AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
marathag
Banned
That was for the poor crazy folk. Now if you were Rich, that was merely an eccentricity
@sonofpegasus, I know you were planning to only take this to the end of the battle of Britain, but could we get an outline/epilogue of the PAM's decisions for the rest of the war?
Several British campaigns become a lot more interesting with proper air cover.
Several British campaigns become a lot more interesting with proper air cover.
Never underestimate the power of British eccentricity! The more you read about stuff that happened in WW2 it just seems so absurd that you think 'that can't have happened...right?' but it did. See Operation Mincemeat and the dramatis personae involved in that and their stories! And as always, an excellent update.
That would be a sequel, much as Reap the Whirlwind will have a post war sequel.
Is that back on? I thought Sbiper had lost interest in it, never mind the sequel.
10.1 Keeping One's Head
10.01 Keeping ones head,
As July drew to a close Sir Phillip carried out his usual review of the AM’s activities and tried to put them into context with the wider prosecution of the war. Neatly placed on his large desk were a number of briefing papers and dockets from various organisations and other ministries along with the latest reports from all sectors of the AM, MAP and the RAF. There were also papers from the Admiralty and the WD.
On his desk amongst these myriad documents was a draft memo setting out the priorities for the RAF as seen by the AM for the immediate future and with various codicils onwards from the next six months. Why Six months? Simply in wartime, especially at this juncture the sheer number of variables and unknowns meant that the further ahead of the planning date the more it was merely guesswork. By making differing assumptions and drafting plans based these various scenarios and options could be planned out.
Therefore for the immediate future the protection of the RAF’s air superiority over the British isle was the most important task and priority. Secondly preparing to counter a seaborne invasion. Thirdly protecting the sea lanes. Providing no invasion had been launched by the end of October then the risk of such an event would drop until the spring. This would perforce drive the counter invasion planning down the priority list a bit but not as much as some would think.
So with those priorities in mind how was the AM to respond. The current air combat over southern England could only intensify prior to any German invasion attempt so the highest priority had to be given to maintaining Fighter Command’s ability to retain air superiority over the UK. This meant that all other RAF commands had to be sub servant to Fighter Commands needs at this time. Anti-invasion measures and the protection of sea lanes were of course Maritime Commands priority.
As to Bomber Command, Portal finding his command placed fourth in importance behind Training Command had complained bitterly claiming his command was the only one capable of doing offensive damage to the Germans. In this matter Sir Phillip was firmly on the side of Sir Hugh Dowding, his assertation that before Bomber Command could fulfil it’s offensive role the security of the ‘Home Base’ had to be secured. Once Britain was safe from invasion, then more resources could be assigned to the bomber offensive. Churchill, probably under prompting from the RAF’s old guard, had raised concerns that Dowding was too defensively minded. Sir Philip felt it necessary to remind Churchill that when at his insistence a Committee consisting of an Admiral, a General and Sir Dowding of Fighter Command representing the RAF, were asked to examining the fighter numbers required for the defence of Great Britain in 1938 it was Sir Hugh who had argued for a lower number of fighter squadrons than the other two committee members as anything above the minimum number required would unnecessarily take away resources from Bomber Command and the RAF’s offensive capacity.
Once Churchill understood that Sir Hugh was not anti bomber per se and actually had quite similar views regarding to the potential of strategic bombing to be fundamentally important to the prosecution of Britains war aims, their professional relationship improved. Over dinner at Checkers Churchill and Dowding had wide ranging discussions about the future use of RAF in taking the war to the enemy. Here Churchill found himself receiving a cold dispassionate assessment of the actual capabilities of the current forces available which was coupled with Dowding’s passionate desire to ensure that the needless loss of thousands of young, men as occurred in the great war was not repeated. Dowding’s view was contrary to Portal’s and others in that he did not think that strategic bombing alone could force the surrender of the Nazi’s but he did think that under the right circumstances it might help force then to ask for an armistice. In Dowding’s view this war would not be won until British Army boots marched up the Unter der Liden in Berlin.
