April 1939, exercise with French tank force (somewhere in France, near Nouvion)
Last autumn it had been agree to hold a joint training exercise in France, sending over an Armoured formation to see how they did against the French Army. With all the workload imposed by the changes to the planned size of the Army, they had seriously considered postponing this, but a number of considerations made it go forward. First, it was seen as an important sign of Anglo-French cooperation and as such show to Germany that the two countries were acting together. Second, if as was looking more and more probable, the two countries would be involved with a war in the not too distant future, the exercise would be a valuable learning tool. And finally, it was pointed out that moving a battalion of tanks, their support and some infantry units to France and back would be an invaluable practice for the logistics people - they were looking with worry at how much and how soon they might have to be moving to France if war came.
So a battalion of tanks plus some of their support - half of an Armoured Brigade - had been loaded onto flatcars and sent off across the channel. There had been a few problems, of course - tanks weren't the easiest of things to move around, even on rail, but in general the Staff were pleased with the way the movement went. A careful note of things that needed to be changed in case a full deployment was needed soon was made.
The exercises themselves went surprisingly well. The French armour, led by Colonel DeGaulle, obviously wanted to show their skill on their home ground, while the RTC men were equally determined to show the French what they could do. Both sides were to play the part of attacker and defender in turn, the defence using an associated infantry force. Lasting a week, they showed up a number of issues for both sides.
The reports - endorsed by the umpires and commanders on both sides - were interesting. The French had done well in attack, but suffered more losses than they had anticipated. The British put this down to better control of their tanks, and better awareness by the commander, not distracted by having to serve as his own gunner. It was noted that the French unit that was fully equipped with radios suffered less. The number of heavy (for the period) anti-tank guns was also a problem, causing the tanks to constantly stop and call down artillery to suppress them. The failure to do this tended to result in heavy tank casualties. For their part the British hadn't realised how tough the S-35's and Char B were, even with the HV3pdr it was hard to kill them at a decent range.
The second phase, with the British attacking, was considered even more valuable. The British tactics were somewhat similar to those the German Armour was expected to employ, making use of their mobility and mobile support to engage the defenders at good odds, and using their speed to break up the defence. Again, this proved lethal to the French units without radios, they simply couldn't coordinate fast enough. The other problem was the unreliability of the French tanks. Tanks were breaking down on both sides, of course, but the reliability of the British units was considerably better. Adding to this, the difficulty of mending the tanks in the field was much higher for the S-35's, resulting in the Umpires deciding the tanks had been lost. The French were also impressed with the way some of the 'damaged' or broken down British tanks were recovered by tractor units, and ruled available for the next day.
The end of the exercise had given both sides a good idea of where they stood. The British were pleased by their tanks, and thought their methods had worked well, although using them against the French had shown quite a few areas that could do with more improvement. 'Killing' the heavily armoured French tanks had been quite hard, although nothing much could be done about that except more gunnery practice. The recovery vehicles support had worked, it also showed they needed more. Given the current equipment shortage, that would be a problem. They'd also had issues with a French 'minefield'; with all the other work that had been going on, clearing mines had been given a low priority, but that really needed looking at more closely.
The French were disappointed with their performance in a number of areas. They were proud of their armoured formations, and hadn't expected the British to be quite so good. A number of recommendations were made both by DeGaulle and the other senior officers attending the exercise.
It was clear that a radio was a big advantage in a fluid battle. Granted the French were hoping not to fight meeting engagements, but they were going to happen, like it or not. Priority should be given to radio equipment, and if there was a shortage, it seemed obvious that formations put in a position to be involved in a fluid battle should be the ones best equipped.
The issue with better command and control was noted, but this was impossible to fix in any short timescale. The idea of at least a two-man turret to improve the problem was already under consideration; in the meantime, more training for the commanders would fill the need. Other than that, they needed to practice at drawing a German attack into a battle favourable to their methods.
The issue of mechanical unreliability was again known; they were impressed by the British tanks, and again efforts were being made to improve their own. One thing that could be done was to start to provide recovery vehicles; the difficulty of fixing the problems on the S-35 tanks would still make it difficult, but at least they could get more tanks back, to be repaired rather than just falling into enemy hands.
Both sides were happy with their artillery, for different reasons. The British ability for light artillery on tracks to follow up fast had impressed, but the French didn't feel a need for it quite yet. Their own plentiful artillery had worked, and while SP guns seemed a nice thing, they had more urgent priorities. In any case, they were not hoping for a meeting engagement in which such a gun would be of the most use.
It was agreed that overall it had been a success, and it was hoped to repeat it perhaps in 6 months time once the lessons had been fully learnt and improvements, where possible, had been made. There was already an ongoing program between some of the armament firms to cooperate - the French companies were very interested in some solutions the British had to some areas they knew needed improvement, such as tank suspension, and the British companies were keeping a close eye on some French technology such as ammunition. With the threat from Germany steadily growing, such cooperation was considered a good idea. One new suggestion was that a small committee be set up, with members from both countries, to examine problems in detail and see if the other country had a better solution. However the current commitments of the British Army, particularly the RTC, made this an idea that would have to wait a while.
SOUMA had been collaborating with some of the British tank manufacturers for some time now. The new S-40 design had come along well, and with the recent rising of tensions had been given a high priority. They had originally intended to show the Army a prototype in October, but this had now been moved forward to July. The incorporation of the British-designed VVSS suspension had gone better than anticipated, which had helped. The new engine still wasn't ready, but the company had suggested the current engine to speed production; the new engine would be fitted as soon as it was available. With a few changes, the tank would cover the deficiencies noted in the recent exercise, and give the French Army what they felt would be the best medium tank in the world.