I understand. Everything kind of makes sense (in an insane, twisted, Imperial Japan sort of way), I guess? At least you incorporated my suggestion of the 3rd Carrier Division attacking Western Australia.

Midway is a disaster in sunken ships? Going back to your previous statements, it would probably be up to two fleet carriers and two light carriers sunk based on the idea that an entire carrier division was sunk (out of two participating?), I suppose. It will be interesting to see the extent of American losses- probably more than OTL from what I can divine from your writing.

Oh, and while I don't particularly like the fact that Coral Sea was so precisely similar to OTL, I understand and accept that (you don't want to rewrite the entire update, I get it). It would be really nice if you could write a unique Midway, though.
I'd also like to see the responses to Midway, especially in capital ship production. Your Japan has at least 12 slips equipped for building capital ships (probably more like 20) and at least 6 more for light carrier equivalents (at least, probably 20-30ish?) based on their current building rates. That's... a lot. A LOT. They'll probably be mostly focused on building fleet carriers after the lessons of Coral Sea and Midway- allowing ITTL Japan to have a relatively similar number of carriers to the US in the future (well, at least in the same order of magnitude).

And about the escorts? Your reason... makes sense, given the times. Oh well. It seems the massive zerg rushes of a hundred cruisers at a time will have to wait until later. But when they happen- IT WILL BE GLORIOUS.

Also, one question. Is/Will Japan (be) building Bofors 40mm? After the lessons of Coral Sea and Midway, they probably will want to refit their AA. They captured some in Singapore OTL and did start at least some production, not to mention any 40mm mounted on the Chinese ships.
 
As a lession of Ciral Sea/Midway, Japan will definetly update their AA amounts, Carrier support, overall strategy, weapons and other things as fast as possible.
 
As a lession of Ciral Sea/Midway, Japan will definetly update their AA amounts, Carrier support, overall strategy, weapons and other things as fast as possible.

With better Axis coordination, the Japanese could mount plenty of the formidable dual turret 3.7 cm Flak 37 AA guns, plus radar and sonar on their boats. Maybe even naval versions of the Fw-190, in exchange for helping the Kaiserliche Marine launch their own carrier program?
 
Chapter 198: Andrey Andreyevich Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Army
Chapter 198: Andrey Andreyevich Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Army:
Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-J28172%2C_Andrej_Andrejewitsch_Wlassow.jpg

Andrey Andreyevich Vlasov or Wlassow (Russian: Андрéй Андрéевич Влáсов, born September 14 [O.S. September 1] 1901) was a Russian Red Army general. During the Second Great War, he was captured attempting to lift the siege of Leningrad. After being captured, he defected to the Axis Central Powers and the new Russian Tsardom and headed the so-called Russian Liberation (Russkaya osvoboditel'naya armiya (ROA)) that would later be the Imperial Russian Army once again.

Born in Lomakino, Nizhny Novgorod Governorate, Russian Empire, Vlasov was originally a student at a Russian Orthodox seminary. He quit the study of divinity after the Russian Revolution, briefly studying agricultural sciences instead, and in 1919 joined the Red Army fighting in the southern theatre in Ukraine, the Caucasus and the Crimea.. He distinguished himself as an officer and gradually rose through the ranks of the Red Army. Vlasov joined the Communist Party in 1930. Sent to China, he acted as a military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek's United Chinese Front from 1938 to November 1939. Upon his return, Vlasov served in several assignments before being given command of the 99th Rifle Division. After just nine months under Vlasov's leadership, and an inspection by Semyon Timoshenko, the division was recognized as one of the best divisions in the Army in 1940. Later iIn 1940, Vlasov was promoted to major general, and when the Germans and their allies invaded the Soviet Union, Vlasov was commanding the 4th Mechanized Corps.

Shortly after the invasion began, Vlasov's corps retook Przemy´sl, holding it for six days. As a lieutenant general, he commanded the 37th Army near Kiev and escaped encirclement.

Vlasov then was put in command of the 2nd Shock Army of the Vulkhov Front of the Volkhov Front and ordered to lead the attempt to lift the Siege of Leningrat during the Lyuban-Chudovo Offensive Operation.

Vlasov's army had spearheaded the Lyuban Offensive Operation to break the Leningrad encirclement. Planned as a combined operation between the Volkhov and Leningrad Fronts on a 30 km frontage, other armies of the Leningrader Front (including the 54th) were supposed to participate at scheduled intervals in this operation. Crossing the Volkhov River, Vlasov's army was successful in breaking through the Imperial German 18th Army's lines and penetrated 70–74 km deep inside German rear area. However, the other armies (the Volkhov Front's 4th, 52nd and 59th Armies, 13th Cavalry Corps, and 4th and 6th Guards Rifle Corps, as well as the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front) failed to exploit Vlasov's advances and provide the required support, and Vlasov's army became stranded. Permission to retreat was refused. With the counter-offensive in April 1942, the Second Shock Army was finally allowed to retreat, but by now, too weakened, it was surrounded and in Mai 1942 virtually annihilated during the final breakout at Myasnoi Bor.
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After Vlasov's army was surrounded, he himself was offered an escape by aeroplane. The general refused and hid in German-occupied territory; ten days later, on June 12, 1942, a local farmer exposed him to the Germans. Vlasov's opponent and captor, general Georg Lindemann, interrogated him about the surrounding of his army and details of battles, then "had Vlasov imprisoned in occupied Vinnytsia." Vlasov claimed that during his ten days in hiding he affirmed his anti-bolshevism, believing Joseph Stalin was the greatest enemy of the Russian people, and there is evidence that suggests Vlasov may have changed sides in a bid to give his countrymen a better life than the one they had under Stalin. His critics, including MarshalKirill Meretskov (who had endorsed Vlasov's promotion to executive officer of the Volkhov front) and some believed that Vlasov adopted a pro-Axis Central Powers German stance in prison out of opportunism, careerism, and survival, fearing Stalinist retribution for losing his last battle and his army.

While in prison, Vlasov met Captain Wilfried Strik-Strikfeld, a Baltig German who was attempting to foster a Russian Liberation Movement. Strik-Strikfeldt had circulated memos to this effect in the Imperial German Army. Strik-Strikfeldt, who had been a participant in the White Movement during the Russian civil war, persuaded Vlasov to become involved in aiding the German advance against the rule of Joseph Stalin and bolshevism. With Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Boyarsky, Vlasov wrote a memo shortly after his capture to the German military leaders suggesting cooperation between anti-Stalinist Russians and the German Army.