Dowding expressed to Churchill his growing concerns about the probable effect of the Luftwaffe pursuing a night bombing campaign against London and other major cities. He saw such a campaign as this as an inevitable consequence of the winning of the daylight air battle which was evolving over the southern and home counties. Despite the great progress made in AI/RDF he was determined that Churchill was aware of the limitations currently inherent within the available technology. One concern that Sir Hugh had raised with Sir Phillip was the imminent departure of ‘Taffy’Bowen to join Tizard in America. Sir Hugh outlined to Sir Phillip just how fundamental to the development of AI/RDF Bowen was. Upon some investigation Sir Philip discovered that a primary reason for Bowen’s request to accompany Tizard to America was due to Lewis who had joined the AMEE as Rowes assistant, having clashed with Bowen over the future control of development of AI/RDF and in effect the subsequent side-lining of Bowen. Sir Phillip had been in professional contact with Bowen since the scientist had joined the RDF team in it’s earliest days and upon looking at the situation Sir Philip decided that he concurred with Sir Hugh Dowding and that if it had to come down to a choice between Lewis or Bowen, then Lewis had to go! Lewis was however a competent administrator which was not necessarily the case with Bowen, who was in administrative terms a young novice. So after much Angst the decision was made to send Lewis on the ship to America with the magnetron and retain Bowen at Cheltenham with the AMEE has the head of AI and centimetric radar development. Sir Phillip now tasked Rowe with helping to find a good administrator to act as Bowen’s right hand as well as a suitable replacement for Lewis as Rowe’s deputy. Bowen had now been advanced up the civil service scientific officer tree far beyond anyone else of his age, to much spluttering by the Whitehall mandarin’s.
Sir Phillip could really do without the distraction of these office politic diversions at this stage of the war but unfortunately they seemed to come with the territory.
What was more important to Sir Phillip was that the estimates for enemy aircraft shot down for the month of July was three hundred or thereabouts and the confirmed losses were just under half of that figure. Most importantly the burgeoning air sea rescue service had saved over forty pilots in that month and had retrieved almost as many enemy pilots. These were all plus points on the wartime balance sheet as was the increasing success of the CRO. In getting fighters back into squadron service.
On July 27th for the first time it was reported that Me 109’s had been observed carrying bombs during a raid in the Dover area. This report was being followed up, as this had implications for the tactics used by Fighter Command in the defence of areas within range of the Me 109.
As July drew to a close Sir Phillip carried out his usual review of the AM’s activities and tried to put them into context with the wider prosecution of the war. Neatly placed on his large desk were a number of briefing papers and dockets from various organisations and other ministries along with the latest reports from all sectors of the AM, MAP and the RAF. There were also papers from the Admiralty and the WD.
On his desk amongst these myriad documents was a draft memo setting out the priorities for the RAF as seen by the AM for the immediate future and with various codicils onwards from the next six months. Why Six months? Simply in wartime, especially at this juncture the sheer number of variables and unknowns meant that the further ahead of the planning date the more it was merely guesswork. By making differing assumptions and drafting plans based these various scenarios and options could be planned out.
Therefore for the immediate future the protection of the RAF’s air superiority over the British isle was the most important task and priority. Secondly preparing to counter a seaborne invasion. Thirdly protecting the sea lanes. Providing no invasion had been launched by the end of October then the risk of such an event would drop until the spring. This would perforce drive the counter invasion planning down the priority list a bit but not as much as some would think.
So with those priorities in mind how was the AM to respond. The current air combat over southern England could only intensify prior to any German invasion attempt so the highest priority had to be given to maintaining Fighter Command’s ability to retain air superiority over the UK. This meant that all other RAF commands had to be sub servant to Fighter Commands needs at this time. Anti-invasion measures and the protection of sea lanes were of course Maritime Commands priority.
As to Bomber Command, Portal finding his command placed fourth in importance behind Training Command had complained bitterly claiming his command was the only one capable of doing offensive damage to the Germans. In this matter Sir Phillip was firmly on the side of Sir Hugh Dowding, his assertation that before Bomber Command could fulfil it’s offensive role the security of the ‘Home Base’ had to be secured. Once Britain was safe from invasion, then more resources could be assigned to the bomber offensive. Churchill, probably under prompting from the RAF’s old guard, had raised concerns that Dowding was too defensively minded. Sir Philip felt it necessary to remind Churchill that when at his insistence a Committee consisting of an Admiral, a General and Sir Dowding of Fighter Command representing the RAF, were asked to examining the fighter numbers required for the defence of Great Britain in 1938 it was Sir Hugh who had argued for a lower number of fighter squadrons than the other two committee members as anything above the minimum number required would unnecessarily take away resources from Bomber Command and the RAF’s offensive capacity.
Once Churchill understood that Sir Hugh was not anti bomber per se and actually had quite similar views regarding to the potential of strategic bombing to be fundamentally important to the prosecution of Britains war aims, their professional relationship improved. Over dinner at Checkers Churchill and Dowding had wide ranging discussions about the future use of RAF in taking the war to the enemy. Here Churchill found himself receiving a cold dispassionate assessment of the actual capabilities of the current forces available which was coupled with Dowding’s passionate desire to ensure that the needless loss of thousands of young, men as occurred in the great war was not repeated. Dowding’s view was contrary to Portal’s and others in that he did not think that strategic bombing alone could force the surrender of the Nazi’s but he did think that under the right circumstances it might help force then to ask for an armistice. In Dowding’s view this war would not be won until British Army boots marched up the Unter der Liden in Berlin.
