who had transferred from the RNAS when the RAF had been formed in 1918 and had remained interested in naval aviation.
As the evening wore on and more and more reports were received at the Air Ministry, Sir Phillip’s concerns increased, for the day’s action had spread far and wide over the Fighter Command Groups. The only Group not to engage in major combat was 14 Group, who’s commander was voicing his dismay that his group had only been faced with the occasional high flying intruder bent on stealing a photographic look at a place of interest. In the South, Eleven Group had been hard pressed at times and for a short period in the afternoon had every single operational squadron under its command committed to the fray. Here the co-operation and interdependency of the Groups as well as the handling of the ‘Bigger Picture’ by the Fighter Command headquarters at Bentley Priory really illustrated the strengths and adaptability the system devised and built under Sir Hugh Dowding’s stewardship.
Sir Phillip and Strathern Evill had quietly explained the strategic thinking and the operational tactics being used by Sir Hugh Dowding to frustrate the Luftwaffe. Two salient points in the day became apparent to the Prime Minister: these were, firstly that Dowding through Sir Keith Park, along with the other Group commanders was determined to oppose every attack before it reached its target and thereby not give the Luftwaffe bombers any easy missions. Secondly’ that it was essential not to over commit forces against any single raid and thereby leave insufficient squadrons to oppose another assault separated by either geography, time or a combination of these. The perils of this situation arising was clearly illustrated during the afternoon when Luftflotte three had attacked the north of England whilst the other German Luftflottes stretched Eleven Group to the absolute limit of its resources. The coordination and cooperation between the Groups was a component of the days conflict that had a marked impression upon Churchill.
The importance of the combined information from the GCI stations giving accurate almost real time plotting of both enemy and friendly aircraft over the bulk of the British Isle, joined with the ability of the Observer Corps to advise on the type and number of aircraft in any given raid, weather and time permitting of course, was today made self-evident. The subsequent analysis of the day’s actions by both operational research at Bentley Priory and the Air Ministry linked with the Intelligence and after action reports meant much would be learnt.
However, all of that would take time and time was something Sir Phillip and Sir Hugh were playing for as they knew that they had only a few precious hours to prepare for the next onslaught by the Luftwaffe, expected the following day. The intelligence services were striving as hard as they could to see beyond ‘the hill’ and divine the enemies’ intentions but at the moment there was precious little hard information that they could give. Signal intelligence from the Y Station intercepts by the still hush hush process of Signal Analysis was the most useful single source of information to Dowding’s planning staff at the current time.
Of the day’s events, several were causing Sir Phillip and Sir Hugh Dowding particular angst. This was primarily the attack on the RDF sites and on the sector stations. Damage to these though disruptive had not yet become critical. Though if the Luftwaffe continued to hit the vulnerable south coast RDF stations and concentrated on the vital sector stations, the situation could quickly deteriorate. In an attempt to lessen the impact that the loss of a sector station would have, Sir Keith Park had been having Eleven Group controllers practicing using the CGI stations to control fighters directly as an alternative to giving instructions via the sector stations. One unintended consequence of these trials had been the realisation that the GCI stations could actually handle more squadrons and guide them in real time to interceptions than the sector station controllers were able to do.
Recently, Sir Phillip had discussions with Sir Hugh and agreed that placing the sector control rooms actually at the sector stations had proven to be a mistake and that as soon as possible they would be moved off the RAF stations to dedicated hardened locations. Though of course this was rather a case of shutting the stable door.
The other factor really exercising the Air Ministry and RAF Fighter Command at this juncture of the current battle was the situation regarding fighter pilots. Whilst the flying schools and OTU’s were doing their utmost to produce the necessary replacement pilots, the quality of the pilots was inevitably decreasing as the more experienced pre-war cadre was whittled away. Sir Phillip daily counted the reports of pilots saved from death and debilitating injury by the armour plate and self-sealing fuel tanks that were now factory fitted in every new fighter. Adding to this was the increasing number of pilots plucked from the waters around the shores of Britain and he daily gave thanks to the Air Sea Rescue Service and others who were returning so many pilots to the battle.
