Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
Yeah, sure. But I admit I have no idea how long sub patrols were in the early days. What I am trying to put forward is the views at the time. With 20-20 hindsight, we all know what should have happened. But how many sub patrols by the newer subs, (and I don't recall any of them being in the Philippines at the time. I am probably wrong on this), carry out ITTL at this stage.
The main USN Sub base would by now be Pearl. What is the transit time from Pearl to the patrol zones, how long were they expected to remain on station and then how long back to Pearl? A month, two?
Then write up AARs, where a number of apparent misfires, failed firing solutions, etc are highlighted? Then allow the HQs to do the OTL thing of accusing the sub captains of not pressing attacks hard enough, inexperience using equipment, stress under operational conditions leading to poor tactical decisions. etc. So refuel, rearm, resupply and out on another patrol.
Having worked with Defence Bureaucrats in the past, an immediate realisation that there must be something wrong with the equipment is not the immediate answer.
So what I am trying to say is that it will inevitably take a couple of sub patrols by the newer subs before someone smells a rat, even if it is merely the sub commanders. After all, not every firing solution works. The target can change course, change speed, etc that will negate even the best firing solution. So how long are the patrols and how many of them are needed before the penny drops? This could take quite a few months before anyone connects the dots that we know.
That would be all well and good, but for the witness testimony of the British and Dutch captains. Plus, even if they can't re-arm in Surabaya, they can at least top up their tanks, which ought to give the captains enough time to write a few reports.
As well as talk with their weps and torp techs as well as their British and Dutch counterparts.
The more facts they can gather the more effective they will be at beating the Ord over the head.
How much of that is there in-theatre (inc India & Australia to be reasonable) that isn't in short supply & not needed for immediate Commonwealth use?
If it's not in-theatre then there's diminishing value in the Commonwealth trying to supply it vs it coming from the US.
If Commonwealth troops are actively using it then that adds a layer of politics to it. Having said that, I could see the Commonwealth powers that be seeing the PR/US relations value in sending a few boatloads of whatever's available to Bataan. Either way seems plausible to me, but sending (and being seen to send) 'something' probably has a value in & of itself.
Of course sending RN subs to help supply the besieged Us forces takes them away from war patrols so they will not be filing those reports of British torpedo success which seems such a favourite on here to help USN get its problems sorted.
Li.ited resources cannot do everything....no matter the wishful thinking !
Li.ited resources cannot do everything....no matter the wishful thinking !
probably my fault that I am not explaining my thoughts clearly.
If the new subs have to use Pearl as their base, because all the spares and Mk XIV torpedoes etc are there and not blown up at Cavite, then how long would it take for a Sub to transit to the war zones, assume off Northern Luzon, spend time on station and then transit back to Pearl? The new S Class, the named ones like Skipjack, could do a max of 21 kts, but no-one wastes fuel that way, so say a cruising speed on the surface of 12 kts. My calculator tells me that at 12 kts from Honolulu to Manila would take 16 1/2 days. So even just getting there and back would take a month. Allow say four weeks on station? Is that reasonable? So even if the first Sub left Pearl on 8 Dec sailed at cruising speed to off Manila and then spent four weeks on station, that sub would take two months to get back to Pearl. That means the first subs reporting in that there was something wrong with the firing solutions would be getting back about early February.
perhaps the first skippers thought something was wrong with the fire computer, or whatever. After all, they had been told that their torpedoes were the best in the world. It would only be after a few more patrols that they would seriously start doubting the torpedoes.
And since the smaller boats with Mk X torpedoes would probably be operating from Singapore or Surabaya, rather than Pearl, the chances of a new sub skipper fronting the wardroom bar in Singapore only to hear from the RN and Dutch about how their own subs were doing so well and also hear from their own smaller boat captains how well they were doing are pretty small.
I reckon it will be about mid year before they start to smell a rat. They need a few more patrols to be able to build a case. First patrol finished Early Feb, next Patrol returns late April and by now the skippers laying over in Pearl while being resupplied etc will start realising they are all having the same problems. Next step is how to figure out what is wrong. Is it the firing solutions, are they overlooking a small but vital step in their attack profiles, or could it be, no, surely not, those magnificent torpedoes that are the best Uncle Sam could buy?
Do remember though, they only have to return to PH to replenish their torpedoes, most other supplies can be sourced more locally.
