My 1000th post!
The 1816 caucus was a defining event in the history of the Democratic-Republican Party. The 1820 caucus, by contrast, was nearly a non-event, with many congressmen not even bothering to attend. Both were marked by unprecedented unanimity within the ranks of the party.
And then there was 1824. Once again, the party gathered at Gadsby’s Tavern in Alexandria — but this time, the mood could not have been more different. William Crawford had finally decided to make his bid for the presidency. His most prominent backer was John C. Calhoun, the powerful chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. His other backers — most prominently Nicholas Ware and David Holmes — were all Southern.
There was a reason why. Since the collapse of the Federalist Party, many of its most important members, such as Rufus King and Daniel Webster, had risen to prominence in the DRP — and a good many of them had no use for slavery. Paraphrasing Horace, Vice President Monroe joked that “captive Hartford[1] has taken captive her fierce conqueror, and brought abolitionism into rustic Virginia.” To Crawford and Calhoun, it wasn’t funny. They saw their position eroding year by year, and they were determined to halt the process. Their goal was not simply to elect Crawford president, but to establish the DRP as neutral if not friendly to the expansion of slavery into the territories.
By a vote of more than two to one, the caucus rejected Crawford in favor of Henry Clay and his running mate, James Barbour. Undeterred, Calhoun asked Clay where he stood on the settlement of Arkansaw, and whether he agreed with the position put forward by Sen. Martin Van Buren of New York. That position was that slavery was an evil. In those states where it existed, the federal government had no authority to tamper with it, but that government should not permit it to spread into a single territory.
In principle, there was no reason whatsoever to raise the question now. It would be some years before Arkansaw had enough settlers to justify its admission as a state. In any case, the caucus was hardly the appropriate venue. But since most of Congress was here in person, even if not acting in their congressional capacity, it was not completely irrelevant.
Clay’s answer was crystalline in its sheer vagueness. Although he personally continued to believe, as he had said in the debate over the Tallmadge Amendment, that the best way to weaken slavery was to “diffuse” it over as broad an area as possible, he would not attempt to “compel the introduction” of the institution into those territories “where there was no affinity for it.” He added, however, that “it would be against reason to impose a uniform law or condition governing the settlement of such broad and diverse regions as our territories.” In other words, slaveholders could continue to settle Arkansaw — maybe — but had best avoid Ioway and the other territories where free labor had already set its stamp.
Calhoun then asked if the admission of a future state of Arkansaw would be subject to the same conditions that Sen. Tallmadge had imposed upon Missouri. Clay replied, reasonably enough, that it was “far too early to say.”
This did not satisfy either Sen. Tallmadge or Rufus King. They already thought of Van Buren’s position not as a coherent legal and moral position, but as a middle ground between good and evil, one that condemned millions to slavery while offering vague hope for their grandchildren or great-grandchildren. Now, the compromise was itself being compromised by no less than the party’s own candidate for president. To abolitionists, it seemed that they were trapped in a sort of political Zeno’s paradox, doomed to meet the slaveholders halfway and halfway and halfway again while the slaveholders themselves never budged an inch.
But those slaveholders saw things very differently. Leaving the District and Missouri out of the equation, there were now ten slave states with the possibility of one more — perhaps two, said the optimists. (Very little was known at this point of the Kyantine River[2] region.) There were twelve free states, with the certainty of at least four more in time now that the boundaries of Mennisota Territory had been drawn. The ambitious and unflappable Crawford might set aside this defeat and set his eyes on 1828, but to Calhoun, the central government he had done so much to empower was beginning to look distinctly unfriendly. The Dead Roses had been good to him — and he bore a personal grudge against Randolph from last year’s debate over the niter tariff[3] — but neither gratitude nor bitterness could change the facts.
Andrea Fessler, Rise of the Dead Rose
[1] A reference to the Hartford Convention, the New Englanders’ Never-Live-It-Down moment.
[2] OTL’s Canadian River.
[3] I probably should have made this into a separate post, but… as late as the Civil War IOTL, the U.S. was dependent on British imports of niter, which would have been a problem if the U.S. ever had to fight Great Britain. The tariff was intended to make it possible for a domestic niter industry to grow.
Randolph opposed this for two reasons. First of all, he didn’t like tariffs. Second, the main beneficiary of the proposed tariff (other than the U.S. armed forces) was the Alexandria apothecary/dyeworks Stabler & Sons, which had already achieved great wealth and political clout from being the official supplier of “Republican Purple” dye and now wanted to branch out into the niter business. Randolph saw this as political corruption. During the debate in the House, he managed to phrase his objections in a way that made it sound like he was accusing Calhoun of having been bought off by Stabler. Calhoun took grave offense at this. Henry Clay had to step in and defuse the situation before it escalated into a duel.
As for the tariff, it will come as no surprise to learn that the Dead Roses, and Stabler & Sons, got their way. (My poor Americans — not even a quarter of the way into the 19th century and they’re already developing their own military-industrial complex.)