11 February 1942. London, England.
The eleventh meeting of the third Tank Board had been convened and, as usual, the agenda had many items that needed to be discussed. The chairman, Geoffrey Burton, formerly of the British Small Arms Company, as Director General of Tanks and Transport (DGTT) had two groups in front of him.
The Ministry of Supply team, which under Lord Beaverbrook had appointed two new industrialists to the Tank Board, Oliver Lucas and George Usher. Lucas, who firm produced electronic components, had been appointed Controller General of Research and Development (CGRD). Usher, from the firm International Combustion, which produced steam generating plant, was Director General of Tank Supply (DGTS), responsible for tank production. Burton’s deputy (DDGTT) Major-General John Crawford continued to attend the meetings, although Usher had taken over his role in Tank Supply.
The War Office team was led by Lieutenant-General Gordon Macready, Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff (ACIGS), with Major-General Ronald Weeks as his deputy and Brigadier Alexander Richardson (Director Armoured Fighting Vehicles (DAFV). The only independent member of the Tank Board was Colonel George Green, the American Liaison Officer regarding design and production issues on Armoured Fighting Vehicles.
Beaverbrook’s instructions were for the Tank Board to ‘consider General Staff specifications, types and programmes of armoured fighting vehicles, including their armament, and to take decisions thereon. They were also to receive design and production progress reports.’ Burton had been industrious about the business, and was trying to resolve the fundamental problem of whether the Tank Board was advisory (as originally constituted) or executive (as Beaverbrook desired).
With both Lucas and Usher new to their jobs, and no previous experience of tank design or production, Macready and Richardson were concerned that the ‘customers’ of the tanks, the Royal Armoured Corps, were playing second fiddle to the ‘suppliers’ of tanks. The army knew what it needed, how many it needed and when they were needed. On the current agenda was yet another example of the tail wagging the dog.
At previous meetings it had been agreed that a heavy infantry tank, carrying the 17-pdr gun should be developed. Among the ideas was to look into the possibility of adopting the American T1 (a proposed 50-ton tank with the 3-inch M7 gun). The problem of a designing a tank big enough, with the 4-inch armour needed, weighing about 50 tons, even with the new Rolls Royce Meteor engine, reliability of the automotive parts would be problematic, as would the ability to transport it. Therefore, the idea had then been changed to adapting a cruiser tank to take an enlarged turret capable of handling the weight and power of the new gun.
Richardson had been working with Carden at Vickers and knew that the Victor with the 75mm HV gun would be more than adequate. Work on the alternative turret by Stothert and Pitt and the continuing involvement of ‘The Old Gang’ was beyond the Major-General’s grasp. Whatever would come of the man-hours of design and construction was ultimately a complete waste of time and money.
What the civilians were thinking of would probably be better off as a self-propelled anti-tank gun, but that would be the Royal Artillery’s responsibility, rather than the Royal Armoured Corps. There were enough examples of Italian and German attempts at creating a mobile anti-tank platform with protection for the crew to see just exactly what the options were. The army wanted a tank that was mobile, protected and had a good dual-purpose gun. The Victor ticked all those boxes, and probably would for the next few years. Carden was already working on the follow-on tank to replace the Victor, and again the army knew that there was a good chance that would be just the thing when it was needed, as the A9, A10, A11 and Valiant had been so far.
The one particular fear for the Army was Beaverbrook’s obsession with sending aid to Russia. The Soviets only wanted Vickers tanks, although they regretfully had accepted Matilda IIs as well. If a large number of Vickers tanks were being sent to Murmansk, there was the danger of the British Army would be left with Nuffield Crusaders and Vauxhall Churchills in the cruiser and infantry tank roles. Neither of these even had the 6-pdr gun, never mind the 17-pdr. From General Alan Brook (CIGS) all the way down to Richardson, the army was invested in having one all-purpose tank. Designing another tank around the 17-pdr gun just seemed wasteful.
It had been understandable in the late 1930s to increase the war potential of industry by bringing new firms into tank production. The Matilda II was the only real success, although the A13mk4 hadn’t been too bad. It was clear to the ‘customer’ that all available production should go into the tank that the customer wanted. There were certainly other uses for the Crusader and Churchill hulls for specialised vehicles, but what the Armoured Divisions wanted was 75mm HV armed Victors.
In 1941, with great efforts, UK suppliers had produced over 5300 tanks. It was expected that in 1942, that figure could reach about 9500 tanks. The army wanted the vast majority of those tanks to be Valiant IIs and Victors. It would grudgingly accept Crusaders and Churchills, but only as a minority. The Tank Brigades that were converting to Churchills weren’t thrilled that the Churchill wasn’t any great improvement on the Matilda II, except in thicker armour. The expanding Armoured Brigades receiving the Crusaders were in some ways glad just to be getting tanks to train on. As a training tank the Crusader was fine, but the Russians had rejected them for good reason.
Matilda IIs were still showing their worth in Malaya, and the American M3 Light tanks were proving acceptable against the Japanese. The Australians were enthusiastic about the 75mm gun on the Grants they were getting, and the Indians and South Africans would probably accept them too, until the newer M4 arrived later in the year. There was no doubt that sooner rather than later, the British Army would once more be facing the Wehrmacht in Europe. There weren’t many tank crews who wanted to do that in a cruiser tank armed with a 2-pdr gun, nor an unreliable monstrosity designed to fit the 17-pdr. There was a better tank with a better gun available, the civilians had to understand that, otherwise more time and effort would be wasted, only to lead to unnecessary casualties among the Royal Armoured Corps, and the army in general.
