The Forge of Weyland

DeGaulle's report
  • DeGaulle's Report on the British Army 1938 Summer Exercise

    Colonel DeGaulle considered his words carefully before starting on his report on the British Army summer exercises he'd returned from. While he had found fault with some of the ideas and actions he'd witnessed, there were some aspects that would be worth looking at more deeply.

    First, the men. The British Armoured formation was obviously professional, only to be expected of long term soldiers, and knew their jobs well. There had been issues with some of the vehicles, but his liaison had explained that they were using the exercise to have a first look at some of their new equipment, and in some cases training had been rushed to get them on the field. He could understand that - the politicians in France as well were less than forthcoming for the money needed for vital exercises, and maximising the lessons learnt was only prudent.

    The tactics used he had found interesting, although by no means perfect.

    The first was their aim to if possible bypass the enemy to strike at his rear and B-echelon troops. While he agreed with that as an efficient way of defeating the enemy, he was less than convinced about the way they went about it. Their first aim was to outflank. If that failed, to exploit a weak point found by their reconnaissance troops, and as a last result to punch a hold to drive their exploitation force through. While such tactics might well be effective against lesser opposition, such as the Italian forces they faced in North Africa, he considered it far less likely to work against the Germans. Leaving your flanks unguarded, or weak points, was an amateur mistake the German Army was not going to make. A German force would have to be attacked first. This was why the French Army had the Char B, a tank designed to break through a defence. He was unconvinced that the British heavy tanks were capable of this. While faster and more mobile than the Char B, they didn't mount the powerful gun it carried to reduce fortifications. It would do the job they intended, to support an infantry attack, but this would be of limited use against a well prepared enemy. It didn't help that he considered their artillery support too light by French standards. He felt that their methods and equipment would lead to too many casualties unless luck was on their side.

    The second part of the exercises he had seen was more interesting. The forces had been used first to counter-attack an infantry breakthrough, then in defence to fortify the infantry against a more powerful force. He could see both tactics being useful if France was attacked by Germany. The use of a powerful tank force to 'plug the gap' or ideally destroy a breakthrough was suited to the fast moving armoured formation. The use of tanks to reinforce was again only good tactics, and the French Army already had such plans.

    The issue he had was with their equipment. They had good, fast heavy tanks, but only in small numbers. They had nothing like the supply of smaller infantry support tanks the French had, and he wasn't convinced that they could handle such a defence. Their medium, Cruiser, tanks were good, on a par with the S-35. A rather different design philosophy, but overall similar machines - reasonably fast, well protected and with a good gun. He noted that the British were still using the idea of the 5-man crew. The number of men such crews used was presumably of less importance in a relatively small tank force than the French one. He did appreciate the idea - allowing the commander freedom to command was certainly of benefit, although three men in the turret seemed too many. A four man crew was probably the best compromise, and he made a note to ask if they were still looking at the idea of a new model of S-35 that incorporated this concept.

    He had noted that the British tanks seemed reliable. Obviously exercises were not quite normal conditions, every tank unit made sure all their vehicles were as ready as possible beforehand, something not always possible in a real war, but they hadn't had many breakdowns. What he had seen that he wanted to recommend was the way they allocated recovery vehicles to assist or withdraw broken down (or marked as damaged by the umpires) tanks for repair either behind the front lines, or taken by transported to the base workshop area. That would certainly reduce tanks lost to mechanical failures, and perhaps more should be done along these lines. It was notable that certain breakdowns, like a broken track, were repaired much faster than on most French tanks.

    The infantry carriers he had found interesting. They were used mainly to carry troops, rather than supplies, a reversal of their use in the French Army. They had seemed rugged vehicles, although he felt the lack of things like a specialised vehicle for refuelling the tanks was a serious omission.

    In all, he supposed he could sum up his report as interesting, some promising ideas and vehicles, but the need more work and better tactics. One of the more senior British officers had mentioned to him, in the mess after the exercise, that it was a pity they couldn't arrange some sort of exercise with the French armour, such a thing would likely be of benefit to both countries. He decided to see if someone higher up would consider the idea. While he felt that the British would get the most benefit from French experience, they had shown a few promising ideas, and an enemy with different equipment and ideas was a better opponent than your own men.
     
    RTC exercise report 1938
  • RTC report on the 1938 Summer Exercises

    We are pleased with the results of the exercises overall, although they did show there were areas that still need considerable work. With all the new equipment having its first use, this was expected, but it has helped pinpoint the areas that are in need of most improvement.

    The faster and more powerful tanks proved effective in the breakthrough exercise. The extra speed and reliability, and the thicker armour (resulting in fewer losses to the AT guns) had made exploiting a weak point the Cavalry had located a lot easier. Not without losses, but a far more acceptable rate of loss. The light armoured cars had proved to be very effective; the light tanks had worked well, although the small number of the new Daimler heavy armoured car had actually worked better. This had been a surprise - they had thought that the light tank would be more useful over rough ground, but except for a couple of areas with very poor conditions the lack of tracks hadn't been a problem, and their speed was most useful. The officer commanding them had pointed out that they had avoided the really bad conditions, but the feeling was that in Western Europe doing this in a real battle wouldn't be an issue. We still need a way to handle mines better, while we didn't have any tanks killed by them, the umpires adjudicated we had a number immobilised.

    The mobility of the new infantry tank had also been a surprise. The speed of attack had not been anticipated by the infantry, and their heavy armour had helped them take little damage. The infantry had complained they needed more heavy AT guns and mines if such beasts were to be let loose on them! They had also been upset at the losses the Umpires had determined due to the HE guns on the tanks.

    The new Birch guns had worked very well. While new, the crews were familiar with the guns, and only one of the rather inexperienced drivers had got his gun stuck badly enough to need serious assistance. They'd had a few other problems, but properly trained crews should take care of them.

    The carriers had also proved a success. While not dissimilar in mobility to the old dragons, the crews had found the rear doors a big improvement, must faster and easier to use. Again they'd had a few more issues than expected, the crews weren't familiar with them yet, but this could be fixed with more training time.

    The improved speed and protection had also worked well in the counterattack. One advantage had been the use of radio by the carriers. It was too expensive to fit them all with radios, but they were operating in groups of fours, three infantry squads plus the command, and the command vehicle had a radio. So coordinating the infantry support had been much faster and easier. It had also shown they needed a lot more practice in netting, as well as speeding the process up. While radios weren't cheap, the suggestion was that they fitted one in four vehicles for the Armoured Infantry Brigade. It might be of less use to pure infantry units, that would have to be looked at.

    One point we would like to raise is that we currently have no good anti-tank or anti-personel mines in service. The infantry have used mock-up mines to considerable effect against us, and surely they would have equal efficiency against an enemy force. We suggest this lack be looked into, and also ways of us neutralising them, or at least minimising their effect.



    All in all, they were very happy with the results. Not only had they clearly won, despite the infantry being well-organised and equipped with ant-tank weapons, it had showed up a lot of faults. None of these were insurmountable, and they expected to have all these fixed up in time. The suggestion was that they incorporate the necessary fixes and modification in the next batch of tanks - apparently Vickers had offered to increase the armour, as well as fitting the new Wireless Set No 9 which was just finishing development, to make a Mark 2. More armour was always considered a Good Thing by tankers.

    General Brooke had spent some time with the French observers, his excellent French making this productive. He'd made some notes on the French armoured expert, a colonel DeGaulle - "personally arrogant and supercilious, tends to consider French tactics always the best, but he certainly knows his stuff. Have suggested to him some sort of joint exercises would be useful to both parties if these could be arranged."
     
    sudetan crisis
  • Kick
    August 1938, The Sudenten Crisis

    In August, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain sent Lord Runciman on a Mission to Czechoslovakia in order to see if he could obtain a settlement between the Czechoslovak government and the Germans in the Sudetenland. Lord Runciman's first day included meetings with President Beneš and Prime Minister Milan Hodža as well as a direct meeting with the Sudeten Germans from Henlein's SdP. On the next day he met with Dr and Mme Beneš and later met non-Nazi Germans in his hotel

    A full account of his report—including summaries of the conclusions of his meetings with the various parties—which he made in person to the Cabinet on his return to Britain expressed sadness that he could not bring about agreement with the various parties, but he agreed with Lord Halifax that the time gained was important. He reported on the situation of the Sudeten Germans, and he gave details of four plans which had been proposed to deal with the crisis, each of which had points which, he reported, made it unacceptable to the other parties to the negotiations.

    The four were: Transfer of the Sudetenland to the Reich; hold a plebiscite on the transfer of the Sudetenland to the Reich, organize a Four Power Conference on the matter or create a federal Czechoslovakia. At the meeting, he said that he was very reluctant to offer his own solution; he had not seen this as his task. The most that he said was that the great centres of opposition were in Eger and Asch, in the north-western corner of Bohemia, which contained about 800,000 Germans and very few others.

    He did say that the transfer of these areas to Germany would almost certainly be a good thing; he added that the Czechoslovak army would certainly oppose this very strongly, and that Beneš had said that they would fight rather than accept it.

    ********************


    Neville Chamberlain met Adolf Hitler in Berchtesgaden on 15 September and agreed to the seccession of the Sudetenland; three days later, French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier did the same. No Czechoslovak representative was invited to these discussions. Germany was now able to walk into the Sudetenland without firing a shot.

    Chamberlain met Hitler again, in Godesberg on 22 September, to confirm the agreements. Hitler, aiming to use the crisis as a pretext for war, now demanded not only the annexation of the Sudetenland but the immediate military occupation of the territories, giving the Czechoslovak army no time to adapt their defence measures to the new borders. This was a shock to Chamberlain, who had Czech agreement to his initial proposals. On 24th September it was accepted that the talks between Chamberlain and Hitler had broken down.

    Hitler in a speech at the Sportpalast in Berlin claimed that the Sudetenland was "the last territorial demand I have to make in Europe" and gave Czechoslovakia a deadline of 28 September at 2:00 p.m. to cede the Sudetenland to Germany or face war. His new demands were the immediate cession of all the territories (with scarcely any considerable exception) where there are Sudeten Germans. There is no longer any question of only such districts where they make up more than 50 per cent. Districts where they are in conspicuous minorities or even where there are no Sudeten Germans at all are included.

    This 'solution' was immediately rejected by the Czechs. In Britain, the news at home is dominated by the mass distribution of gas masks and the digging of trenches in parks.

    On the 27th September Hitler made another speech in Berlin, repeating his earlier demands. Czechoslovakia has until 1 October to cede the Sudetenland to Germany, otherwise he threatens to take it forcibly. But at least he promises that this is his last territorial claim in Europe.

    Women and children have been evacuating Paris for Brittany and Normandy. Extra trains have been laid on, and authorities believe that the population of the inner city can be brought down from 3 million to only 500,000. Cities closer to the German frontier are already nearly empty of civilians

    In Britain, RAF personnel have been recalled from leave. The men of the fighter squadrons and barrage balloon units of the Auxiliary Air Force have been called up, as have those in the Observer Corps and the anti-aircraft units of the Territorial Army. The air-raid warning system has been activated. All 'Purely as a precautionary measure'.

    On the 28th September the German ultimatum for the Czech withdrawal from the Sudetenland by 1 October remains. But there is a report of a new deadline: the ultimatum must be accepted by 2pm today, or else Germany will mobilise its armed forces. Hungary has already begun mobilising, and the Royal Navy was being given its mobilisation orders this morning.

    To achieve a solution, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini suggested a conference of the major powers in Munich. At the same time, Chamberlain was nearing the end of a long and important speech to the House of Commons, giving an account of his actions and the Government's policy during the crisis. Germany was due to mobilise its forces today at 2pm, but he had asked Mussolini to use his influence with Hitler to gain a delay of at least 24 hours so that another round of diplomacy could take place. But in the course of his speech, Chamberlain was informed, firstly that the request for a delay had been granted. Then he was handed a note which bore a message from Hitler inviting Chamberlain to meet with him, Mussolini and Daladier in Munich tomorrow morning

    On 29th September, Hitler, Daladier and Chamberlain met and agreed to Mussolini's proposal (actually prepared by Hermann Göring) and signed the Munich Agreement, accepting the immediate occupation of the Sudetenland. The Czechoslovak government, though not party to the talks, submitted to compulsion and promised to abide by the agreement on 30 September.

