DeGaulle's Report on the British Army 1938 Summer Exercise
Colonel DeGaulle considered his words carefully before starting on his report on the British Army summer exercises he'd returned from. While he had found fault with some of the ideas and actions he'd witnessed, there were some aspects that would be worth looking at more deeply.
First, the men. The British Armoured formation was obviously professional, only to be expected of long term soldiers, and knew their jobs well. There had been issues with some of the vehicles, but his liaison had explained that they were using the exercise to have a first look at some of their new equipment, and in some cases training had been rushed to get them on the field. He could understand that - the politicians in France as well were less than forthcoming for the money needed for vital exercises, and maximising the lessons learnt was only prudent.
The tactics used he had found interesting, although by no means perfect.
The first was their aim to if possible bypass the enemy to strike at his rear and B-echelon troops. While he agreed with that as an efficient way of defeating the enemy, he was less than convinced about the way they went about it. Their first aim was to outflank. If that failed, to exploit a weak point found by their reconnaissance troops, and as a last result to punch a hold to drive their exploitation force through. While such tactics might well be effective against lesser opposition, such as the Italian forces they faced in North Africa, he considered it far less likely to work against the Germans. Leaving your flanks unguarded, or weak points, was an amateur mistake the German Army was not going to make. A German force would have to be attacked first. This was why the French Army had the Char B, a tank designed to break through a defence. He was unconvinced that the British heavy tanks were capable of this. While faster and more mobile than the Char B, they didn't mount the powerful gun it carried to reduce fortifications. It would do the job they intended, to support an infantry attack, but this would be of limited use against a well prepared enemy. It didn't help that he considered their artillery support too light by French standards. He felt that their methods and equipment would lead to too many casualties unless luck was on their side.
The second part of the exercises he had seen was more interesting. The forces had been used first to counter-attack an infantry breakthrough, then in defence to fortify the infantry against a more powerful force. He could see both tactics being useful if France was attacked by Germany. The use of a powerful tank force to 'plug the gap' or ideally destroy a breakthrough was suited to the fast moving armoured formation. The use of tanks to reinforce was again only good tactics, and the French Army already had such plans.
The issue he had was with their equipment. They had good, fast heavy tanks, but only in small numbers. They had nothing like the supply of smaller infantry support tanks the French had, and he wasn't convinced that they could handle such a defence. Their medium, Cruiser, tanks were good, on a par with the S-35. A rather different design philosophy, but overall similar machines - reasonably fast, well protected and with a good gun. He noted that the British were still using the idea of the 5-man crew. The number of men such crews used was presumably of less importance in a relatively small tank force than the French one. He did appreciate the idea - allowing the commander freedom to command was certainly of benefit, although three men in the turret seemed too many. A four man crew was probably the best compromise, and he made a note to ask if they were still looking at the idea of a new model of S-35 that incorporated this concept.
He had noted that the British tanks seemed reliable. Obviously exercises were not quite normal conditions, every tank unit made sure all their vehicles were as ready as possible beforehand, something not always possible in a real war, but they hadn't had many breakdowns. What he had seen that he wanted to recommend was the way they allocated recovery vehicles to assist or withdraw broken down (or marked as damaged by the umpires) tanks for repair either behind the front lines, or taken by transported to the base workshop area. That would certainly reduce tanks lost to mechanical failures, and perhaps more should be done along these lines. It was notable that certain breakdowns, like a broken track, were repaired much faster than on most French tanks.
The infantry carriers he had found interesting. They were used mainly to carry troops, rather than supplies, a reversal of their use in the French Army. They had seemed rugged vehicles, although he felt the lack of things like a specialised vehicle for refuelling the tanks was a serious omission.
In all, he supposed he could sum up his report as interesting, some promising ideas and vehicles, but the need more work and better tactics. One of the more senior British officers had mentioned to him, in the mess after the exercise, that it was a pity they couldn't arrange some sort of exercise with the French armour, such a thing would likely be of benefit to both countries. He decided to see if someone higher up would consider the idea. While he felt that the British would get the most benefit from French experience, they had shown a few promising ideas, and an enemy with different equipment and ideas was a better opponent than your own men.