Vlasov was taken to Berlin under the protection of the Imperial German Armies propaganda department. While there, he and other Soviet officers, Exiled Russian nobles and the future Tsar began drafting plans for the creation of a Russian provisional government and the recruitment of a Russian army of liberation under Russian command. Vlasov founded the Russian Liberation Army, known as ROA (from Russkaya Osvoboditel'naya Armiya). When the Axis Central Powers liberated Leningrad and Tsar Vladimir proclaimed the new Russian Empire, Vlasov wrote an anti-Bolshevik leaflet known as the "St. Petersburg Proclamation", which was dropped from aircraft by the millions on Soviet forces and Soviet-controlled soil. In the same year, Vlasov also published an open letter titled "Why have I taken u the Struggle against Bolshevism". He quickly became a prominent figure and leading General of the Russian Liberation Army. With the newly formed Russian Liberation Army out of former Russian Prisoners of War, the Axis Central Power's propaganda department issued Russian Liberation Army patches to Russian volunteers and tried to use Vlasov's name in order to encourage defections. Several hundred thousand former Soviet citizens served in the newly formed Russian Liberation Army quickly after, wearing this patch and uniforms (some German ones, but also recolored Red Army Uniforms and newer ones clearly inspired by the old Imperial Russian Army and the White Army during the Civil War) under Vlasov's own command. Tsar Vladimir himself encouraged Vlaslov to become the new Supreme General-feldmarshal for it's armed forces, even if some Axis Central Powers members and governments were still very wary of Vlasov and his intentions. On the other hand there was a growing support of Vlasov's inside the Axis Central Powers armies to use a new White Movement to win the Crusade against Bolshevism.
Denikin_poster.jpg

By now many in Axis Central Power dominated Europe believed that Tsar Vladimir and General Vlasov might succeed in overthrowing Stalin, destroying the Soviet Union and liberation a new Russian Empire in the east that would be allied to their Axis Central Power cause. To promote the liberation of Russia, Tsar Vladimir and General-feldmarshal Vlasov took several trips to Axis-Central Power-occupied Russia, organizing local votes and government (encouraging people to rule themselves as they seem fit) and promoting volunteers to join their Russian Liberation Army to protect this new freedoms and reforms. During their speeches Tsar Vladimir and General-feldmarshal Vlasov referred to the Axis Central Power forces as guests and neighbors that would help the Russians to kick the Bolshevic intruder and criminals out of their homes.

The Tsar's and Vlasov emissaries lectured to the Russian prisoners of war, explaining to them that their government had declared them all traitors, and that escaping was pointless. As Vlasov proclaimed, even if the Soviets succeeded, Stalin would send them to Sibiria. Under service of the new Tsar, Vlasov and his Russian Liberation Army fought the Red Army alongside the Axis Central Power forces that had attacked the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Eastern Crusade. Because some Axis Central Power forces and governments did not truly trust the Russians that had switched sides from the Soviet Army to the Russian Liberation Army, they at first only permitted them to operate near regular Axis Central Power forces, in support of them, or in the rear lines as Guard Divisions.
 
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With better Axis coordination, the Japanese could mount plenty of the formidable dual turret 3.7 cm Flak 37 AA guns, plus radar and sonar on their boats. Maybe even naval versions of the Fw-190, in exchange for helping the Kaiserliche Marine launch their own carrier program?


Wait, are I assume you're not talking about the semi-automatic hand loaded 3.7cm Flak gun right?
 
Got it, I mistook it for the C/30.

Technically the 3.7 cm Flak 37 was originally not designed for the naval use...but then again neither was the 25 mm Hotchkiss AA Gun that was the basis for the Japanese Type-96 Light AA Gun. I'm sure they can cope.

The Japanese should also try and get the license for the 8.8 cm Flak 37. It might be too heavy for use on ships, not without extensive rebuilds, but in ground-based defense it'd be very effective. Trade oxygen torpedo tech and amphibious landing craft designs for it, maybe even the data and plans for Experimental Submarine 71. That last would be very useful for development of the Type-XXI and Type-XXIII U-boats. For the 3.7 cm Flak 37 and maybe a carrier variant of the Fw-190, make the last a shared project and as part of Japanese help for a German carrier program in exchange for the former. Germany needs carriers if it's going to be a world power after WWII.
 
Technically the 3.7 cm Flak 37 was originally not designed for the naval use...but then again neither was the 25 mm Hotchkiss AA Gun that was the basis for the Japanese Type-96 Light AA Gun. I'm sure they can cope.

The Japanese should also try and get the license for the 8.8 cm Flak 37. It might be too heavy for use on ships, not without extensive rebuilds, but in ground-based defense it'd be very effective. Trade oxygen torpedo tech and amphibious landing craft designs for it, maybe even the data and plans for Experimental Submarine 71. That last would be very useful for development of the Type-XXI and Type-XXIII U-boats. For the 3.7 cm Flak 37 and maybe a carrier variant of the Fw-190, make the last a shared project and as part of Japanese help for a German carrier program in exchange for the former. Germany needs carriers if it's going to be a world power after WWII.

Disgusting Army weapon REEEEEEEEEEEEEEE. /s
 
Chapter 199: Hitler's former Cabinet – A tale of Franz Gürtner
Chapter 199: Hitler's former Cabinet – A tale of Franz Gürtner
Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-H13466%2C_Franz_G%C3%BCrtner.jpg

Franz Gürtner (26 August 1881 – 29 January 1941) was a German Minister of Justice in Adolf's cabinet, responsible for coordinating jurisprudence in the Nazi controlled Germany. He provided official sanction and legal grounds for a series of actions under the governments of Franz von Papen, Kurt von Schleicher, and Adolf Hitler from 1932 until his death in 1941.

Gürtner was the son of Franz Gürtner (locomotive engineer) and Marie Gürtner, née Weinzierl. After the graduating from the gymnasium in 1900 in Regensburg, he studied law at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. After eight semesters he passed in 1904 his university examination. His preparation for Bavarian civil service was interrupted for the military service in the Königlich Bayerisches 11. Infanterie-Regiment „von der Tann“. After passing his second Staatsexamen in 1908 he worked as syndic for a Munich brewery association. On October 1, 1909, he entered the higher civil service of the Bavarian ministry of justice. On August 7, 1914 Gürtner was drafted as a reserve officer for military service in First Great War. He served with the 11th Infantry Regiment on the Western Front. He rose to deputy battalion commander and received the Iron Cross II and I. Class and the Military Merit Order (Bavaria) IV class with swords. From September 1917 he took part with the Bavarian Infantry Battalion 702 (as Expeditionary Force) in the campaign in Palestine region of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, he received the House Order of Hohenzollern with swords and the Gallipoli Star. His appointment as battalion commander on October 31, 1918 was the day of the surrender of the Ottoman Empire. He led the battalion back to Constantinople and arrived on March 17, 1919 in Wilhelmshaven, where he was demobilized.