    On Monday 3rd October, German troops begin occupying Sudetenland. Polish forces occupy Teschen.

    This agreement was hailed in public in Britain as a success, delivering 'Peace in our time'. However this was not entirely convincing; Chamberlain, in a speech in Parliament on the 3rd, said that there can be no let-up in the pace of rearmament. In particular there is to be a 'big increase' in the RAF, especially for 'the defence of London'. Hoare, the Home Secretary, said in his speech that 'on the whole the machinery of A.R.P. had worked well', and it was mainly a matter of filling the gaps revealed by the crisis. Duff Cooper's resignation speech accused the Cabinet of being too timid to give a strong warning to Hitler, who he believed was more open to 'the language of the mailed fist' rather than Chamberlain's approach of 'sweet reasonableness'.

    The decision to carry on with re-armament would cause large changes in the organisation and equipment of the Army.



    {The first section is an edited version of a small part of the Wiki article on the Sudeten crisis, Sudetenland - Wikipedia.

    The second section is a compilation from a number of different sources, mainly some transcripts from British newspapers of the time, and some historical data; It's again a summation of the historical goings-on in the various countries, with some changes.
     
    Last edited:
    October 1938
  • October 1938, the changes to the Army and increases in supply

    The major change the Munich Crisis caused for the Army was the final abandonment of the idea of a small Army basically charged with defending the Empire. Not only did war with German now appear more or less certain, but there was also the possibility that France alone might not be able to prevent her territory from being overrun and the Channel ports from being occupied. This possibility the Chiefs of Staff were now bound to take into account, and in doing so to find that the German occupation of France would so endanger the safety of Britain as to justify recasting in favour of France the entire order of strategic priorities. What they did in fact was to extend to the defence of France Britain's defence priority number one, as defined in the current Cabinet directive, i.e. that the security of the United Kingdom was the 'cornerstone of Imperial defence policy'. For their part, the French were now looking at a far larger British commitment of land forces, to help compensate for the loss of the Czech divisions.

    The War Office proposed a series of increases, all of which were still limited by the concept of limited liability. However it was obvious that this policy was going to be revoked, the only real question being when this would officially happen. So a series of proposals was laid out, including concerns about industrial capacity for the Army, in preparation for a decision on the anticipated new requirements.

    The biggest problems were the production of artillery and armoured vehicles. Both needed specialised production facilities, and these needed a long time to be built and in operation. The artillery requirement was already being addressed - the shortage of AA guns being a particular issue, given how far it fell short of the authorised number, but the plans were going ahead.

    The question of armour and mechanisation was more complex. At the moment, they were looking at an Armoured Division plus at least an Armoured Brigade for Egypt as the minimum. This would require around 750 tanks plus associated vehicles and guns. While the negotiations with the Germans had been going on, a supplementary order for a further 100 A10* tanks had been placed. These would not be delivered until mid-1939 at best, and the current orders would only just cover the current requirements. While the training needs would be covered, the force would need more tanks as a war reserve. If they were going to maintain the number of tank formations, let alone increase them, more orders would have to be placed. However there wasn't much point in doing that unless they also increased the manufacturing capability, or the orders wouldn't arrive in time.

    The current orders (including tanks already delivered this year) was for 70 MkVID, 450 A10*, 140A11, 140A12 and 70A13. While the deliveries from Vickers and Harland and Wolf had been going as planned, and the A13's from the Nuffield group were arriving and should be available soon, there was worry about the delivery times from Vulcan. The A12 was needed by the infantry as their support tank, but as yet the best Vulcan could offer was tanks arriving in the middle of 1939. But the other factories were busy with the rest of the existing orders, without new capacity they couldn't supply more tanks to cover the late A12's. The manufacturing companies were consulted to see what could be done.

    The current capability for tanks and other heavy armoured vehicles was basically at four companies, with other firms engaged in supplying parts and components for assembly.

    Vickers had two main tank plants, Elswick and Chertsey. Both these had been modernised, and consideration had been given for future expansion. Currently the two plants were producing 15 tanks/month each (30/month total) a mix of A10* and A11 tanks, for a total of 360/year.

    Nuffield was currently producing 10 A13 tanks/month, a total of 120/year. They hadn't designed the plant for expansion.

    Harland & Wolff in Belfast had a new tank plant; built with help from Vickers, it had also been designed with expansion in mind. It was currently producing 15 A10*/month, but it was also capable of building the A11, 180 tanks/year.

    The combined production was 660/year. When Vulcan had got their production sorted, they were looking at building 10 A12 tanks a month, although their construction methods would make it easier to expand this using other heavy manufacturing companies such as railway suppliers.

    While a potential of nearly 800 tanks a year would have been seen as more than adequate a few years ago, the anticipated needs made then insufficient. The firms were asked what expansion could be done at the existing sites, and if new tank plants should also be considered. A number of different proposals were made, but after examining them and the current cost, the Army decided to ask for funds to expand certain factories.

    The Vickers factories had been reconstructed with the aim of making them specialised tank plants. There was sufficient room to allow expansion to around 25 tanks per month each, and both factories could be extended, which should raise their potential to 40. Adding to the workforce to do multi-shift working could increase this to about 70 tanks a month each. Vickers considered this the maximum efficient size, due to constraints outside the actual factory that limited the supply of parts and raw materials - even parts of tanks were heavy, and couldn't just be carried in by lorry. Vickers suggested they could always build another factory, but building and equipping it, as well as training the workforce, would take around 18 months. If this was to be done, a site in a different location would give more flexibility if their factories were bombed.

    Harland & Wolff had built their new tank plant under the guidance of Vickers, and they reported that it could be expanded in the same way as the two main Vickers plants, and with similar time constraints.

    Nuffield's situation was rather different. They had used an existing site for building the A13, and it couldn't be easily expanded. They had other sites that could be converted, or even built from scratch, but tooling and skilled workmen would probably be the limiting factor.

    Vulcan, using more traditional methods and rivetted castings could more easily subcontract building tanks to other heavy machinery works, and while the output would be a lot lower than the specialist tank works, ramping up production would be faster, although the companies existing work would have to be considered.

    Bearing in mind that they were still, officially, looking at a relatively small number of tanks, the Army decided on moderate action, that could hopefully be sped up later if necessary. Vickers were authorised to start getting the tools to expand their existing plants, and train workers. This would still take about 9 months. Extensions to both factories would be built, but no tooling agreed. If the need for tanks didn't expand as suspected, the factory could be used for other purposes. Building would take 12-15 months, although if necessary tooling and training could be started before it was complete. A similar expansion would be funded for Harland & Wolff. All this was basically similar to the RAF's shadow factory scheme.

    Nuffield would look at turning another existing site to tank production. Tooling and training the workforce would be the slowest part, but they estimated they could double their production in about 9 months, and the process could be repeated if more tanks were needed. Since Vulcan were still having serious issues meeting their existing order, no expansion was planned at present.

    If these measure went ahead, by the start of 1940 industry should be able to supply around 1600 tanks per year.

    The second problem was that the tanks needed specialised engines. Vickers had built a factory in Scotland to make the kestrel, but this was only intended to produce 500 engines a year. Provision had been made to expand this, and they estimated production could be doubled in about 9 months. Further expansion could double this, but would take another year. Given the vulnerability of a single engine plant, it was suggested to build a second. Vickers had been talking to Rover, who were very interested. A plant similar in size to their Scottish one could be producing 1,000 engines a year by the end of 1939, which would supply enough engines for the available tank production plus allowances for spares. Addition capacity could be added, it was easier as engine works didn't require the heavy machinery and capability to deal with heavy tanks.

    The final parts were not precisely tank manufacture, but were specialise parts needed. Mainly these were the guns, radios and optics, that couldn't just be built by motor or engineering factories. Expansion of the existing suppliers to match the tank output was recommended. It was also pointed out that this many tanks would exceed the available armour plate production. New plant took time, and even started now it would be 18 months before starting to produce. Armour plate would have to be sourced from abroad as a temporary solution. This wasn't easy, but supplies were available in Austria and Czechoslovakia. The irony - and potential problem - of using these sources wasn't lost on anyone, but the need had to be filled.
     
    French tank industry
  • The French tank industry talks and the S-40 design

    Some of the French tank builders had been talking to British industry for some time about the possibility of licensing some of their technology for their new tank designs. Due to the issues of the way British tanks were built, they weren't looking at a British design - only the Vulcan A12 was being made in a way similar to French tanks - but more at certain components which would be used in their program of improving existing models.

    Of particular interest was the suspension systems; these had proved to be poor and unreliable on French tanks. Some of the other features were of interest, but the French felt that most of their tank improvements would be a better version of their existing solutions. The biggest point of controversy was the turret size; the British insisted that a 3-man turret was the best solution, although a 2-man plus some loading assistance was acceptable if the turret couldn't be made large enough, while the French preferred the one man turret as it allowed thicker armour.

    While much of these discussion would carry on well into the future - the complex interaction of the French manufacturers with their government made this rather inevitable - some more constructive talks had come to maturity with the SOMUA company.

    For some time, they had been looking at improving their S-35 tank. While seen as a very good tank, the French Army had a number of issues with it. First was the lack of a hatch on the cupola, which forced the commander to fight 'buttoned up'. The one-man turret wasn't seen as such an issue. The second issue was the poor mechanical reliability. The suspension units were too weak and too complicated, demanding enormous maintenance efforts, especially since the cast armour modules did not allow an easy access to the suspension and engine. Repairing broken tracks in the field was well-nigh impossible. The company had been talking to Vickers and Nuffield about licensing their suspension design for some time, and an agreement was signed in September 1938. This would be the Nuffield VVSS version of the Horstman suspension, which had worked very well on their A13 tank. It was a simple design that would be relatively easy to implement on what SOMUA were starting to call the S-40. The design was also licensed to the AMX company for use in their proposed AMX-40 tank.

    SOMUA had also been designing an assault gun, based on the S-35 design. The SAu 40 carried a 75mm gun, and had an extra road wheel to improve off-road performance. It also used a rather wider hull. Based on the new suspension, and the SAu 40, the company had put forward a new version of the S-35 called the AC5 type. It would have a welded ARL 2C turret and redesigned cast superstructure, both to lower production costs and to improve protection standards. The new suspension should improve its performance and reliability. The greater weight of the tank would compensated for by lowering the hull height by fourteen centimetres, causing a weight gain of four hundred kilogrammes. In contrast, the engine deck was raised to fit an improved 230 hp engine, increasing maximum speed to 45 km/h. While the engine wouldn't be available for a year, the existing one would do for the first vehicles. The armament would remain the excellent 47 mm SA 35 gun, and the armour thickness would remain roughly the same. The use of a new welded turret would allow the same protection while giving more space. Using a new suspension would also allow some redesign of the cast armour sections to make maintenance easier. The new design would be presented to the French Army in October 1938, and if ordered they could start producing the tank around 9 months from an order being placed. It would however take time for the Army to evaluate the new design and decide to make an order.

    (these changes were suggested in the run-up to the war. The French were looking at British suspension systems, in the end in OTL they went for the Christie (not available in TTL) for the AMX40. The decision to do the changes is slightly advanced as the current British tanks are a little better than OTL, but as usual the French delivery dates are far too optimistic)
     
    October 1938
  • October 1938, An Anti-Aircraft Solution

    One of the points brought up during the summer exercise was the lack of mobile AA protection. While the tanks themselves were reasonably safe, the associated infantry and supporting arms were much more vulnerable, even though their protection had been improved. The obvious solution was to mount the divisions AA guns on a tracked vehicle to keep up with the tanks and infantry.

    This would be more expensive than just a towed AA gun, and after some consideration it was decided that only the forward elements and SP guns really needed this type of support, the rest of the division could be covered by towed units. This still left the issue of what guns were available.

    The 3" and 3.7" heavy AA guns were ruled out immediately - too big, too heavy. The 40mm bofors was being produced under license, but it was relatively heavy, especially with the Kerrison predictor considered essential for good targetting. While this would serve the HQ and more static elements, something lighter would be needed, unless they wanted to mount it on an A10 chassis, which would make it considerably more expensive. In any case, what they were looking at was something to stop a ground-attack aircraft, not a high altitude bomber.