In fact, that evening Sir Phillip had the pleasant personal task of signing an Official Air Ministry Letter of Commendation and thanks to a certain Miss Prince, who on the early morning of the fourteenth of August had sallied forth in a small canoe into the Channel to rescue one of the crew of a Bomber Command Blenheim that had ditched as it returned from the raid on Turin. Fortunately, a fishing boat had also managed to rescue the other two crew members. Whilst approving of the efforts of Miss Prince, the same could not be said of the current head of Bomber Command. As far as Sir Phillip was concerned, Portal was getting his priorities all wrong, sending a handful of Blenheim bombers carrying an insignificant bombload all the way to Italy to attack what were currently irrelevant aircraft factories. This was in Sir Phillip’s view a gross error of judgement whilst there were invasion barges and Luftwaffe airfields just across the channel to be attacked that were at this juncture far more important targets for Britain’s survival. So it was mixed thoughts that Sir Phillip finally left the Air Ministry for the night. On one hand hew was impatient to read the more detailed reports of the days air fighting and to look at the analysis provided by his tame boffins. On the other hand he was very concerned that if tomorrow brought the Luftwaffe in such force again, especially against Eleven Group then the system might break. With Churchill intending to visit Sir Keith Park at his Group Headquarters the next day it would only add to the pressure.
I will be putting up a couple of more posts in the next few hours and then I will be off the net for almost a month due to RL. Abnormal service regarding TTL will then resume sometime in May!
10.10 The View From The Other Side Of The Hill
10.10. The View from the other side of the Hill.
The fifteenth of August also happened to be the day the Reich Marshall Goering had called another conference of his senior officers at Kerrinhall. Unlike the last conference at Goering’s Prussian retreat where the performance of his stallions at stud seemed to be the most important item on the agenda this meeting was all business. Goering opened proceedings by instructing his commanders to provide heavier and closer escorts to protect the Ju 87 Stuka’s which seemed to be attracting particular attention from the RAF fighters and where taking serious losses as a consequence. To achieve the necessary level of protection Goering was instructing the fighters to provide three levels of escort, First a Gruppen of fighters was to provide close escort and even dive with the Stukas to stave of fighter attacks. A second Gruppen flying at medium altitude was to range ahead of the Stuka formation to sweep aside the defending fighters. The Third Gruppen’s task was to fly top cover over the whole formation and finally Goering reiterated that the escort must stay with the Stukas as they crossed the channel on their return from the target. Goering stated that the latest intelligence reports confirmed that the RAF fighter defences had taken crippling losses in aircraft and pilots whilst their ground facilities had been pounded into rubble. With his head of intelligence Colonel ‘Beppo’ Schmid reiterating that Fighter Command was on it’s knees Goering was confident that the major attacks taking place as he spoke would, with another day or two of attacks of the same intensity, secure air supremacy over southern England for the Luftwaffe. Goering concluded his opening address by stating ‘Operations are to be exclusively directed against the enemy air force including the targets of the enemy aircraft industry. . . . . Our night attacks are essentially dislocation raids, made so that the enemy defences and population shall be no respite.’ Efforts were to be to ensure that in daylight secondary targets conformed to this policy and that the same criteria was to be applied to all night attacks other than of course the continuing mine laying program. Goering also instructed that the special navigation and night bombing unit K.Gr.100 was to be committed to the general air assault. At this juncture Goering gave probably due to faulty intelligence, Fighter Command some respite exactly where it would be of the most benefit by stating, ‘It is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing the attacks on radio site, in view of the fact that not one of those attacked so far has been put out of action.’
In the subsequent discussions the performance of the RAF fighters came under scrutiny with the effectiveness of the cannon armed fighters being particularly noted as being a fundamental difference from the experience of the campaign in Belgium and France. Where in that earlier campaign Luftwaffe aircraft would return to base riddled with bullet hole and little significant damage it was noted that only two or three cannon shells could wreak havoc with even the largest bomber aircraft and this was definitely resulting in higher losses and many more wounded aircrew. The Luftwaffe commanders were particularly concerned by the effectiveness of the RAF Defiant fighters when they managed to get into a bomber formation, their four 20mm cannons were earning them a fearsome reputation amongst The Bomber Gruppen. The similarity in the silhouette between the Hawker Hurricane and the Bolton and Paul Defiant was resulting in Bombers crews mistaking the latter for the former when attacked and calling for ever closer and heavier fighter escorts. To minimise the losses in officers an edict was issued that no more than one officer was to fly in any aircraft.
Much debate was made over the ratio of fighters to bombers and it was noted in that in the planning for the operations taking place at that very moment that the ratio of Fighters to bombers had risen to a factor of two and a half times as many fighter sorties as bomber ones. This level of escort was putting serious strain on the fighter Gruppen and meant that up to half the bomber force was sitting on the ground due to insufficient escorts.
The ever increasing losses being suffered by the night bombers had been noted, ‘Beppo’ Schmitt and his intelligence team ascribed these increasing losses to the longer duration of the raids, the short summer nights and finally to the apparent increase of 1.5m wave length RDF stations which they believed were used primarily by the AA and searchlight batteries. Reports of the possibility of the RAF night fighters having an airborne RDF system were dismissed as mere fantasy.
