AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
Well the Vickers K gun was an RAF weapon and that was much beloved by the Long Range Dessert Group and the SAS. Both because it was relatively light weight and had a high rate of fire, which was advantageous when firing at targets from a moving vehicle. This version was known as the Vickers GO No.2 Mk.1 Land Service and was a converted from the Vickers Gas Operated (Vickers G.O.) observers machine gun.
This is a well known picture of SAS jeeps in the western desert armed with both twin and single Vickers K guns.
This is a well known picture of SAS jeeps in the western desert armed with both twin and single Vickers K guns.I don't have time to answer in detail. However, this chart shows the establishment of the Territorial Army from 1920-21 to 1939-40, which was compiled from copies of the Army Estimates held by the library of the National Army Museum in London.
Note the following:
- This is the establishment, not the actual strength. The Army Estimates had a separate table for the actual personnel strength of the TA at 1st January.
- The National Army Museum didn't have a copy of the Army Estimates 1927-28 so I had to repeat the information for 1926-27 for that financial year.
- The information for 1939-40 is the personnel establishment of the TA before conscription was introduced and the number of infantry divisions was doubled from 12 to 24.
- The forerunner of Anti-Aircraft Command was known as the Air Defence Troops and then the 1st Anti-Aircraft Corps. The actual personnel strength of the Air Defence Troops was considerably below establishment from the early 1920s to the middle of the 1930s.
- The expansion of the Air Defence Troops from the middle of the 1930s to 1939-40 was partially at the expense of reductions in the size of the Territorial Field Force. E.g.
- The increase from 9,392 in 1935-36 to 47,435 in 1937-38 was achieved by converting 2 infantry division into anti-aircraft divisions. The number of infantry battalions was reduced from 168 to 141.
- The Army Estimates 1939-40 does not list the type or number of units for security reasons. However, there was a reorganisation of the TA infantry divisions in the 1939-40 Army Estimates. Instead of 12 divisions with 12 infantry battalions each (total 144 infantry battalions) there were to be 9 divisions with 9 infantry battalions each and 3 divisions with 6 infantry battalions each (total 99 infantry battalions).
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7.3 March 1940 Continued
7.3 March 1940 Continued.
The recent attack on the 16th march 1940 carried out against both shore establishments and the RN fleet which had only recently returned to the anchorage at Scapa showed just how far the UK air defence had come since the start of the war. He-111 medium bombers of I/KG26 carried out one of the first attacks on British land targets in WWII during this raid and were accompanied by 14, Ju-88’s I/KG30 who dive bombed ships of the Fleet. The incoming He-111’s were detected by the RDF CH/CHL station at RAF Neverbutton and the local defence fighters were scramble, 611 squadron flying spitfire MkII’s from RAF Skeabrae and A squadron of Hurricane MkIc’s from RNAS Twatt. The fleet was also alerted and two squadrons of Follond Fulmars of the FAA currently based ashore at RNAS Hatson were also sent aloft. Four squadrons were about a many as the new sector control station at Kirkwall could manage. Common sense had prevailed and this sector station was controlled and manned jointly by the RN/FAA and the RAF. Communications included FAA radios and a Naval Signals attachment for direct communication with the fleet. As had been previously agreed the RAF controller sent the RAF squadrons after the High level Bombers and the Naval controller directed the FAA fighters after the Lower level raid. The first interception was carried out by the spitfires of 611 squadron. This was the first time a squadron of cannon armed RAF fighters had attacked a formation of German bombers. The 611 squadron pilots were gratified by the devastating effect that a pair of 20mm cannon had on He-111, any hits around the glazed cockpit seemed to be mortal to the crew and hence the aircraft. I/KG26 had an unfortunate record as they had lossed the first German aircraft to crash on British soil when one of their Heinkel He 111H bombers was shot down by Spitfires from 602 and 603 squadrons on the 28th of October.
On the evening of the 16th of March their fate was worse, the first pass by 611 squadron saw three Heinkels go down and two badly damaged. The second pass finished off one of these and damaged two more. The Hurricane squadron climbing more slowly only had time for one quick head on attack before the raid was within the gun zone of the anchorage and fleet. Even that hasty attack had claimed another two bombers.
To say the combined shore and fleet AA barrage was impressive would be an understatement, the sky was positively blackened by the concentrated explosion of shells. The work under taken by Blackett and the OR team working with AA command now really showed the benefits of the changes to gun control to allow for the different data available form gun ranging RDF rather than visual rangefinders. The difference between the co-ordinated land based barrage and the individual targeting of the ships was plain to see and noted by the naval OR team with the fleet.
Despite the intense barrage only two further aircraft were observed to be damaged but the entire remaining gaggle of He-111 discarded their bombs and dove away from the both the gun barrage and the waiting fighters. It was only as the bombs were dropped that it became apparent to those on the ground that the He-111 were not attacking the fleet but were aiming for the shore establishments and especially RNAS Haston.