    The next stage was to consult with the RAF, who were known to be studying the best weapon to use in their fighters. They replied that they had looked at three solutions, the 0.303 machine gun, the 0.5" machine gun, and the 20mm cannon. Of these, the cannon was considered to be the best solution. While they had been mainly looking at how to shoot down a bomber, they suggested the same solution would apply to the army, on the basis that aircraft like the Stuka or other ground-attack planes would be armoured, and so be difficult to shoot down with rifle calibre ammunition. The 0.5" gun was a more viable solution for the army that in a fighter, where the weight had been an issue - this wouldn't be such a problem on the ground. They pointed out that the 20mm cannon they were considering might not be the best option for the Army - it was a lightweight version, and they suggested that the rate of fire might actually be rather high. Their experts needed it for a highly trained pilot who had been lining up his target; it might not be as good a solution for army gunners.

    The next people to talk to were the navy. They were using the 0.5" Vickers machine gun as an AA gun on their ships, and had been evaluating the Swill 20mm Oerlikon. The Admiralty had been looking at the 20mm since 1937, but had rejected the 1934 model. However they had told Oerlikon at the time that if they could raise the muzzle velocity and demonstrate that the weapon could be used and maintained by non-specialist personnel, such as fishermen and merchant seamen, then it would be acceptable. While Oerlikon were in the process of making such modifications, these requirements were not such a concern to the Army. Any guns would be operated and maintained by trained gunners, so the 1934 model would be acceptable. A higher MV would be nice, but that would be much easier to change.

    It was therefore decided that the Army would authorise a license for the gun, to be built by Vickers. This would make it much easier if the RN authorised the modified gun later, as Vickers already produced the AA guns for the Navy. The first guns would be ready in the autumn of 1939. In the meantime, they would purchase 100 guns direct from Switzerland for trials and to equip the initial units. The quad 0.5" Vickers gun in service with the RN was also considered, but the cannon delivered around twice the weight of fire, and they expected the time available to shoot would be less than that encountered at sea due to visibility issue, so that was a significant factor. Vickers was confident they could build a suitable twin mounting for fitting to a vehicle; they had already looked at some possible solutions for ships.

    The final decision was what vehicle to use. While a purpose-built solution would of course have been ideal, the limited number they intended to build and the increased maintenance issues of a new chassis meant modifying an existing vehicle was the better solution. The three available were the MkVI tank, the Lloyd carrier, and the A10/Birch gun. The A10 chassis, while certainly the largest and most capable, was thought to be too expensive for 2 20mm guns. The MkVI was considered a little small, as while the twin guns wouldn't be too heavy, they did require space for the crew. The decision was for a modified carrier. Vickers estimated the gun and mount would weigh about 1600 pounds, plus things like ammunition drums. They would use the open-top carrier as the basis, with a lower side and rear to allow the gun to traverse more easily. The front crew compartment would be extended to allow four men. This would be the gun crew, with one of the crew doubling up as the driver. This gave space for the mount, and in fact the weight would be less that the infantry carrier.

    The conversion was seen as easy, and Vickers could provide some for evaluation in six months, which was seen as likely to be when they'd get the first shipment. Oerlikon would be asked to provide a couple of guns immediately for the prototype.
     
    Battle of Lulworth Cove
  • October 1938, The Battle of Lulworth Cove.

    The staff at Lulworth Cove were used to tankies turning up to shoot things, after all that was what they were there for. This time they were going to have tanks actually shooting at each other, which was a first for them.

    It had all started back in June, when there had been a slightly unofficial shoot-off between the Czech LT-35 and an A10*. The intention had been to show that using the gunner as the elevation control was a better method, as it allowed firing on the move. The results had been embarrassing - the Czech method of mechanical elevation control seemed to work better, they'd won the contest at all ranges over 500 yards, and even then the A10 crew had had to be careful not to go too fast. Given the senior tank officers who were extremely keen on the idea of firing on the move like this, the result hadn't been promulgated too widely.

    This had become more interesting after the annual exercises in the summer. For the first time the new A11 tank had been involved, and due to the size of its gun Vickers had provided it with a mechanical elevation control. Earlier in the year, when they did the first shooting trials, this had worked well, although the tanks had to stop and fire. As these were heavily armoured infantry tanks, this hadn't seemed like too harsh a restriction. The problem had been that after the exercise the A11 crews had complained that they were being unfairly 'marked down' on accuracy against the A10 crews. A certain amount of bad feeling and suggestions of bias had resulted.

    Given the situation, one senior officer had mentioned that it was a pity they couldn't let the two types compete 'for real', as that would show the real advantage of firing on the move. The problem was, of course, that you couldn't have two tank crews actually firing at each other. That problem itself had suggested a thought to one of the junior officers at Lulworth. What if you could arrange such a contest in a safe way? Obviously you couldn't use the main tank guns, but what about the machine guns? That would be safe, but those guns were hardly representative of the main gun. Still, maybe something could be bodged up? So he decided to have a word with a couple of the senior armourers. They thought on it, agreed it was a crazy idea, then asked him to come back later.

    A few days later, they had some interesting drawings, which after going through looked like they might actually work. What they had done is to first assume they'd removed the tank main gun. That was no huge problem, it was a standard maintenance practice. Then the replaced it. They'd started with a Boys rifle, then added some wood to make the resultant assembly the same size as the main gun. Some lead weights gave it a similar balance - not perfect, but close enough. They'd obviously need to do two different ones, but reckoned they could knock one up in a few days. Finally, since the Boys was, after all, an anti-tank gun, they'd suggested training ammo, just to be safe.

    The reaction of his senior officer was one of guarded interest, once he'd gone through all the safety issues. Of course, they'd have to make up the testing guns, and get a couple of tanks and crews down for a few days, but it would certainly settle a lot of arguments, and after all one of their jobs was to make their crews the best possible gunners. He authorised the armourers to make up a couple of test guns, while he got in contact with some more senior RTC officers.



    A week later, the tests commenced, despite much muttering among the range safety officers. The tank crews themselves weren't worried - they'd all volunteered, and had complete confidence that a Boys Rifle would do more then scratch the paintwork. They had agreed that the losing crew bought the beer, so as far as they were concerned everything was good to go. In theory, this was going to be observed and marked by the range staff. In practice, quite a few RTC officers, some quite senior, had 'happened to be around' and so thought they might as well watch.

    The competition was to start at 2,000 yards apart, and shooting could start at 1600 yards. The radio operator in each tank had a stopwatch, because the rifle was faster to reload than the gun, especially the 6/18 pdr, and rate of fire was part of the test. The infantry tack could shoot while stationary or moving, but the cruiser had to shoot on the move. The range staff had binoculars and telescopes to tell when a tank was hit. The results were not what the senior officers had been expecting.

    At long ranges (over 1,000 yards), shooting while stationary won easily. The A11 alternating between moving, then stopping suddenly to shoot, before jerking into motion again. The A10 crew admitted later they had real issues hitting on the move until they slowed down a lot, at which point the other tank had no more difficulty hitting them that while stationary.

    The A10 did do better at short ranges, but only under 500 yards, and not moving close to their maximum speed. It was a glum A10 crew that evening, who had to supply the A11 tankers with a considerable quantity of beer.

    When reported, there were a lot of surprised officers. Firing on the move, aimed by the gunner, had been practice for so long they couldn't understand how it wasn't working. In fact it was such a shock that two more days were spent on the exercise, leading to the same results. If anything the performance of the A11 improved.

    This would cause serious discussion over the next couple of weeks. Obviously the tanks needed to use the most accurate method of shooting. But firing on the move had seemed up till now to be such an advantage. So after two weeks of arguing in circles, someone decided to ask Vickers what they thought the best options were.

    Vickers (who'd unofficially heard of the results already) were quietly amused. They were already certain that balancing a gun on a man's shoulder was out of date, especially since they'd been looking at the size of guns needed to kill one of their own infantry tanks. However the Army had insisted, and while they'd slipped a mechanical system past them for the infantry tank, the opposition to the same method for the cruiser had been strongly resisted. So their solution had to take into account the still-strong insistence of firing on the move. Their solution was twofold. First, in the short term, the tanks should move to move-stop-fire-move. They already had a mechanical system to help in this, fitted to the A11, and this would be easy to add to new cruiser tanks. They saw no problem in building more units to be fitted to the existing tanks, in fact they could probably get this done by the base workshops as long as they provided the parts and some initial instruction.

    To solve the still-wanted firing on the move, they suggested another mechanical system which would automatically stabilise the gun (in the same sort of way the gunner did now). This would solve the problem of having to stop, and allow much bigger and heavier guns as well. They knew that at least one American company was working on the problem, and they had some ideas of their own. It would take a while to develop and test - they thought 18 months or so (in public - in private they thought it would take a lot longer), and then new tanks would have it fitted, and older tanks could probably be retrofitted if needed. This technical solution was seen as a lifeline by the fire on the move group, who while still unhappy could agree to live without it as a short-term tactic.

    There was considerable discussion as to why the fire on the move technique had suddenly proved so poor. No-one could quite tie it down, but the most accepted reason was that tanks were a lot better and faster now. The mechanical assist made stopping and firing quickly a lot easier, thus meaning they weren't a stationary target for a long time, the tanks could accelerate faster, and the much higher speeds made it much more difficult to hit while moving. While tanks had sped along at 6-7mph this hadn't been obvious, at 25mph it was proving a lot harder.

    Vickers agreed to modify all new tanks with the necessary equipment - as the turrets in their two tanks were a similar size, this was fairly easy. Nuffield would have to think more on the A13 design, it wasn't yet certain how difficult it would be to convert them, although it would be less of a problem to incorporate it into new models. The turret on the Vulcan would be another problem, but Vickers promised to help on both tanks once they had a modified design for the A10*.

    (while not using actual tank-on-tank action, a test of halt-fire-move and firing on the move apparently took place at Lulworth in the summer of 1939.The halt-fire-move won. Nothing changed immediately. Here I've had it happen earlier, with a test harder to rebut (ok, a little author fiat here), and much easier to change things as there is already the necessary mechanism available)
     
    Last edited:
    The Fairey Battle
  • November 1938, Ground Support Aircraft - the Fairey Battle and the Army

    During the Munich Crisis, the possibility of war seemed to be inevitable to the Air Ministry. This meant they had to seriously evaluate the effectiveness and survivability of their aircraft, and the Fairey Battle was a problem to them. Currently tasked as a strategic bomber, the ability of the single-engined plane to survive this mission was causing greater and greater concern. So much so that Ludlow-Hewitt stated that the risk of sending his Battles to bomb the Ruhr (their currently intended mission) was simply too great.

    Given this, his suggestion was to use them in France to support the French Army. The tactical role would be less dangerous, as they would not have to fly deep into enemy territory. The Air Staff were in favour of this, as it seemed better to use the battle for something than nothing, and it would show the French that they were being supported. It didn't mean they actually liked the idea; the job of bombers was to destroy the enemy's factories and infrastructure, not swan about the country supporting the Army, but they considered the Battle obsolete, and this seemed all it was good for.

    With this new role, a number of the problems the Battle had been fighting with could be avoided. Long range would no longer be a requirement, navigational, night flying and bomb aiming equipment could be removed, reducing the weight, and it was likely the third crew member could also be dispensed with.

    After the resolution of the Sudenten issue, the RAF started to have second thoughts. The Battle squadrons had not had to be sent to France after all, and so maybe it could still be used in its proper role. These thoughts might have gained ground, except for the intervention of the Army in the form of the CIGS, Lord Gort. As a man with a keen interest in aviation as well as the needs of the Army, he had been keeping an eye on the Air Ministry perambulations around trying to make all their bombers available for strategic bombing. After his conversation with Sir Richard Fairey last winter, he'd been looking at the battle in particular. While it wasn't perfect for the type of close air support the Army wanted, it seemed the best available. He'd also learned more from Sir Richard about how the RAF seemd to be trying everything NOT to have the Battle, and so thought that he would have a better chance of getting them for the Air Support his staff had been trying to get the RAF to commit to.