Dowding expressed to Churchill his growing concerns about the probable effect of the Luftwaffe pursuing a night bombing campaign against London and other major cities. He saw such a campaign as this as an inevitable consequence of the winning of the daylight air battle which was evolving over the southern and home counties. Despite the great progress made in AI/RDF he was determined that Churchill was aware of the limitations currently inherent within the available technology. One concern that Sir Hugh had raised with Sir Phillip was the imminent departure of ‘Taffy’Bowen to join Tizard in America. Sir Hugh outlined to Sir Phillip just how fundamental to the development of AI/RDF Bowen was. Upon some investigation Sir Philip discovered that a primary reason for Bowen’s request to accompany Tizard to America was due to Lewis who had joined the AMEE as Rowes assistant, having clashed with Bowen over the future control of development of AI/RDF and in effect the subsequent side-lining of Bowen. Sir Phillip had been in professional contact with Bowen since the scientist had joined the RDF team in it’s earliest days and upon looking at the situation Sir Philip decided that he concurred with Sir Hugh Dowding and that if it had to come down to a choice between Lewis or Bowen, then Lewis had to go! Lewis was however a competent administrator which was not necessarily the case with Bowen, who was in administrative terms a young novice. So after much Angst the decision was made to send Lewis on the ship to America with the magnetron and retain Bowen at Cheltenham with the AMEE has the head of AI and centimetric radar development. Sir Phillip now tasked Rowe with helping to find a good administrator to act as Bowen’s right hand as well as a suitable replacement for Lewis as Rowe’s deputy. Bowen had now been advanced up the civil service scientific officer tree far beyond anyone else of his age, to much spluttering by the Whitehall mandarin’s.
Sir Phillip could really do without the distraction of these office politic diversions at this stage of the war but unfortunately they seemed to come with the territory.
What was more important to Sir Phillip was that the estimates for enemy aircraft shot down for the month of July was three hundred or thereabouts and the confirmed losses were just under half of that figure. Most importantly the burgeoning air sea rescue service had saved over forty pilots in that month and had retrieved almost as many enemy pilots. These were all plus points on the wartime balance sheet as was the increasing success of the CRO. In getting fighters back into squadron service.
On July 27th for the first time it was reported that Me 109’s had been observed carrying bombs during a raid in the Dover area. This report was being followed up, as this had implications for the tactics used by Fighter Command in the defence of areas within range of the Me 109.
Huzzah it lives! And with a damn well written break down of what's going on, politiking and other shenanigans. I assume that keeping Bowden will help move the UK's radars along a bit faster instead of having him go barrelling off to the USA for a few months (and at great risk because torpedoes). Keeping Tizzard on is a great decision although Bomber command is grumbling like a goodun for sure.
But, making sure that home base is safe before even thinking about striking back is the right tactical and strategic thing to do. At the moment, the only thing that matters is the security of the UK.
But, making sure that home base is safe before even thinking about striking back is the right tactical and strategic thing to do. At the moment, the only thing that matters is the security of the UK.
Very nice chapter. Yay, office politics! /s
Please do not quote entire story posts.
Due to RL intervening posts have been difficult to research and write, from tomorrow there will be another hiatus of at least two weeks whilst we travel. I hope to take this TL to a logical conclusion in the future but it might be a bit slow. So please bear with me, comments and suggestions are always welcomed.
10.2 The Pace Fluctuates Slightly
10.2, The pace fluctuates slightly
August First,
Day, East and south coast shipping attacked.
Night, South Wales and midlands targeted. Minelaying in the Thames Estuary and north-east Scottish coast.
Weather. Fair in most districts with Straits and Channel overcast. Low cloud dispersing during the day. Warmer. (1)
Due to the weather condition it was a quite morning for Fighter Command. However early in the afternoon Church Fenton sector controllers were advised of two intruders approaching the north-east coast and heading towards two coastal convoys, code named ‘Agent’ and ‘Arena’ Both 616 and 607 squadrons were scrambled to intercept and each squadron encountered a single enemy aircraft, a Do.17 and a Ju 88. Due t the low cloud no conclusive engagement occurred and both raiders escaped.
