If I may, I would like to offer my own two cents on this TL. This is a really good and refreshing POD compared to other Axis scenarios. The world is your sandbox, explore the consequences to its fullest extent; crazier things happened in real life after all. Other people may not like the idea of an Axis Victory Scenario, but I would like to see one regardless because of the POD you've chosen. The physical and psychological damage on Europe and the Middle East because of a more successful Rommel. It may not have to be a Victory in the usual sense but I would like to see how this would affect Middle Eastern politics. An Axis Turkey and Spain would be a pleasant surprise if Rommel continues his success all the way to Egypt.
Sixes and Snake eyes Rommel's luck in an alternate 1942 desert war
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Going to offer my 2 cents. I like the timeline so far. One of the reasons I really like Alternate History in general, is that you learn so much about Actual History. For instance, I'd never heard of Koening and his brigade's heroic stand before I looked at this thread. Actual history is plenty interesting, it just is rarely taught that way. Did that brigade ever get a movie or a decent part of one made lionizing them?
On the issue of probability and lack thereof---I come from the perspective of someone who has GM'd a lot of games in a lot of systems who is decidedly of the simulationist bent. When I run games or write scenarios or the like, I tend to assign myself an 'improbability budget'. For a timeline like this one, OTL costs you nothing. In your budget you've changed a roll of 0 (as in, a 1 with a -1 modifier most likely to what's probably a 3 or so----3:1 engagements with moderately improved defenses go the attacker's way @70% of the time). Thus far that's the only real roll you could be considered as having changed. If you're familiar with ASL and similar systems, they often talk about the 'rule of 7'---as in, in estimating who has the upper hand look at what would happen if all rolls of 2d6 were to come out 7. In the scope of timelines, that's a VERY small expenditure of improbability, I've seen way more lavish ones that still fail to hit the ASB level.
On the issue of probability and lack thereof---I come from the perspective of someone who has GM'd a lot of games in a lot of systems who is decidedly of the simulationist bent. When I run games or write scenarios or the like, I tend to assign myself an 'improbability budget'. For a timeline like this one, OTL costs you nothing. In your budget you've changed a roll of 0 (as in, a 1 with a -1 modifier most likely to what's probably a 3 or so----3:1 engagements with moderately improved defenses go the attacker's way @70% of the time). Thus far that's the only real roll you could be considered as having changed. If you're familiar with ASL and similar systems, they often talk about the 'rule of 7'---as in, in estimating who has the upper hand look at what would happen if all rolls of 2d6 were to come out 7. In the scope of timelines, that's a VERY small expenditure of improbability, I've seen way more lavish ones that still fail to hit the ASB level.
The Axis logistical problem in North Africa was really insoluble. The large Italian army of 1940 was mostly infantry. A much smaller British motorized Corps destroyed them. The motorized/mechanized armies that fought each other from Spring 1941 on were highly mobile, and able to generate great firepower, but had much higher logistical requirements. Logistics were the limiting factor for both sides. The nature, and scale of these mobile forces dictated an offensive strategy, for both sides. No defensive lines, in a European sense could be held, and the risk of allowing the enemy the chance to strike at your vitals was too high a risk. This was shown by the fact that the side who attacked first usually won. Gazala was a perfect case in point of the futility of trying to defend a large operational area, when the defense perimeter was breached within hours.
The Axis logistical limit was set by the size of the Italian merchant marine, and the port facilities to receive them. If Rommel's directive was to prevent the fall of Tripoli, his supply situation would be fine. The down side was that a defensive strategy would be demoralizing, leave the British with the initiative, and eventual lead to the fall of Tripoli. The staff in Berlin thought in terms of holding Tripoli for 2 years, which as it turned out was about right. Going on the offensive expended more resources, but forced the Allies to expend much more.
Pushing away from Tripoli meant using the limited road net, and eastern ports, like Benghazi, which never fully recovered from the damage the retreating British inflicted on it. Tobruk was only captured at the end of the Gazala battle. The Axis lacked the logistical forces, and materials to expand, and upgrade the road network in eastern Libya, and they only had a limited pool of trucks. By circler reasoning the Axis lacked the infrastructure, to upgrade the infrastructure, in the time frame, and conditions of the war.