    He formally proposed that the Army needed dedicated Air Support - the annual exercises had shown that - and that as the current aircraft were being phased out, that the Battle would make a perfectly acceptable replacement. After all, if it was available to support the French Army, then surely it was available to support the British Army?

    This led to certain issues in the Air Ministry. On one hand, they were reluctant to let any aircraft go into what they saw as a useless role. On the other hand, it was difficult to refute the facts that they had indeed promised the Army support, that the Battle had been declared unwanted and obsolete, and that they had suggested offering them to support the French Army. They weren't sure just how, but Lord Gort seemed to have a very good idea of just what the RAF had been doing, and trying to do, to the Battle. They tried to suggest that in fact the Battle wasn't really a very good airplane for the Army's needs, but that got the rather obvious reply of 'then what is?' Other than trying to get out of their commitment to support the Army, the only way out seemed to be to allocate the battle to the Army's support needs.

    Once the agreement to allocate the current squadrons of Battle had been reached, Lord Gort felt free for his staff to officially talk to Fairey about what could be done with the plane. He was very well aware (unofficially, of course) that it really wasn't very suitable in it's current form, but that Sir Richard had ideas for modifying the plane so it would do the badly-needed job.

    The suggestions were to increase the performance of the aircraft while improving its protection. As the Air Ministry had suggested, equipment not needed for a tactical role could be removed, as could the third crewman - the pilot would navigate. This saved considerable weight, which would be used to provide self-sealing fuel tanks and some protective armour for the crew and the aircraft. The Battle had the capability of bombing at 80 degrees, but this meant some strengthening and adding air brakes. This could be done to new-build aircraft, and possible refitted to existing ones. They would acquire the French 'Semape' covering, which had been found to be very effective at plugging holes. All these modifications would add weight, but not as much as had been saved, and once the Army had agreed on the necessary range, fuel tankage could be removed, or at least not filled, reducing weight further, Finally Sir Richard had some other modifications in mind that had been intended to make the plane more acceptable in a strategic role; by changes to the radiator and exhaust systems, improved drag reduction and the use of the more powerful Merlin X, he thought he could get the speed even with bombs to over 300mph, and more once the bombs had gone. This would help the plane evade enemy fighters and be less likely to be hit by ground fire.

    The changes to maximum dive angle were fairly minor - the plane had originally been intended to be able to dive at 80 degrees - and would add a very useful ability. He also wanted to evaluate the use of light bombs, 20 or 40 pounds, in place of the 250lb bombs the RAF currently demanded. The larger bombs needed to be dropped from 1,000 feet for safety, and this left the aircraft very exposed to light AA. The RAF hadn't considered the light bombs practical, although similar bombs had been used in WW1. One further suggestion was to increase the forward firing armament, but this was postponed until it was seen how the other changes affected the performance. It was considered a necessity for ground attack, but it would be a compromise between weight and performance.

    The Army staff examined these proposals, and while some looked perhaps overambitious, agree to accept all o them as soon as they could be supplied.

    (the changes listed were all proposed by Fairey in an attempt to make the Battle more acceptable. Two types of change, one to make it a better bomber, the other a better close-support aircraft. None were gone ahead with except some of the armour - which was ordered, made, but not fitted. Self sealing tanks were specified, but the RAF gave the Battle such a low priority it wasn't fitted before the Battle of France)
     
    Upgrading the tanks
  • December 1938, Upgrading the Tanks

    With the likely increase in tank production in the near future, it was time to decide on how to improve the current tanks. Given the intelligence reports on the current German tanks, it wasn't thought that completely new models were needed yet, but a Mark2 version could include quite a few minor improvements.

    First for discussion was the Vickers A10*. Vickers had proposed before that they could increase the armour thickness with only a small effect on the speed. There were reports of Germany testing 5cm guns, which would give a performance as least as good as the HV3pdr, so the decision was agreed to increase the frontal armour to 50mm from 40mm, and the side/read from 30mm to 35mm, The latest version of the Kiwi engine would be fitted, giving 360hp, and Vickers thought the speed would still be around 20mph on rough ground and 29mph on the road, which was considered adequate. The weight would go up to 20 tons, which was very heavy for the Army's lighter bridging equipment, but this should be manageable with care. The biggest change was the gun mounting; after the Lulworth Cove tests, a version of the elevation mount from the A11 would be fitted. As this meant there would be more room in the turret, an additional 8 rounds could be carried. The radio would be the new Wireless Set No9 which was just about to go into production, a far superior set to the No7 currently fitted. The tank would also use the new high-strength tracks for better life. Finally a package of small changes and modifications suggested by the MEE and the RTC after using the tanks would be incorporated.

    Vickers also suggested they could do an upgrade to the existing tanks. Once they had the new elevation control in production, they could build additional ones for retrofitting; while not easy, they thought the base workshops could do the job, which avoided them having to use the factory. Some of the modifications could be done at the same time - they could see which ones were simple and supply the necessary components. The new tracks could be supplied, and once enough had been produced, the existing radio could be replaced by a No9. They suggested the existing No7's be supplied to the carrier platoons - it was less capable, but the carriers were less likely to need the longer range set. If required, they could also weld an extra plate on the glacis - to give the same protection as the 50mm on the new mark, it would need to be about 13mm thick. Adding extra armour to the side and rear would be a much harder job.

    The Army decided to go with the refitting with the exception of appliqué armour, which they didn't consider necessary yet. To avoid confusion, this would be the Mark 2, and the new build with thicker armour the Mark 3.

    Next was the Vickers A11. Given its weight and protection, the Army didn't feel the need to increase it yet, and they were worried about the engine power and suspension if the weight increased. The only changes required were the No9 radio set, and again a small package of modifications. Vickers again agreed that most of this could be applied to the existing tanks, but in view of the minimal changes, only the new tanks would be the Mark 2.

    The A13 design from Nuffield was a little more controversial. While it had very good speed, the armour protection wasn't as good as the A10*. There were also issues with the engine system. While it had performed acceptably on trials, now the training establishment was using them there were getting concerned about issues with reliability and cooling. Before a Mark2 model could be approved, they wanted this issue investigated fully. One possibility was the Kiwi engine, slightly more powerful than the Nuffield Liberty, it would allow more protection to be added while retaining the current speed. Nuffield were very much against changing the engine, but the real problem was that production of the Kiwi was barely enough to meet the needs of the A10/A11 tanks, and production wouldn't be ramped up for some time. Nuffield also suggested a new Meadows flat 12 engine that was just finishing development. This produced 300hp, and wouldn't have the supply issues of the Kiwi, but it would be a tight fit. Nuffield offered to design a new tank based closely on the A13; this would have 45mm frontal armour and 30mm side and rear, if the Meadows engine were to be used they could widen the tank to give the needed space in the engine compartment. If they were looking at tanks to be deployed to Europe, perhaps they could design it for the continental rail gauge rather than the British one, which would allow a wider tank. Like the A10*, it would come it at about 20tons, but this could be reduced by nearly a ton by using welding instead of the riveting on the A13. They estimated the speed at 18mph on rough ground and 28mph on the road, but were hopeful of improvements in power from the new engine. This tank could also have the new elevation gearing. With the different shape and size of the Vickers equipment, it wouldn't fit easily in the old turret, and it probably wouldn't be practical to try and refit it. While something could be done, it would require a resign of the control mechanism. The Army decided to consider this after attempts had been made to rectify the problems with the Liberty engine package; they needed more tanks, and if the engine could be improved, and some minor improvements added, they were considering a follow-on order for the A13 even if it didn't have the new elevation controls. The final issue was the range - the large petrol engine meant the tank was shorter-legged than the other tanks. Nuffield's engineers had been considering this issue. While there really wasn't more internal room for petrol, the Nuffield engineering team had designed an external drum tank; this would be used during transit and while not in combat, and it would double the tank's range.

    The final tank under construction was the A12 by Vulcan. As with the A11, the protection was considered adequate, it was even thicker than the A11. There were also issues with refitting elevation gearing, but Vulcan were confident a new turret would easily take this. As the purpose of the tank was infantry support, and it wasn't supposed to be fighting other tanks, no changes were proposed for the current model. Its production was already late, and the Army would rather have them than wait for an improved version. Once the tank was in proper production, they could look at a redesigned turret.

    Both Vulcan and Nuffield promised to provide updates once the immediate problems had been fixed with their tanks.

    The issue of new tanks, not considered urgent yet, was put to the firms for consideration, and they were each asked to produce a proposal for new tanks, either infantry, cruiser or both.
     
    British tank details
  • OK here's a data sheet on the current British tanks. Named after weapons, except the Matilda (as its basically the same tank, it would have been confusing to rename it).
    Two are basically very similar to OTL, the other 2 should have been straightforward to build. Ironically the two Vickers designs are very close to the Pz III(with the 5cm gun and thicker armour of Autumn 1940) and the Pz IV (with the thicker armour of late 1940), both of which could easily have been produced in 1939.

    British Tanks, comparison with OTL tanks


    Vickers A10* (Sabre) Mk3


    HV3pdr gun, 50mm frontal armour, 35mm sides. 360hp diesel engine, speed about 20mph/28mph(road). Modified 3-wheel 'slow motion' Horstman suspension. About 20 tons.

    In British terms its similar to the Crusader tank Crusader tank - Wikipedia. Its also similar to PzIII Ausf.H Panzer III - Wikipedia

    Vickers A11 - (Cutlass) Mk 2

    6/18pdr gun, 70mm frontal armour, 60mm sides, 360hp diesel engine, speed about 14mph/23mph(road). Horstman suspension.Weight about 25 tons

    No real OTL British equivalent, operationally is a faster Matilda with a bit less armour. The closest OTL tank is the PZ IV Ausf.F1 or Ausf.E Panzer IV - Wikipedia

    Vulcan A12 (Matilda) Mk 1

    HV3pdr gun, 78mm frontal armour, 70mm sides, 190hp (twinned engine), speed about 9mph/16mph(road). OTL suspension. Weight about 26 tons

    Basically this is the OTL Matilda II with a 3pdr gun. Matilda II - Wikipedia

    Nuffield A13 (Scimitar) Mk 2

    HV3pdr gun, 30mm frontal armour, 15mm sides, 320hp petrol engine (Liberty), speed about 24mph/30mph. VVSS Horstman suspension.

    Most similar OTL tank is the Cruiser Mk IV Cruiser Mk IV - Wikipedia the differences are the HV3pdr gun and the different suspension system. Has the same wonderful *cough* Nuffield Liberty engine. About 16 tons


    Guns.

    The HV3pdr is an enlarged 2pdr. Something similar to 4,7cm KPÚV vz. 38 - Wikipedia or 47 mm APX anti-tank gun - Wikipedia. As it can use the older 3pdr ammunition (at a lower MV), it does have an HE shell, even though it's not brilliant

    The 6/18pdr is based on a Vickers 6pdr naval gun, lightened a bit then 'throated out' to handle the 18pdr shell. It has an AT round, but this isnt as powerful as the 18pdr artillery one, but its still good by 1939 standards

    The Kiwi engine is a diesel based on the RR kestrel, a simplified version of one built for a racing car.

    The Sabre Mk3 comes in Autumn 1939 (the Mark 1 finishes production Summer 1939)

    The Cutlas Mk2 comes in Spring 1939

    The Matilda starts arriving in Summer 1939 (in small numbers, production issues as OTL)

    Scimitar Mk2 starts arriving in Spring 1939
     
    Future tanks 1
  • January 1939, Future Tanks, Engines and Guns (part 1)

    Vickers


    The request to look at possible new tanks didn't come as a surprise to Vickers. Now that the A10* and A11 were in full production, and the initial issues fixed, it was time to think about their replacements. After all it took 2-3 years to design and a tank and get it into production. To start with, they looked at the three limiting factors - the gun, the suspension, and the engine. These would determine what transmission and other supplemental equipment was needed, and how much armour could be carried, assuming the Army wanted similar speeds to the current tanks.