After the war, Gürtner pursued a successful legal career, being appointed Bavarian Minister of Justice on 8 November 1922, a position he held until his nomination by Franz von Papen as Reich Minister of Justice on 2 June 1932. Through a Roman Catholic, Gürtner joined the largely Protestant German National People's Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei, DNVP), which was unusual as German Catholics usually supported the Zentrum or in Bavaria the Bavarian People's Party. Gürtner was a staunch conservative and nationalist who rejected the Weimar Republic, as he associated democracy with "weakness", which led him into the radical conservative DNVP. A member of the German National People' Party and an old-school bureaucrat, Gürtner was sympathetic to right-wing extremists such as Hitler. During the 1924 Beer Hall Putsch trial, Hitler was allowed to interrupt the proceedings as often as he wished, to cross-examine witnesses at will, and to speak on his own behalf at almost any length. Gürtner obtained Hitler's early release from Landsberg Prison, and later persuaded the Bavarian government to legalize the banned NSDAP, and allow Hitler to speak again in public.

After serving as Minister of Justice in the cabinets of Papen and Kurt von Schleicher, Gürtner was retained by Hitler in his post, and made responsible for coordinating jurisprudence in the Third Reich. Although Gürtner was not a Nazi, he was an authoritarian by inclination (as were the rest of his DNVP colleagues). He fully supported the Reichstag Fire Decree, which effectively wiped out civil liberties in Germany. Indeed, on the day before the Reichstag fire, he proposed a bill that was almost as heavy-handed as the Reichstag Fire Decree; it would have instituted severe restrictions on civil liberties under the pretense of keeping the Communists from launching a general strike. He also merged the German judges' association with the new National Socialist Lawyers Association (Nationalsozialistischer Rechtswahrerbund), and provided a veil of constitutional legality for the new Nazi State.

At first, Gürtner also tried to protect the independence of the judiciary and at least a facade of legal norms. Gürtner as an old-fashioned conservative rejected democracy, but partly because he believed in the rechtsstaat ("law state") and partly to protect the turf of his ministry, he sought to club the tendency of the SA and the SS to engage in extrajudicial punishments. Gürtner was most insistent that only the courts could inflict punishments on opponents of the Nazi regime. The ill-treatment of prisoners at concentration camps in Wuppertal (Kemna), Bredow and Hohenstein (in Saxony), under the jurisdiction of local SA leaders, provoked a sharp protest from the Ministry of Justice. Gürtner observed that prisoners were being beaten to the point of unconsciousness with whips and blunt instruments, commenting that such treatment "reveals a brutality and cruelty in the perpetrators which are totally alien to German sentiment and feeling. Such cruelty, reminiscent of oriental sadism cannot be explained or excused by militant bitterness however great."

In 1933, Gürtner came into conflict with one of his subordinates, Roland Freisler, over the issues of Rassenschande (literally: "racial disgrace"), or sexual relationship between an "Aryan" and a "non-Aryan", which Freisler wanted immediately criminalized. Gürtner, in a meeting, pointed out many practical difficulties with Freisler's proposal. This did not, however, stop the passing of the Nuremberg Laws two years later, criminalizing it.

In the weeks following the Night of the Long Knives, a purge of SA officers and conservative critics of the regime that resulted in perhaps hundreds of executions, he demonstrated his loyalty to the Nazi regime by writing a law that added a legal veneer to the purge. Signed into law by both Hitler and Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick, the "Law Regarding Measures of State Self-Defense"retrospectively legalized the murders committed during the purge. Gürtner even quashed some initial efforts by local prosecutors to take legal action against those who carried out the murders. As a part of bid to retain a role for the judiciary in the repression of enemies of the state and to protect the rechtsstaat, Gürtner opened the first session of the People's Court on 14 July 1934. The People's Court was a special court for trying those accused of being enemies of the state, whose procedures were meant to ensure the conviction of the accused. Starting in 1933, Gürtner found himself uneasily attempting to maintain the rule of law in Germany by bending the rules of the laws to suit Hitler, a process that steadily involved him and the rest of the German judiciary into excusing and justifying terror.

In July 1935, Gürtner amended Paragraph 175 of the German penal code to extend its scope and increased the penalties. By the end of 1935, it was already apparent that neither Gürtner nor Frick would be able to impose limitations on the power of the Gestapo, or control the SS camps where thousands of detainees were being held without judicial review. During the Second Great War, the feeble protestation of the Ministry of Justice was weakened still further, as alleged criminals were increasingly 'dealt with' by the Gestapo and SA, without recourse to any court of law.

Instead of resigning, Gürtner stayed on, even going as far as joining the Nazi Party in 1937. He provided official sanction and legal grounds for a series of repressive actions, beginning with the institution of Ständegerichte (drumhead court-martial) that trialed people in the occupied eastern territories. A district judge and member of the Confessing Church, Lothar Kreyssing, wrote to Gürtner protesting (correctly) that the mass murder and euthanasia program was illegal (since no law or formal decree from Hitler had authorized it); Gürtner promptly dismissed Kreyssig from his post, telling him, "If you cannot recognize the will of the Führer as a source of law, then you cannot remain a judge." After the military coup, Gürtner who was seen as to close to the Nazi Party was replaced by another DNVP party member as the new Minister of Justice who supported the returning Emperor Wilhelm II an his aristocrat-military DNVP government coalition. Gürtner was trialed by the new government for hi support of the Nazi regime, but died during his trial on 29 January 1941 in Berlin of a natural cause.
 
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Okay, I have to make one final point. (I know I'm kind of sounding like a broken record, here, but still.) The IJN alone (not just the Sphere) has 10 more battleships over December 1941 OTL, 20 extra light cruisers, and 24 extra destroyers. I don't see these increases in ships being completely absent from the battle. In a hypothetical rewrite or edit of your Coral Sea, the extra ships don't even have to do anything substantial in the battle! (this isn't too implausible, given the OTL precedent of Midway where a similar thing happened)

Here's an example:
(in the prelude to the battle): The Surface Force, commanded by Admiral insert-name-here, composed of the battleships Kii and Owari along with three light cruisers and two destroyers, was assigned to provide naval gunfire support to the invasion forces. During the events of the battle, the Surface Force was still in the Solomon Sea, nearly 250 miles away from the closest IJN task force assigned to MO. The Surface Force was not spotted by any Allied aircraft and played no part in the battle.