To add to the Luftwaffe’s woes the initial reports received in the evening of the fifteenth of August from Luftflotte two and three were that both the Ju87 Stuka and the much vaunted Me 110 had again suffered major losses. For some reason no provisional reports had been yet received from Luftflotte five bases in Denmark and Norway. With major operations due to continue on the fallowing day all the senior officers departed as soon as practical to return to their units spread over occupied Europe.
The fifteenth of August also happened to be the day the Reich Marshall Goering had called another conference of his senior officers at Kerrinhall. Unlike the last conference at Goering’s Prussian retreat where the performance of his stallions at stud seemed to be the most important item on the agenda this meeting was all business. Goering opened proceedings by instructing his commanders to provide heavier and closer escorts to protect the Ju 87 Stuka’s which seemed to be attracting particular attention from the RAF fighters and where taking serious losses as a consequence. To achieve the necessary level of protection Goering was instructing the fighters to provide three levels of escort, First a Gruppen of fighters was to provide close escort and even dive with the Stukas to stave of fighter attacks. A second Gruppen flying at medium altitude was to range ahead of the Stuka formation to sweep aside the defending fighters. The Third Gruppen’s task was to fly top cover over the whole formation and finally Goering reiterated that the escort must stay with the Stukas as they crossed the channel on their return from the target. Goering stated that the latest intelligence reports confirmed that the RAF fighter defences had taken crippling losses in aircraft and pilots whilst their ground facilities had been pounded into rubble. With his head of intelligence Colonel ‘Beppo’ Schmid reiterating that Fighter Command was on it’s knees Goering was confident that the major attacks taking place as he spoke would, with another day or two of attacks of the same intensity, secure air supremacy over southern England for the Luftwaffe. Goering concluded his opening address by stating ‘Operations are to be exclusively directed against the enemy air force including the targets of the enemy aircraft industry. . . . . Our night attacks are essentially dislocation raids, made so that the enemy defences and population shall be no respite.’ Efforts were to be to ensure that in daylight secondary targets conformed to this policy and that the same criteria was to be applied to all night attacks other than of course the continuing mine laying program. Goering also instructed that the special navigation and night bombing unit K.Gr.100 was to be committed to the general air assault. At this juncture Goering gave probably due to faulty intelligence, Fighter Command some respite exactly where it would be of the most benefit by stating, ‘It is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing the attacks on radio site, in view of the fact that not one of those attacked so far has been put out of action.’
In the subsequent discussions the performance of the RAF fighters came under scrutiny with the effectiveness of the cannon armed fighters being particularly noted as being a fundamental difference from the experience of the campaign in Belgium and France. Where in that earlier campaign Luftwaffe aircraft would return to base riddled with bullet hole and little significant damage it was noted that only two or three cannon shells could wreak havoc with even the largest bomber aircraft and this was definitely resulting in higher losses and many more wounded aircrew. The Luftwaffe commanders were particularly concerned by the effectiveness of the RAF Defiant fighters when they managed to get into a bomber formation, their four 20mm cannons were earning them a fearsome reputation amongst The Bomber Gruppen. The similarity in the silhouette between the Hawker Hurricane and the Bolton and Paul Defiant was resulting in Bombers crews mistaking the latter for the former when attacked and calling for ever closer and heavier fighter escorts. To minimise the losses in officers an edict was issued that no more than one officer was to fly in any aircraft.
Much debate was made over the ratio of fighters to bombers and it was noted in that in the planning for the operations taking place at that very moment that the ratio of Fighters to bombers had risen to a factor of two and a half times as many fighter sorties as bomber ones. This level of escort was putting serious strain on the fighter Gruppen and meant that up to half the bomber force was sitting on the ground due to insufficient escorts.
The ever increasing losses being suffered by the night bombers had been noted, ‘Beppo’ Schmitt and his intelligence team ascribed these increasing losses to the longer duration of the raids, the short summer nights and finally to the apparent increase of 1.5m wave length RDF stations which they believed were used primarily by the AA and searchlight batteries. Reports of the possibility of the RAF night fighters having an airborne RDF system were dismissed as mere fantasy.
To add to the Luftwaffe’s woes the initial reports received in the evening of the fifteenth of August from Luftflotte two and three were that both the Ju87 Stuka and the much vaunted Me 110 had again suffered major losses. For some reason no provisional reports had been yet received from Luftflotte five bases in Denmark and Norway. With major operations due to continue on the fallowing day all the senior officers departed as soon as practical to return to their units spread over occupied Europe.