    The first talks included Henry Riccardo, who'd been leading a team developing the Kiwi engine. He explained that there were problems if they needed more engine power. They were currently putting the Kiwi 3 into production, and they'd got just about all the performance they could squeeze out of a diesel engine of its capacity. There were, fortunately, a number of options of different power levels.

    First, the Kiwi could be supercharged or turbocharged. He preferred the turbocharging solution; it would be hard to get a good supercharger designer, the Air industry had them all and wouldn't let any of them go. Also a turbocharger was more efficient for a ground engine - aero engines had different issues. A properly designed turbocharger for the Kiwi should add about 60-70hp, bringing it up to about 430hp. It would take time, probably 6-9 months if all went well, and it would make the engine more expensive. Now if, as was looking increasingly likely, there was a war, the cost wouldn't be such an issue, but otherwise if might make the engine too expensive and the Army might want to move to a less costly option.

    His second option was to repeat the Kiwi work on the Rolls-Royce Merlin. This had about 30% greater displacement, and a more modern design. As a diesel it should produce about 500hp. The problem was that the chances of getting any Merlin engines, with the RAF needing all that could be produced, were almost nil.

    Going back to petrol versions of the Kiwi or Merlin would give more power, but at a cost. They would really need much higher quality fuel than the pool petrol, and the chances of using the wrong fuel were much greater with two type of petrol than with two types of diesel. Also, the fuel consumption would increase, needing more room for fuel and increasing the tank weight.

    There was the 500hp diesel that they'd been working on, first designed for the A11 before the Army decided the Kiwi was good enough. This could be put into production fairly easily, although it was heavier than he liked.

    His final option was a new engine he'd been working on with the Paxman company, the 12TP. This was a smaller version of their VeeRB design. It was currently only a prototype, but as it was basically a cut down VeeRB, there shouldn't be too many problems getting it into production - he estimated about a year to get a production line running. The advantage of this engine was its modern design - it would give 600hp at little more weight than the 500hp model they'd been developing.

    There were obvious advantages and disadvantages between the 500hp and 600hp engines, and while not a tank designer he suggested the decision as probably what size of engine fitted best, and allowed for the sort of weight gains that was a constant affliction of tank design.

    The committee decided to put that decision aside for a moment - at least they had a number of options - while considering the other features they wanted in a new tank.

    The next on their list was the suspension. The Carden designed A10* suspension was working well, but Sir John wasn't sure how much more weight it could take. Some analysis indicated that it was starting to get near its limit for weight and reasonable quality of ride. However now that the Army had decided (at least for now) to remove the requirement of shooting on the move, they had a bit more flexibility. He had been looking at improvements, and had been very interested in the VVSS system Nuffield had acquired from America. From the MEE's reports it gave a better, smoother ride than a straight Horstman suspension. Using this on a heavier version of their A11 suspension, it should be capable of carrying a tank of up to 35 tomes with good reliability and a reasonable ride for the crew. He wanted to get hold of a unit from Nuffield, and try it on a test A11; they would strengthen the suspension then weight it down and see what it could actually handle. If it did as well as he hoped, they would have a suitable suspension for the next generation of tanks.

    The final new piece would be the gun. They already had two options, the HV3pdr and the 6/18pdr. These were fine for what they were currently expected to face, but of course the enemy would be developing tanks with thicker armour, and their own infantry tanks were too well protected for these guns to beat. So the first thought was what size gun would defeat the A11?

    The most likely candidate was already being developed in conjunction with Woolwich, the new HV6pdr. Development had been started in June last year, starting with their 6pdr naval gun, and it was expected to have a prototype ready for trials in the summer. The good news was that when they'd designed the A10*, they'd made the turret with some room for a larger gun, in case they Army had decided to fit it with the 6/18pdr as a close support version. The change to elevation control helped, the gun could be moved forward in the turret. Given the size and recoil the new 6pdr would have, it should fit comfortably in the existing turret with some minor alterations. The calculations showed it should penetrate the 70mm glacis of the A11 at around 800-1,000 yards. It would also be possible, if required, to fit the 6pdr in the A11.

    There were issues with the 6pdr as a multipurpose gun. While the AT round they were looking at was good, the high velocity meant a small HE load. Ideally they wanted a good HE and smoke shell so they wouldn't need to mix tanks with different guns together. There were possibilities to do this, and the shell experts promised to go away and look at them; they were confident they could produce some acceptable shells, although the warned that making a good HE shell meant using a lower muzzle velocity, so they might need dual-graduated sights. But this was seen as an acceptable compromise for what would be on offer. One other gun improvement was to make a version of the new 25pdr gun for a tank to give it a greater HE load.

    While the 6pdr looked a very promising upgrade, if the enemy produced tanks with thicker armour than our current infantry models, it would struggle. There was discussion about what would be needed to kill a tank with 100mm of armour - while no current tank approached that, it would be sensible to be prepared. Some calculations indicated something around a 15pd shell , assuming similar muzzle velocity to the 3pdr and 6pdr. The only gun Vickers had in that class was their 3" AA gun, made earlier in the decade. It would need updating and modifying, it wasn't intended as an AT gun, and no-one was quite sure how much armour it would actually penetrate. The gun team asked if they could get a few solid AT rounds made - there was a complete gun, left over from the trials - and see if they could test it out to get an idea. They'd almost certainly need a new design, but having a measured starting point would be most helpful.

    The Vickers team decided to review the new tanks options once they had results of the tests, particularly the suspension tests. Of course, suggesting a tank of over 30 tons might shock the army a bit, and they'd need to upgrade things like their transporters, but it wasn't as if the new tank would appear overnight.
     
    Future Tanks 2
  • January 1939, Future Tanks, Engines and Guns (part 2)

    Harland & Wolff


    Harland & Wolff had learned a lot about building tanks from Vickers. Their own engineering team were now confident they could handle designing one of their own, they iddn't want to just be building copies of Vickers designs. While the existing tanks were good, they were confident they could design something better. Given the size of their team, they decides to just design an infantry tank replacement. The design outline would be set by looking at what was possible compared to the existing A11 and A12 designs.

    Given both the current infantry tanks came in at over 25 tons, there didn't seem much point in building slightly bigger. So the first decision was to look at a tank of around 35tons. If it was to be an infantry tank, it didn't have to be very fast, though equalling the speed of the A11 would be a useful starting parameter. This would obviously need a larger engine than the Kiwi, but there was already a 500hp diesel (designed for the original A11), that they could use. A bigger diesel was also possible. Using a large diesel would also help with the proposal they were going to make, that if such a diesel was needed for a tank (not just their design), they could build one in Belfast. This would have the advantage of being out of bomber rangs.

    Unlike Vickers, they didn't design guns, so they assumed they would use what was available. The obvious upgrade to the 6/18pdr was a new gun using the 25pdr ammunition, so they would size the turret accordingly. They'd appreciated the foresight of the Vickers designs of allowing for a somewhat larger gun as an improvement without having to redesign the whole tank, so they would try and do the same.

    They knew Vickers were looking at a new heavy-duty suspension, but thought they had some ideas that would work well for an infantry tank, where high speed wasn't such an important option, while the ability to move well in very poor terrain was.

    Given the weight they were thinking of, they could put 100mm of armour on the glacis, and probably something like 70mm on the sides and rear. After building the Vickers designs, they were confident that welding such thick steel wouldn't be a problem, but they'd probably need to train more welders.

    The Board gave approval to do an outline design, detailed enough to present to the Army to see if it would match their ideas for a new tank once that advanced to the specification stage.

    Nuffield

    The Nuffield engineers had mixed feelings about the A13 tank. They felt it was a good tank, especially as it was their first foray into tank design. It was the fastest tank on offer, and while the Army had required them to increase the armour, it had met the Army's original specification. They had been looking at ways of improving the A13, but it was looking more and more that the best solution was a new tank. By making this a derivation of the A13, the development time could be reduced.

    Their draft plans were to widen the tank to the continental loading gauge. This allowed another 9" of width, and this would given them more space in the tank and allow a greater range of engine possibilities. Despite the problems, there was a lot of pressure from Lord Nuffield to keep to the Liberty engine, but the Army had made clear that if only for considerations of engine supply, more than one engine should be able to power the tank. They had been looking at the new Meadows engine, and if they could widen the tank, the size wouldn't be an issue.

    Even for cruiser tanks, the armour thickness was steadily increasing, so they decided to specify a glacis of 50mm and 35mm on the sides, very similar to the A10* design. They would keep to the VVSS suspension, it had been very successful on the A13, and they still expected to get 30mph out of the new tank.

    The turret really needed a complete redesign. It would start off by using the HV3pdr with a mechanical elevation control, but if this was to be a follow-on from the A13, space for a larger gun would be a sensible idea. It was also possible a fast close-support tank would sell well to the Army, so the decision was to make the turret ring large enough to take the Vickers 6/18pdr gun.

    The team felt that as this tank would use a lot of the parts and tooling already in production for the A13, they could show a prototype quite quickly, in about 6 months. It could be in production 6 months from approval, although this would mean stopping A13 production for a time to retool. Otherwise it would be around 12 months, though time could be saved if the government would pay for a new site to be built or re-equipped, as that wouldn't affect A13 production.

    It was decided to propose this solution to the Army, rather than spend time trying to do major rework on the A13

    Vulcan

    While Vulcan were happy with the performance of their A12 design, the manufacturing was proving to be an horrendous problem. The design had looked fine some years ago, when only small quantities of tanks were being ordered, but as the numbers kept rising their style of building was become more and more limited compared to the sort of production lines Vickers was building. Their problem was they had a lot of experience with heavy castings, not so much with the sort of welded tank that now seemed the way things were going. After heated discussion, and seeing how they couldn't compete with companies like Vickers and Nuffield for output, they decided to play to their strengths. They would offer to cast parts, up to full turrets, designing and building them in partnership with the larger firms. They could also do castings for other armoured vehicles, and offer to build specialised tanks and armoured vehicles where a large production run wasn't needed. While this wasn't as prestigious as designing and building your own design tank, looking at the Army's needs it would certainly keep their order book full for the foreseeable future.
     
    3rd Feb 1939
  • 3rd February 1939, Limited Liability revoked and the larger army

    On the 2nd February, the doctrine of limited liability was finally formally revoked. The new size of the Army would be 10 divisions, two of them armoured, and appropriate TA reserves. Having finally got what they wished for, and a promise of funding, the Army now had a large problem to wrestle with - now to get all the equipment they needed, and how to get the manpower to use it all. There would need to be serious increases in the training system.

    One of the ironies the RTC was well aware of was that having finally got what they'd been asking for, they now had to deal with the problems of actually doing it. The biggest problem was how to effectively double the size of the armoured formations. After three years, they hadn't even got the first armoured division compete. Ordering more tanks was fine, but as recent discussions had shown, ordering tanks wasn't like turning on a tap. It would take time for production to ramp up, no matter how many tanks they ordered.

    Worse, they would have to implement massive increases in training. They would have to speed up the training of new crews, which also meant more trainers, and worse, a lot more tanks to be used for training. The exercises over the past few years had been invaluable in working out their new methods and doctrine, but the result of the inevitable heavy use of the existing armour had basically written it all off. At best, it could be used for basic familiarisation training at home, but the tanks were worn out. A less energetic exercise program might have avoided this.

    The second problem was the lack of tanks for training. Currently they were assuming about 20% of the new tanks went to training and replacements. This was fine as long as they were looking at the old system of relatively small numbers of crews. The number allocated to training would have to go up, and this meant even fewer tanks would end up in service. There was even a suggestion - soon quashed - that maybe they could build a few hundred cheap light tanks. Granted they would have eased the training problem a little, and they could be built quite quickly, but that would divert effort from the tanks they really needed. Worse, despite all their lectures and demonstrations, there were still a lot of Army officers who didn't really understand the use of tanks. To them, anything with tracks was a tank, and they'd assume they could use a light tank as a cruiser. Which would result in lost battles, and a lot of dead tank crews. Better not to put temptation in their way.

    The training issue was only going to get worse when they had to assign tanks for the infantry to train with. One thing that had been emphasised by the more successful infantry commanders in the exercises was the need for their men to know how to work with tanks and how best to support and be supported by them. While the RTC fully endorsed this, they hadn't expected to be needing to actually do the training for some time. The only thing they could really do to ease the problem was to have the tank crews from the tank regiments help out; that eased the manpower burden, but tanks would still be needed, they couldn't just wear out the regiments tanks in training.

