Well, I guess we're back to normal operating order. Probably going to do an update on Pakistan - and then go back to talking about stuff going down in the USSR and the Mediterranean War.
Deal with the Devil
Menachem Begin was faced with an interesting dilemma. The Syrian invasion dealt a death blow to British hopes in Egypt, as Israeli troops were hastily withdrawn to desperately defend the small Jewish state. And survival was no great reward: now the state of Israel was flooded with Jewish refugees from Northern Israel, which had lost almost half of its Jewish population to massacres and expulsions by the victorious Syrians. Israel seemed irrevocably wounded - and with the Kingdom of Egypt, not friendly towards Israel but not also dedicated to destroying it, widely expected to fall to a far more radical anti-Western movement, the future of the small Jewish state seemed very precarious. But the same issue that Menachem Begin took advantage of to save Israel - the Sino-Syrian split, seemed to be tearing apart the entire Eastern bloc. The Syro-Israeli War lasted roughly between May of 1960 to the end of the Battle of Haifa in February of 1961, more than two years before the August Days, two years of great peril for Israel.
The year and a half after the end of the Syro-Israeli War was a time of political triumph for Begin, who was hailed as Israel's savior and enjoyed sky-high approval ratings, especially because the general public was not aware of what he had done to get the Syrians off their backs, allowing him to institute radical free market reforms in Israel. In addition, Begin in fact had correctly guessed that the Syrians desired Israeli military technology and prepare for a strike against Jordan, something he was more or less fine with it, since he figured it was better them than Israel. Furthermore, he believed that the Syrians didn't actually have the capability to seriously defeat the British Army, one of the most technologically advanced and well-trained armies in the world, having proved its prowess in both the Second World War and the Three Years War. Begin was much less impressed by the Syrian Army, as he generally believed that the Syrian Army was both smaller and less competent. In fact, he feared the People's Volunteer Army from North China far more the Syrians, because they had almost managed to overrun Haifa even without Syrian support. Although the loss of Northern Israel was a catastrophe for Israel, the fact that a tiny Israeli army outnumbered in armor 15-1 by the Syrians (and closer to 3-1 in infantry numbers) managed to hold out for so long generally led Begin to believe that the Syrians were simply not a threat to Israel given Israel's rapid militarization after the Syro-Israeli War - let alone the mighty British Empire. If the Syrians smashed into Britain, he assumed this would prove to be a costly and bloody mistake for the Syrians, removing yet another threat to Israel and allowing Israel to concentrate on the growing threat to the southwest (the expected regime change in Egypt). Furthermore, the Syrians were fighting in a second front. As a result, the decision was made personally by Begin for the Mossad to openly aid Syrian intelligence services in supplying fake information to the British, obscuring the fact that the Syrians were preparing for a massive assault on the British-backed Arab Federation.
After the end of the Syro-Israeli War, the Syrians had thrown their army immediately supporting the Iraqi Nationalists under Fuad al-Rikabi. Most of the weapons transferred to the Syrians were mechanized, armored, and aircraft technology, including long-range missiles, which didn't seem particularly helpful in the actual war in Iraq, which was largely waged between infantry militias in close urban areas. Moreover, the Nationalists had attracted the ire of more or less every other faction in Iraq, including the British-backed Royalists and the American-backed Islamists, who more or less had an informal understanding that they would focus on the Syrian-backed Nationalists first. The North Chinese, stung by the defeat in Haifa, more or less just adopted an entirely defensive posture in Judeopalestine and Iraqi Kurdistan, refusing to help any of the other factions, including Syrian-backed Nationalists, in an ironic echo of how the Syrians refused to back the PLA in the Battle of Haifa. Syrian intervention in Iraq played a major role in shifting the war - the Islamists, Nationalists, and Royalists had all expended significant manpower and materials expelling the Communists and the North Chinese from Baghdad - who had conveniently left behind most of their heavy equipment in their frenzied retreat to Kurdistan. The Nationalists ended up seizing most of those weapons because almost half of the ethnic Arab officers from the Communists defected to the Nationalists in the aftermath of the "Second Mongol Sack of Baghdad", bringing with them access to where such materials were stored. The Nationalists had already gained a huge advantage in weaponry before the Syrians explicitly entered the war - the Syrian entrance turned the advantage overwhelming.