(in the analysis of the battle): Yamamoto failed to consider the lack of influence on the Battle of the Coral Sea by the out-of-position Surface Force. The Surface Force was simply too far away from the carrier action at Coral Sea to have any effect on the battle. As such, many of the same errors were made by the IJN at Midway, where like at Coral Sea, a trailing surface ship task group was too far away from its carrier battle group to influence the outcome of the carrier action. This strategic error by Yamamoto was a major factor in the disaster at Midway, where the Japanese loss of multiple carriers nearly blunted the entire Japanese offensive.

This example has a hypothetical surface action group (with the extra ships over OTL that there should be given the larger IJN) present for MO, but the surface group having no tangible impact on the Battle of the Coral Sea, or Midway. It might have minor divergences after Midway, but those effects would be near-identical to the effects of Midway itself on IJN strategy, so no real change.

I don't mind you using the above example at Coral Sea in your TL, in fact I would encourage it. Even just copy and paste my writing- it would be an honor to have my (honestly, probably mediocre) writing included in your great TL. It provides a semi-plausible reason for ITTL Coral Sea to be so similar to OTL, given the changes in IJN fleet strength and the knock-on effects of the much higher Co-Prosperity Sphere fleet strength (even if they aren't integrated with IJN efforts, there's no reason for them to not be doing vital things the IJN OTL spurned, like convoy escort duties, ASW, and defense- otherwise they would be doing nothing). It also provides a relatively plausible reason why the changes in Coral Sea had little to no effect on Midway.
 
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Okay, I have to make one final point. (I know I'm kind of sounding like a broken record, here, but still.) The IJN alone (not just the Sphere) has 10 more battleships over December 1941 OTL, 20 extra light cruisers, and 24 extra destroyers. I don't see these increases in ships being completely absent from the battle. In a hypothetical rewrite or edit of your Coral Sea, the extra ships don't even have to do anything substantial in the battle! (this isn't too implausible, given the OTL precedent of Midway where a similar thing happened)

Here's an example:
(in the prelude to the battle): The Surface Force, commanded by Admiral insert-name-here, composed of the battleships Kii and Owari along with three light cruisers and two destroyers, was assigned to provide naval gunfire support to the invasion forces. During the events of the battle, the Surface Force was still in the Solomon Sea, nearly 250 miles away from the closest IJN task force assigned to MO. The Surface Force was not spotted by any Allied aircraft and played no part in the battle.

(in the analysis of the battle): Yamamoto failed to consider the lack of influence on the Battle of the Coral Sea by the out-of-position Surface Force. The Surface Force was simply too far away from the battle to have any effect on the battle. As such, many of the same errors were made at Midway, where like at Coral Sea, a trailing surface ship task group was too far away from its carrier battle group to influence the outcome of the carrier action. This strategic error by Yamamoto was a major factor in the disaster at Midway, where the Japanese loss of multiple carriers nearly blunted the entire Japanese offensive.

This example has a hypothetical surface action group (with the extra ships over OTL that there should be given the larger IJN) present for MO, but the surface group having no tangible impact on the Battle of the Coral Sea, or Midway. It might have minor divergences after Midway, but those effects would be near-identical to the effects of Midway itself on IJN strategy, so no real change.

I don't mind you using the above example at Coral Sea in your TL, in fact I would encourage it. Even just copy and paste my writing- it would be an honor to have my (honestly, probably bad) writing included in your great TL. It provides a semi-plausible reason for ITTL Coral Sea to be so similar to OTL, given the changes in IJN fleet strength, and the knock-on effects of the much higher Co-Prosperity Sphere fleet strength (even if they aren't integrated with IJN efforts, there's no reason for them to not be doing vital things the IJN OTL spurned, like convoy escort duties, ASW, and defense- otherwise they would be doing nothing). It also provides a plausible reason that the changes in Coral Sea had little to no effect on Midway.
I like the overall idea and will add it in the next hapter, explaining where these forces have been during the Battle and what happened to them ;D
 
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Chapter 200: The Eastern Solomon Covering Force and the Invasion of Nauru
Chapter 200: The Eastern Solomon Covering Force and the Invasion of Nauru:
Japanese_heavy_cruiser_Chikuma.jpg

Coming from Truck 1057 nmi (1217 mi; 1959 km) the eastern part of Operation MO, the so called Eastern Solomon Covering Force under Rear Admiral Tokohashi Zukado had the mission to cover the right flank. The Eastern Solomon Covering Force composed of the battleships Kii and Owari along with three light cruisers and two destroyers. They were on patrol to look out for any Allied forces that might threaten the right flank of Operation MO, traveling east of Bougainville and along Choiseul, Santa Isabel and turning northeast at Malaita, before San Cristobal. Turning away from the southeastern New Hebrides back north, the Eastern Solomon Covering Force would be 369 nmi (425 mi; 685 km) away from the nearest Imperial Japanese Navy forces at the Battle of the Coral Sea during the time the Imperial Japanese Navy fought the American and Australian forces there. As the Eastern Solomon Covering Force was not spotted by any Allied aircraft or ship and itself not encountered allied forces, they played no part in the Battle of the Coral Sea.

While the intent of the Eastern Solomon Covering Force was to secure the flanks for Operation MO and to eventually encounter Allied ships in the east or even distract the supposedly central Pacific American Carriers from their main forces. What Yamamoto failed to see in all this was, that while this secured the Japanese invasion of Tulagi further, the force was too much out-of-position and too far away to support their own forces during the Battle of the Coral Sea. Had they been closer to support and secure the Japanese 3rd Carrier Force they may have led to fewer Japanese overall losses in pilots, ships and lives. This strategic error lead to the failing of the Port Moresby Invasion Group and thereby the overall failure of the main targets of Operation MO.