    Of course, it wasn't just the lack of tank numbers. The RTC had been expecting to form the Mobile Division this summer, once enough tanks had been built. Their intention had been to use the summer exercises to show the flaws, then spend the next year getting the division to operate smoothly. The EAF and later formations had basically been Brigade-sized units, and they'd never built a full Armoured Division before, there were going to be problems. Now it looked like they were going to have to do this 'on the run', and that was likely to cause even bigger problems.

    Apart from the tanks, the rest of the equipment they needed was just as big a problem. Given the equipment scales needed for the new formations, there was a shortage of everything, from boots to bullets. The best that could be done was to get on with it. Fortunately the Division was already an approved unit, and formations had been allocated, or they suspected they would have had huge problems even putting the Division together. As it was, all their units would be fighting for their share of equipment. At least one senior officer was heard to remark he wasn't sure which was worse - not getting what you asked for, or actually getting it!

    Still, at least now they wouldn't have to constantly fight just to get approval of what they needed to do. More tanks and carriers would be needed as soon as possible, and a review would be made of when orders could be placed to get the type they needed as early as possible. The numbers of tanks was alarming to those who'd been used to ordering tanks by the dozen; equipping the suggested two armoured divisions, and 2 independent armoured brigades, would take some 1,200 tanks, add training and replacements and some allowance for wastage and they were looking at more like 2,000. And Egypt would need additional formations on top of that!

    While a full review of needs and production would take some weeks, it was decided to order an additional 150 A13 tanks from Nuffield, who had nearly finished their initial run of 70 tanks. The immediate fixes the company had offered would help, and the current thinking was that they could be sent out to Egypt. That would give Hobart at uniform tank Brigade, and the thinner armour of that model wouldn't be an issue facing the Italians. It would hopefully also give time for them to look at fixing the engine issues.
     
    20 Feb 1939
  • 20th February 1939, Development of the new Armoured Divisions

    The last few weeks had been feverously busy for the RTC. While everyone in the Army had been working out what was needed to supply the newly revised order of battle for the continent, and checking what was in stores - and more often what wasn't - the armoured force was caught in the middle of re-equipping, which hardly helped matters. They needed to place new tank orders urgently, but before they did they needed to work out exactly what they needed, to make sure things arrived in the correct order.

    The first order of business was the armoured divisions. While well on the way to building the first one, it couldn't just be split into two. All the existing exercises and tests had been with Brigade-sized formations, and a lot of work needed to be done to construct a full Division, let alone two of them. There was also the issue of its size. A lot of discussion had gone into the most efficient size of the division, and in fact it had become clear that the initial size of three Brigades was actually rather large. With the speed and mobility of the tanks, it was a lot harder to control them effectively than a traditional formation, and after a lot of paper exercises, they had decided on a divisional structure of two Brigades plus the associated elements. Until the decision to expand the Army, this had been kept quiet - if they were only to have a single Armoured Division, best for it to be a large one. That was no longer an issue, so the first thing to do was to finish the organisational structure.

    An Armoured Brigade would consist of two RTC regiments. Each would need 48 tanks, plus 3 more for the regimental command, and two communication tanks (for calling in divisional elements like the heavy artillery). The Brigade would need a small command group, a specialised command tank (rather like the ones they'd used successfully in the old EAF) for the Brigade command, plus a few tanks for his escort. Four regiments meant about 220 cruiser tanks. Divisional HQ would need two more command tanks, plus a reserve squadron of 16 cruiser tanks. Division would also control a Regiment of Infantry tanks, consisting of 72 tanks intended to form 3 battalions. The engineers also wanted four engineering tanks per Brigade, so they could do work under protection. The Brigade artillery needed 48 SP guns. That came to a somewhat terrifying 360 cruiser, infantry and specialised tanks.

    The intended Independent Armoured Brigades were a bit simpler, but they still used around 120 tanks. There was still discussion about the need for SP guns; at the moment, they didn't feel a supporting Infantry Tank Brigade needed them, but one using cruiser tanks might. And of course none of these numbers allowed for training, wastage, and reserves - this would probably add half as many tanks again. There was also the need to send armour to the Western desert Force, it was intended to strengthen them with a Brigade of Cruiser tanks to add to the light armour already in place.

    The current tank orders were due to be completed by the end of April (with the exception of the A13Mk2 Scimitar recent order). That would give them 350A10* Sabre, 140A11 Cutlass, 90A13 Scimitar and 30 SP Guns. There were also 140 A12 Matilda's on order, but the first ones weren't expected until June, Vulcan were having difficulty with the manufacture, and were short of the skilled labour they needed.

    The decision was to use the Scimitar tanks for the Western Desert Force. Their thinner armour would not be such an issue facing the Italian tanks. The training department would retain 30 of the A13's, the other 60 would be shipped out. Reinforcements would be sent once Nuffield had built them. That left the problem of the continental force.

    The 350 Sabre tanks were just about enough for the Armoured division, although some of the designs for the specialised tanks were still being drawn up. Fortunately these were relatively simple to build, they were basically an armoured box on the A10* chassis. But they would need another 120 tanks just for training needs, as well as another 40 SP guns. An order would be placed for these with Vickers and Harland & Wolff. The good news was that production was now nearly 15 tanks a month from each of their two factories, as long as their subcontractors could also keep up with their part of the supply chain. An order would be made for 140 tanks and SP guns from Vickers and 70 from H&W, delivery hopefully by the August. Once they could see how production was going they would place further orders. Both companies had already agreed that new orders would be for the Mk3 tank, and they would see how fast they could build conversion kits for the existing tanks, in view of the new urgency they were looking at subcontracting the work.

    Infantry tanks were also in very short supply. The big problem was the delay in Vulcan actually getting tanks out. The 140 A11 Cutlass tanks nearing completion would fit out the Armoured Divisions requirement, and the Vulcan Matilda tanks would make up another Independent Brigade, but the question was when? The A11 would do the job, but it was built in the same factories as the Sabre and the SP guns, so urgent discussions would be needed with the suppliers as to how to get the most tanks as fast as possible. There was still ongoing discussion of whether an Independent Armoured Brigade could use the infantry tank better than the Armoured Division.

    Of course, this meant that even with the expected increase in production later in the year, the second armoured division wouldn't get its tanks until the summer of 1940. Discussions had been held earlier with the firms, and treasury approval needed to be obtained to get them to increase tank, and tank engine, production as fast as possible. And they hadn't even started on seriously enlarging the training teams yet.



    Having done the best they could with the tanks, they had to consider the requirements for the armoured infantry battalions. Even with the new smaller structure, a Brigade needed two battalions, and they used around 100 carriers each by the time they'd added in all the odds and sods to go with the infantry sections. The Division HQ troops needed more, and it was expected that the Division would need 600, including training needs. The good news from Vickers was that carriers were much simpler beasts to build than tanks, and that they could be contracted out to suitable vehicle and machinery contractors. Also most of the training could be conducted by the battalions, once they'd taught the drivers. The bad news was that this would all have to be arranged, and the potential contractors had, in the main, not realised the Army would be calling on them in peacetime. However an initial order for 600 closed and 200 open carriers was placed anyway, on the assurance that subcontractors would be sourced to increase production as fast as possible. It was obvious that they were not going to be able to equip the division with its correct complement of vehicles immediately, so until them more men that they liked would be on wheels, not tracks.

    The issue of the kit the soldiers would need was yet another headache. Most of it was standard for an infantry battalion, which at least helped in that they knew what they needed. They already knew they would be short of Bren guns; with the carriers, the additional weight of a Bren and its ammo wasn't as big a problem as it was for the infantry moving on foot, so they had decided to go with a squad using two Bren guns for increased firepower. However Bren guns were in short supply, so for the time being they would be limited to one, until the rest of the infantry formations had been issued with theirs. Some of the more enterprising sergeants had been talking to the Quartermasters about exactly what ex-WW1 kit they had hidden away at the back of the warehouse.

    The list of new equipment just kept growing. Heavy artillery for the Division, Engineers and their vehicles, communications - they needed a lot more radios than an infantry division - all the parts that made a Division work were either not immediately available or in short supply. They had managed to get the Swiss order for Oerlikon guns approved by the Treasury, and Vickers were moving on with a production line, but again tooling and trained manpower were in short supply. Still, they hoped to get 20 AA units available by the Autumn, four for each battalion plus the HQ allotment. And of course, a lot of the men would need training in all the new kit, adding even more to the workload. For some of it, they hadn't even got the trainers themselves familiar with it.
     
    March 1939
  • 14th March 1939

    The President of Czechoslovakia, Emil Hacha, accedes to Hitler's demand to make Bohemia-Moravia a protectorate of Germany. Slovakia and Ruthenia immediately declare their independence from the government in Prague.


    15th March 1939

    German troops occupy the rest of Czechoslovakia, annexing Bohemia and Moravia in passing, and making Slovakia a German Protectorate while giving Ruthenia to Hungary. Adolf Hitler declares in Berlin that 'Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist'.

    All of these actions were in violation of the Munich agreement reached only the previous October. By occupying Czechoslovakia, Germany had gained 2,175 field cannons, 469 tanks, 500 anti-aircraft artillery pieces, 43,000 machine guns, 1,090,000 military rifles, 114,000 pistols, about a billion rounds of ammunition and three million anti-aircraft shells. This amount of weaponry would be sufficient to arm about half of the Wehrmacht.

    The reaction of Britain and France is muted. When pressed as to why he was ignoring the German annexation, in breach of the Munich treaty, Chamberlain explained that as Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist 'by its own hand', the treaty no longer applied.

    However actions did take place as a result of this. Even as German troops were marching into Prague, Britain and France had been having secret negotiations, as a result of which not only did the British representatives promise to participate in land operations in France, but to do so at a level comparable with that of the lost Czechoslovakian Army. This meant that Britain would build a field army of 32 division.


    17th March 1939

    Daladier announced that France was going to increase its military spending.


    21st March 1939

    Hitler again reiterates his demand on Poland for the return of Danzig and the 'Polish Corridor'. These are refused again by Poland on the following day.



    23rd March 1939

    German troops occupy the city of Memel, on the border of East Prussia and Lithuania. Poland reacts to this by warning Germany that any similar attempt to seize the city of Danzig would mean war between the two countries, and partially mobilises its armed forces.


    27th March 1939

    At a Foreign Policy Committee meeting of the British Cabinet, after a stormy debate it is decided to side with Poland, rather than attempt a multi-national solution involving the Soviet Union. While militarily preferable, the Polish hate of the Soviets, and Chamberlains own personal dislike of them, have made this the only solution.


    29th March

    Chamberlain announces the decision to bring the Territorial Army up to its war establishment, and once that was done, to double its numbers. This would give Britain 26 Territorial divisions as well as the 6 Regular divisions. No public decision had been made as to how many of these divisions would be armoured, but provisional thoughts inside the Army was that they would need 6-8, though it was likely some of these would be split into two Armoured Brigades.. The number or armoured vehicles that Britain needed to build was increasing far faster than the capability to build them. Given the need to equip so many armoured formations, including the reserves and the need of the training organisation, they were looking at an estimate of around 5,000 tanks. It would be necessary to consult urgently with the manufacturers as to how quickly they could increase production, and how much could be built by non-specialist firms.
     
    3rd April 1939
  • 3rd April 1939 - Building the tanks

    The main tank manufacturers had been called in to discuss how soon they could increase production. While all of them had some plans in place, and indeed some had started to build up to a higher production level after the meetings of a few months ago, the Army needs to see what could be done now the requirement had suddenly got a lot more urgent.

