12.04 Politics and Campaigns.
Antony Eden as The Secretary of State for War had in mid October been sent to the Middle East to ascertain the situation first hand and to consult with the Greek Government regarding British help in their current Campaign in Albania and the possible future aid to Greece in the event of a German led assault via Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The British Government were only too aware of the vulnerability of not only Greece but also the fragile nature of the continuing neutrality of Turkey. The loss of the latter country to the Axis would seriously threaten the security of the oil fields in Iraq and Iran. In 1939 the French and British Government had given Greece guarantees of aid in the case of an invasion and despite the fall of France there were certain British politicians who considered that Britain was obliged to honour this guarantee and provide all possible assistance to the Greeks should the Germans invade.
In consultation with the Greeks, Antony Eden was informed by the Greek Government of their appreciations of the RAF squadrons sent to their aid so far, however they were concerned that any contingent of the British or Commonwealth army that was sent would be of sufficient size to deter rather than provoke a German assault via Bulgaria. To safeguard Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace the minimum number of British divisions required was set by the Greeks at twenty.
Even stripping all other areas in the Middle East Command Zone the maximum Antony Eden could offer the Greeks was four divisions. Even if the Eastern Greek provinces were abandoned, including the strategically important port of Salonika, neither the Greeks nor their British Army liaison officers were convinced that the now shorter front could be held with the help of the four divisions offered.
Therefore the Greek Government made it only too clear to Antony Eden that unless he could provide twenty Divisions then the Greek government would refuse to accept any British or Allied troops at all at this time. However further reinforcements of the RAF Greek air component would be welcome. Unfortunately with winter deepening there were no all weather airfields available to host any more RAF squadrons in Greece
Wavell in Egypt had expressed in fairly stark terms that sending any army units to Greece could well make it impossible for the British army to prevent an advance towards the Suez Canal by the Italian forces now encamp in strength within Egypt’s western border. Wavell’s argument was that the defence of Egypt and the destruction of the Italian forces in East Africa was more important that any political gesture to aid the Greeks.
Especially when that help was unwanted and could cause a cascade of defeats in all of the middle eastern theatre. Further talks were to be held with the Greeks for the British forces in Crete to be increased, for the expansion and protection of airfields to facilitate the support of those RAF units fighting in Greece.
To help with the reduction and defeat of the Italian forces in East Africa Sir Antony Eden was convinced that Operation Compass had to be backed to the hilt so as to pin the Italian forces in the Western Dessert in place.
Upon his return to London Sir Antony Eden had, after private discussions with Churchill, given the war Cabinet a full briefing of the situation in the Middle East and his appraisal of how the Government should respond. In later decades historians would argue that Sir Antony Eden’s presentation to and his persuasion of the War Cabinet to focus on North and East Africa rather than the Balkans, as the so called ‘soft underbelly’ of Europe, was one of the most critical junctures in the conflict.
There were still some in the British Government who thought that Britain was committed to aiding Greece with military aid whatever the cost on other fronts, as to abandon Greece would not read well in the American press. How losing a campaign in both North and East Africa could read any better was a point that had been most pointedly made.
Reviewing the results of the recent operations against the Italians the Admiralty had come to some rather startling conclusions and these they had shared with the RAF.
Firstly that the key to the success of operation Compass would be the strangulation of the Italian supply lines to Italian North Africa. As long as Malta held and could act like a fleet of aircraft carriers permanently place only seventy miles south of Scilly then the RAF and the Navy could cut this route by intercepting and sinking the supply ships. The ASV equipped Wellingtons of RAF Maritime Command based on Malta would in the eyes of the Admiralty be a key part in this endeavour.
Being able to track the Italian convoys in all weathers through daylight and dark would make interception of more convoys possible. The Admiralty also suggested if the RAF and the RN started to succeed in choking off the Italian supplies to Libya then it was highly likely that Mussolini would turn to Hitler for help. The quickest way to help would be to send the Luftwaffe south to pound Malta into ruins and deny the central Mediterranean to the RN.
Admiral Sir Arthur Dowding as Fifth Sea Lord and Sir Hugh Dowding as CAS, were of course in constant contact and the possibility of German intervention in the Mediterranean had been discussed and analysed before now, with the building situation in Greece the possible countermoves had again advanced up the agenda.
In their discussions with Sir Antony Eden the consensus that due to the shorter line of communications and logistical advantages for the axis any counter move by the allies would have to initially rely on resources already in theatre. It was a case of, not if but when the Germans came south. The questions was where could they be held.
The consensus between the military arms was that Crete could be held and it was vital that it was, to secure the Eastern Mediterranean sea routes, Malta had to hold and the Italians driven out of North and East Africa before they could be reinforced. Getting political support for this view point was the crux of the matter.
With advice from the AM at the end of the summer, as what was now being called the Battle of Britain was winding down, the government had agreed that in anticipation of a renewal of the air battle over England in the spring of 1941 that Fighter Commands order of battle should be raised to seventy five squadrons.
If the Air Force in the Middle East was to be significantly reinforced, a necessity agreed by all three service commanders in Egypt, then the Home commands would need to be stripped of some squadrons. Getting the Cabinet to accede to such moves was problematical, persuading them that Luftwaffe aircraft could not be in two places at once and the more aircraft the Axis sent to the Mediterranean the less there could be facing the UK was fundamental to getting squadrons released from the home defence force.
Sending more squadrons overseas in anticipation of the Luftwaffe moving had proved a step to far for the government. So the RAF and the Navy were left to make contingency plans only.
To Sir Hugh it was blatantly obvious that when the Luftwaffe joined the attacks on Malta that even the Hurricane Mk III’s that had now arrived would struggle to maintain an air umbrella against the Luftwaffe’s latest version of the Me 109. Therefore the logical response was to get Spitfires on to the Island now. Unfortunately as shown, the Government as yet would not release Spitfire from the UK defence and by the time they did, the operational conditions for Gibraltar club runs might have changed to the point where they were not viable. One option discussed, was to strip the FAA of it’s reserve of Follond Falcons and send them to Malta, The Falcon could make the ferry flight from Gibraltar to Malta, However it’s performance was closer to the Hurricane Mk III than the Spitfire Mk II or Mk III. So the consensus was that this should not be done until or unless Malta’s fighter defence was so eroded that there was no other option but replenish the fighter force as quickly as possible.