In the south no 145 Squadron flying hurricanes from Weshampnett engage enemy aircraft over Hastings. For the loss of one aircraft and it’s pilot they claimed an Hs 126 destroyed and a Ju 88 damaged. At the same time a factory, goods yard and a timber tard at Norwich were bombed with the raiders getting away unmolested, the timber yard had to be left to burn out. That night the minelayers were out again dropping their deadly cargoes as diverse as Montrose, Southend and Bristol.
Whilst Fighter Command could claim an impressive five hostile aircraft shot down for the loss of a single Hurricane and it’s pilot the day was marred by the realisation that a claimed sixth enemy aircraft downed near Mablethorpe by aircraft from 12 Group actually was a Fairy Battle from no 1 Group. Despite IFF, and all the other technical innovations tragic mistakes still occurred. Whilst not made public such events resulted in a forensic investigation by the Operational Research unit working with the AMRE and the RAE to find the root cause of the mistaken identity of the aircraft downed so that operational procedure and equipment could be modified so as to try and prevent such tragic events.
Six hundred and fifty nine sorties were flown by fighter command on this day maintaining the strain on resources.
August Second,
Day, shipping attacked in channel and east coast,
Night South Wales and the midlands.
Weather, mainly fine in the north but cloudy in the east. Channel cloudy. Drizzle in Dover straits. (1)
Though the weather resulted in a quieter day the RAF still flew four hundred and seventy seven sorties. Most of these were in defence of east coast and other convoys. One trawler was sunk and the steamer ‘Highlander’ claimed two attackers shot down and entered Leith harbour with the wreckage of one of them strewn across here deck. Whilst no RAF aircraft were lost several enemy aircraft were claimed as damaged (later Luftwaffe records would show that no less than four of the aircraft damaged failed to make it back to safety) but none as destroyed.
No less than eighty mine laying sorties were plotted that night ranging from as far north as the Orkneys and as far south as Dungeness. There were also night raids on Farnborough, Halton, Romford, Catterick and the Forth Bridge.
August Third,
Day, Mainly shipping reconnaissance in the Channel.
Night South Wales, with some raids continuing to Liverpool, Crewe and Bradford area.
Weather, Mainly dull with Bright patches. Cloud Base 4,000 feet. Visibility five miles.(1)
Daylight activity was subdued by the weather with some five raids by about a dozen aircraft each on the south west whilst the channel saw shipping reconnaissance sorties. Fighter Command still flew in excess of four hundred sorties and destroyed four enemy aircraft without loss. Once more with night fall the minelayers were active supported by attacks in the north by the aircraft of Luftflotte 5 on the Orkney islands and the Firth of Forth. Further South the Tyne and Humber were attacked whilst no less than a dozen raids were made on Harwich.
August Fourth
Day, reconnaissance along the south coast and Bristol Channel.
Night, Little activity.
Weather, Fine to fair early. Cloudy with bright intervals at midday, clearing in the evening. (1)
Fittingly August the fourth was a Sunday as it proved to be a bit of a day of rest for both the Luftwaffe and the RAF. Even on a day of little action the RAF still flew a total od two hundred and sixty one sorties for no loss and no enemy aircraft destroyed.
August fifth.
Day, Shipping in Straits attacked.
Night, Minelaying between the Wash and the Tay.
Weather, Temperature high. Fine with slight haze in the channel. (1)
The combat started early at eight AM. with Spitfires from No65 squadron getting the bounce an at trio of Me 109’s four miles off the coast at Calais. The squadron leader of the RAF squadron was first to fire a burst that sent the leading 109 plunging into the sea. The next 109 was sent hurrying back south pouring smoke from a damaged engine and a third was seen to take damage before it too ran for safety.
Later around two in the afternoon in very hazy condition spitfires from No. 41 squadron and Hurricanes from No. 151 squadrons were involved in inconclusive actions defending shipping in the channel. One Me 109 was confirmed as destroyed and several other aircraft claimed as probable’s.
Once more over four hundred sorties were flown with six enemy aircraft clamed for the loss of one.
August sixth,
Day, little activity.
Night, Minelaying of east and south-east coasts.
Weather, Generally cloudy with fairly strong winds. Cloud ceiling 3,000 to 5,000ft. (1)
Despite the weather conditions resulting in only seven enemy raiders crossing the British coast there was still sufficient enemy activity in the channel to result is Fighter Command again flying over four hundred sorties for the loss of one aircraft. Four probable’s were claimed by no certain kills.
August seventh.
Day, Convoy reconnaissance’s. Convoy of Cromer attacked.
Night, Widespread raids from the Thames Estuary to Aberdeen and from Poole Dorset, to Land’s End and Liverpool.
