Cairo Conference, January 1943
As a new year dawned, the leaders of the six major Allied powers (Britain, France, Japan, China, Italy and the United States) met in Cairo in an attempt to form a unified policy for the defeat of the Axis, and how the post-war world should be organised.
As he had in Washington, Chiang Kai-shek once again argued for the return of Manchuria to China once the Soviets were evicted from the territory, insisting that it had been unjustly taken from China in 1931. The Japanese, who had been the first nation attacked by the Axis, maintained that it was unfair that they be left in a worse position than they had been on June 27th, 1939, if they were on the winning side. While Japan had only had the support of Britain and France in Washington, now Roosevelt was inclined to return Manchukuo to them as well. The new civilian government in Japan had been well received in the West, and Japan had done much more of the fighting in the war than China – indeed China had never been at war with the USSR. Chiang argued that the defeat of the CCP was just as important as defeating the USSR and therefore deserving of credit, but as the CCP was all but vanquished and the Chinese looked to be making no move to fight the Soviets, it fell on deaf ears.
The question of what to do in Europe was no more clear. About the only thing anyone could be sure about was that Germany had to be occupied and the Nazi government overthrown, to prevent the rise of another “stab in the back” myth and another war twenty years down the track. How far to occupy was a very different question – a drive to Berlin would likely be quite costly, and Daladier worried that the French Army would not accept those losses, especially if a German state was created afterwards. Roosevelt meanwhile wanted to ensure an ‘unconditional surrender’ of the Nazis, and a complete occupation of Germany to deny them the chance of starting another war. Churchill wanted to go one step further, believing that a march to Moscow was necessary, complete with an overthrow of the Bolsheviks, denying the Soviets any of their recent conquests.
Churchill was alone in wanting to go as far as Moscow. Roosevelt, Daladier and Mussolini all knew that a full-scale invasion of Russia would be an enormous undertaking over terrible terrain and at the end of a massive logistic pipeline, against an enemy that was vast in numbers and in industrial power (during the 1930s, the USSR had more tanks than the rest of the world combined, and production had not slowed since). Roosevelt wanted to restore the independence of Poland, Finland, Turkey and Romania, but as it was not yet clear how hard Stalin would need to be pushed to make such an arrangement possible, the Allies decided to allow the situation to develop. One thing remained clear though: the Axis had not only to lose the war, but had to be convinced that they had indeed lost. A half-measure like that of 1918 would not provide the world with security and peace.
The Oil War, February 1943
Oil’s importance to the Axis war effort cannot be overstated – tanks and planes needed it to move, and without either of those a successful sustained campaign against a modern army would be impossible. Oil had been the driving factor for both the invasion of Romania in 1940 and the invasion of Iran in 1941, the former to secure Germany’s supply and the latter to improve the Soviets’. Ploesti was now providing Germany with just enough oil to manage its war machine, although production of synthetic fuels gave them extra security. Baku had been heavily damaged by an earlier air raid, and while Maikop and Grozny had taken up the slack, the Soviet margin of error had been decreased considerably, and Stalin had done everything imaginable to improve defences in the Caucasus (while oil from Iran was taken back to add to the Soviet stockpile).
Poor infrastructure in the Middle East, the short range of escort fighters and Soviet defences had deterred the Allies from attacking Baku after their first raid, but with Italy having entered the war, attacking Ploesti was now a viable option. ‘Bomber’ Harris wasted no time transferring some RAF units to Italian Albania (now the closest Allied territory to Romania), and the first raid on the oil complex was conducted on February 2nd, 1943. Although the Germans had defended Ploesti well, and more than 60 bombers were lost in the raid, it was hailed as a major success after intelligence agents found out that Ploesti’s production capabilities had been reduced by more than 50%, enough to force Germany into dependence on synthetic fuels (the production centres of which were also routine targets) and Soviet exports for good.
The raid on Ploesti finally convinced Stalin to commit the Red Air Force to help defend Germany, despite Hitler and Goring’s boasts that the Luftwaffe was capable of holding the Combined Bomber Offensive back. With tens of thousands of planes, Stalin believed that the Red Air Force would provide a multifold increase in Axis airpower over Germany and France, and when Hitler was made aware of just how vast his ally’s air force really was, he reluctantly allowed it to operate from German airfields.
Stalin’s contribution of 2,000 Yak fighters to the Western Front quickly proved troublesome, as the Luftwaffe airfields did not have the necessary infrastructure to manage so many more planes at once (despite what Goring had told Stalin), and overcrowding made it much more difficult for ground crews to handle even the previous numbers of planes. Allied bombers took the opportunity to destroy many aircraft on the ground, while those few Yak fighters that did manage to get in the air were outmatched by their Allied counterparts (Stalin, who had heard about the Ki-61’s use in Korea, was shocked by the far superior A7M and P-47 being used in Europe). After around three weeks of chaos, it was decided that while Soviet planes could replace German losses, a substantial increase in fighter cover was not possible, and many Soviet squadrons were withdrawn, instead providing cover to the interior of Germany and Romania. With this change, the Luftwaffe now had access to a far more substantial reserve, and the Allied bomber raids quickly became much more costly.
Collapse in the Middle East, March 1943
In Iran, the Soviet position had unravelled in the face of several naval landings and a general offensive by the 7th Indian Army. Chuikov had fallen back to Esfahan, where his supply line was reduced to just over half its previous length, hoping that the Indians would become overstretched and become a prime target for a counterattack.
The counterattack never materialised. In early January, the Indian forces based in central Iraq (which until now had been holding the line in case Chuikov decided to move west) launched an offensive of their own into central Iran. The divisions that Chuikov had positioned to hold the western mountains were quickly defeated, and the new offensive threatened his supply line once more, forcing yet another retreat towards Tehran, with the 19th Army dwindling as many conscripts, tired of life under Stalin, deserted.
Chuikov’s shattered army eventually made it into Tehran, only to be once again met by the Indian forces, who placed the city under siege in March. Cut off from supply, and too far from other Soviet forces to hope for relief, Chuikov committed suicide and the 19th Army surrendered. Excepting the northern border regions, Iran was free from Soviet forces.
- BNC