Meanwhile the separate attack by the 14 Ju-88’s that had flown from I/KG38’s base in Holland surprised the defending Fulmars, for just as the first squadron dove to the attack, the Ju-88’s themselves commenced a divebombing attack on the anchorage. Despite this two flights of Fulmars followed the bombers down with mixed results although two JU-88’s were shot down and at least one more damaged, one of the Fulmars was hit by the naval short range AA guns that had now turned their urgent attention to the dive bombers. The Fulmar was seen to plunge strait into the flow and the pilot killed. The diving Ju-88’s managed one hit, causing considerable damage to the cruiser HMS Norfolk and a near miss causing slight damage to another vessel. However as the remaining Ju-88 fled south east they were set upon by the vengeful Fulmars. When the FAA pilots returned they claimed no less than six of the bombers downed and two probable’s plus claiming that the remaining four had also been damaged to some extent. One Fulmar crash landed due to damage to its undercarriage and several others exhibited various degrees of damage from the defending machine guns.
The RAF and FAA felt that they could have achieved even more if their interception and tactics had been better but this did compared favourably to the attack on the Firth of Forth on the 16th of October when Junkers Ju-88 aircraft of Stab 1, Kampfgeschwader 30 (I/KG30) inflicted damage on HMS Southampton, Edinburgh and Mohawk. This attack had partially succeeded because a fault in the radar system at Cockburnspath meaning there was no warning from it and the new radar at Anstruther only picked up the aircraft at the last moment due to their approach from the west. Despite this 602 Squadron (City of Glasgow) who were based at Drem in East Lothian; and 603 Squadron (City of Edinburgh) based at Turnhouse. Plus No 612 (County of Aberdeen) Squadron from RAF Leuchars (Principally a Maritime command station) though scrambled too late to intercept the raid before they bombed the ships managed a large number of running engagement as the three squadrons harried the fast retreating Ju-88’s. At the time despite numerous claims from the pilots of all three squadrons only two kills were confirmed at the time when their surviving crews were rescued. One Pilot in each of 602 and 603 Squadrons being credited and of the remaining seven Ju-88’s no les than five were claimed as probable’s. Despite the fact that ships had been bombed and damaged in the Firth of Forth only two days after the loss of HMS Royal Oak in Scapa Flow the sight of so many fighters chasing the fleeing Luftwaffe bombers did much for the appreciation of the RAF by the Navy. The fact that all three squadrons were local Scottish auxiliary air force ones was a godsend for the propaganda boys as well.
The events of the 16th October also provided an opertunity for Sir Phillip and Winston Churchill to get past their confrontation in cabinet over the near loss of Ark Royal a few weeks earlier. A special OR team from the Air Ministry had analysed the after action reports of the Firth of Forth raid and investigated the pilots claims. Due to the fact that all the aircraft claimed were over the sea when attacked there were no crash sites to confirm the kills so the only two that could be confirmed were the two where survivors and the dead were recovered. It was noted that the despite having eight machineguns the fighters had had difficulty in downing the fleeing Ju-88’s and the return fire, whilst not bringing any RAF fighters down had caused damage and wounded one pilot, who got his damaged aircraft down at the nearest field. To provide better protection to the Fleet bases and shipyards in Scotland the conversion of the 13 Group fighter squadrons to the cannon armed variants has commence with the Scottish squadrons as soon as 11 and 12 group had enough to provide cover for the east coast as far as Dover.
The recent attack on the 16th march 1940 carried out against both shore establishments and the RN fleet which had only recently returned to the anchorage at Scapa showed just how far the UK air defence had come since the start of the war. He-111 medium bombers of I/KG26 carried out one of the first attacks on British land targets in WWII during this raid and were accompanied by 14, Ju-88’s I/KG30 who dive bombed ships of the Fleet. The incoming He-111’s were detected by the RDF CH/CHL station at RAF Neverbutton and the local defence fighters were scramble, 611 squadron flying spitfire MkII’s from RAF Skeabrae and A squadron of Hurricane MkIc’s from RNAS Twatt. The fleet was also alerted and two squadrons of Follond Fulmars of the FAA currently based ashore at RNAS Hatson were also sent aloft. Four squadrons were about a many as the new sector control station at Kirkwall could manage. Common sense had prevailed and this sector station was controlled and manned jointly by the RN/FAA and the RAF. Communications included FAA radios and a Naval Signals attachment for direct communication with the fleet. As had been previously agreed the RAF controller sent the RAF squadrons after the High level Bombers and the Naval controller directed the FAA fighters after the Lower level raid. The first interception was carried out by the spitfires of 611 squadron. This was the first time a squadron of cannon armed RAF fighters had attacked a formation of German bombers. The 611 squadron pilots were gratified by the devastating effect that a pair of 20mm cannon had on He-111, any hits around the glazed cockpit seemed to be mortal to the crew and hence the aircraft. I/KG26 had an unfortunate record as they had lossed the first German aircraft to crash on British soil when one of their Heinkel He 111H bombers was shot down by Spitfires from 602 and 603 squadrons on the 28th of October.
On the evening of the 16th of March their fate was worse, the first pass by 611 squadron saw three Heinkels go down and two badly damaged. The second pass finished off one of these and damaged two more. The Hurricane squadron climbing more slowly only had time for one quick head on attack before the raid was within the gun zone of the anchorage and fleet. Even that hasty attack had claimed another two bombers.