10.11 Counting The Cost And Taking Stock
10.11 Counting the cost and taking stock.
On arriving at his desk in the Air Ministry early on the morning of the sixteenth of August Sir Phillip first checked the days weather forecast summary that was laid out ready for him. Even a quick glance told him that it was likely to be another busy day. Putting the weather forecast to one side He picked up the initial intelligence report on the previous days combat. First was the estimates for enemy aircraft shot down, the collated after action reports from the previous day gave a claimed figure of one hundred and eighty two enemy aircraft downed with a further thirty six claimed as probable’s and over fifty damaged. With Fighter Command having made a total of nine hundred and seventy four sorties that was a very high success rate, from experience Sir Phillip cut all these figures in half and still considered it an impressive achievement. The Reports from the wreck checkers was that they had so far identified no less than sixty two confirmed enemy aircraft crash sites on British soil and another thirteen aircraft confirmed to have crashed in the sea. Giving a figure of at least seventy five enemy air craft downed which was still less than half the total claimed.
The next sheet contained the adverse of the balance sheet detailing the combat losses of Fighter Command for the last twenty four hours. The list made for very sombre reading for thirty four aircraft had been shot down with thirteen pilots killed and fourteen pilots wounded, half of whom would be out of action for at least two months. Some would consider that with ‘ Lord Haw Haw’ stridently announcing that the Luftwaffe had shot down ninety nine RAF fighters including eighty two Hurricanes and Spitfires, five Curtis Hawks (of which there were none in RAF service at the time) and a further fourteen aircraft of various unspecified types that the RAF was losing the battle. These figures were approximately three times the RAF figures and if the German intelligence service believed in the figures that they were broadcasting it would indicate that they believed that fighter and pilot numbers available to Fighter Command had been seriously hit and that might well explain why Luftflotte five had been sent virtually unescorted by fighters against targets in northern England and southern Scotland.
Privately Sir Phillip blessed the fact that Luftflotte five had been sent against the north as without escort the RAF fighters had by all accounts hit them hard. The inexperienced RDF teams in Thirteen Groups area had badly under estimated the number of aircraft in these raids and the figures from the Observer Corps and the fighter pilots who intercepted where not that accurate either. The figures Sir Phillip had were seventy Heinkels with thirty plus Me 110’s as escort in the first wave and sixty Ju 88’s in the second wave further to the south.
Only after the war was it confirmed just how high the losses had been, though reports from resistance fighters in Norway and Denmark had noted the number of crashed and wrecked aircraft there these reports took time to filter through. Luftflotte 5 in Norway from bases at Sola and Stavanger had dispatched sixty-three Heinkel He111 bombers from I and III/KG26. twenty-five Bf110s of I/ZG76 based at Stavanger/Forus lifted off twenty minutes later laden with one thousand litre drop tanks to escort the Heinkels to their targets. Further south fifty plus Ju88 bombers from KG30 in Denmark were tasked with the more southerly attack. Fifteen Heinkel 111’s were shot down or written off and another seven were damaged to the point to render them un- operational. Less than a third of the aircraft returned undamaged. The losses in the crews were proportionate. The twenty-five Me110’s also suffered badly with a loss rate of just under fifty percent as twelve aircraft written off. The Ju 88’s were only slightly better of with losses of eleven for around a twenty percent loss rate. Unknown to the Air Ministry and the RAF the remains of most of Luftflotte Five were reassigned to the areas of Luftflotte one and two to make up for the losses there. This off course was unknown to Fighter Command and the Air Ministry at the time so the fighting strength of twelve and thirteen group had to be maintained in anticipation of further assaults from The Luftflotte bases in Norway and Denmark.
Another thing in the reports that caught Sir Phillips attention was the number of different aircraft types that had been listed amongst the wrecks and crash sites examined. There were multiple examples of Me 109’s, Me 110’s, He 111’s, Ju 88’s, Ju 87’s and Do 17’s but additionally three float planes had been also found, these being an Arado 196, and He 115 and an He 59. The wreck of the He 115 had been washed ashore as far north as Arbroath.
On arriving at his desk in the Air Ministry early on the morning of the sixteenth of August Sir Phillip first checked the days weather forecast summary that was laid out ready for him. Even a quick glance told him that it was likely to be another busy day. Putting the weather forecast to one side He picked up the initial intelligence report on the previous days combat. First was the estimates for enemy aircraft shot down, the collated after action reports from the previous day gave a claimed figure of one hundred and eighty two enemy aircraft downed with a further thirty six claimed as probable’s and over fifty damaged. With Fighter Command having made a total of nine hundred and seventy four sorties that was a very high success rate, from experience Sir Phillip cut all these figures in half and still considered it an impressive achievement. The Reports from the wreck checkers was that they had so far identified no less than sixty two confirmed enemy aircraft crash sites on British soil and another thirteen aircraft confirmed to have crashed in the sea. Giving a figure of at least seventy five enemy air craft downed which was still less than half the total claimed.