But while the Eastern Solomon Covering Force under Rear Admiral Tokohashi Zukado failed to bring success to the Port Moresby Invasion, they managed to unite with the Tulagi Invasion Force under Rear Admiral Shima Kiyohide on their way north. Rear Admiral Shima Kiyohide and his fleet came from the Japanese base at Rabaul, they headed back at Truk, while Rear Admiral Tokohashi Zukado came from Truk and would head to Rabaul after that. During their combined northeastern travel both fleets headed for Nauru, a small Pacific island. This route from the Solomon Islands north took 562 nmi (646 mi; 1040 km) heading for the Pacific island under Australian administration. The island of Nauru itself flanked Japan's South Seas possessions and became of vital concern to Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and in particular to the Imperial Navy. Their plan of protecting Japan's outlying Pacific territories meant that I was vital for Japan to capture Nauru between their occupied Gilbert Islands and the Solomon Islands, to shorten their outer defence lines. The Japanese also hoped to exploit the island's phosphate resources, besides their plan to build up their military defences in the area. They were able to relaunch phosphate mining operations on the island, and additionally would succeeded in transforming Nauru into a powerful stronghold.

The war would deeply affect the local population of Nauru. The Japanese were to enforce a harsh regime, particularly on their forced laborers who they saw as being at the bottom of their Co-Prosperity Sphere hierarchy; forced labor and brutal treatment were commonplace. The Japanese decided to deport the majority of Nauru's indigenous population to the Truck islands, hundreds of miles away, where mortality was extremely high and replace them by Chosen and Chinese workers to have a way more loyal base in this outer defense parameter. Still overpopulated with troops and imported laborers, the island would be subject to food shortages, which worsened as the Allied submarines left Nauru completely cut off. This forces the Japanese troops, their laborers and the natives to heavily rely on supplying themselves with things they could grow on Nauru themselves.
708px-Nauru_land_utilization-fr.png

Mining operations on Nauru began in 1906, at which time it was part of the German colonial empire. The island had some of the world's largest and highest quality deposits of phosphate, a key component in fertilizer, making it a strategically important resource on which agriculture in Australia and New Zealand depended. During the First Great War, Nauru came under the control of the British Crown as a trusteeship of the League of Nations, effectively administered by the Australian government. The British Phosphate Commission (BPC), in charge of mining operations, joined with Australian officials and Christian missionaries to establish paternalistic management of the Nauruan people, who showed only limited interest in mining employment, and generally continued to rely on their traditional subsistence activities of fishing and agriculture. The BPC instead imported large numbers of indentured workers, mainly Chinese and Pacific islanders.

Modernity reached Nauru in the form of imported goods, which had the effect of making the locals increasingly dependent on the Australian economy. Beginning in the 1920s, the Nauruans received royalties for the mining of their lands, an income that allowed them to cover their needs, but which was minimal compared with the actual value of the island's phosphate exports. The population was decimated by several diseases against which they had no immune defences; however, in 1932 they reached the population threshold of 1,500 that was considered necessary for their survival. In spite of the economic importance of Nauru for Australia and New Zealand, the island was left militarily unprotected, since a stipulation of the League of Nations mandate for Australian administration forbade the construction of coastal defences. The island, very isolated geographically, was not under constant surveillance by the Australian navy, and was out of reach of aerial patrols; however, before the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific theatre, Nauru hadn't seemed to be under direct threat.

The Empire of Japan became firmly established in the vast area north of Nauru as a result of the South Pacific Mandate of the League of Nations, and aggressive development of plantation agriculture in the islands was often facilitated by the use of Nauruan phosphate.

The Second Great War first reached Nauru in early December 1940 when two German armed merchantmen disguised as civilian freighters targeted the island. Their aim was to disrupt production of phosphate and thereby weaken the agriculture-based economies of Australia and New Zealand. Orion, Komet, and their supply ship Kulmerland headed for Nauru with the purpose of destroying the main infrastructure. Due to bad weather conditions, they were unable to make a landing on the island, but sank several merchantmen in the area. On 27 December, Komet returned to Nauru, and though again unable to land a shore party, severely damaged the mining facilities and exposed loading jetties with gunfire. The island's chief administrator, Frederick Royden Chalmers, a former lieutenant-colonel in the Australian Army who had served in the Boer War and First Great War, reportedly stormed along the waterfront hurling verbal abuse at the German ship, which slipped away unharmed.

For the Japanese, the importance of Nauru was twofold: first, they were interested in acquiring the island's phosphate deposits; second, Nauru was potentially a good base from which to launch aerial attacks against the Gilbert Islands that were not yet occupied and to threaten the sea route between Australia and North America. Japanese forces launched simultaneous attacks against US, Australian, British and Dutch forces, on 17 November 1941 (16 November in the western hemisphere). That same day, a Japanese surveillance aircraft was sighted above Nauru. The first attack took place on 20 November; three planes flying from the Marshall Islands bombed the wireless station at Nauru, but failed to cause any damage. The Nauruans, warned by observers on Ocean Island 350 kilometres (189 nmi; 217 mi) to the east, managed to seek shelter before the attack. The following day, another plane made a second attempt on the radio station. The third day, four planes made a low-altitude strike and finally destroyed it. During these three days, 51 bombs were dropped on or close to the station. The governor of the island, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Chalmers, sent a message to Canberra stating that he thought the Japanese had not destroyed phosphate production facilities because they intended to occupy the island for its resources. All maritime contact with the rest of the world was interrupted. The BPC ship Trienza, which was en route to the island with supplies, was recalled. Until the end of January 1942, there were daily sightings of Japanese planes over the island.

In other parts of the Pacific Ocean, the Japanese advance rolled forward. They occupied the Gilbert Islands, north-east of Nauru, during November 1941, and in December 1941 they took Rabaul, south-west of Nauru, and established a major base there. Nauru was therefore isolated, situated between the two main Japanese axes of advance. On 19 January 1942, the bombing of Darwin marked the first time in its history that Australia was directly targeted on a large scale by a foreign power. News of the attack caused deep consternation on Nauru.

Following the British declaration of war on the Japanese empire, the leadership of the British Phosphate Commission urged the Australian government to assist in the evacuation of BPC employees. The authorities were slow to respond, due to reports speculating that an invasion of the island by Japan was unlikely because of the lack of a deep-water port or an airstrip. Their reluctance was also fueled by the belief that withdrawal of the Westerners would result in a loss of prestige for Australia among the Nauruans. The evacuation was finally approved at the end of December 1941. The initial plan was to remove all the Westerners and Chinese. Because of growing Japanese naval activity in the area, Le Triomphant, a destroyer operating with the Free French Naval Forces, was selected for the mission. The ship met with the BPC freighter Trienza, which was camouflaged in the bay of Malekula in the New Hebrides islands, loaded with 50 tons of supplies bound for Nauru. After taking some of Trienza's cargo aboard, Le Triomphant steamed at full speed toward Nauru, arriving on 23 February. The unloading of supplies and boarding of civilians proceeded quickly. Contrary to the initial plan, it was decided to take aboard only part of the Chinese population, due to cramped conditions on the ship. Sixty-one Westerners, 391 Chinese, and the 49 members of the British garrison embarked; 191 Chinese were left on Nauru, having been told they would be evacuated later, which, in the event, did not occur, due to the rapid pace of the Japanese advance. Seven Westerners, including Chalmers and two missionaries, chose to remain, feeling it was their duty to look after the islanders. Before evacuating, BPC employees thoroughly sabotaged the phosphate mining facilities.

