Thanks for the correction, my bad for posting very early in the morning whilst still half asleep!
Pffffft. A minor slip of the keyboard in a remark not part of the timeline, it’s nothing.
I only mentioned it because it sent me off googling for the dH Swift when I couldn’t picture which plane it was, turned out there was (just this one time) a good reason for my brain failure!
 
12.08 Operation Compass the opening gambit
12.08 Operation Compass the opening gambit.

In the eight decades since the start of Operation compass much has been written to laud what has become recognised as one of the ‘Greatest Feats of Arms’ carried out by a British and Commonwealth army in the field. In more recent years Historians have explored in greater detail the contribution made by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force to the Campaigns in Africa. In modern times the fall of Greece has become a favourite point of departure for both writers and fans of alternate history. As official documents have been released and historical scholarship has turned towards examination of the part played by all three arms of the military in North Africa a reappraisal of the campaign has taken place. The fact that such a relatively small force fought a campaign over a thousand miles of inhospitable country against a far larger Italian Force that had the advantage of shorter lines of communication and supply. The modern view now espoused by many historians is that the contribution of the Air force and Navy were fundamental to the achievements of the army units in the field.

Right from the onset of hostilities with Italy on the eleventh of June nineteen forty, number two-o-two group under their commander Air Commodore R. Collishaw had taken the fight to the Italians. Within a very short time the assorted squadrons under Commodore Collishaw had forced the Italians to adopt a defensive stance. Considering that the RAF fighter Squadrons had had little time since exchanging their Gladiators for Hurricanes, their domination of the Regia Aeronautica was even more remarkable. At the commencement of hostilities with Italy Longmore had the grand total of twenty nine squadrons of all combat aircraft types to cover an area larger than Europe, The opposing forces consisted of, in Italian Libya alone some two hundred and eighty two aircraft and with the main force of the Regia Aeronautica numbering an additional twelve hundred combat aircraft only a short flight across the Mediterranean away allowed for rapid reinforcement of their north African bases. This moral and tactical advantage was maintained even after the Italian advance into Egypt had deprived Collishaw’s group of their forward air bases. For the next several months the RAF forces in Egypt harassed the Italians as they set up and supplied their armed camps in Egypt.

It was clear to both Longmore and Collishaw that if General O’Conner’s five day raid was successful there could well be a need for the RAF squadrons of 202 Group to keep pace with any advance. In anticipation of this Colishaw’s group was assigned as much motor transport as was possible and Longmore gathered as many transport aircraft in the Delta as he could, in anticipation of the need to resupply the advancing RAF units. By the seventh of December when operation Compass commenced Longmore by stripping all other commands is the Middle east of their transport aircraft managed to gather together a motley group of transport aircraft. The backbone of the fleet would be the Bombays of two one six squadrons with other squadrons equipped with Vickers Valencia’s, DH Dominies, Westland Lysanders and DH. Flamingos.

Longmore had a few weeks before the commencement of Compass arranged for the transfer of No 2 Armoured Car Company from Palestine to the western desert to join the 11th Hussars in their reconnaissance ‘beyond the wire’. This move was to have a far greater impact on the course oft he campaign and the entire remainder of the war that any of those involved could ever have anticipated.



In the run to the start of operation Compass on the night before it started Wellington bombers from Malta had bombed Regia aeronautical bases at Castel . On the following night Wellingtons from bases in Egypt had bombed the Italian airfields at Benina near Benghasi whilst other RAF aircraft had flown continuously over the Italian camps to both keep the Italians awake and to mask the sound of the approaching army units. The speed of the advance was remarkable, Bardia falling on January the third and Tobruk less than three weeks later. General O’Conner with a force of less than three Divisions had in under seven weeks captured over one hundred thousand Italian prisoners, hundreds of armoured vehicles and thousands of lorries. Along with the tanks at Bardia a fully equipped tank workshop and depot had been acquired. All in all tens of thousands of small arms, hundreds of field pieces and anti aircraft guns of all sizes was a bounty that needed to be used. So far the ‘five day raid ‘ had reaped rewards beyond all expectation and despite the tiredness of his troops and the worn-out condition of their equipment the General was determined to continue the pressure on the Italians and continue the advance as rapidly as possible.

The capture and occupation by the RAF of the Italian airfields around Bardia had greatly facilitated the forwarded movements of the Squadrons under Collishaw’s control. The next problem for the RAF as well as the Army was to bring up supplies and replacements as well as the not considerable problem of escorting the huge number of Italian prisoners through to Egypt and prisoner of war camps.

The re-equipment of the Desert army even as it continued its pursuit of the enemy was much helped by the arrival in Egypt of the first of the supply convoys that had departed British ports in Mid October for the long voyage round the Cape of Good Hope. The encirclement of the remaining Italian force within the Cyrenaican bulge was now a distinct possibility that General O’Conner was determined to exercise. The speed with which the Royal Engineers and the RN cleared Tobruk Harbour and brought forward supplies was a critical element of this endeavour. For Collisaw’s men and aircraft of what was now the embryonic Desert Air Force the problem was not only one of supply but of maintaining operational airfields in increasingly wet and muddy conditions.