    Vickers were already building extra capacity at their Elswick and Chertsey plants. These were currently producing 15 tanks a month at each plant, and this could be a mix of the A10 Sabre, the A11 Cutlass and the various specialised armoured vehicles such as the SP gun. They would need to plan some months in advance for the precise mixture, but didn't foresee any major issues. They had also started to make space to increase production by adding new production facilities to the existing floorspace. This would need appropriate tooling, and a large number of new workers. Assuming a full go-ahead, this additional capacity should be available in March of 1940, and would double capacity of each plant to 30 AFV a month. Not much could be done to speed this up, there was a shortage of the specialised tooling needed, and while much of the work was semi-skilled, it still needed some experienced staff for inspection, control, and jobs like welding thick armour plate. In any case, they felt that the shortage of armour plate would likely preclude much earlier expansion of output in any case.

    They had also started to look at building additional factory space. This had only just started, but could go ahead at full speed as soon as the Treasury was willing. Given that they would again have to train a workforce and get in machinery as well as building the actual factory expansion, they thought this could start producing around August 1940, depending on the availability of the needed men and material. This would add a further 15 AFV a month, bringing them up to 45. After that, they could move to multi-shift working; this would again require more men to be trained, and cost more. Exactly when this would be feasible depended on how fast the new works progressed, and how willing the Treasury was to support the increase in the cost of the workforce. But when fully applied, each plant should be able to produce about 900 AFV per year, assuming the subcontracting companies could keep up. This was thought to be the practical limit; tanks and even their components were heavy and the transport links outside the plants would be at capacity, even with some improvements.

    Harland & Wolff were in a similar position, and with similar timescales, again depending mainly on the availability of tooling and trained manpower. Their employment situation was a bit better in Northern Ireland, but they still had to train the skills required. They had got their current production up to 15 tanks a month, and the output could increase at roughly the same rate as Vickers.

    Given the current issues with the A12 Matilda, Vulcan found it difficult to promise a large increase for some time. If there was funding, they could increase that workforce, but some of the work, like the grinding of castings, was skilled work that couldn't be easily improved. They suggested that more use of other manufacturers might be a useful way of increasing the number of tanks.

    Nuffield were in a somewhat different position. The current plant they were using to build the A13 Scimitar would be expensive to expand, and instead they were looking at production at new sites. They wanted to agree on a specification for an A13 replacement, and could expand their capability in the expectation of the new model being built. They estimated they could have a prototype built in 6 months - it used a lot of parts in common with the A13, which would speed things up - and production could start about 6 months after approval. They could offer a build of up to 30 tanks a month (in addition to their current production) with Treasury backing.

    The Army had hoped for better figures, given the new need for huge numbers of tanks, but the manufactures pointed out that expanding the number of factories wouldn't help in the short term, there was a limitation on getting the specialised tooling. The most efficient course was to get more companies involved in making components while they built up the main plants, after which the situation and need could be reassessed. In any case, building parts for tanks would give other firms some useful experience if they were to be turned into a full tank factory.

    Looking at the figures, the current production of 55 tanks a month, rising to around 150 a month in around a year (provided Vulcan had fixed their production bottlenecks by then), and to around 230 a month by late 1940. This would still take over two years to reach the target numbers, but there were also limits as to how fast the Army could absorb new tanks. They were already looking at how to get hold of more areas for training, and expanding the training cadre, but this would also take time.

    The second issue was the production of engines. The good news was that if the new Morris engine proved acceptable, it could be made quite quickly. This would cover the Nuffield tank production, and possibly that from Vulcan as well. Some of the lighter AFV such as the SP guns could also use existing engines. The big bottleneck was in the production of the Kiwi diesel engine. This had taken more time to expand than expected, and even now was only running at 500 a year, not enough to support the Sabre and Cutlass needs, let along the projected expansion.

    The good news was that an engine plant was easier to expand than a tank factory, and that production could be grown to 80 engines a month by the late autumn. New floor space could be constructed, but Vickers was worried about relying on a single factory. They suggested two more be fitted out; one at Harland & Wolff, well out of bombing range and convenient for their tank works, and another in conjunction with Rover, who they had been talking to about the possibilities. These could be producing 1,000 engines a year each by the spring of 1940, enough to cover the expected tank build.

    Vickers final suggestion was to look at possible sites to build a larger diesel, such as the 500hp design the Army had decided against last year. It could be fitted in the Cutlass tank with minor modifications - it had, after all, been originally designed with it in mind - and would provide an alternative source. While no decision on the suggestion was made immediately, Vickers were authorised to look into sites and timescales for later consideration.

    The other possibility was to produce or buy in more from abroad. Given the uncertainty of buying in Europe, the main possibilities were the USA and Canada. USA purchases were strictly limited by foreign currency requirements, but a study would be made to see if there were particularly restrictive bottlenecks that US production could help with. Canada was more promising. Vickers had been discussing a possible site in Canada for the Canadian need for tanks; originally it had been intended to supply these from the UK, but this was obviously now not possible. A plant could export tanks and components to the UK as well as meet Canada's own requirement. Vickers was asked to progress the idea with more urgency.
     
    French Exercise
  • April 1939, exercise with French tank force (somewhere in France, near Nouvion)

    Last autumn it had been agree to hold a joint training exercise in France, sending over an Armoured formation to see how they did against the French Army. With all the workload imposed by the changes to the planned size of the Army, they had seriously considered postponing this, but a number of considerations made it go forward. First, it was seen as an important sign of Anglo-French cooperation and as such show to Germany that the two countries were acting together. Second, if as was looking more and more probable, the two countries would be involved with a war in the not too distant future, the exercise would be a valuable learning tool. And finally, it was pointed out that moving a battalion of tanks, their support and some infantry units to France and back would be an invaluable practice for the logistics people - they were looking with worry at how much and how soon they might have to be moving to France if war came.

    So a battalion of tanks plus some of their support - half of an Armoured Brigade - had been loaded onto flatcars and sent off across the channel. There had been a few problems, of course - tanks weren't the easiest of things to move around, even on rail, but in general the Staff were pleased with the way the movement went. A careful note of things that needed to be changed in case a full deployment was needed soon was made.

    The exercises themselves went surprisingly well. The French armour, led by Colonel DeGaulle, obviously wanted to show their skill on their home ground, while the RTC men were equally determined to show the French what they could do. Both sides were to play the part of attacker and defender in turn, the defence using an associated infantry force. Lasting a week, they showed up a number of issues for both sides.

    The reports - endorsed by the umpires and commanders on both sides - were interesting. The French had done well in attack, but suffered more losses than they had anticipated. The British put this down to better control of their tanks, and better awareness by the commander, not distracted by having to serve as his own gunner. It was noted that the French unit that was fully equipped with radios suffered less. The number of heavy (for the period) anti-tank guns was also a problem, causing the tanks to constantly stop and call down artillery to suppress them. The failure to do this tended to result in heavy tank casualties. For their part the British hadn't realised how tough the S-35's and Char B were, even with the HV3pdr it was hard to kill them at a decent range.

    The second phase, with the British attacking, was considered even more valuable. The British tactics were somewhat similar to those the German Armour was expected to employ, making use of their mobility and mobile support to engage the defenders at good odds, and using their speed to break up the defence. Again, this proved lethal to the French units without radios, they simply couldn't coordinate fast enough. The other problem was the unreliability of the French tanks. Tanks were breaking down on both sides, of course, but the reliability of the British units was considerably better. Adding to this, the difficulty of mending the tanks in the field was much higher for the S-35's, resulting in the Umpires deciding the tanks had been lost. The French were also impressed with the way some of the 'damaged' or broken down British tanks were recovered by tractor units, and ruled available for the next day.

    The end of the exercise had given both sides a good idea of where they stood. The British were pleased by their tanks, and thought their methods had worked well, although using them against the French had shown quite a few areas that could do with more improvement. 'Killing' the heavily armoured French tanks had been quite hard, although nothing much could be done about that except more gunnery practice. The recovery vehicles support had worked, it also showed they needed more. Given the current equipment shortage, that would be a problem. They'd also had issues with a French 'minefield'; with all the other work that had been going on, clearing mines had been given a low priority, but that really needed looking at more closely.

    The French were disappointed with their performance in a number of areas. They were proud of their armoured formations, and hadn't expected the British to be quite so good. A number of recommendations were made both by DeGaulle and the other senior officers attending the exercise.

    It was clear that a radio was a big advantage in a fluid battle. Granted the French were hoping not to fight meeting engagements, but they were going to happen, like it or not. Priority should be given to radio equipment, and if there was a shortage, it seemed obvious that formations put in a position to be involved in a fluid battle should be the ones best equipped.

    The issue with better command and control was noted, but this was impossible to fix in any short timescale. The idea of at least a two-man turret to improve the problem was already under consideration; in the meantime, more training for the commanders would fill the need. Other than that, they needed to practice at drawing a German attack into a battle favourable to their methods.

    The issue of mechanical unreliability was again known; they were impressed by the British tanks, and again efforts were being made to improve their own. One thing that could be done was to start to provide recovery vehicles; the difficulty of fixing the problems on the S-35 tanks would still make it difficult, but at least they could get more tanks back, to be repaired rather than just falling into enemy hands.

    Both sides were happy with their artillery, for different reasons. The British ability for light artillery on tracks to follow up fast had impressed, but the French didn't feel a need for it quite yet. Their own plentiful artillery had worked, and while SP guns seemed a nice thing, they had more urgent priorities. In any case, they were not hoping for a meeting engagement in which such a gun would be of the most use.

    It was agreed that overall it had been a success, and it was hoped to repeat it perhaps in 6 months time once the lessons had been fully learnt and improvements, where possible, had been made. There was already an ongoing program between some of the armament firms to cooperate - the French companies were very interested in some solutions the British had to some areas they knew needed improvement, such as tank suspension, and the British companies were keeping a close eye on some French technology such as ammunition. With the threat from Germany steadily growing, such cooperation was considered a good idea. One new suggestion was that a small committee be set up, with members from both countries, to examine problems in detail and see if the other country had a better solution. However the current commitments of the British Army, particularly the RTC, made this an idea that would have to wait a while.

    SOUMA had been collaborating with some of the British tank manufacturers for some time now. The new S-40 design had come along well, and with the recent rising of tensions had been given a high priority. They had originally intended to show the Army a prototype in October, but this had now been moved forward to July. The incorporation of the British-designed VVSS suspension had gone better than anticipated, which had helped. The new engine still wasn't ready, but the company had suggested the current engine to speed production; the new engine would be fitted as soon as it was available. With a few changes, the tank would cover the deficiencies noted in the recent exercise, and give the French Army what they felt would be the best medium tank in the world.
     
    Last edited:
    18th April 1939
  • 18th April 1939, London.

    There is a meeting between the management of Vickers and the Government to look at establishing new sources of military supplies in Canada. Vickers has been investigating these for some time, as Canada had been interested in obtaining tanks, which the commitments in Britain had left in short supply. Vickers had been originally negotiating on a deal to build one or more of the current models in Canada, but with the ongoing developments this was felt to be too minimal a solution.

    The Canadian government was unwilling to commit to building what they saw as war industries, or spend money on developing them, but were prepared to facilitate new armament works as long as Vickers paid for them. For their part, Vickers was happy to do this as long as they were recompensed by the Government.

    Canada was seen as the best source of equipment in the Empire and Dominions; it had a modern technical base, ample resources and was close to the USA where parts and machinery could be purchased. It was decided to fund two new sites; the first would be in partnership with the Montreal Locomotive Works to build tanks and component parts. Secondly they wanted to build a new factory complex to build tanks, guns and other specialised vehicles close to Toronto, conveniently close to the steel mills at Hamilton.

    While officially the Canadian government were not part of the arrangement, they would make every effort to help these deals along. Vickers had looked at a number of locations, and all they needed was official permission - which was swiftly granted - to break ground. They needed to buy in tools and train the workforce as well as just build the factory, but expected the first output from the new works in the summer of 1940.

    It was expected to get vehicles from Montreal sooner than this, the main detail to be resolved was which tank to build. The Canadian government had indicated it would be interested in purchasing the A10 Sabre, and the A12 Matilda II was the other possibility. There had been discussions as to whether the tank would be completely welded, as at Vickers, or use cast sections. The Canadian plants were familiar with casting, and there was a shortage of armour plate in the country, so one option was to build the A10 with cast hull sections and turret. Vickers had investigated this when they first designed the tank, before deciding welding was the better way to go, so the drawings wouldn't have to be done from scratch, just updated and possibly modified for Canadian methods.. The Matilda II of course already cast, but there were concerns as to the time it needed to produce them, given Vulcan's problems.

