Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

Yeah, sure. But I admit I have no idea how long sub patrols were in the early days. What I am trying to put forward is the views at the time. With 20-20 hindsight, we all know what should have happened. But how many sub patrols by the newer subs, (and I don't recall any of them being in the Philippines at the time. I am probably wrong on this), carry out ITTL at this stage.
The main USN Sub base would by now be Pearl. What is the transit time from Pearl to the patrol zones, how long were they expected to remain on station and then how long back to Pearl? A month, two?
Then write up AARs, where a number of apparent misfires, failed firing solutions, etc are highlighted? Then allow the HQs to do the OTL thing of accusing the sub captains of not pressing attacks hard enough, inexperience using equipment, stress under operational conditions leading to poor tactical decisions. etc. So refuel, rearm, resupply and out on another patrol.
Having worked with Defence Bureaucrats in the past, an immediate realisation that there must be something wrong with the equipment is not the immediate answer.
So what I am trying to say is that it will inevitably take a couple of sub patrols by the newer subs before someone smells a rat, even if it is merely the sub commanders. After all, not every firing solution works. The target can change course, change speed, etc that will negate even the best firing solution. So how long are the patrols and how many of them are needed before the penny drops? This could take quite a few months before anyone connects the dots that we know.

Great points.

The Germans took a long while to fix their torpedoes, too - they weren't working properly until December 1942. http://www.uboataces.com/articles-wooden-torpedoes.shtml

The fact that the Germans also took a while to realise they has a problem, and even longer to fix it, indicates that (as you say) it's harder to work out that there's a problem in real life than when we read about the issues decades later, and harder to fix it. I hacen't had a chance to read this thesis about the issues with German torpedoes (https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1599&context=etd).

To underline the extent of similar issues, some of the earliest examples of German torpedo malfunction took place during the same action as the earliest examples of the failure of the British anti-submarine bomb. Given what munitions have to go through, it's probably not surprising that all combatants had major problems with duds during WW2,
 
what another two Divisions will achieve where the previous have failed remains a mystery. I do wonder if the Imperial General HQ's intake of lead paint is sufficient to actually think this is a good idea?

The Japanese position in Malaya is obviously a long way short of their goals but they have secured some rubber plantations and have access to the Malacca Strait, that's not nothing. If they can stabilise the front with reinforcements they can bank those gains and once they've sorted their supply lines a future offensive is always possible, perhaps post the Philippines. As long as Percival is their opponent dynamism is going to be lacking on the British side.
That said going on the attack immediately when outnumbered and thereby worsening your position requires a dose of lead paint but the IJA has form there.
 
As long as Percival is their opponent dynamism is going to be lacking on the British side
If Auchinleck is as I suspect staying mostly in Singapore then Percival is in effect back to being a senior staff officer rather than THE MAN IN CHARGE. He was actually rather good as a staff officer, just not fit for overall command. Even while still technically G.O.C Malaya with Auchinleck looking over his shoulder the crippling pressure is greatly reduced.
 
That said going on the attack immediately when outnumbered and thereby worsening your position requires a dose of lead paint but the IJA has form there.
It's not unreasonable for the IJA to assume that they have also done a great deal of damage to the defending British forces. They are doubtless also being told by the IJN that Singapore is completely cut off from resupply (because the IJN are not going to admit to their greatest enemy that they have failed in anyway, certainly not this early).

Given that faulty intelligence it is not completely stupid to think that 'one more push' with fresh forces will bring victory, if the British were on the ropes and lacking supplies then two new divisions could achieve at least a breakthrough if not more. The problem is that the key assumptions are completely wrong and no-one in the IJA is challenging them, doubtless in part because they are what the leadership wants to hear.

It's a bad decision fuelled by hubris and made worse by the IJA's internal culture, but it's not lead paint drinking bad decision making. Not yet anyway.
 
The Japanese position in Malaya is obviously a long way short of their goals but they have secured some rubber plantations and have access to the Malacca Strait, that's not nothing. If they can stabilise the front with reinforcements they can bank those gains and once they've sorted their supply lines a future offensive is always possible, perhaps post the Philippines. As long as Percival is their opponent dynamism is going to be lacking on the British side.
Thing is, the Japanese can't hold the British for any real length of time. The British infantry is backed up with Matilda II tanks, Which the Japanese can only really deal with via molotov cocktails (requires getting in close), heavy artillery (vanishingly rare) or air support (intermittent at best). They might have a few rubber plantations, but not the logistics required to exploit them. As for access to the Malacca Strait, I don't see how that helps them in any real way, since they can't pass the Singapore Strait, and I doubt there's anything left with a metal hull in what ports they control.
 
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Given how dense patches of jungle are and tye growning strength of the RAF in thr Far East as well as the growing Tripple A the Japanese Army Air Corps crews must be taking a beating.
 
