3rd February 1939, Limited Liability revoked and the larger army
On the 2nd February, the doctrine of limited liability was finally formally revoked. The new size of the Army would be 10 divisions, two of them armoured, and appropriate TA reserves. Having finally got what they wished for, and a promise of funding, the Army now had a large problem to wrestle with - now to get all the equipment they needed, and how to get the manpower to use it all. There would need to be serious increases in the training system.
One of the ironies the RTC was well aware of was that having finally got what they'd been asking for, they now had to deal with the problems of actually doing it. The biggest problem was how to effectively double the size of the armoured formations. After three years, they hadn't even got the first armoured division compete. Ordering more tanks was fine, but as recent discussions had shown, ordering tanks wasn't like turning on a tap. It would take time for production to ramp up, no matter how many tanks they ordered.
Worse, they would have to implement massive increases in training. They would have to speed up the training of new crews, which also meant more trainers, and worse, a lot more tanks to be used for training. The exercises over the past few years had been invaluable in working out their new methods and doctrine, but the result of the inevitable heavy use of the existing armour had basically written it all off. At best, it could be used for basic familiarisation training at home, but the tanks were worn out. A less energetic exercise program might have avoided this.
The second problem was the lack of tanks for training. Currently they were assuming about 20% of the new tanks went to training and replacements. This was fine as long as they were looking at the old system of relatively small numbers of crews. The number allocated to training would have to go up, and this meant even fewer tanks would end up in service. There was even a suggestion - soon quashed - that maybe they could build a few hundred cheap light tanks. Granted they would have eased the training problem a little, and they could be built quite quickly, but that would divert effort from the tanks they really needed. Worse, despite all their lectures and demonstrations, there were still a lot of Army officers who didn't really understand the use of tanks. To them, anything with tracks was a tank, and they'd assume they could use a light tank as a cruiser. Which would result in lost battles, and a lot of dead tank crews. Better not to put temptation in their way.
The training issue was only going to get worse when they had to assign tanks for the infantry to train with. One thing that had been emphasised by the more successful infantry commanders in the exercises was the need for their men to know how to work with tanks and how best to support and be supported by them. While the RTC fully endorsed this, they hadn't expected to be needing to actually do the training for some time. The only thing they could really do to ease the problem was to have the tank crews from the tank regiments help out; that eased the manpower burden, but tanks would still be needed, they couldn't just wear out the regiments tanks in training.
Of course, it wasn't just the lack of tank numbers. The RTC had been expecting to form the Mobile Division this summer, once enough tanks had been built. Their intention had been to use the summer exercises to show the flaws, then spend the next year getting the division to operate smoothly. The EAF and later formations had basically been Brigade-sized units, and they'd never built a full Armoured Division before, there were going to be problems. Now it looked like they were going to have to do this 'on the run', and that was likely to cause even bigger problems.
Apart from the tanks, the rest of the equipment they needed was just as big a problem. Given the equipment scales needed for the new formations, there was a shortage of everything, from boots to bullets. The best that could be done was to get on with it. Fortunately the Division was already an approved unit, and formations had been allocated, or they suspected they would have had huge problems even putting the Division together. As it was, all their units would be fighting for their share of equipment. At least one senior officer was heard to remark he wasn't sure which was worse - not getting what you asked for, or actually getting it!
Still, at least now they wouldn't have to constantly fight just to get approval of what they needed to do. More tanks and carriers would be needed as soon as possible, and a review would be made of when orders could be placed to get the type they needed as early as possible. The numbers of tanks was alarming to those who'd been used to ordering tanks by the dozen; equipping the suggested two armoured divisions, and 2 independent armoured brigades, would take some 1,200 tanks, add training and replacements and some allowance for wastage and they were looking at more like 2,000. And Egypt would need additional formations on top of that!
While a full review of needs and production would take some weeks, it was decided to order an additional 150 A13 tanks from Nuffield, who had nearly finished their initial run of 70 tanks. The immediate fixes the company had offered would help, and the current thinking was that they could be sent out to Egypt. That would give Hobart at uniform tank Brigade, and the thinner armour of that model wouldn't be an issue facing the Italians. It would hopefully also give time for them to look at fixing the engine issues.