To say the combined shore and fleet AA barrage was impressive would be an understatement, the sky was positively blackened by the concentrated explosion of shells. The work under taken by Blackett and the OR team working with AA command now really showed the benefits of the changes to gun control to allow for the different data available form gun ranging RDF rather than visual rangefinders. The difference between the co-ordinated land based barrage and the individual targeting of the ships was plain to see and noted by the naval OR team with the fleet.
Despite the intense barrage only two further aircraft were observed to be damaged but the entire remaining gaggle of He-111 discarded their bombs and dove away from the both the gun barrage and the waiting fighters. It was only as the bombs were dropped that it became apparent to those on the ground that the He-111 were not attacking the fleet but were aiming for the shore establishments and especially RNAS Haston.
Meanwhile the separate attack by the 14 Ju-88’s that had flown from I/KG38’s base in Holland surprised the defending Fulmars, for just as the first squadron dove to the attack, the Ju-88’s themselves commenced a divebombing attack on the anchorage. Despite this two flights of Fulmars followed the bombers down with mixed results although two JU-88’s were shot down and at least one more damaged, one of the Fulmars was hit by the naval short range AA guns that had now turned their urgent attention to the dive bombers. The Fulmar was seen to plunge strait into the flow and the pilot killed. The diving Ju-88’s managed one hit, causing considerable damage to the cruiser HMS Norfolk and a near miss causing slight damage to another vessel. However as the remaining Ju-88 fled south east they were set upon by the vengeful Fulmars. When the FAA pilots returned they claimed no less than six of the bombers downed and two probable’s plus claiming that the remaining four had also been damaged to some extent. One Fulmar crash landed due to damage to its undercarriage and several others exhibited various degrees of damage from the defending machine guns.
The RAF and FAA felt that they could have achieved even more if their interception and tactics had been better but this did compared favourably to the attack on the Firth of Forth on the 16th of October when Junkers Ju-88 aircraft of Stab 1, Kampfgeschwader 30 (I/KG30) inflicted damage on HMS Southampton, Edinburgh and Mohawk. This attack had partially succeeded because a fault in the radar system at Cockburnspath meaning there was no warning from it and the new radar at Anstruther only picked up the aircraft at the last moment due to their approach from the west. Despite this 602 Squadron (City of Glasgow) who were based at Drem in East Lothian; and 603 Squadron (City of Edinburgh) based at Turnhouse. Plus No 612 (County of Aberdeen) Squadron from RAF Leuchars (Principally a Maritime command station) though scrambled too late to intercept the raid before they bombed the ships managed a large number of running engagement as the three squadrons harried the fast retreating Ju-88’s. At the time despite numerous claims from the pilots of all three squadrons only two kills were confirmed at the time when their surviving crews were rescued. One Pilot in each of 602 and 603 Squadrons being credited and of the remaining seven Ju-88’s no les than five were claimed as probable’s. Despite the fact that ships had been bombed and damaged in the Firth of Forth only two days after the loss of HMS Royal Oak in Scapa Flow the sight of so many fighters chasing the fleeing Luftwaffe bombers did much for the appreciation of the RAF by the Navy. The fact that all three squadrons were local Scottish auxiliary air force ones was a godsend for the propaganda boys as well.
The events of the 16th October also provided an opertunity for Sir Phillip and Winston Churchill to get past their confrontation in cabinet over the near loss of Ark Royal a few weeks earlier. A special OR team from the Air Ministry had analysed the after action reports of the Firth of Forth raid and investigated the pilots claims. Due to the fact that all the aircraft claimed were over the sea when attacked there were no crash sites to confirm the kills so the only two that could be confirmed were the two where survivors and the dead were recovered. It was noted that the despite having eight machineguns the fighters had had difficulty in downing the fleeing Ju-88’s and the return fire, whilst not bringing any RAF fighters down had caused damage and wounded one pilot, who got his damaged aircraft down at the nearest field. To provide better protection to the Fleet bases and shipyards in Scotland the conversion of the 13 Group fighter squadrons to the cannon armed variants has commence with the Scottish squadrons as soon as 11 and 12 group had enough to provide cover for the east coast as far as Dover.
Could be worse, you could be serving on the Flower Class corvette HMS Pansy!
Urban legend has it that Tyne Tess Television (TTTV) was going to be called Tyne Wear And Tees Television until they saw the word that the acronym spelt.
Are the Fencible Army Nursing Yeomanry and Cambridge University Naval Training Squadron both true?
Are the Fencible Army Nursing Yeomanry and Cambridge University Naval Training Squadron both true?
RE AA guns in general, the UK's AA defences never seem to get much lime light, I don't know how effective they were, but with the 3.7-inch AA gun they had a potent weapon for sure. Hell the UK even put 5.25-inch guns in their turret mountings ashore as AA weapons.
This should be self-explanatory. I added the losses per sortie columns.
There really was the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry a British organisation dating from 1907. In WW1 they worked with the Belgium, Italian and French armies but not the British!
Yes that was SOE using an existing organisation as smoke and mirrors to hide what and where their recruits were up to.