Weather, Mainly fair with cloud and thunderstorms in eastern districts. South-eastern districts cloudy. Winds variable. (1)
Despite the reasonable weather conditions the Luftwaffe today curtailed their activity with some reconnaissance missions and no major raids. The Luftwaffe still paid a price for the intelligence that their aircraft tried to gather, with the RAF fighters claiming four enemy aircraft downed and four probable’s as well, having flown just under four hundred sorties.
Those in the know within the government and armed forces were aware that the Luftwaffe was building up for something and that it would commence sooner rather than later. General sander broadcasting on the German domestic radio service was very evening dropping very broad hints that a major bombing campaign against the British was about to commence.
(1) Dailey summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
August First,
Day, East and south coast shipping attacked.
Night, South Wales and midlands targeted. Minelaying in the Thames Estuary and north-east Scottish coast.
Weather. Fair in most districts with Straits and Channel overcast. Low cloud dispersing during the day. Warmer. (1)
Due to the weather condition it was a quite morning for Fighter Command. However early in the afternoon Church Fenton sector controllers were advised of two intruders approaching the north-east coast and heading towards two coastal convoys, code named ‘Agent’ and ‘Arena’ Both 616 and 607 squadrons were scrambled to intercept and each squadron encountered a single enemy aircraft, a Do.17 and a Ju 88. Due t the low cloud no conclusive engagement occurred and both raiders escaped.
In the south no 145 Squadron flying hurricanes from Weshampnett engage enemy aircraft over Hastings. For the loss of one aircraft and it’s pilot they claimed an Hs 126 destroyed and a Ju 88 damaged. At the same time a factory, goods yard and a timber tard at Norwich were bombed with the raiders getting away unmolested, the timber yard had to be left to burn out. That night the minelayers were out again dropping their deadly cargoes as diverse as Montrose, Southend and Bristol.
Whilst Fighter Command could claim an impressive five hostile aircraft shot down for the loss of a single Hurricane and it’s pilot the day was marred by the realisation that a claimed sixth enemy aircraft downed near Mablethorpe by aircraft from 12 Group actually was a Fairy Battle from no 1 Group. Despite IFF, and all the other technical innovations tragic mistakes still occurred. Whilst not made public such events resulted in a forensic investigation by the Operational Research unit working with the AMRE and the RAE to find the root cause of the mistaken identity of the aircraft downed so that operational procedure and equipment could be modified so as to try and prevent such tragic events.
Six hundred and fifty nine sorties were flown by fighter command on this day maintaining the strain on resources.
August Second,
Day, shipping attacked in channel and east coast,
Night South Wales and the midlands.
Weather, mainly fine in the north but cloudy in the east. Channel cloudy. Drizzle in Dover straits. (1)
Though the weather resulted in a quieter day the RAF still flew four hundred and seventy seven sorties. Most of these were in defence of east coast and other convoys. One trawler was sunk and the steamer ‘Highlander’ claimed two attackers shot down and entered Leith harbour with the wreckage of one of them strewn across here deck. Whilst no RAF aircraft were lost several enemy aircraft were claimed as damaged (later Luftwaffe records would show that no less than four of the aircraft damaged failed to make it back to safety) but none as destroyed.
No less than eighty mine laying sorties were plotted that night ranging from as far north as the Orkneys and as far south as Dungeness. There were also night raids on Farnborough, Halton, Romford, Catterick and the Forth Bridge.
August Third,
Day, Mainly shipping reconnaissance in the Channel.
Night South Wales, with some raids continuing to Liverpool, Crewe and Bradford area.
Weather, Mainly dull with Bright patches. Cloud Base 4,000 feet. Visibility five miles.(1)
Daylight activity was subdued by the weather with some five raids by about a dozen aircraft each on the south west whilst the channel saw shipping reconnaissance sorties. Fighter Command still flew in excess of four hundred sorties and destroyed four enemy aircraft without loss. Once more with night fall the minelayers were active supported by attacks in the north by the aircraft of Luftflotte 5 on the Orkney islands and the Firth of Forth. Further South the Tyne and Humber were attacked whilst no less than a dozen raids were made on Harwich.
August Fourth
Day, reconnaissance along the south coast and Bristol Channel.
Night, Little activity.
Weather, Fine to fair early. Cloudy with bright intervals at midday, clearing in the evening. (1)
Fittingly August the fourth was a Sunday as it proved to be a bit of a day of rest for both the Luftwaffe and the RAF. Even on a day of little action the RAF still flew a total od two hundred and sixty one sorties for no loss and no enemy aircraft destroyed.
August fifth.