The next sheet contained the adverse of the balance sheet detailing the combat losses of Fighter Command for the last twenty four hours. The list made for very sombre reading for thirty four aircraft had been shot down with thirteen pilots killed and fourteen pilots wounded, half of whom would be out of action for at least two months. Some would consider that with ‘ Lord Haw Haw’ stridently announcing that the Luftwaffe had shot down ninety nine RAF fighters including eighty two Hurricanes and Spitfires, five Curtis Hawks (of which there were none in RAF service at the time) and a further fourteen aircraft of various unspecified types that the RAF was losing the battle. These figures were approximately three times the RAF figures and if the German intelligence service believed in the figures that they were broadcasting it would indicate that they believed that fighter and pilot numbers available to Fighter Command had been seriously hit and that might well explain why Luftflotte five had been sent virtually unescorted by fighters against targets in northern England and southern Scotland.
Privately Sir Phillip blessed the fact that Luftflotte five had been sent against the north as without escort the RAF fighters had by all accounts hit them hard. The inexperienced RDF teams in Thirteen Groups area had badly under estimated the number of aircraft in these raids and the figures from the Observer Corps and the fighter pilots who intercepted where not that accurate either. The figures Sir Phillip had were seventy Heinkels with thirty plus Me 110’s as escort in the first wave and sixty Ju 88’s in the second wave further to the south.
Only after the war was it confirmed just how high the losses had been, though reports from resistance fighters in Norway and Denmark had noted the number of crashed and wrecked aircraft there these reports took time to filter through. Luftflotte 5 in Norway from bases at Sola and Stavanger had dispatched sixty-three Heinkel He111 bombers from I and III/KG26. twenty-five Bf110s of I/ZG76 based at Stavanger/Forus lifted off twenty minutes later laden with one thousand litre drop tanks to escort the Heinkels to their targets. Further south fifty plus Ju88 bombers from KG30 in Denmark were tasked with the more southerly attack. Fifteen Heinkel 111’s were shot down or written off and another seven were damaged to the point to render them un- operational. Less than a third of the aircraft returned undamaged. The losses in the crews were proportionate. The twenty-five Me110’s also suffered badly with a loss rate of just under fifty percent as twelve aircraft written off. The Ju 88’s were only slightly better of with losses of eleven for around a twenty percent loss rate. Unknown to the Air Ministry and the RAF the remains of most of Luftflotte Five were reassigned to the areas of Luftflotte one and two to make up for the losses there. This off course was unknown to Fighter Command and the Air Ministry at the time so the fighting strength of twelve and thirteen group had to be maintained in anticipation of further assaults from The Luftflotte bases in Norway and Denmark.
Another thing in the reports that caught Sir Phillips attention was the number of different aircraft types that had been listed amongst the wrecks and crash sites examined. There were multiple examples of Me 109’s, Me 110’s, He 111’s, Ju 88’s, Ju 87’s and Do 17’s but additionally three float planes had been also found, these being an Arado 196, and He 115 and an He 59. The wreck of the He 115 had been washed ashore as far north as Arbroath.
10.12 Another Big Effort Both Sides Of The Channel
10. 12 Another big effort both sides of the Channel.
Friday sixteenth of August.
Day. Airfields in Kent, Hampshire and West Sussex attacked. Wide spread damage. Ventnor Radar station out of action. Other targets in Oxfordshire, Essex and Suffolk. Goering in Conference.
Night, Many light attacks.
Weather Mainly fair and warm. Channel Haze. (1)
The Haze was welcomed by the Luftwaffe pilots as it offered them some cover despite it being a sunny summers day. Around eleven o’clock around the plotting tables the WRAFFs sprung into action as the first raid of the day was plotted. These plots quickly showed a number of raids heading for Kent, Norfolk and Greater London. Once again Eleven Group airfields were the primary targets. The greatest damage was done to the group station at West Malling where eighteen bombers added to the destruction wrought the day before and rendering the station unable to carry out operations until the twentieth of August. Park had responded to these attacks by sending aloft a dozen squadrons as he did not wish to over commit when a second wave could appear at any moment. This was what he Told Churchill who had arrived at eleven groups underground command centre at Uxbridge a few minutes earlier. Seemingly just to prove Park’s prudence correct at Midday an even larger force was observed on the RDF screens with enemy formations being plotted from Great Yarmouth in the north round to Portland in the south. Estimates put the total enemy force approaching at some three hundred and fifty aircraft in total.