Given how dense patches of jungle are and tye growning strength of the RAF in thr Far East as well as the growing Tripple A the Japanese Army Air Corps crews must be taking a beating.
Airbases in Malaya itself aren't practical (their logistics is barely supporting the soldiers, aircraft are beyond hope), and those outside the area mean long transit time, and short operational times.
 
If Auchinleck is as I suspect staying mostly in Singapore then Percival is in effect back to being a senior staff officer rather than THE MAN IN CHARGE. He was actually rather good as a staff officer, just not fit for overall command. Even while still technically G.O.C Malaya with Auchinleck looking over his shoulder the crippling pressure is greatly reduced.

As a staff officer he was top rate and if he had spent the war at MoD main office or on theatre commanders staffs he would have been an unsung hero of the war. As good as the Auk is he has much wider responsibilities than just ground operations in Malaya and Percival is the Army commander and that is going to impact the British drive back up the peninsular.

Thing is, the Japanese can't hold the British for any real length of time. The British infantry is backed up with Matilda II tanks, Which the Japanese can only really deal with via molotov cocktails (requires getting in close), heavy artillery (vanishingly rare) or air support (intermittent at best). They might have a few rubber plantations, but not the logistics required to exploit them. As for access to the Malacca Strait, I don't see how that helps them in any real way, since they can't pass the Singapore Strait, and I doubt there's anything left with a metal hull in what ports they control.
Airbases in Malaya itself aren't practical (their logistics is barely supporting the soldiers, aircraft are beyond hope), and those outside the area mean long transit time, and short operational times.

They have some AT guns and ditches also work, Matilda II's are a real problem for them but they are not invincible and if the British get over confident they will be caught out. Japanese logistics aren't able to support airbases in Malaya or solidify their lines yet. But with Percival ensuring the drive north goes slowly the Japanese have time to make significant improvements if they choose to. If they simply waste time and blood on pointless and hopeless attacks that's that but the IJA was not the incompetent collection of clowns that some people on here paint them.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
The Japanese are being to fall into the classic mistake of reenforcing failure, instead of reenforcing success. IOTL the Japanese enjoyed a consistent stream of success, which forced the various allied nations onto the back foot, and to reacting instead of acting. Where as ITTL while they have enjoyed a measure of success against the Americans, their performance against the British has been mostly unsuccessful. And they are now trying to make good on their plans, by moving even more troops into Malaya. However given that the British have managed to keep the Burma road open, moving troops from China who are going to be desperately needed to face off against the Chinese forces in future. Those troops that are going to Malaya are only going to be thrown in to a fight, with poor to non existent logistics, against an ever improving military force. The ability of the Japanese to live of the land, land that has already been stipend of resources, and had IOTL been reliant on imported rice. Is as the indigenous people move into the deep jungle, or behind the British lines, going to become impossible. And without plentiful local food supplies, after a at best difficult journey, the Japanese troops will quickly become ineffectual, living off bugs and roots. The major problem for the Japanese is that they haven’t succeeded against the British quickly, and given the sheer depth of Britain’s resources. While the British will be gaining strength day by day, they the Japanese are only becoming weaker, and are beginning to face the challenge of diminishing returns. Were as the British have a world spanning empire and the resources of the United States to draw upon, the Japanese who were already struggling pre war, now face the two strongest nations militarily, financially and industrially in the world. Let us look at just tanks, given the situation ITTL, the British alone are able to deploy tanks that are better than any that the Japanese can produce, but that have become functionally obsolete in Europe, in numbers that the Japanese can only dream of. And they can support these tanks, with logistics on a scale that dwarfs anything that the Japanese have available. And it’s the same with all the implements of war, from ships, aircraft, guns and even boots, let alone being able to feed their troops and the civilian population. While some British forces might go short of rations for a time, non of them will starve. And within a short time, no British forces, will have to ration their ammunition expenditure, unlike the Japanese who will be counting bullets.

RR.
 
You just have to admire the IJA high command for their ability to delude themselves.
What choice do they have

They went all in on day one so have no choice but to continue to reinforce failure - like a gambler having lost a risky bet obliged to then make even larger risky bets to recoup his losses and gets into a terrible spiral rapidly reaching a point of nothing to lose by continuing the process as they are so far into the red it makes no odds anymore
 
They have some AT guns and ditches also work, Matilda II's are a real problem for them but they are not invincible and if the British get over confident they will be caught out.
Britain has already learned a number of lessons, and it's assumed the experienced crews have passed onj said lessons.