Day, Shipping in Straits attacked.
Night, Minelaying between the Wash and the Tay.
Weather, Temperature high. Fine with slight haze in the channel. (1)
The combat started early at eight AM. with Spitfires from No65 squadron getting the bounce an at trio of Me 109’s four miles off the coast at Calais. The squadron leader of the RAF squadron was first to fire a burst that sent the leading 109 plunging into the sea. The next 109 was sent hurrying back south pouring smoke from a damaged engine and a third was seen to take damage before it too ran for safety.
Later around two in the afternoon in very hazy condition spitfires from No. 41 squadron and Hurricanes from No. 151 squadrons were involved in inconclusive actions defending shipping in the channel. One Me 109 was confirmed as destroyed and several other aircraft claimed as probable’s.
Once more over four hundred sorties were flown with six enemy aircraft clamed for the loss of one.
August sixth,
Day, little activity.
Night, Minelaying of east and south-east coasts.
Weather, Generally cloudy with fairly strong winds. Cloud ceiling 3,000 to 5,000ft. (1)
Despite the weather conditions resulting in only seven enemy raiders crossing the British coast there was still sufficient enemy activity in the channel to result is Fighter Command again flying over four hundred sorties for the loss of one aircraft. Four probable’s were claimed by no certain kills.
August seventh.
Day, Convoy reconnaissance’s. Convoy of Cromer attacked.
Night, Widespread raids from the Thames Estuary to Aberdeen and from Poole Dorset, to Land’s End and Liverpool.
Weather, Mainly fair with cloud and thunderstorms in eastern districts. South-eastern districts cloudy. Winds variable. (1)
Despite the reasonable weather conditions the Luftwaffe today curtailed their activity with some reconnaissance missions and no major raids. The Luftwaffe still paid a price for the intelligence that their aircraft tried to gather, with the RAF fighters claiming four enemy aircraft downed and four probable’s as well, having flown just under four hundred sorties.
Those in the know within the government and armed forces were aware that the Luftwaffe was building up for something and that it would commence sooner rather than later. General sander broadcasting on the German domestic radio service was very evening dropping very broad hints that a major bombing campaign against the British was about to commence.
(1) Dailey summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
10.3 Climax Of The Convoy Battle?
10.3 Has the climax of the convoy battle has been reached?
Day, here major attacks on a Channel convoy.
Night, Small Raids and Minelaying.
Weather, Showers and Bright intervals. Channel cloudy.
Once more aided by the prevailing weather where the visibility of six to eight miles with cloud at 2000ft the German pounced on a passing convoy only thirty miles from the occupied French Coast. The convoy in question, Convoy C.W. 9, under the code name ‘Peewit’ had assembled in the Thames Estuary. The passage of the twenty ship convoy and it’s escorts was timed to take them through the narrows at Dover in the dark of the night. However the darkness could not hide the convoy from the German Freya Radar positioned up on the cliffs at Cap Blanc Nez. This resulted in the convoy being attacked by a pack of E-boats shortly before dawn on the eighth. This attack sank no less than three ships and damaged others.
As the convoy moved further west and the day brightened it became the turn of the Luftwaffe to try and destroy the convoy. To this end around nine o’clock in the morning the RDF stations on the south coast began to detect a sizable formation approaching form the area of the Cotin peninsular. This attack comprised a large force of Ju 8’s from Fliegerkorps VIII with an escort of Me 109’s from JG27. In an example of excellent co-ordination between two different Groups of Fighter Command a force of five squadrons from 11 and an additional squadron from 10 group successfully broke up this attack. Later a the now ragged convoy passed the Isle of Wight another large force of some fifty seven Ju 87’s, despite the intervention of four and a half squadrons of fighters, again from both 10 and 11 group the convoy was hit hard and more ships damaged and sunk. The progress of the battered remains of the convoy was noted by the departing German aircraft and their determination to completely destroy the is convoy was made evident when another raid was launched from the airfields around Cherbourg at approach the remaining ships of ‘peewit’ as they approached the vicinity of Swanage around five pm. This raid consisted of no less than eighty seven Ju 87’s with an escort of Me109’s. More Squadron from number 10 group could be committed to the convoy’s defence now that it was further west. With the westering sun of late afternoon the controllers of 10 group were able to get several squadrons into favourable interception positions. The aircraft from 11 group approaching from the east were at a disadvantage but had altitude and fortuitously gained the attention of the bulk of the Me 109 escort fighters. No less than seven squadrons from 10 and 11 group were engaged in what resulted in one of the largest single engagements so far with some two hundred aircraft involved. After the somewhat mixed results of the morning the success of the RAF fighters in getting in amongst the Ju 87’s in the final raid was the pay off for a lot of hard work by the entirety of the Fighter command personnel to perfect the ‘Dowding System’. From 11 group no 145 squadron had flown two previous missions the day from Westampnett to defend the convoy in their Hurricane Mk 1A’s On this third sortie squadron leader J.R.A. Peel leading the squadron not only shot down a Ju 87 but also having broken off that attack to parry the defending Me 109,s proceeded to shoot down two of them. This multiple victory was not an isolated case in a remarkable feet of airmanship one of his flight commanders had actually not only shot down a JU 87’s after his engine had suddenly stopped but had also managed to get a seconded when his engine revived for a short time before expiring completely but he was still to glide back to his base at Wethampnett and safely land his aircraft. Number Forty Three Squadron also racked up a major score as they two managed to get in amongst the JU 87’s. It was noted at the after action debriefs especially by the veteran pilots who had fought in France what a difference having two 20mm cannons made. As one rather excited pilot put it “ give them a good squirt and the blighter just spontaneously disassembles in flight”. As the conflict above dispersed the remains of the battered convoy having now lost a total of six ships since daylight with a further six badly damaged added to the three ships previously sunk by the E-boats night attack, plodded on resolutely towards the west and the setting sun.