The plot table at Uxbridge showed the most easterly enemy formation was by passing Dover and consisted of an estimated one hundred plus Do17 bombers and Bf109 fighters and was on track for the Thames Estuary. With the attack on the Shorts factory the day before fresh in the controllers minds Park ordered 54 Sqn (Hornchurch), 56 Sqn (North Weald) and 64 Sqn (Kenley) scrambled. They duly intercepted the enemy over the Thames Estuary.
Only fifteen minutes behind this attack a larger enemy formation was tracked between Brighton and Folkestone and Park scrambled three squadrons. 32 Sqn (Biggin Hill), 111 Sqn (Croydon) and 266 Sqn (Hornchurch). All three squadrons joined into an impromptu wing and swept en-masse into the bomber formation hoping to break the formation and spread the bombers to be attacked piece meal. This result in a huge melee of nearly two hundred aircraft and this inevitably resulted in a number of collisions,
Meanwhile a third Luftwaffe formation had departed from Cherbourg and was heading towards the Southampton/Portsmouth area. Park ordered 43 Squadron and 601 Squadron (Tangmere) to be scrambled, even as Ten Group were launching their own response the Luftwaffe formation of again over one hundred aircraft split up as it approached Portland Bill with elements attacking Tangmere, Ventnor, Lee on Solent, RAE Farnborough and Gosport. At Tangmere personnel were ordered to the shelters as once again the enemy attacked the airdrome, here the close escort now provided for the Ju 87’s initially worked as planned and the airdrome was extensively damaged with every hanger and most of the other building destroyed or damaged to some extent with nearly a dozen RAF aircraft destroyed on the ground. Those aircraft of 43 and 601 squadrons who managed to evade the fighter escort took their toll of the Ju 87’s as they fled towards the nearby coast and the long haul across the channel to the safety of their bases. Five Ju 87’s had split off from the main attack as it passed the East end the Isle of Wight and carried out a precision attack on the RDF Chain Home station at Ventnor, this had only just returned to service after the previous attack and this one again rendered Ventnor inoperative, with hardly a single building undamaged, repairs would take until the twenty third of August. The expedient temporary RDF cover instigate after the earlier attack would just have to continue to plug the gap.
A dozen JU 88’s with an escort of Me 110’s had attacked Gosport casing damage and casualties whilst the Fleet Air Arm base at Lee on Solent also suffered damage. The finale of this attack was carried out by eight Ju 88’s that bombed the RAE at Farnborough causing some damage but even greater disruption by dropping delayed action bombs, the last of which did not detonate more than forty-eight hours.
It was at the height of this action that Churchill had enquired of Park what Squadrons Eleven Group had in reserve, Park’s slightly terse reply of “None, they are all up” was apparently a source of sobering thought for Churchill. In fact at that moment 213 Sqn (Exeter) and 249 Sqn (Boscombe Down) both from Number Ten Group were involved in combat over Southampton temporarily reinforcing the western edge of number Eleven Group’s area just as Number Twelve Group had sent squadrons as far south as London and the Thames estuary in the east of Eleven Groups zone on similar missions. This flexibility and co-ordinated effort once again impressed Churchill, much as it had done the day before when he was at Bentley Priory. To Park, Churchill seemed to be fascinated by the relatively small number of pilots engaged in the battle on hand rather than the vast number of people involved in all aspects of the current air conflict.
The finale of the day was an attack by two Ju 88’s that swept north from the coast at Christchurch and hit the number Twenty Three Group Maintenance Unit and the Number Two Service Flying Training School at Brize Norton. Some thirty two bombs were scattered over the airfield causing extensive damage and destroying no fewer than forty-six training aircraft and injuring ten personnel.
It was for his valour during the fight over Gosport that, Flight Lieutenant J.B. Nicholson was awarded the first VC for a Fighter Command pilot, flying a Hurricane Mk Ic with 249 squadron he spotted three Ju 8’s fleeing south over the Solent, as he lined up to attack them his hurricane was attacked from behind by an Me 110, who’s first burst of cannon shells shattered the canopy. wounded Nicholson on the head where a large gash flooded his right eye with blood, struggling to see through a haze of blood and the blast of air through his shattered cockpit Nicholson’s aircraft was raked again by a burst of cannon shells The explosion of one of these causing a wound to his left lower leg whilst another shell hit the reserve fuel rank just in front of the cockpit, however good the self-sealing system on the tank was it was overwhelmed by the effect of the cannon shell, whilst the smaller holes remained sealed the main impact had ruptured the tank and flaming fuel started to spew over the cockpit. Despite this Nicholson manoeuvred his dying fighter such as to get one good burst from his own cannons at the Me 110 that had now overshot his aircraft. This burst from the Hurricanes cannons and machine guns wrecked the port engine and shredded the left wing sending the Me 110 spinning into the sea. Even as the flames began to enter the cockpit and burn Nicholson, he had to grab his injured left leg and pull it up onto his seat as he undid his harness and fell clear of the now doomed aircraft.