One of the reasons Rommel didn't want to spend a lot of time talking about his supply problems was, because if he did he wouldn't have been able to do anything else. He saw offensive action as the only solution to his problems. Rommel wasn't the first general in history who decided the only way to feed his army was from the enemy. Like Alexander cutting the Gordian Knot, living off the richer British Army would solve his dilemma. If he hadn't thought that way he wouldn't have been Rommel, he would've been George B. McClellan.
cardcarrier
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So many thoughtful comments and I got super stuck at work yesterday and today am falling behind in responding,..I do agree much with the above
Rommel defending around Tripoli would fail in short order, we know traditional defensive lines in the desert based on what happened to Ritchie and Graziani didn't work. And there are the added 2 dimensions which I tried to reference above, and tied in with Rommel's historical rejection of 1942 operation herkules
The closer the British where to Tripoli on the ground, the closer their airbases where, therefore they could bomb the ships/dockyards; this was Rommel's main reason to want to drive them away past tobruk was their American provided A-20 bombers, and domestic designs where able to bomb Tripoli and the waters around it at will from Gambut Rommel trying to stand at El Agehlia closer to his supply lines makes this even worse because it makes the British air bases another 250 miles closer, meaning their medium bombers could hit it several times a day. And British logistics in terms of them being ~over extended~ as they advanced could only ever be a short term problem, due their always having the option to use coastal convoys with fighter escort, with their never being enough u-boats to make a difference; and their displayed ability to generate a rail line from Egypt behind the army
Within this, the closer the air bases where to Tripoli, the more likely the British where to repeat their naval raids on Tripoli such as when they had 3 of their battleships conduct a bombardment on April 21st 1941 because they would be able to detail air cover right over the ships and the city. It also gives them easier time resupplying malta due to avenues of approach and better options to provide air cover over the eastern convoys
Rommel wasn't Eisenhower or Montgomery, but he could read a map, mark a radius of known British aircraft ranges from their positions and see the situation for what it was. He was the one willing to face reality IMO in 1942 as opposed to Kesselring or Cavallero wanting to launch Herkules when the time of that granting any value to the Panzer Army had passed at least 6 months before
Without full throated support from both Germany and Italy (ie cancel case blue, shift to defensive posture, juggle air and armor assets to Rommel) there was never going to be an alternation of Rommel logistics circular doom equation other than risking everything to defeat the 8th army and capture Egypt
Personally I'd have had Gazala go the same as in original timeline, if I were writing a North Africa originating 'Third Reich VICTORIOUS! (at least until the Americans atomic bomb them back to the stone age)' scenario, but would have had the Allied leadership (edit: continue to) mess up (edit: at) Alam Halfa. Point of departure being Montgomery maybe annoys the wrong people in London too much in 1940/early 1941 and gets exiled to Malaya. (Sorry Imperial Japan, but swings and roundabouts; Rommel gets someone less rigorous in Egypt in 1942, you get a fanatically over-trained Malayan force kicking you out and halfway back to Bangkok, whilst Alexander manages to hang onto enough of Burma to matter.)
But eh well; you're committed to this now...
Maybe next time...
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I like what you've posted so far, and I've seen no massively implausible events happening. However, could you clarify your source when it comes to:
Several people have made some very good points about how that reference doesn't add up.
Up to a point. There are some places near Tripoli close to Tripoli where an outflanking movement would be very difficult eg Khoms.
That might be true, but as cardcarrier pointed out the RAF, and RN would make Tripoli untenable. Axis Army Group Africa held out so long in Northern Tunisia because they had an air bridge to Sicily, Tripoli was too far away for fighters to cover it. Rommel knew Tripoli was indefensible, so he abandoned it, to join the 5th Panzer Army in Tunisia. Once the Allies gained air superiority, and the navy controlled the Sicilian Straits the Axis forces were doomed.
cardcarrier
Banned
That is essentially the late Paddy Griffith's "the hinge" alternate history timeline that he produced in conjunction with Peter Tsouras in the 2000s. Fun writing but the DAK by the time it reached Alamein historically barely had the strength of a reinforced battalion.
He does make mention in his timeline for a feature I intend to introduce into mine, which is historical(ish), the introduction of individual reinforcements by air to the DAK and PAA. This happened historically too late in the battle for the wrong reasons, as members of the Crete and Greece garrison, and some forces that had been with held for Operation Herkules where sent as emergency replacements for Rommel after things had already gone sideways
For the purposes of my timeline (spoiler) I intend to have OB Sud perceive Rommel as having great success at Gazala, and respond with this type of reinforcement earlier. As opposed to telling him, that he was spent and stop at the border (while sort of saying that they would do Herkules if he stopped and waited at the Egyptian frontier)
This is to cover up/address one of the glaring weaknesses of the timeline and Rommel's historical position, that even in a more successful Gazala/Super Gazala, Rommel's force which was already small to begin with would be spent, and desperate for infantry and tank crew replacements, even if Belhamed could make up for much of his material losses for the short term
The earlier introduction of airlifted replacements should make up for that in some degree. The crews of the Italian 10th armored regiment for example had been put through vigorous training exercises in preparation for Operation Herkules and where rated as good by General Kesselring. The Livorno assault and landing division was also rated as good by their German observers. There is also the combat experienced Centauro division which was close to shipping completely to Libya, but could have crews air lifted in to reinforce the XX corps faster.