Japanese logistics aren't able to support airbases in Malaya or solidify their lines yet. But with Percival ensuring the drive north goes slowly the Japanese have time to make significant improvements if they choose to. If they simply waste time and blood on pointless and hopeless attacks that's that but the IJA was not the incompetent collection of clowns that some people on here paint them.
It's not all Percival, the terrain, the nature of the enemy, and the limitations of their own equipment are also slowing the British down considerably. As to preparing defences, I doubt they could manage much. Earthworks are all they'll have the resources for, and since those require a lot of men to set up, that would denude the front-line.
 
As a staff officer he was top rate and if he had spent the war at MoD main office or on theatre commanders staffs he would have been an unsung hero of the war. As good as the Auk is he has much wider responsibilities than just ground operations in Malaya and Percival is the Army commander and that is going to impact the British drive back up the peninsular...
Hmm. Wasn't Auchinleck more than happy to take over the army in North Africa in 1942 after the Gazala disaster and loss of Tobruk? It's not as if commanding an army is completely out of Auchinleck's wheelhouse (or whatever the army equivalent terminology is.)
 
Britain has already learned a number of lessons, and it's assumed the experienced crews have passed onj said lessons.

At an institutional level they have learned lots of lessons, they have probably even learned a bit about what well motivated troops with inadequate anti tank weapons can do to cocky tanks (the better Italian units). But victory disease effects everyone.

It's not all Percival, the terrain, the nature of the enemy, and the limitations of their own equipment are also slowing the British down considerably. As to preparing defences, I doubt they could manage much. Earthworks are all they'll have the resources for, and since those require a lot of men to set up, that would denude the front-line.

Absolutely, Malaya in terrain terms is Italy plus jungle, and strongly favours the defender. If the Japanese can bring themselves to accept that they are the defender they could make it a complete nightmare. The important factor is that an O'Connor or Slim will keep the pressure up as much as the terrain allows and keep the Japanese off balance for as long as possible. Percival isn't that sort of commander.

Hmm. Wasn't Auchinleck more than happy to take over the army in North Africa in 1942 after the Gazala disaster and loss of Tobruk? It's not as if commanding an army is completely out of Auchinleck's wheelhouse (or whatever the army equivalent terminology is.)

The Auk was a very capable commander but only took over after a complete disaster despite having a dozen other things to do, note he did not take over before Gazala. Here things are going ok, so the normal division of responsibilities between the Army commander and the Theatre commander will be in place.
 
At an institutional level they have learned lots of lessons, they have probably even learned a bit about what well motivated troops with inadequate anti tank weapons can do to cocky tanks (the better Italian units). But victory disease effects everyone.
Britain won't be prone to victory disease here, because the Japanese will fight so hard. You get victory disease after an easy win, not a bloody slog.

Absolutely, Malaya in terrain terms is Italy plus jungle, and strongly favours the defender. If the Japanese can bring themselves to accept that they are the defender they could make it a complete nightmare. The important factor is that an O'Connor or Slim will keep the pressure up as much as the terrain allows and keep the Japanese off balance for as long as possible. Percival isn't that sort of commander.
Fixed defences aren't quick to build, and the Japanese only have local wood an earth available, not steel and concrete. The Japanese are also inexperienced at constructing defences, and the jungle isn't really the best place for fixed defences anyway, sight-lines are too short.
 
They have some AT guns and ditches also work, Matilda II's are a real problem for them but they are not invincible and if the British get over confident they will be caught out
Well OTL they had major issues with Stuarts so Matilda's in early 1942 might as well be Tigers. Virtually all the AT Guns will be pretty useless, Type 94 37mm, with only the literal handful of Type 1 47mm guns having a hope frontally. So as long as the British support their tanks with infantry, Japanese defences will just get ground away.
 
Especially so now that the British are bringing in greater numbers of CS tanks, amounting to 1-in-3 in the newer formation, plus extra guns to equip to older vehicles.
 
Britain won't be prone to victory disease here, because the Japanese will fight so hard. You get victory disease after an easy win, not a bloody slog.

At a unit level there are only so many times a Matilda II and it's crew can roam that battlefield watching everything the Japanese throw at it bounce off before they get cocky and that won't end well.

Fixed defences aren't quick to build, and the Japanese only have local wood an earth available, not steel and concrete. The Japanese are also inexperienced at constructing defences, and the jungle isn't really the best place for fixed defences anyway, sight-lines are too short.

I'm sure the Australians and Americans who got to dig the Japanese out of various fixed defensive positions in OTL will be delighted to hear that. Except the won't because they got in half by a Nambu in a log bunker that they didn't spot until too late.
The Japanese absolutely know how to prepare defensive positions in jungle terrain and were very good at it.
You're correct that a good defensive position requires time to establish but if they choose they have the space to do what the Germans did so well in Italy and fight delaying actions as they fall back onto prepared defensive positions. But this is dependent on them accepting that they are on the defensive in this theatre at least.
 
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