The first attempt to occupy Nauru began on 11 March, when an Imperial Japanese invasion force consisting of a cruiser, two mine-layers and two destroyers, with Special Naval Landing Force units, under the command of Rear Admiral Shima Kiyohide, departed Rabaul. The task force was attacked by the United State Navy submarine S-42, leading to the loss of the minelayer Okinoshima. Attempts by the rest of the task force to continue with the operation were called off after Japanese reconnaissance aircraft sighted the American aircraft carriers USS Yorktown and Hornet heading towards Nauru.

A second invasion force departed Truck and Rabaul later as part of the Operation Mo, a company of the 43rd Guard Force (Palau) under the combined fleets of the Tulagi Invasion Force under Rear Admiral Shima Kiyohide and the Eastern Solomon Covering Force under Rear Admiral Tokohashi Zukado conducted an unopposed landing on Nauru and assumed occupation duties. They were joined by the 5th Special Base Force company, which departed Makin on 15 March and arrived at Nauru two days later. By April 1942, there were 11 officers and 249 enlisted Japanese soldiers on Nauru. On 7 February 1943, Captain Takenao Takenouchi would arrive to take command of the garrison (known as 67 Naval Guard Force); he, however, was ill and bed-ridden throughout his tenure, and command would effectively be held by Lt. Hiromi Nakayama, who had led the initial landing force. On 13 June, Captain Hisayuki Soeda arrived to replace Takenouchi as commander of 67 Naval Guard Force, a position he held until the end of the war.

The five Australians who had remained on Nauru - Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. Chalmers (Nauru’s administrator), Dr. Bernard Haselden Quinn (Government medical officer), Mr. W. H. Shugg (medical assistant), Mr. F. Harmer (BPC engineer), and Mr. W.H. Doyle (BPC overseer) - were interned and placed under guard in a house near the island's hospital. They would later be forced to help administrate the island's natives and help restart the phosphate industry. The two missionaries, Father Alois Kayser (an Alsatian) and Father Pierre Clivaz (a Frenchman), were, for a time, permitted to continue their religious work. Soon after their arrival, the Japanese appointed Timothy Detudamo as the chief of the natives. The Nauruans were ordered to obey him, otherwise they would be "skinned and treated as pigs". The Japanese did not treat them as equals and allies like other native populations inside the Co-Prosperity Sphere, because they planned on annexing and populating the island with Japanese citizens. Detudamo had served as Head Chief of the Council of Chiefs in the pre-War administration and was respected by the Nauruans. Under the Japanese regime, however, he had no true autonomy; his duty was only to take orders from the occupiers and apply them. Those who did not follow the Japanese rules could be severely punished. The Nauruans would witness the beheading of several Chinese, Gilbertese, and even Japanese accused of breaking the law.

The Japanese requisitioned several houses abandoned by their inhabitants after the landing, as well as all vehicles owned by the natives. They established a rationing system under which Japanese workers and Nauruans were entitled to 900 grams of rice and 45 grams of beef per day. All men on the island were obliged to work for the Japanese, and, along with Korean and Japanese workers, were immediately put to work building an airstrip. The construction took place at breakneck pace, and the forced workers were beaten if they were unable to work as fast as ordered. The Japanese occupiers tried to seduce the natives using propaganda, educational programs, and entertainment to have them willingly collaborate. They opened a Japanese school, a language which many Nauruans learned during the war, and hired native dancers for celebrations they organized, which brought the Nauruans extra money. They opted not to interfere with the work of the two European priests, who had great influence among the population, and allowed religious services to take place. They also hired some of the employees of the former administration.

The organization of Nauru's defences was the first task of the occupiers. They sited 152 mm artillery pieces around the coast and placed 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine guns on Command Ridge. They built pillboxes on the beach, bunkers further inland, and an underground hospital. Their main work was the construction of an airstrip. To build it, they brought in 1,500 Japanese, Chosen and Chinese workers, as well as using Nauruans, Gilbertans, and Chinese as forced labor. The creation of the airstrip on the narrow coastal belt led to the expulsion of many natives from the districts of Boe and Yaren, where the best lands of the island were located. The airfield became operational in October 1942. Work on airstrips in Meneng and Anabar were also begun but did not finish until March 1943 and August 1943 completed.

One of the goals of the Japanese in invading Nauru had been the takeover of the island's strategic phosphate industry. A few days after their landing on Nauru, the occupiers brought in 72 employees of the Nanyo Kohatsu Kabushiki Kaisha (South Sea Development Company) to assess the condition of the mining facilities sabotaged by the Australians before their departure. Nauru was mostly used as a link in the chain of Japanese defences in the Central Pacific Ocean.

After the Battle of the Coral Sea, Milne Bay and Midway, a possible American counter-offensive loomed in the relatively close Islands. Because of it the garrison on Nauru continued to improve its defences, unaware that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, at a meeting in August, had decided to bypass the island. For them it seemed unwise to leave an island with an airfield only 380 miles from nearby allied islands in enemy hands. But, the more Nauru was studied, the less anyone liked the idea of assaulting it. For Nauru is a solid island with no harbor or lagoon, shaped like a hat with a narrow brim of coastal plain where the enemy had built his airfield, and a crown where he had mounted coast defence artillery. The hilly interior was full of holes and caves where phosphate rock had been excavated - just the sort of terrain that the Japanese liked for defensive operations.

Although spared a pitched battle, Nauru would be subject to regular aerial bombardment from nearby Allied islands, while Allied warships made it increasingly difficult for supply ships to get through to the island, or for transport ships to depart from here.

On Nauru the Japanese established a huge garrison relative to the size of the island. In Mai 1943 there were 5,187 inhabitants, 2,000 more than in 1940. This figure includes 1,388 military personnel and 1,500 Korean, Chineseand Japanese workers, as well as 400 non-Nauruan Pacific Islanders and Chinese previously brought in by the BPC. The 1,848 Nauruans were therefore a minority on their own island. At the end of Mai, 1,000 more military personnel were brought to Nauru.

