Italy - Bite to Go With the Bark, October 1942
In the dark days of June 1940, as German panzers rushed towards Paris and the French Army appeared to be a small push away from complete collapse, Benito Mussolini had considered joining the Axis, saying to Marshal Badoglio that “I only need a few thousand dead so that I can sit at the peace conference as a man who has fought”. Mussolini had waited for the French Army to break apart, and was ready to claim his seat as a victor, but when the German victory failed to materialise, and at Minsk a month later, he decided to abandon the Axis unless a breakthrough on the Western Front occurred.
Remaining neutral turned out to be a wise move. Had Italy joined the Axis in 1940, they couldn’t have hoped to accomplish much. Even with the Germans nearing Paris, the French had built a formidable defensive line on their Italian border, while Marshal Graziani repeatedly expressed doubts about his ability to invade Egypt if it became necessary to do so. The Italian Army, while sizeable, was largely unmechanised and contained substantial amounts of outdated equipment. Furthermore, Hitler’s “betrayal” of Mussolini in allying with Stalin in 1939 had not been well received at home, and Mussolini did not believe the political cost to be worth a war that Italy had no hope of winning on its own.
Two years later, the situation had changed. Reforms, new production and two extra years of recovery after the cost of the Spanish Civil War had made the Italian Army, if not quite up to the standards of the French, British or German Armies, then it had at least become a respectable force that had the potential to make a valuable contribution to whichever side it supported. Although most of Mussolini’s territorial ambitions were in Allied (Nice, Tunisia) or formerly Allied (Dalmatia having belonged to Yugoslavia) lands, he believed that the Italian Empire could still be built while supporting what he thought would be the winning side.
In October 1942, Mussolini sent his diplomats to London to make the Allies an offer: if the French and British would remove all sanctions on Italian trade from the 1936 war with Ethiopia, would grant Italy the Dalmatian coast and his other claims to Yugoslavia after the war, and would allow Italy the greatest influence over determining the post-war fate of Austria, then he would declare war on Germany and the USSR, opening up a new front in the Balkans and divert German attention away from the Western Front.
Churchill and Daladier debated the offer for several hours, as it remained unclear whether the Italian Army would perform as poorly as it did in World War I (where troops had needed to be diverted away from the Western Front). Furthermore, the two leaders were concerned about how the deal would be received in Yugoslavia, which had also fought with the Allies and was continuing to maintain an anti-German resistance campaign. After much consideration, Churchill informed Mussolini that he was willing to agree to the terms, lifting sanctions on Italian trade on October 16th. After the war, Churchill justified the decision by explaining that “if a man’s house has burned down, and a carpenter offers to help you rebuild it provided you return his hammer that you borrowed last year, you don’t want to spend the next year wishing you had a carpenter helping you”, and that Italy’s claimed lands in Yugoslavia were both small in size and far from the Chetnik resistance strongholds in Serbia.
Opening the Southern Front, November 1942
Italy’s declaration of war on October 17th exposed Germany’s long southern flank to Allied invasion. Although Hitler had ordered the construction of defences along the Alpine border with Italy (especially the routes that led to what had once been Austria), this border was still undermanned. The German Army Group D, under Ferdinand Schorner’s command since Kleist returned to Berlin in early 1942, was overstretched in managing occupied Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey, which involved a fierce battle with the Chetniks and other resistance groups.
The Italian offensive into Yugoslavia began an hour after the declaration of war, although word had not reached Schorner’s headquarters when Graziani’s troops crossed the border. Conducted by two forces, one based in Trieste and the other in Albania, the Italian plan was to take advantage of German confusion and occupy as much of Yugoslavia as possible before the Germans could form an adequate defence. The Italians also hoped to link up with the Chetniks in Serbia and help the resistance movements restore the Yugoslav government. In addition, Mussolini hoped to secure air bases within range of the Ploesti oilfields, which would allow the other Allies to begin bombing this vital Axis resource.
The Italian troops performed well, with a powerful motorised column seizing Ljubljana on the first day and Zagreb by the fourth, cutting the best German road and rail links between Germany and Belgrade. In the south, the naval base at Dubrovnik was taken undamaged while Bulgarian forces put up a stiff resistance in Skopje. When the city was taken, the entire southern third of Yugoslavia was open to liberation.
Hitler meanwhile wasted no time in sending reinforcements to Schorner, and the Hungarians resolved to defend their part of Yugoslavia. A combination of difficult terrain and increasing Axis resistance slowed Graziani’s offensive down, although in many parts of the front the Italians still found success, most notably the liberation of Sarajevo on November 10th. Budapest became the second Axis capital to be bombed from the air, and when heavy autumn rains finally brought the offensive to a halt, Italian soldiers occupied the western half of Yugoslavia, and the Chetniks fought viciously to reclaim the east.
Operation Mountain Lion, December 1942
Chuikov’s 19th Army, based in eastern Iran, was never going to be able to make a serious invasion attempt into India. At the end of a supply line stretching over 1000km from Baku, there was no way to keep the army both in supply and large enough to defeat the British Indian Army, which numbered more than two million. Chuikov’s priority since taking Bandar-e-Abbas in November 1941 had simply been to make the British believe he was planning to invade India, and otherwise keep control of the Iranian oilfields.
The Indians however, had no interest in being under communist rule (even if this meant delaying independence from the British), and had waited the hot summer out so that they could finally push the Soviets away from their borders. New armies had been raised and plans developed, and in late 1942 the Indians were ready for battle.
The Indian supply line would be no easier to manage than the Soviet one was. The Indian lines beginning in Karachi were almost as far from Bandar-e-Abbas as Baku, and travelled through the same arid terrain that the Soviet lines did. The new 7th Indian Army could roughly match Chuikov’s strength, but parity would not be enough to guarantee victory.
Instead, the Indians decided that an amphibious landing on the south Iranian coast (and launched from Arabia) could divert Chuikov’s attention, forcing him to pull some of his forces back, while the 7th Indian defeated what he left behind. Churchill expressed his reservations about the plan, comparing it to his failed Gallipoli campaign in 1915, but General Wavell gave his support after intelligence discovered that the Soviet defences in Ganaveh, Bushehr and other planned landing sites were much weaker than expected.
‘Operation Mountain Lion’ began on December 8th with the landing of four Indian divisions in southwestern Iran. Soviet forces in the area were quickly defeated, retreating into the interior of Iran and destroying the oilfields as they passed (some of the fields were not operational again until as late as 1951). Bandar-e-Abbas itself was stormed in another naval landing on the 11th, while the 7th Indian Army began attacking from the east, forcing Chuikov to retreat towards Kerman, and then Esfahan as the Soviet position unravelled. Stalin was angry and considered sending Chuikov to the gulag, and only his tremendous victory against the Indians a year earlier kept him out of Siberia.
- BNC