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10 February 1942. Tokyo, Japan
allanpcameron
Donor
10 February 1942. Tokyo, Japan
The Imperial General Headquarters approved the transfer of the Japanese 4th Infantry Division from Shanghai, China to the Philippine Islands to reinforce Masaharu Homma's forces and finish off the Americans.
It had been planned to transfer 38th Infantry Division, which had successfully captured Hong Kong, to 16th Army, for the capture of the Dutch East Indies. Since the capture of Singapore hadn’t yet been accomplished, it had been deemed necessary to send 38th Division to reinforce the efforts in Malaya. General Sano would be given orders that his 38th Division would be sent first to confront the incursion from Burma threatening 25th Army’s line of communications. At least this formation had proven capable of defeating a British force, and they were expected to do so again.
Imamura’s 16th Army’s (56 Division, less the Brigade on Borneo, (now seriously depleted) and 2nd Division), had the role to capture the Dutch East Indies after the capture of Malaya and the Philippines. The Imperial General Headquarters had to consider whether the losses on Celebes could be made good by sending 2nd Division to capture it. They also needed to capture Ambon, as well as clearing Borneo so that the airfields could encircle Java. The problem was it would take weeks for the troops to arrive at their various destinations due to logistical issues, in other words, getting the Navy to agree and make the ships available.
It was decided that the Philippines and Malaya would have to take precedence. 2nd Infantry Division would also be sent to Malaya, and Imamura would take over from Yamashita who had proven incapable of winning a victory.
Note: The first paragraph is taken from here: and although it is only one source, I suspect it is true. The rest of the update is my best guess at what else they might do. Obviously sending 38th and 2nd Division to Malaya after the defeat of Yamashita seems to be throwing good money after bad. Both Yamashita's 25th Army and Iida's 15th Army have now been completely chewed up, what another two Divisions will achieve where the previous have failed remains a mystery. I do wonder if the Imperial General HQ's intake of lead paint is sufficient to actually think this is a good idea?
The Imperial General Headquarters approved the transfer of the Japanese 4th Infantry Division from Shanghai, China to the Philippine Islands to reinforce Masaharu Homma's forces and finish off the Americans.
It had been planned to transfer 38th Infantry Division, which had successfully captured Hong Kong, to 16th Army, for the capture of the Dutch East Indies. Since the capture of Singapore hadn’t yet been accomplished, it had been deemed necessary to send 38th Division to reinforce the efforts in Malaya. General Sano would be given orders that his 38th Division would be sent first to confront the incursion from Burma threatening 25th Army’s line of communications. At least this formation had proven capable of defeating a British force, and they were expected to do so again.
Imamura’s 16th Army’s (56 Division, less the Brigade on Borneo, (now seriously depleted) and 2nd Division), had the role to capture the Dutch East Indies after the capture of Malaya and the Philippines. The Imperial General Headquarters had to consider whether the losses on Celebes could be made good by sending 2nd Division to capture it. They also needed to capture Ambon, as well as clearing Borneo so that the airfields could encircle Java. The problem was it would take weeks for the troops to arrive at their various destinations due to logistical issues, in other words, getting the Navy to agree and make the ships available.
It was decided that the Philippines and Malaya would have to take precedence. 2nd Infantry Division would also be sent to Malaya, and Imamura would take over from Yamashita who had proven incapable of winning a victory.
Note: The first paragraph is taken from here: and although it is only one source, I suspect it is true. The rest of the update is my best guess at what else they might do. Obviously sending 38th and 2nd Division to Malaya after the defeat of Yamashita seems to be throwing good money after bad. Both Yamashita's 25th Army and Iida's 15th Army have now been completely chewed up, what another two Divisions will achieve where the previous have failed remains a mystery. I do wonder if the Imperial General HQ's intake of lead paint is sufficient to actually think this is a good idea?
You just have to admire the IJA high command for their ability to delude themselves.
In certain regards they were not connected to reality at all, defeat was impossible therefore reports were read in a very slanted way, same with formulating conclusions. If all they could do is send 2 divisions, then 2 divisions must be more than enough. It does highlight just how lucky they got OTL with only slight delays just destroying them when you do a what if.
From what I know of the IJA it accords well of how they tended to view situation. Japan has this strange mix of conservatism and rapid modernisation when it comes to their military which effects their mindset and modes of thought.
How much effect would another division have on the PI? Then the clock is ticking on the IJA...time isn't on their side.