German reinforcements would be more problematic, in the sense that although Kesselring could and did generate infantry replacements via the paratrooper formations earmarked for Malta and the above mentioned Greek garrisons, available German tank crews would require support from other commands, as 90 percent of the German tank corps was armpit deep in Russia, but I will develop this during the timeline
cardcarrier
Banned
This is the post that I have wanted to get back to greatly the last two days; my apologies
I was far to overly broad in that statement about well served units, and regret the implication it gave. The French unit was miraculously well served, but some other formations particularly the South African Natal Field Artillery fought with suicidal bravery when hopelessly surrounded and knocked out many tanks with their final rounds and allowed many of their countrymen and elements of the 50th British division to escape Rommel's bag. Every man starring down the barrels of Rommel's tanks watching his shells dwindle down to single digits and not abandoning their post, deserves the highest respect for their valor
The battle of Bir Hakeim including use of Luftwaffe observers and the characters referenced (except for the divisional commanders) are the fiction/alternate history of the timeline. I have had Trieste and elements of Trento decapitate and pierce the box with air and artillery support
There where 3 RA Gruppo equipped with Stukas at this time (IIRC 97 101 and 102) and they are mentioned as having taken part in the assault in Tobruk in English sources. I however do not have an English source that says which one(s) of the units where stationed in Africa vs Sicily, but would stand by generalized statement of Italian Stukas being available in Africa
French guns, this is where I need to make a correction; the 2 pounders where listed in the DAK recovery haul after the box was evacuated... BUT upon reading your note and thinking about it logically I would be certain they where left behinds belonging to the British 7th motorized who picked up the survivors of Keonig's formation and evacuated them, and they where not actually guns that belonged to the French itself. So please accept my apology and consider them French 47mm AT guns for the purposes of our timeline
The 149mm guns are Corps and Army artillery, not organic to Trieste. This was lazy writing on my part to not differentiate and I appreciate your noticing it. That website you linked to is community developed and appears to have a number some errors in it (still a nice tool though
) feel free to reference back if I screwed up elsewhere, I don't pretend to have written a masterpiece, it's just an armchair thought exercise for the most partcardcarrier
Banned
Regarding this source, I had the map emailed to me several years ago by a friend whom knew of my interest in this timeline project because I was looking for a cleaner digital Gazala map, without all the markings of the battle of the Cauldron. The stupidity of my not reviewing; exactly the source material from which that was generated, in front of detail oriented readers like you all is embarrassing; apologies
Please simply accept the map as clean digital copy of Gazala map without cauldron markings all over it
I don't believe I've ever read the book or paper it's printed in so can't comment if its half of anything but if the consensus is it's crap so be it I just want the map entered into the recordcardcarrier
Banned
There are not any English movies I am aware of regarding General Keonig. He was however elevated to the position of Marshal of France on his death and to my knowledge is regarded as a heroic French figure (and rightly so) in their domestic history
He is also highly regarded in Israel (as there where a number of Jews in the Free French Brigade) and developed positive relations between the French Defense Dept and Israel after the war. There are several streets in Israel named after him
The honor story of him among the Jews was that he let them fly their star of David in battle , despite it not being allowed in British military regulation
I can't speak as to Rommel's strength at Alam Halfa (the battle between the two battles of El Alamein) but you might find part five (Alamein) of Nigel Hamilton's biography of Montgomery interesting reading as to the mindset and psychological state of the 8th army leadership after the first battle of El Alamein.
'Headless chickens' is the impression it conveys to me, and it looks to me that they could have been panicked and routed by Rommel again at Alam Halfa. (There were plans to disperse and fight Rommel piecemeal, and plans for a strategic withdrawal to Khartoum, and attempts made to attack Rommel which went nowhere and... urgh… Auchinleck was getting and trusting some very dubious advice...)
cardcarrier
Banned
The Gazala Gallop was a real thing, and the command structure of the 8th army and Middle East HQ was a very tense and scary thing at those times
depending on which sources you give credit to, Middle East GHQ was burning documents and the RN was preparing the Alexandria dockyards for demolition
Ritchie and Auchinleck did not run a good ship together
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Auchinleck's letters to Ritchie around Gazala are fascinating; a mixture of micro-management and over-optimism.