In the meantime this was not the sole activity and using the cloud cover and the distraction of the convoy battle a number of Luftwaffe aircraft carried out photographic reconnaissance of potential south coast targets. These included the airfields at Lee-on-Solent, Gostport and Farnborough and the Harbours at Dover, Portsmouth and Portland.
After much analysing of the after action reports the RAF finally claimed some twenty four bombers and thirty six fighters shot down. On the other hand the Luftwaffe were claiming no less than forty nine RAF fighters destroyed. In actuality the RAF lost eighteen aircraft through the days battle with a further one falling that night. Allowing for the now usual over claiming of the pilots involved in the stress and excitement of combat, even if you halved the number of RAF successes then the result was still an impressive thirty odd German aircraft destroyed. Later analysis of the reports from the convoy and naval escort later raised this figure to forty two aircraft. One problem encountered here was the difficulty that the on board observers had of distinguishing between friend or foe as the aircraft plunged from the sky. This led to only those aircraft definitely identified as hostile by the mariners being accredited to the total (2). On the figure given by the RAF the loss ratio was for that day at least a healthy three to one in their favour.
Such was the scale of the days conflict and the and the sheer number of aircraft claimed by Fighter Command that it elicited an congratulatory message from Churchill to Sir Phillip as Secretary of State for Air and also to sir Hugh Dowding and Bentley Priory.
That night Fliegerdivision IX again laid mines in the Thames Estuary and along the east coast. Small scale raids by bombers were carried out Birmingham, Cardiff, Middlesbrough, Liverpool, hull and the Bristol aircraft factory at Filton.
(1) Dailey summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
(2) post war investigations using the Luftwaffe’s own records showed that on this particular occasion the British estimate had been much closer to reality, though the proportion of fighters to bombers downed was way off, the Luftwaffe had actually suffered a loss of just under fifty aircraft, of which thirty five had been Ju87’s. Some Luftwaffe papers also showed the dismay of the Ju 87 pilots at the horrendous losses they had taken. These losses approaching 30% for the final days raid showed that even when heavily escorted the Ju 87 was very vulnerable if cannon armed fighters could get in amongst them.
Day, here major attacks on a Channel convoy.
Night, Small Raids and Minelaying.
Weather, Showers and Bright intervals. Channel cloudy.
Once more aided by the prevailing weather where the visibility of six to eight miles with cloud at 2000ft the German pounced on a passing convoy only thirty miles from the occupied French Coast. The convoy in question, Convoy C.W. 9, under the code name ‘Peewit’ had assembled in the Thames Estuary. The passage of the twenty ship convoy and it’s escorts was timed to take them through the narrows at Dover in the dark of the night. However the darkness could not hide the convoy from the German Freya Radar positioned up on the cliffs at Cap Blanc Nez. This resulted in the convoy being attacked by a pack of E-boats shortly before dawn on the eighth. This attack sank no less than three ships and damaged others.