    In addition to tanks, Vickers also wanted to build guns and engines. The new Toronto plant would build all three - land was plentiful, and there was no risk of enemy attack, so the plant would be laid out for maximum efficiency. Being a port on the Great Lakes, there would be no huge problem shipping raw materials and finished weapons out. They were looking at a plant to build the Kiwi engine, 1,000 units a year, and also factory space to build guns, starting with the 2pdr and HV3pdr guns. One possibility was an American diesel engine, built under license in Canada by the subsidiary of a large US manufacturer, but this needed further investigation.

    Vickers were also looking at the possibility or sourcing some components from the USA. While convenient, there were serious issues as to the availability of US dollars, and they didn't expect to get permission short of a War. Another possibility worth looking into was a collaboration with a company like General Motors in Canada, for building engines and vehicles.



    27th April 1939

    In order to meet the forthcoming needs of the armed forces, in particular the Army, a limited form of conscription was authorised in Britain. Leslie Hore-Belisha, the Secretary of State for War, persuaded the Cabinet to introduce a limited form of conscription. Only single men in the age group 20-22 years old were liable, and in order to distinguish them from the Regular and territorial amy they would be called 'militiamen'. The intention was for the first intake to undergo six months of basic training before being discharged into the active reserve. They would then be recalled for short training periods and attend an annual camp. Parliament would pass the enabling Military Training act on the 26th May.

    28th April 1939

    Adolf Hitler addresses the Reichstag, denouncing both the 10-year non-aggression pact with Poland and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935. He calls the Anglo0Polish Agreement an alliance directed exclusively against Germany, and again demands the return of Danzig to Germany. The Royal Navy starts preparations for increasing the size of its anti-submarine force, now that they are no longer confined by the Agreement. Although there are still hopes that War can be averted, to most in office this is looking less and less likely, and war planning proceeds as far as economic and financial resources allow.

    3rd May 1939, War Office, London

    General Martel had been involved with mine-clearing devices and techniques in WW1, so was the obvious person to consult about modernising the techniques for modern use. The methods of the time had basically been a tank-mounted mine roller, and this was seen as the obvious starting point, as they had proven to be fairly successful.

    Interest had waned after the Great War, as it had been considered that any minefields encountered would be too large for easy clearance under fire. However exercises and tests had shown that there was a use for tactical minefields, and being able to clear these would speed things up - and reduce losses - considerably. Martel, while feeling his earlier considerations had been valued, accepted that things were changing, and that a group should be set up to test and refine the old methods with a modern tank. It would also test current proposed British mines - while some experimental and test mines had been used over the years, there was no good modern mine in mass production. The Army wanted a anti-infantry and anti-tank mine, if only one was possible then the anti-tank version. Given that they were expecting to be defending initial German attacks, mines seemed very useful, and enterprising infantry units had been fairly successful with dummy ones against the RTC exercises. And intelligence showed the Germans themselves were keen on the use of mines, so ways of neutralising them would be helpful when they themselves attacked.

    He wouldn't be taking part in the evaluations himself - he had recently over the 50th (Northumbrian) Division, and would be busy preparing them, and also the second line 'daughter' unit the 23rd (Northumbrian) division. He particularly wanted to ensure they knew how to work with and against tanks. While spare tanks were very thin on the ground, he was sure some of his old contacts could arrange for something suitable to occur. He did suggest to his visitors that once they had got to the stage of needing some infantry to help them test things out, he'd be happy to have his Division supply some men.
     
    15th May 1939
  • 15th May 1939, Department for Tank Development, Berlin

    The group of men sitting around the table were responsible for building the tanks Germany needed for its new Panzer Divisions. This resulted in them being very busy indeed. The tank program for the new Pz III and Pz Iv tanks was not going well.

    The Panzer III was intended to be the backbone of the panzer divisions, capable of engaging and destroying enemy tank forces. It had originally been hoped to have this in full production in 1937, but the program kept encountering problems. So far all that had been built was 60 prototypes and 40 actual production vehicles. This was hardly the way to equip a Panzer Army.

    The Panzer IV production was little better, due to constant changes in the design. 35 had been built in 1936, but major revisions had meant that only 42 of the new Ausf B had been completed by 1938. The next version, the Ausf C, was still not quite right, but they were about to start building the Ausf D, with upgraded protection and the hull machine gun re-introduced.

    While they had ample Pz I and Pz II tanks, the Pz I was only intended for training, and the Pz II, while a good light tank, was not going to fare well against the British and French medium tanks, let alone the formidable Char B. The need for medium tanks was so great they had resorted to including the Pz 38(t), a modification of a Czech design, built in Czechoslovakia. The irony of this was not lost on many of the men. At least it had a 37mm gun which gave it a chance against a medium tank.

    The reports on British and French tank production, as well as the intelligence reports from the two countries recent join exercise made gloomy reading. Up till now, French tank production had been chaotic, and while producing a fair number of tanks, most of these had been considered of little use on a modern battlefield. They had also been plagued by mechanical problems. However it looked like the French were finally improving their act. They had new tanks being designed, as well as improvements in the current vehicles. When these came into production, if they built them at the previous rate there would be problems for the Panzers. The British had seemed fairly quiet until last year - their main aim seemed to be developing tactics and methods for their existing tanks, and all they had been building were small light tanks, mainly for policing their Empire. Things had changed, though, and a new generation of tanks were making their way into service.

    The joint Anglo-French exercise had been German Intelligence's first really good view of the new equipment. While of course they hadn't been in a position to get a close look, it wasn't too hard for them to gather information and photographs to add to the intelligence gathered by other means. The French hadn't fielded anything new. The S-35 and the Char B were still worryingly powerful tanks, but the tactics of using their mobility to outflank and surround them should still be effective. What was more worrying was they noticed considerably more use of radio by the French force. Of course, they had known the French had radios, but not that they were in such wide use. That would have to be reported to the Panzer commanders.

    The new British tanks had looked worrying. They seemed well designed, and not dissimilar to their own Pz III and Pz IV. They knew that the British had split their tanks into two types, and these matched that usage. They hadn't been able to find out too much, but at least one report remarked on their good tactical mobility and didnt report too many acses of broken-down tanks. They had also noted that all the tanks seemed to have radios, and that they were used a lot. The use of infantry carriers was a new thing for the British, this was the first time they had seen them used.

    What was worrying was that in some respects the British organisation had gone down a similar route to their own, and it was always difficult to fight someone using your own methods. They took heart in the fact that there had been obvious issues, the British hadn't exploited as fast or as efficiently as their Panzer crews, so again the tactical advantage would be with themselves.

    The other issue for discussion was the technical response to the new tanks. In addition to those shown, the ones the French were known to have in design. They knew that the French CharB and S-35 carried heavier armour than the panzers, but the idea had been that adept tactical manoeuvring would allow them to be attacked in the flank or rear where this wouldn't be such an issue. At least one of the British tanks, the one that seemed equipped for close support, judging by its gun, was heavt. Not as heavy as the Char B, but still some surreptitious examination of the track marks showed it was no lightweight. That, and the calculated size, implied good protection.

    They had already considered steps to deal with this. The first was to increase the protection of their own tanks, the second to fit a larger gun. The Pz III and Pz IV currently had 30mm of frontal protection, and it would be possible to add to this. However this would add weight, and slow the tanks down, something they were reluctant to do until it was shown to be necessary. The second option, a bigger gun, was actually one that had been considered when the Pz III was designed. They had intended to equip it with a high velocity 5cm gun, and the turret sized accordingly. The decision had been made, however, to use the 37mm gun to keep commonality with the infantry AT gun, even though it had worse performance. When tanks had only carried 15mm of armour, this wasn't seen as a problem, but now maybe it should be thought on again.

    The problem was that modifications and tests to do these improvements would, yet again, slow down the production of the tanks. If that had been going well, that might have been acceptable, but given the current dire state, nothing that slowed the production line down could be accepted. The decision was that the engineers would be allowed to find out what could be done - one tank would be allocated for appliqué armour and fitting of a 50mm gun - so that when changes needed to be made it could be done quickly, but given the plans that were being drawn up for Poland, that seemed the best that could be done.
     
    The New Nuffield Tank
  • 22nd May 1939

    The Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano and the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop sign a ten-year political and military alliance between the two countries, which will be dubbed 'The Pact of Steel'. It guarantees support for each other in the event of war.

    This causes the British to re-evaluate the defence of Egypt and the Canal zone. This had been slowly built up since the scare over the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, but needs elsewhere had limited this. Contingency plans are put into action to bring in reinforcements.


    1st June 1939 - The new Nuffield Tank


    Given that the A13 Scimitar was the Nuffield Organisations first foray into designing a tank, they felt they'd done a pretty good job. However it now seemed that the rapid changes in tank design would be better served by a new design, based on the successful parts of the A13, would be a better way forward. They'd also learnt from Vickers to treat Ministry Specifications more as guidelines than rules.

    The big difference was the engine. There had been a lot of heating issues with the Liberty engine, as well as the issue of its cost, and for this tank a new engine had been provided for, a new flat 12 of over 300hp. If that didn't work out, the Liberty could be used with fairly minor modifications. The VVSS Horstman suspension had proven to work very well on the A13 - so well in fact it was being copied by Vickers for their next heavy tanks - and while the transmission and mechanicals had needed changing, it has been possible to base much of them on the A13, which had made a big reduction in the time needed to get the prototype working.

    The tank was the first designed in Britain that exceeded the recommended track gauge for the railways, at 9'3" wide. This had been found necessary to fit the engine and its cooling system in - the engine was flat, which was good (it meant a lower tank profile), but also wide. As it was by now obvious that these tanks would be travelling around the Continental railway system, with its more generous width restriction, this had been accepted by the Army. While it would require checking before shipping them around Britain, in practice there weren't many bottlenecks that would affect it, and any that were an issue could be handled by routing accordingly.

    The width had also allowed a wide turret ring. Vickers had built their two current models with a 60" turret ring, to allow both the 6/18pdr close support weapon, and if needed a larger high velocity gun. While the Nuffield engineers had their own ideas about the shape and layout of the turret, it had been decided to copy this. They could actually have made it slightly wider, but a common diameter seemed a sensible thing. The prototype mounted the HV3pdr, but they pointed out it could also take the 6/18pdr if the Army wanted a close support version. There had been a suggestion that a narrower ring could be used, and shape the turret to allow more space, but in the end a simpler shape was used. This way they could fit the preferred 5 man crew into the tank. The changes from the old A13 turret were fairly small, the most obvious being the extra room of the wider turret, aided by using the new mechanical elevation control, pushing the gun further forward.

    The biggest change from the A13 was the weight. The Army had actually been quite reluctant to suggest a weight, merely saying that the all-up weight should be less than 24 tons to make it easy for the Army's current equipment to handle. The mild steel prototype came in at 21 tons, and they expected the final version to be closer to 22tons. They had used welding - this had been considered for the A13, but time constraints had made them decide on riveted construction for that tank - and that gave them over 4% weight reduction They had increased the size of the fuel tank - the tank could now achieve 180 miles range on the road, better than the current Vickers tanks, and their first trial had clocked it at 25mph on the road and 15 on rough terrain, making it suitable for the cruiser role if needed.

    With the changes, particular the all-welded hull, Nuffield had decided to build the tank in a different factory to the A13. They expected to be able to produce 20 tanks a month 9 months after a contract was approved, and could expand into another of their factories if more were needed - the main limitation was the funding. This also let them carry on producing the A13, which was still considered an acceptable tank, one which would be soon equipping the armoured force protecting the Suez Canal.

    5th July 1939, MEE Farnborough.

    The unit was pleased to see the first of the production A12 Matilda II tanks. They'd evaluated the prototypes, and it seemed to have taken an age for the final version to come off the production line. Normally they'd have gone to the training unit, but after all the delays the Army wanted to be sure everything was all right now. So they'd been sent the first four for a final evaluation before sending them on to the training unit, but so far everything looked good. It certainly looked the part, it just seemed a shame these had taken so long to get to them.
     
    Top