However for all the dynamic arrows of Rommel's first day's moves on the situation map, the British believed that they had successfully held him and were considering options for a counter-offensive.
Warning
No, they were not miraculous, they were who they were. And their combat record speaks for itself.
Yes but you have not shown any attached to Italian units, which was my question, and considering what the Germans thought of the Italians, you need to prove this
Per the map you posted and every source I can find Trento is part of XXI corps and is physically too far to the north to be present. Trieste has 4 infantry battalions and per your map is 'lost' during the relevant period. In one of your post you had Trento having four regiments. This is bullshit, Italian Infantry divisions only have two. Scholarly research to prove this isn't true required.
So you've got nothing about Italian stuka units being able to bomb Bir Hirkeim.
So you admit you have no idea of the French force composure or equipment and you're happy to correct 'mistakes' with a simple autocorrect....
Corps and Army artillery would have been allocated to the two Italian infantry Corps in the north, how do they teleport to where you need them? If you don't like the OOB of Trieste I posted , feel free to post your own referenced source.The 149mm guns are Corps and Army artillery, not organic to Trieste. This was lazy writing on my part to not differentiate and I appreciate your noticing it. That website you linked to is community developed and appears to have a number some errors in it (still a nice tool though
You've ignored several of my questions. I've tried to requote them but that seems to beyond the measure of my skill.
I'm not saying Bir Hakeim couldn't have fallen on 27/5/1942 (with my limited knowledge, I've been looking for a decent book on Gazala for years. Everything I have is the opening chapter(s) of books on Alamein). But it would have taken 15th and 21st Panzer to unite and ride over the top of them . The losses to mine fields, the 75s and the die hard defenders would have considerable. Not to mention that these formations would not be available to do what they did OTL, Rommel didn't have the stones to do it.
Doing so basic reading, even the Wikipedia article describes the French HQ as some what rather different that what you do, and to quote "Stuka dive bombers raided Bir Hakeim more than twenty times but the French positions were so well built as to be almost invulnerable."
I get what you're trying to do. But your fall of Bir Harkeim isn't plausible. Reads like a Nazi wank. Sure has attracted flies like shit.
cardcarrier
Banned
They held out, surrounded at first by 3 times and eventually by 6+ times their number under heavy bomardment for 16 days, it was miraculous
No I do not admit that, I have advised I don't have a source on which units where there, not that units where not available at all. There are sources in english which state Italian stukas helped in the bombing/capture of Tobruk; which was part of the battle of Gazala, which stands to reason that there where units available at the beginning of the battle. AFAIK a stuka with full bombload cannot fly round trip from Sicily to Tobruk, so I would stand by my more generalized statement of Italian Stukas being available. If there is a source that says the bombers came later or where based in Sicily and could fly that far, I would retract
I explained that I used the recovered items from the box without making the next step consider that the British 7th motorized had entered the battlefield to evacuate the French. The point was conceded and reconsidered for the timeline
Elements of the DAK did attack the box later in the siege historically and took heavy losses I am trying to entirely remove that for the purposes of the timeline
In re-reading my first post I carried a typo which reads poorly; please consider for the purposes of the timeline that Trento is relocated to Trieste left flank, 2 battalions augment Trieste and their remaining forces work in between the French and the 150th Brigade box. For the purposes of the timeline the fire missions of the artillery are semi displaced from historical to disrupt Bir Hakeim, with their historical ranges
The map is original timeline, just so the readers could see the general placement of formations in the first 48 hours without all the cauldron markings; Trieste is obviously not lost in the minefields in this timeline
I would kindly ask that the implication that I am a Nazi fan boy or apologist please be dropped by you and the others in the thread whom have done so. I was advised and double checked the forum rules; purely military related axis alternate histories are not forbidden, and from my browsing seem a common topic
please bear in mind I have never written an alternate history timeline before, so even if I am making mistakes which you might find glaring, they are not coming from a position of malice, or intended heavy handed ness
thanx
Oops. Copied wrong line
I gave a general notice to this entire thread to cut out the carfighting and Play the Ball.
This is not Playing the Ball, and it sure looks like trying to pick a fights.
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