As the convoy moved further west and the day brightened it became the turn of the Luftwaffe to try and destroy the convoy. To this end around nine o’clock in the morning the RDF stations on the south coast began to detect a sizable formation approaching form the area of the Cotin peninsular. This attack comprised a large force of Ju 8’s from Fliegerkorps VIII with an escort of Me 109’s from JG27. In an example of excellent co-ordination between two different Groups of Fighter Command a force of five squadrons from 11 and an additional squadron from 10 group successfully broke up this attack. Later a the now ragged convoy passed the Isle of Wight another large force of some fifty seven Ju 87’s, despite the intervention of four and a half squadrons of fighters, again from both 10 and 11 group the convoy was hit hard and more ships damaged and sunk. The progress of the battered remains of the convoy was noted by the departing German aircraft and their determination to completely destroy the is convoy was made evident when another raid was launched from the airfields around Cherbourg at approach the remaining ships of ‘peewit’ as they approached the vicinity of Swanage around five pm. This raid consisted of no less than eighty seven Ju 87’s with an escort of Me109’s. More Squadron from number 10 group could be committed to the convoy’s defence now that it was further west. With the westering sun of late afternoon the controllers of 10 group were able to get several squadrons into favourable interception positions. The aircraft from 11 group approaching from the east were at a disadvantage but had altitude and fortuitously gained the attention of the bulk of the Me 109 escort fighters. No less than seven squadrons from 10 and 11 group were engaged in what resulted in one of the largest single engagements so far with some two hundred aircraft involved. After the somewhat mixed results of the morning the success of the RAF fighters in getting in amongst the Ju 87’s in the final raid was the pay off for a lot of hard work by the entirety of the Fighter command personnel to perfect the ‘Dowding System’. From 11 group no 145 squadron had flown two previous missions the day from Westampnett to defend the convoy in their Hurricane Mk 1A’s On this third sortie squadron leader J.R.A. Peel leading the squadron not only shot down a Ju 87 but also having broken off that attack to parry the defending Me 109,s proceeded to shoot down two of them. This multiple victory was not an isolated case in a remarkable feet of airmanship one of his flight commanders had actually not only shot down a JU 87’s after his engine had suddenly stopped but had also managed to get a seconded when his engine revived for a short time before expiring completely but he was still to glide back to his base at Wethampnett and safely land his aircraft. Number Forty Three Squadron also racked up a major score as they two managed to get in amongst the JU 87’s. It was noted at the after action debriefs especially by the veteran pilots who had fought in France what a difference having two 20mm cannons made. As one rather excited pilot put it “ give them a good squirt and the blighter just spontaneously disassembles in flight”. As the conflict above dispersed the remains of the battered convoy having now lost a total of six ships since daylight with a further six badly damaged added to the three ships previously sunk by the E-boats night attack, plodded on resolutely towards the west and the setting sun.
In the meantime this was not the sole activity and using the cloud cover and the distraction of the convoy battle a number of Luftwaffe aircraft carried out photographic reconnaissance of potential south coast targets. These included the airfields at Lee-on-Solent, Gostport and Farnborough and the Harbours at Dover, Portsmouth and Portland.
After much analysing of the after action reports the RAF finally claimed some twenty four bombers and thirty six fighters shot down. On the other hand the Luftwaffe were claiming no less than forty nine RAF fighters destroyed. In actuality the RAF lost eighteen aircraft through the days battle with a further one falling that night. Allowing for the now usual over claiming of the pilots involved in the stress and excitement of combat, even if you halved the number of RAF successes then the result was still an impressive thirty odd German aircraft destroyed. Later analysis of the reports from the convoy and naval escort later raised this figure to forty two aircraft. One problem encountered here was the difficulty that the on board observers had of distinguishing between friend or foe as the aircraft plunged from the sky. This led to only those aircraft definitely identified as hostile by the mariners being accredited to the total (2). On the figure given by the RAF the loss ratio was for that day at least a healthy three to one in their favour.
Such was the scale of the days conflict and the and the sheer number of aircraft claimed by Fighter Command that it elicited an congratulatory message from Churchill to Sir Phillip as Secretary of State for Air and also to sir Hugh Dowding and Bentley Priory.
That night Fliegerdivision IX again laid mines in the Thames Estuary and along the east coast. Small scale raids by bombers were carried out Birmingham, Cardiff, Middlesbrough, Liverpool, hull and the Bristol aircraft factory at Filton.
(1) Dailey summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
(2) post war investigations using the Luftwaffe’s own records showed that on this particular occasion the British estimate had been much closer to reality, though the proportion of fighters to bombers downed was way off, the Luftwaffe had actually suffered a loss of just under fifty aircraft, of which thirty five had been Ju87’s. Some Luftwaffe papers also showed the dismay of the Ju 87 pilots at the horrendous losses they had taken. These losses approaching 30% for the final days raid showed that even when heavily escorted the Ju 87 was very vulnerable if cannon armed fighters could get in amongst them.