Even as the army prepared to advance both along the coast road and across the Bulge of Cyrenaica to cut off the Italians in Bengasi from Tripoli, lessons were being learned and actions taken. One of the features of the campaign so far had been the exploits of the armoured cars of the 11th Hussars and the RAF’s No2 Armoured car company who ranged far and wide in advance of the army probing and reconnoitring. A feature of their exploits was that the RAF armoured cars were crewed by men who had spent years patrolling in Iraq, Palestine and Persia in co-operation with the local Squadrons aircraft. All their vehicles therefore had HF and the newer VHF radios for direct contact with RAF aircraft. The ability of the RAF armoured cars to call up the support of fighters and bombers was noted by the 11th Hussars, as was their ability to whistle up a Lysander full of fuel ammunition and food seemingly on a daily basis. Also much valued was the ability of the Lysanders to fly out wounded and bring in replacement personnel. By the time that Derna fell somehow some of the Morris C9 armoured cars of the 11th Hussars had acquired RAF radios and were organising their own air support and re supply.

The success of this close air cooperation was being lauded up the command chain in both the Army and the RAF which would bring official recognition and reorganisation to integrate air support into O’Conner’s entire operational force.
 
Raymond Collishaw ... from the skies of the western front in his Sopwith Tri-plane to the deserts of North Africa ... and still making history! Well done, and thank you for the inclusion of a personal favorite.
I first heard of him from my Uncle Mel way back in the 60's ... Uncle Mel was a tanker by way of the RNWMP (never volunteer for anything,lad!), but he could regale you with the exploits of Collishaw, Bishop, Barker and the rest for hours.
 
The Generation who fought and flew n WW1 really were a very special group. I was lucky enough to know and talk to more than one pilot of that era. Inspiration by the bucket load!
 
A few butterfly are starting to fly in this post. The changes form OTL are small but significant. No Gladiators in service ITL, Hurricane MK II are being replaced by MkIII's. Tactics from earlier battles have been learnt. Logistics, logistics, logistics. The Army still have crap tanks, so Operation Compass will still be hobbled.
 
It would be interesting to do a combined British wank TL where improvements to all thee services are combined!
Allan
You could do a sort of round robin, one writer deals with each and the three then cover the interaction. Foresight war covered all three services and that worked.
 
The Generation who fought and flew n WW1 really were a very special group. I was lucky enough to know and talk to more than one pilot of that era. Inspiration by the bucket load!
It's hard to comprehend the shear guts those men had. Just to fly in those death traps was an act of borderline insanity but to then take them into combat, often sitting on the petrol tank, with unreliable engines, fragile airframes, few navigational instruments and no parachutes, the mind boggles.
 
the Vickers Valencia is still in service and flying in supplies to units in the western desert. Any WW1 pilot would feel right at home flying this beast in 1941.

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For want of better, it did a good job at the time.
 
I'm so in favour of that although given the lack of a magic money tree I reckon the "Dear Readers" would put it in the ASB camp!
Not necessarily - depends on how it was done.
e.g. 193n - cross departmental "standardisation and cooperation" committee set up.

Establishes standards for
1) Army/navy/air force vehicles - similar to Canadian Military Pattern, but empire wide.
For stuff as simple as spark plugs, headlight bulbs and headlights, ensuring they are interchangeable as far as possible.
Also wheel and tyre sizes, chassis sizes, etc.
Not insisting that everything is the same, but that they are, as far as possible, interchangeable.
So that the standard chassis would have standard connection points, so a variety of engines (which would have standardised connection points to match) could be fitted.
Extend that to AFVs, and standardise on Horstmann suspension.
2) Cross force agreement on weapon calibres and types, as far as possible, e.g standardisation on light AA
As a sideline this could also sort out the buggers muddle in the RN on middle calibre guns.
The army only having smoke for the CS tanks.
And later on having guns that don't fit in the turrets.
3) Standardisation and standards imposed on shadow factories.
Leads to a row with Nuffield, and building the Castle Bromwich factory goes to Vickers.
4) New technology & research also comes to the committee, so radio & radar development is rationalised across the 3 services.
5) Sub committee on planning (having plans for industrial expansion, knowing who can build what, and alerting them to what is expected ahead of time).
6) Sub committee on doctrine (have to know how the forces plan to use the kit, in order to know what standards to write, and how they will work together).
Being questioned on stuff tends to concentrate minds on assumptions, and forces people to justify decisions.
Doesn't necessarily change things completely, but does clarify the various options, and the thinking behind them.

None of that costs a penny, and could even save a lot.
 
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