Later estimate had Nicholson free falling some four thousand feet before he pulled his ripcord and parachute to what he assumed was the safety of the Hampshire countryside. Unfortunately an over enthusiastic member of the Home Guard added insult to injury by peppering Nickolsons backside with bird shot from his shotgun. It would be some months before He was fit to fly again, Nicholson’s burns were bad but not critical and this was ascribed by him to the time the self-sealing tank had bought him and the fact that only his left leg had been hit by cannon shell fragments was clear evidence of the effectiveness of the armour plate behind him.
Further to the east the camaraderie of the sea was shown when the RNLI lifeboat ‘Canadian Pacific’ happened upon a ‘Mexican stand off ‘ between a disabled RAF air sea rescue launch and a Luftwaffe seaplane that had landed to recover a pilot who was in the water between them and the launch but was now under the rescue launches guns. The Coxswain of the lifeboat pulled alongside the seaplane and passed over the bodies of two dead Luftwaffe aircrew they had recovered and instructed the aircraft to depart. The coxswain then manoeuvred his lifeboat to pickup the pilot and proceeded to tow the disabled RAF launch into Pagham Harbour. This pragmatic approach by the RNLI Coxswain not only secured the safety of the launch and it’s crew but also the RAF pilot in the water, the Coxswain reckoning being that one live pilot was worth at least two dead ones,
(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
Friday sixteenth of August.
Day. Airfields in Kent, Hampshire and West Sussex attacked. Wide spread damage. Ventnor Radar station out of action. Other targets in Oxfordshire, Essex and Suffolk. Goering in Conference.
Night, Many light attacks.
Weather Mainly fair and warm. Channel Haze. (1)
The Haze was welcomed by the Luftwaffe pilots as it offered them some cover despite it being a sunny summers day. Around eleven o’clock around the plotting tables the WRAFFs sprung into action as the first raid of the day was plotted. These plots quickly showed a number of raids heading for Kent, Norfolk and Greater London. Once again Eleven Group airfields were the primary targets. The greatest damage was done to the group station at West Malling where eighteen bombers added to the destruction wrought the day before and rendering the station unable to carry out operations until the twentieth of August. Park had responded to these attacks by sending aloft a dozen squadrons as he did not wish to over commit when a second wave could appear at any moment. This was what he Told Churchill who had arrived at eleven groups underground command centre at Uxbridge a few minutes earlier. Seemingly just to prove Park’s prudence correct at Midday an even larger force was observed on the RDF screens with enemy formations being plotted from Great Yarmouth in the north round to Portland in the south. Estimates put the total enemy force approaching at some three hundred and fifty aircraft in total.
The plot table at Uxbridge showed the most easterly enemy formation was by passing Dover and consisted of an estimated one hundred plus Do17 bombers and Bf109 fighters and was on track for the Thames Estuary. With the attack on the Shorts factory the day before fresh in the controllers minds Park ordered 54 Sqn (Hornchurch), 56 Sqn (North Weald) and 64 Sqn (Kenley) scrambled. They duly intercepted the enemy over the Thames Estuary.
Only fifteen minutes behind this attack a larger enemy formation was tracked between Brighton and Folkestone and Park scrambled three squadrons. 32 Sqn (Biggin Hill), 111 Sqn (Croydon) and 266 Sqn (Hornchurch). All three squadrons joined into an impromptu wing and swept en-masse into the bomber formation hoping to break the formation and spread the bombers to be attacked piece meal. This result in a huge melee of nearly two hundred aircraft and this inevitably resulted in a number of collisions,
Meanwhile a third Luftwaffe formation had departed from Cherbourg and was heading towards the Southampton/Portsmouth area. Park ordered 43 Squadron and 601 Squadron (Tangmere) to be scrambled, even as Ten Group were launching their own response the Luftwaffe formation of again over one hundred aircraft split up as it approached Portland Bill with elements attacking Tangmere, Ventnor, Lee on Solent, RAE Farnborough and Gosport. At Tangmere personnel were ordered to the shelters as once again the enemy attacked the airdrome, here the close escort now provided for the Ju 87’s initially worked as planned and the airdrome was extensively damaged with every hanger and most of the other building destroyed or damaged to some extent with nearly a dozen RAF aircraft destroyed on the ground. Those aircraft of 43 and 601 squadrons who managed to evade the fighter escort took their toll of the Ju 87’s as they fled towards the nearby coast and the long haul across the channel to the safety of their bases. Five Ju 87’s had split off from the main attack as it passed the East end the Isle of Wight and carried out a precision attack on the RDF Chain Home station at Ventnor, this had only just returned to service after the previous attack and this one again rendered Ventnor inoperative, with hardly a single building undamaged, repairs would take until the twenty third of August. The expedient temporary RDF cover instigate after the earlier attack would just have to continue to plug the gap.