President Kennedy began to see the intervention, which he had inherited from his predecessor, as rather problematic - and began to quietly plot for an exit strategy. The American CIA cleverly guessed that upon a Nationalist victory, pro-Islamist refugees would flood into nearby Kuwait, giving the Islamists sufficient public support to seize control of Kuwait. Welding together Kuwait, Al-Hasa, and Qatif would give America nearly direct control of most of the Middle East's oil resources outside of Iran. The large Shia population of Bahrain was also seen as an asset. President Kennedy was increasingly infuriated at the refusal of Western European nations to decolonize, something he believed would lead to the rise of Communist anti-colonial leaders. He believed that covertly seizing control of most of Great Britain's oil resources would allow the United States to impose its political will on Western Europe, forcing them to relinquish control of their colonies to indigenous anti-Communist leaders. The French cooperating with the Soviet Union to preserve their colonies in Algeria was the final straw in the political coffin of the American Europhiles, causing them to step up aid to the Islamists - but on the goal of seizing control of Kuwait and Bahrain upon defeat in Iraq. In contrast, the British also stepped up their aid to Jordan, the main sponsor of the Royalists, hoping to still win the war. The Royal Jordanian Army became one of the best equipped armies in the Middle East, essentially on par with the Syrians.
In conjunction with the failure to conquer Haifa and the flight from Baghdad, the leadership of the PRC began to universally regard their Middle Eastern foray as a costly disaster (considering the loss of thousands of lives, tanks, and airplanes), but blamed the failure primarily on "ideologically suspect allies", which was not wrong considering the breakdown in relations with Syria. North Chinese military aid to the rebels in Egypt - but were targeted with the explicit purpose of strengthening Egyptian leftists vis-a-vis the Muslim Brotherhood in the aftermath of a revolution they also anticipated would be successful. It seemed in the early 1960's, every nation thought the Kingdom of Egypt was doomed (including its own leaders, who slowly transferred their assets and extended family abroad) except the United Kingdom itself. PVA commanders were ordered to not "escalate" the wars in Iraq and Israel, essentially entrenching themselves in Judeopalestine and Northern Iraq. Amusingly, as a result of the North Chinese and Iraqi Communist retreat into Kurdistan, Kurds politically dominated three political entities - the Iraqi Republic, the Federal People's Republic of Turkey, and the Republic of Mahabad (a Soviet puppet state from 1946-1956, when it was once again placed under Iranian control as an autonomous region during the Soviet-Iranian detente) - none of them with the Kurds directly referenced. The Iranian Kurds generally didn't hold much in common with the other two - though there were efforts to ensure Kurdish unity by creating a "People's Federation of Turkey-Iraq", but this was seen as implausible in light of tensions between the USSR and North China.
In addition, Begin understood that the existence of Judeopalestine in the North was essentially a buffer between Israel and Syria - the Syrians had gotten surprisingly little from the whole affair besides domestic mass support. In a sense, from a pure realpolitik perspective, this actually made the two of them natural allies. Tlass was nowhere as Marxist-leaning as his predecessor - and although willing to pay lip service to "scientific socialism", didn't really see any need to align himself with any form of Communism. Relations with the USSR were driven merely by a realpolitik trade - the Syrians received military equipment from Beria in exchange for giving the Soviets naval access to the Mediterranean.
Begin's solution to the mass influx of refugees from the North...was to settle them in the Sinai Peninsula, as the Israelis continued to fortify the Suez Canal, having abandoned the rest of Egypt for the British and Royalist Egyptians to take care of. In many ways, the Israeli presence in Egypt was just not helpful in any way whatsoever - the mere fact that the Royalist Egyptians were seen as being aided by the hated Israelis torpedoed their public support. The Israelis, aided generously by the Kennedy Administration, quickly resupplied their army with the help of Americans and French. In particular, very warm trade relations were forged between the Israelis and both the Indians and South Chinese, partly in reaction to the increasing omnipresence of the Pakistani Interservices Agency (ISI) in the Middle East. In fact, the massive intelligence triumph of Syria (who did not have a sophisticated intelligence agency) against the British (who had an incredibly sophisticated intelligence agency) was heavily due to the fact that both the Mossad and ISI, typically at odds, actually covertly cooperated to mislead the British. The Asian trade turned Eilat, a port city alongside the Red Sea, into one of the most important ports for the Israeli economy, causing Israel to invest significant resources in developing a naval presence in the Red Sea. As a reuslt, many such refugees sent to the Sinai Peninsula would settle on the Southern Coast, setting up small businesses to export goods to India and South China. The desire to hold the Sinai led the Israelis to building one of the most heavily fortified borders in the war, hoping to also seize the Suez upon any collapse of the Kingdom of Egypt.