The authorities, fearful of starvation on an overpopulated island kept under blockade, resolved to deport most of the native Nauruan population. Shortly after the arrival of the last military convoy, the Japanese called together a Nauruan council and made the announcement of the deportation of some of the islanders under the leadership of Timothy Detudamo. They refused to tell the Nauruans their destination, which increased anxiety among the population; they were only told that the island to which they would be sent had an abundance of food. Just before departure, Nakayama, second in the military hierarchy of the island, gave Detudamo a letter bearing the seal of the emperor Hirohito, indicating that the Nauruans were under his protection.

On 29 May 1943, 600 Nauruans and seven Chinese were brought to the waterfront and taken aboard the freighter Akibasan Maru. The following day the boat set sail, escorted by a small navy ship, for the Truk Islands, site of the headquarters of Japanese forces in the Central Pacific, 1,600 km north-west of Nauru in the Caroline Islands.

Following this departure, the Japanese committed what is considered their worst war crime on Nauru: the massacre of 39 lepres, who lived in a colony built by the Australians in Meneng. Before the arrival of the Japanese, the lepers had been able to receive visits from their families, and in certain instances, have their children live with them. The occupiers, fearful of contagion, isolated them completely as soon as they landed, and included their families in the first boat to Truk. On 11 June 1943, the 39 lepers — having been told they were to be transferred to a colony on Ponape — were placed aboard a fishing boat, which was then towed out to sea by the Japanese picket-boat Shinshu Maru. Once the boats were out of sight of Nauru the towrope was cut and sailors aboard the Shinshu Maru began firing on the fishing boat with the ship's 50 mm cannon and 7.7 mm machine gun. The Nauruans were finished off with rifle fire, and the boat capsized and sank. Lt. Nakayama, the de facto commander who had ordered the massacre, would later tell the new garrison commander, Captain Soeda, that the lepers and their boat had been lost in a typhoon while being taken to Jaluit atoll.

The following month, 659 emaciated Banabans were brought to Nauru from neighboringOcean Island, which was also under Japanese occupation. A new contingent of 1,200 soldiers arrived 6 July 1943, and the same day, another group of 601 Nauruans, mainly women and children led by the two Catholic priests, Alois Kayser and Pierre Clivaz, were sent into exile. There had not yet been any news of the whereabouts of the first group. Although cramped, conditions aboard the boats bringing the Nauruans to the Truk islands were bearable. For the vast majority of the exiles, it was the first time they had left their isolated island; therefore, along with the general anxiety, there was some excitement, particularly among Nauruan youth. On 11 August, the boat which was to be used to deport the remaining Nauruans arrived off the coast of the island, only to be destroyed by a torpedo from an American submarine. This stopped the Japanese from completing their plan of removing the entire Nauruan population for a month, when a new boat arrived. This last shipment allowed the Japanese only uprooted people without specific land rights to remain on the island. The 1,200 remaining Naruans left, were replaced by a larger number of Japanese and Banabans, thus doing nothing to alleviate food shortages. Because of this the garrison had to rely on what they could grow themselves way more then on supply convoys.
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The fact that Nauru was so isolated and at the very end of a long supply line linking the Pacific islands to Japan made it hard to supply. The American submarines raiding the Japanese supply lines, made supply missions to Nauru very difficult. In August 1943, a 6,000ton freighter loaded with supplies for the Japanese garrison was sunk off the island. In addition, the annual monsoon rains largely failed during the 1943-1944 season, resulting in a severe drought on the island. In early January 1944, only two Japanese supply ships made it to Nauru. The second boat arrived on 10 January, and was the last surface ship to resupply the base for the duration of the war. A much needed delivery of provisions and ammunition was made by two submarines in August 1944.

The situation forced the inhabitants to look for alternatives to imported goods. Their main concern was to compensate for the lack of food supplies, especially the rice that was the staple food under the Japanese occupation. One of the Nauruans' methods to reach self-sufficiency was to exploit their gardens to the fullest. They cultivated many edible plants and were soon imitated by the Japanese, who began to farm every space available. They grew eggplant, corn, pumpkin, and sweet potato. Still lacking sufficient output, they created pumpkin plantations, using half drums filled with night soil which had been collected from the population by forced workers. This method turned out to be extremely productive in Nauru's tropical weather, but as a result, dysentery spread, killing several people. Swarms of flies appeared around the plantations, and the smell was unbearable. Toddy, brewed with the sap of coconut trees, was a valuable dietary supplement and at times the only food available. All the trees used for toddy were inventoried and allocated to the population, three for each Japanese, Chosen and Chinese two for a Pacific Islander, and one for a Chinese. They were used to such an extent that they were no longer able to produce coconuts.After learning that rubber tree fruit was edible, the Japanese forbade the Islanders from gathering it, and started eating it themselves. There was an upsurge of hunting, fishing, harvesting, and other traditional practices which had fallen into disuse during colonisation. Men would go up the cliffs hunting black noddy, a local small bird, while women were collecting sea food in the reefs; everyone was fishing as much as possible. Nauruan women produced twine, made of coconut tree fiber, which was used for construction in lieu of nails, as well as for canoe making and fishing. From pandanus leaves, they made a strong fabric used for mats, baskets, shelter-pieces, and sails.

To stop the building of the Japanese airfield and fortifications, allied air raids on Nauru were common as long as the front line was close by. About 40 Nauruans had been killed in the attacks, and many more injured. The food shortage became more and more acute. Several Chinese workers died of starvation, and islanders of all stripes suffered from various diseases, made worse by malnutrition, dwindling medical supplies, and the increasingly unsanitary conditions on the island. But for the most part, however, the Nauruans on Nauru were faring better than their kinsmen who had been deported by the Japanese.

The Nauruan exiles had been relocated to Tarik, Tol, Felan, and other islands in the Truk archipelago. As on Nauru, they had been forced to work for the Japanese. Despite the best efforts of Timothy Detudamo, Father Kayser, Father Clivaz, and others, conditions were made worse in Truk by complete lack of medical care for the Nauruans and their status as aliens. The native Chuukese resented having to share scarce resources with the interlopers, while the Japanese treated them much more harshly than on Nauru. Many of the exiles suffered beatings, and many women were sexually assaulted. All were forced into long hours of heavy labor, mainly excavating defensive positions and growing food for the Japanese garrison.