A dozen JU 88’s with an escort of Me 110’s had attacked Gosport casing damage and casualties whilst the Fleet Air Arm base at Lee on Solent also suffered damage. The finale of this attack was carried out by eight Ju 88’s that bombed the RAE at Farnborough causing some damage but even greater disruption by dropping delayed action bombs, the last of which did not detonate more than forty-eight hours.
It was at the height of this action that Churchill had enquired of Park what Squadrons Eleven Group had in reserve, Park’s slightly terse reply of “None, they are all up” was apparently a source of sobering thought for Churchill. In fact at that moment 213 Sqn (Exeter) and 249 Sqn (Boscombe Down) both from Number Ten Group were involved in combat over Southampton temporarily reinforcing the western edge of number Eleven Group’s area just as Number Twelve Group had sent squadrons as far south as London and the Thames estuary in the east of Eleven Groups zone on similar missions. This flexibility and co-ordinated effort once again impressed Churchill, much as it had done the day before when he was at Bentley Priory. To Park, Churchill seemed to be fascinated by the relatively small number of pilots engaged in the battle on hand rather than the vast number of people involved in all aspects of the current air conflict.
The finale of the day was an attack by two Ju 88’s that swept north from the coast at Christchurch and hit the number Twenty Three Group Maintenance Unit and the Number Two Service Flying Training School at Brize Norton. Some thirty two bombs were scattered over the airfield causing extensive damage and destroying no fewer than forty-six training aircraft and injuring ten personnel.
It was for his valour during the fight over Gosport that, Flight Lieutenant J.B. Nicholson was awarded the first VC for a Fighter Command pilot, flying a Hurricane Mk Ic with 249 squadron he spotted three Ju 8’s fleeing south over the Solent, as he lined up to attack them his hurricane was attacked from behind by an Me 110, who’s first burst of cannon shells shattered the canopy. wounded Nicholson on the head where a large gash flooded his right eye with blood, struggling to see through a haze of blood and the blast of air through his shattered cockpit Nicholson’s aircraft was raked again by a burst of cannon shells The explosion of one of these causing a wound to his left lower leg whilst another shell hit the reserve fuel rank just in front of the cockpit, however good the self-sealing system on the tank was it was overwhelmed by the effect of the cannon shell, whilst the smaller holes remained sealed the main impact had ruptured the tank and flaming fuel started to spew over the cockpit. Despite this Nicholson manoeuvred his dying fighter such as to get one good burst from his own cannons at the Me 110 that had now overshot his aircraft. This burst from the Hurricanes cannons and machine guns wrecked the port engine and shredded the left wing sending the Me 110 spinning into the sea. Even as the flames began to enter the cockpit and burn Nicholson, he had to grab his injured left leg and pull it up onto his seat as he undid his harness and fell clear of the now doomed aircraft.
Later estimate had Nicholson free falling some four thousand feet before he pulled his ripcord and parachute to what he assumed was the safety of the Hampshire countryside. Unfortunately an over enthusiastic member of the Home Guard added insult to injury by peppering Nickolsons backside with bird shot from his shotgun. It would be some months before He was fit to fly again, Nicholson’s burns were bad but not critical and this was ascribed by him to the time the self-sealing tank had bought him and the fact that only his left leg had been hit by cannon shell fragments was clear evidence of the effectiveness of the armour plate behind him.
Further to the east the camaraderie of the sea was shown when the RNLI lifeboat ‘Canadian Pacific’ happened upon a ‘Mexican stand off ‘ between a disabled RAF air sea rescue launch and a Luftwaffe seaplane that had landed to recover a pilot who was in the water between them and the launch but was now under the rescue launches guns. The Coxswain of the lifeboat pulled alongside the seaplane and passed over the bodies of two dead Luftwaffe aircrew they had recovered and instructed the aircraft to depart. The coxswain then manoeuvred his lifeboat to pickup the pilot and proceeded to tow the disabled RAF launch into Pagham Harbour. This pragmatic approach by the RNLI Coxswain not only secured the safety of the launch and it’s crew but also the RAF pilot in the water, the Coxswain reckoning being that one live pilot was worth at least two dead ones,
(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster