Neutrality acts only applied to countries AT WAR; US could and did export arms to countries not involved in a war - see for example operators of P-36.
Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
Browning's entire product line was available through their whole owned subsidiary, Frabrique Nationale of Belgium.
I also think the near 80+% failure rate of the torpedoes had alot to do with it, too.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Aber, I'd kinda answer to that with a yes and no!
Yes, anyone listening in, ie switchboard operator, or telephone engineer, would be able to note down what was said, while being removed from the actual participants of the conversation. And the poster you provided illustrates that.
And no, most senior officers in the services would be using a telephone connected to a military switchboard, asking them to connect him (or her) to General so and so, the military operator them setting up the call. This may be simply dialling it, using the automatic telephone system, if calling to a town or city, but even in the UK, I believe there were still small manual exchanges in use during WW2. So some calls did route via a civilian operator. Now that's the UK, after the USA, probably the most advanced telephone network. But for countries in the Middle East, India and Malaya, I believe there were very few auto exchanges. So this was everyday life.
The telephone, as a means of communication, was the best they had at the time. Radio had to be coded, because it was too easy to listen in, telegraph was very slow and limited, only the telephone allowed a two way conversation, where an issued could be discussed, and so a huge amount of military organisation was done over the telephone.
Obviously, security was a concern but, its not as easy as one might first think, to listen into the phone call you want to. A military call from a brigade HQ in a small town in Cornwall may well be going to a manual exchange, in a village where the battalion HQ is located. there will be few operators here, and so a chance our 'spy' can harvest a good deal of information. But we're talking about turning a manual operator into a spy, by money, blackmail, or personal belief, dealing with a case handler, unless of course they are also a radio operator, with a secret radio stashed away. Or introducing our spy into this network, having to pass all the obvious questions of why pick them, and why are they needed? So in Britain, I think there was little real danger. But moving to distant shores, this risk must increase, both the lure of money and personal belief (nationalism) being greater.
The second part of that conundrum is how does the spy know when to be on duty, they can't monitor the 24 hours in a day, are they going to be the lucky to take the call that really matters. And lastly, pre war, telephone calls were still very important, the cost of a call meant one didn't ring up and chat to one girlfriend for an hour after school, as some of us no doubt did back in the 70's. No these were commercial call, again of a sensitive nature, information that a competitor could really benefit from. So as the telephone network grew, and manual exchanges multiplied, the serious nature of being a telephone operator grew, becoming something of a prestigious job, with the nature of confidentiality and security bred into those lucky enough to get the job.
So, yes it was a security risk, but no, not as much as one might at first think. An example of the dedication the women had to their jobs, was the manual operators board in Kuala Lumpur continued to be staffed right up until the Japanese were in the city, the operators painfully aware of how important the telephone network was to the military, and their determination to do their bit right to the end.
MWI 41092512 Bicycles In Taiwan
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
1941, Thursday 25 September;
The Engineer NCO thrush the pole into the stream, a marker indicating it was a little under four shaku, his free arm then waved his men forward. In, the team of four splashed, closing with the far bank, one either side, front and back, the rear pair in water up to their arm pits, holding the cross beams on a shoulder, supporting the light pontoon bridge of five bamboo trucks lashed together, a second bridge team followed, standing behind, providing a complete crossing of the stream. The platoon of infantrymen, rifles slung, an arm through the bicycle frame, resting it on their shoulder, began crossing, verbal shouts from their NCO demanding a faster pace, one at a time, stepping across each pontoon, and then up the bank, back onto the road. A Staff Lieutenant watched, standing on the adjacent road bridge, one eye on his watch, timing the event. One soldier fell off, splashing heavily, the NCO barking angrily to the rest to continue crossing, the soldier surfacing, and then struggling to wade towards a bank. Having reached it, under an onslaught of blows and curses from his platoon sergeant, he unslung his rifle and removed his back pack, before stepping back out into the stream, his feet feeling around for the lost sunken bike.
Despite the NCO’s urging, the pace slowed, no one else having any inclination to falling in. The bike found and recovered, the soldier climbed out onto the bank, slung his back pack and rifle, hoisted his bicycle on his shoulder, and under further blows from his sergeant, cross the pontoon bridge, the platoon sergeant, the last to cross, chasing him, the rest of the platoon already across, onlooking. Their work complete, now the Light Bridging section could cross, firstly several sappers with a bicycle on each shoulder, who then promptly returned, and the two lightweight carts, each carefully wheeled over, the cart inclined, using just one wheel. Further bikes, rope, and a couple of bundles of shovels, axes, and other engineering material was carried across, before, lastly, with everything on the far bank, the Engineer sergeant cross the pontoon bridge, ordering his men out, onto the far bank, their mission successfully complete. The Lieutenant noted the time, satisfied with the outcome.
Any move into South East Asia would see the Japanese Army operating in an environment they knew little about, the jungle, and so a small planning unit, the Taiwan Army Research Section, 30 strong including all its supporting staff, and a very limited budget, was formed in Formosa, to study what problems might arise. Raised at the beginning of 1941, it was headed by Colonel Yoshihide Hayashi, with individual staff officers given responsibility over specific areas, the Philippine Islands, Dutch East Indies, Burma, and Malaya, to which Lt Col Masanobu Tsuji, was assigned. Tsuji, a slim six-foot man with a shaven head, with a small moustache and round spectacles, came with considerable notoriety, his sometimes outrageous behaviour to superior officers, tolerated thanks to the supported by unnamed benefactors high in the Army General Staff.
Details and intelligence on Malaya and Singapore were garnered from a wide variety of sources, fishing boat skippers on conditions of the coastal waters of Eastern Malaya, the interior geography from officials working at a couple of Japanese owned mining companies, while other businessmen and embassy staff contributed additional information. What they noted was that most of the developed part of Malaya was on the western side of the spine of mountains, running down the peninsula. One line of the railway ran through here, with a number of branches to ports and commercial enterprises. There was also a fairly decent metalled road network linking the towns and cities with lots of plantations, mostly rubber, situated on their flanks.
Numerous rivers flowed from the mountain range, both east and west, the larger ones navigable for some distance, providing lateral riverine communications, and formidable barriers for north-south movement. The exception is the Perak River, which runs north to south for about 200 miles, before turning west at Teluk Anson, towards the Malacca Straits, for 50 miles in a series of bends. The smaller ports on both the eastern and western side provided a lot of coastal trade, with small steamers plying their routes between them and Singapore, where goods were often transhipped to ocean going vessels.
Military Officers, posing as tourists, were able to travel through some parts of the country, noting towns like Mersing, Kuantan, and Kota Bharu were in restricted security zones, and more importantly, there were a lot of rivers, and consequently, road and rail bridges, which if destroyed, would severely restrict any advance from moving quickly. Much of the garrison was made up of Indian troops, recently raised, while the best of the British troops had left for Britain or North Africa. Parts of an Australian Division were present, in all likelihood, assembling before transhipping to the Middle East. The equipment for the Army, like the RAF, was old, and not their best, it was noted a few Hurricanes had arrived, but there was no mention of any Spitfires coming. The Royal Navy was reduced to small numbers of old ships for patrolling, their main focus was on the German raiders operating in the Indian Ocean.
Under Tsuji’s drive and direction, the planners worked on developing a fast-moving Modus Operandi, of advancement, for capturing Singapore, adapting tactics and equipment to best allow this. Using the port of Singora as their point of supply, the main thrust down towards Singapore, of two divisions, supported by tanks, would cross the Isthmus, and advance down the western side of the peninsula, taking advantage of the excellent road network.
Both divisions would be mechanised, about 500 motor vehicles assigned to each, including 50 to each infantry regiment, to carry the heavy machine guns, battalion and regimental guns and their ammunition, and essential supplies. Everyone not allocated a seat in a motor vehicle, including junior officers, was given a bicycle, over 6,000 in total in each division. The infantryman was now mobile, with paniers attached to the seat, allowing them to carry between 65-80 pounds of equipment and supplies, with their rifle or light machine gun slung across their back. A bicycle repair squad of at least two men was assigned to each infantry company, expecting to repair about 10 bikes per man, per day. But in times of urgency, the punctured tyre would be removed and the bike ridden on the rims, if the road conditions allowed.
A secondary line of advance would be down the eastern coast, but the third division would not be mechanized, an absence of good roads making wheeled vehicles more of a hinderance. Therefore, supply would be by way of coastal shipping, while much of their advancement achieved by small amphibious landing hopping down the coastline. To support these operations a large Air Force was deemed necessary, firstly to destroy the RAF, and seize control of the air, and then, by hopping down the peninsula, from airfield to airfield, support the ground troops as they advanced. Any concerns about what the Royal Navy might do, were left to the IJN to deal with.
To help everyone involved in the operation, Tsuji had begun writing a Pamphlet, to be distributed to all the troops engaged in the campaign, titled “Read This Alone - And The War Can Be Won” which detailed all the military, ideological and economic aspects of the campaign, written in a simple way, so the common soldier could understand why Japan was going to war, and how important it was for Japan’s survival. And he emphasised that training and attitude would overcome any unseen obstacles that might present themselves to thwarting success. If war did come, the Japanese army would be ready!
The Engineer NCO thrush the pole into the stream, a marker indicating it was a little under four shaku, his free arm then waved his men forward. In, the team of four splashed, closing with the far bank, one either side, front and back, the rear pair in water up to their arm pits, holding the cross beams on a shoulder, supporting the light pontoon bridge of five bamboo trucks lashed together, a second bridge team followed, standing behind, providing a complete crossing of the stream. The platoon of infantrymen, rifles slung, an arm through the bicycle frame, resting it on their shoulder, began crossing, verbal shouts from their NCO demanding a faster pace, one at a time, stepping across each pontoon, and then up the bank, back onto the road. A Staff Lieutenant watched, standing on the adjacent road bridge, one eye on his watch, timing the event. One soldier fell off, splashing heavily, the NCO barking angrily to the rest to continue crossing, the soldier surfacing, and then struggling to wade towards a bank. Having reached it, under an onslaught of blows and curses from his platoon sergeant, he unslung his rifle and removed his back pack, before stepping back out into the stream, his feet feeling around for the lost sunken bike.
Despite the NCO’s urging, the pace slowed, no one else having any inclination to falling in. The bike found and recovered, the soldier climbed out onto the bank, slung his back pack and rifle, hoisted his bicycle on his shoulder, and under further blows from his sergeant, cross the pontoon bridge, the platoon sergeant, the last to cross, chasing him, the rest of the platoon already across, onlooking. Their work complete, now the Light Bridging section could cross, firstly several sappers with a bicycle on each shoulder, who then promptly returned, and the two lightweight carts, each carefully wheeled over, the cart inclined, using just one wheel. Further bikes, rope, and a couple of bundles of shovels, axes, and other engineering material was carried across, before, lastly, with everything on the far bank, the Engineer sergeant cross the pontoon bridge, ordering his men out, onto the far bank, their mission successfully complete. The Lieutenant noted the time, satisfied with the outcome.
Any move into South East Asia would see the Japanese Army operating in an environment they knew little about, the jungle, and so a small planning unit, the Taiwan Army Research Section, 30 strong including all its supporting staff, and a very limited budget, was formed in Formosa, to study what problems might arise. Raised at the beginning of 1941, it was headed by Colonel Yoshihide Hayashi, with individual staff officers given responsibility over specific areas, the Philippine Islands, Dutch East Indies, Burma, and Malaya, to which Lt Col Masanobu Tsuji, was assigned. Tsuji, a slim six-foot man with a shaven head, with a small moustache and round spectacles, came with considerable notoriety, his sometimes outrageous behaviour to superior officers, tolerated thanks to the supported by unnamed benefactors high in the Army General Staff.
Details and intelligence on Malaya and Singapore were garnered from a wide variety of sources, fishing boat skippers on conditions of the coastal waters of Eastern Malaya, the interior geography from officials working at a couple of Japanese owned mining companies, while other businessmen and embassy staff contributed additional information. What they noted was that most of the developed part of Malaya was on the western side of the spine of mountains, running down the peninsula. One line of the railway ran through here, with a number of branches to ports and commercial enterprises. There was also a fairly decent metalled road network linking the towns and cities with lots of plantations, mostly rubber, situated on their flanks.
Numerous rivers flowed from the mountain range, both east and west, the larger ones navigable for some distance, providing lateral riverine communications, and formidable barriers for north-south movement. The exception is the Perak River, which runs north to south for about 200 miles, before turning west at Teluk Anson, towards the Malacca Straits, for 50 miles in a series of bends. The smaller ports on both the eastern and western side provided a lot of coastal trade, with small steamers plying their routes between them and Singapore, where goods were often transhipped to ocean going vessels.
Military Officers, posing as tourists, were able to travel through some parts of the country, noting towns like Mersing, Kuantan, and Kota Bharu were in restricted security zones, and more importantly, there were a lot of rivers, and consequently, road and rail bridges, which if destroyed, would severely restrict any advance from moving quickly. Much of the garrison was made up of Indian troops, recently raised, while the best of the British troops had left for Britain or North Africa. Parts of an Australian Division were present, in all likelihood, assembling before transhipping to the Middle East. The equipment for the Army, like the RAF, was old, and not their best, it was noted a few Hurricanes had arrived, but there was no mention of any Spitfires coming. The Royal Navy was reduced to small numbers of old ships for patrolling, their main focus was on the German raiders operating in the Indian Ocean.
Under Tsuji’s drive and direction, the planners worked on developing a fast-moving Modus Operandi, of advancement, for capturing Singapore, adapting tactics and equipment to best allow this. Using the port of Singora as their point of supply, the main thrust down towards Singapore, of two divisions, supported by tanks, would cross the Isthmus, and advance down the western side of the peninsula, taking advantage of the excellent road network.
Both divisions would be mechanised, about 500 motor vehicles assigned to each, including 50 to each infantry regiment, to carry the heavy machine guns, battalion and regimental guns and their ammunition, and essential supplies. Everyone not allocated a seat in a motor vehicle, including junior officers, was given a bicycle, over 6,000 in total in each division. The infantryman was now mobile, with paniers attached to the seat, allowing them to carry between 65-80 pounds of equipment and supplies, with their rifle or light machine gun slung across their back. A bicycle repair squad of at least two men was assigned to each infantry company, expecting to repair about 10 bikes per man, per day. But in times of urgency, the punctured tyre would be removed and the bike ridden on the rims, if the road conditions allowed.
A secondary line of advance would be down the eastern coast, but the third division would not be mechanized, an absence of good roads making wheeled vehicles more of a hinderance. Therefore, supply would be by way of coastal shipping, while much of their advancement achieved by small amphibious landing hopping down the coastline. To support these operations a large Air Force was deemed necessary, firstly to destroy the RAF, and seize control of the air, and then, by hopping down the peninsula, from airfield to airfield, support the ground troops as they advanced. Any concerns about what the Royal Navy might do, were left to the IJN to deal with.
To help everyone involved in the operation, Tsuji had begun writing a Pamphlet, to be distributed to all the troops engaged in the campaign, titled “Read This Alone - And The War Can Be Won” which detailed all the military, ideological and economic aspects of the campaign, written in a simple way, so the common soldier could understand why Japan was going to war, and how important it was for Japan’s survival. And he emphasised that training and attitude would overcome any unseen obstacles that might present themselves to thwarting success. If war did come, the Japanese army would be ready!
You have the ability to use the Teletype for communications. You had both radio and wire based versions of each used, wire since the 1890' early 1900's and radio in the 30's. One advantage of this was the ability to send the same message at a high rate of speed to more than one receiver at a time for both versions. You would set up the message on a piece of paper tape and then feed it into the teletype machine. On the other end the receiver would get the message and print it out. Imagine the old newsroom type of setup where you have numerous ones setup on seperate circuits over the country. This would allow them to send and receive message all the time and even in code form on the Radio version.
Sounds like a Japanese version of the pre - Great War French doctine; Attaque à outrance.
Without the bright red trousers but in khaki.
You are right, during my national service with the Dutch Army (41st PaLuaBt -- .. Armoured Anti Aircraft Battery) in the early 1980's, I operated just such a device. Combined with an electronic upgraded version of an enigma (16x 4 digits), I was in charge of communication with higher command
The subs involved inshore, and against invasion forces, were primarily the S- Boats, with working, but shorter ranged Mark X torpedos, so the issue is back on poor inte.ligence on Japanese ASW and night vision capabilities. The Fleet boats were patrolling the South China sea, and making recon patrols into the Mandates, After 10 December, all MK XIVs were on the Tenders moving South, so the subs followed. Once the MK Xs on Corrigidor and Canopus were gone the S Boats went south too.
R
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
And
Hi jlckansas and duckie, yes I should have mentioned these. Great for communications between fixed HQs, but in the1930-40s, the terminals were very expensive, big and heavy, requiring a dedicated network. I'm certain both Malaya Command and the Naval base at Singapore both had one, as did the Hong Kong HQ, but I'm not sure if Indian III Corps had one. Does anyone know to what level did they deploy them in North Africa, and whether they were mounted in any mobile signals trucks?
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Parma, yes good point, and I'd agree with the spirt of that, although I don't pretend to understand the tactics employed by the French, I'd like to think it must have been more than just a blind charge into the face of the enemy's guns. With regard to the Japanese, I think their infantry of 1941 were very good at fixing the enemy with a frontal attack, while flanking them, it was almost in their DNA, but they certainly retained the spirt of the Attaque à outrance.
Not static at all, see attached photo, It was mounted in the back on an YA126 1-ton truck. Going on exercises was always fun, with the 4000 Kwh generator in the trailer you had all the power to make food, heat etc. Not like the bloody infantry in an german winter....
Here are a few photos and listings of equipment:
teleprinter:
collections.museumsvictoria.com.au
An article about the signal corps in the CBI showing a setup of teletype.
article from IBM about teleprinters.
Equipment list of Signal Corps to look up individual models.
teleprinter:
Teleprinters - Teletype Model 15, 1940s
Two Teletypes (Model 15) made by the Teletype Corporation in the United States and used in telegraphic communication systems. Input was via a keyboard and output appeared as printed characters on a roll of paper. These machines were brought into use in Australia during World War II. In the days...
collections.museumsvictoria.com.au
An article about the signal corps in the CBI showing a setup of teletype.
article from IBM about teleprinters.
Equipment list of Signal Corps to look up individual models.
With the exception of Nogi at Port Arthur the IJA had regularly used fix and flank against the Russians in Korea and time and again dislodged them from strong positions so absolutely right - in their DNA from high command down and I guess just possible that a young subaltern in 1904 could still have been a senior officer 40 years later (although unlikely)
Subscriber Trunk Dialling (ie between exchanges) only arrived in the UK in 1958!
Errolwi
Monthly Donor
Final roll-out of STD in NZ was late 1970s - my aunt was an operator in a school+pub village.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
OK, hands up, I'm out of my depth with all this teleprinter and cipher machines stuff, clearly more research and learning needed. Keep what you know coming please