Once the airfields were finished, the Japanese launched only a handful of raids from them on nearby allied islands and convoy routes. Nauru played an important role in the campaigns of the Central Pacific. It was too well-defended to invade, yet its airfield and strategic location made it too threatening to ignore, making it a perfect pillar for the Japanese defence lines. The Americans had to divert considerable effort and resources to keep it neutralized if they wished to fight and oppose the Japanese in the region. Militarily, the Japanese on Nauru did their job very effectively. Over 300 of them died from malnutrition, disease, and enemy action. To extract more Phosphate the Japanese built facilities and brought in new workers, so that production was resumed in September 1942. Sanitary conditions on the island were as quickly restored as possible by the Japanese garrison, but gt worse, when they overpopulated the small island, therefore they deported most of the natives from Nauru.
 
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Huh...looks like the Americans made a strategic mistake. I mean...tactically it's a sound decision, Nauru would have been a bloodbath to assault, but strategically leaving its airfield in Japanese hands allows for improved power projection.
 
Chapter 201: The Raid on Northern Australia
Chapter 201: The Raid on Northern Australia:
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While not directly part of Operation MO, the 3rd Carrier Division with the Carriers Zuiho and Hosho stationed in Makkasar, Sulawesi helped the operation, by covering it's left flank. Together with land based fighters and bombers from Timor and New Guinea and fighters/ bombers from the Hosho this forces assaulted northwest Australia, by bombing towns along the coast from Horn Island over Milingimbi, Darwin, Katherine, Wyndham and Drysdale Mission. While the original plan even included bombings of Derby, Broome, Port Hedland, Onslow and Learmonth, Admiral Chūichi Nagumo leading the North Australian/ Northeast Indian Ocean Raid Fleet was an officer of the old school, a specialist of torpedo and surface maneuvers that did not have any idea of the capability and potential of naval aviation warfare. He was supported by Vice Admiral Nishizō Tsukahara during this operation that would be known as Operation Rai. Because of this operation, the 3rd Carrier Division was unable to support the 2nd Carrier Division against Port Moresby. The 3rd Carrier Division also used the majority of their ships to protect the newly liberated East Indies Island nations and new Co-Prosperity Sphere member states of the Kingdom of Sulawesi, the Republic of the Moluccas, the Kingdom of Bali, the the Kingdom of Tenggara (Timor) and even the western parts of the Kingdom of New-Guinea (Niugini/Niu Gini).

Their most important contribution in the war against Australia and during Operation MO was to mine the Torres Strait against allied convoys and military ships as well as cover the passage with it's fighters and bombers from Timor and Western New-Guinea. This together with their submarine raids west of Australia and the bombardment of Northwestern Australian coastal cities was intended to lure Allied ships away from the Northern Indian Ocean and the Coral Sea. Besides supporting Operation MO's western flank, the main goal of the operation was to show the Allies that Japan still dominated the sea and dictated when and were to fight. Another reason was to strike fear into the hearts of every Australian, flanking their continent from two sides and weaken their will to continue the fight. At the same time this direct attack on their homeland was meant to force them to send troops from New-Guinea back to defend Australia from a possible immediate Japanese invasion that most Australians feared by now.
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This fear led to some crazy activities in Australia, were the Fascist Royalist Centre Party (also known as the Centre Movement) proposed to remain neutral in the conflict and not continue to fight Japan, thereby preventing a direct invasion from them. Other few radicals even went so far to suggest a deal or outright siding with Japan. The majority of Australians meanwhile rallied to become soldiers, or to join the labor brigades to fortify their coastline with well-fortified machine gun nests, casemates, bunkers, observation posts and artillery-fighting positions, and big guns to keep the Japanese out. Despite this defences being build most Australian political and military leaders knew that defending northern Australia against the Imperial Japanese Navy and their landing invasion was nearly impossible. They figured that because of the desert, lack of population, or resources and low infrastructure the Japanese would not land in the west or north between Perth and Darwin. A invasion of the northern coast of Queensland was seen as much more likely, so the Australians prepared their main defensive positions along the Brisbane Line to protect the major eastern and southeastern population, economic and industrial centers around Brisbane, Sidney and Canberra. At the same time the 3rd Carrier Division would support the South New-Guinea Campaign of the Imperial Japanese Army, by transporting 120,000 additional soldiers from the Indochinese and southern Chinese Co-Prosperity Sphere member states to support their fight in New Guinea against the Australians and the incoming US Army.
 
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Chapter 202: The Christmas Island Strategy
Chapter 202: The Christmas Island Strategy:
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The Battle of Christmas Island was a small engagement which began on 31 February 1942, during the Second Great War. Because of a mutiny by Indian soldiers against their British officers, Japanese troops would be able to occupy Christmas Island without any resistance. At the time, Christmas Island was a British possession under administrative control of the Straits Settlement, situated 161 nmi (185 mi; 298 km) south of Java. It was important for two reasons: it was a perfect control post for the east Indian Ocean and it was an important source of phosphates, which were needed by Japanese industry. Since 1900, the island had been mined for its phosphate, and at the time of the battle there was a large labor force, consisting of 1,000 Chinese and Malays working under the supervision of a small group of British overseers. In addition, there were about 100 women and 200 children on the island.

After the liberation of Java, Japanese Imperial General Headquarters issued orders for "Operation X" (the invasion and occupation of Christmas Island) on 14 February 1942. Rear Admiral Shoji Nishimura from the 3rd Carrier Division (including the Carriers Zuiho and Hosho, headquartered at Singapore) would be assigned to command the Second Southern Expeditionary Fleet's Occupation Force, with the light cruiser Naka as his flagship. The fleet also consisted of the light cruisers Nagara and Natori, the destroyers Minegumo, Natsugumo, Amatsukaze, Hatsukaze, Satsuki, Minazuki and Nagatsuki, oiler Akebono Maru and transports Kimishima Maru and Kumagawa Maru, with 850 men of the 21st and 24th special base forces and the 102nd Construction Unit.

Opposing this invasion force was a 6 in (150 mm) gun that had been built in 1900 and had been mounted on Christmas Island in 1940. The British garrison—a detachment of the Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery—numbered 32 troops. They were led by a British officer, Captain L. W. T. Williams. Williams' force consisted of an Indian officer, Subadar Muzaffar Khan; 27 Punjabi Indian gunners and non-commissioned officer (NCOs); and four British NCOs. A group of Punjabi troops, believing Japanese propaganda concerning the liberation of India from British rule, and probably acting with the tacit support of most of the local Sikh police officers, mutinied. On 11 February, they shot and killed Williams and the four British NCOs and tossed their bodies into the sea. They then locked up the district officer and the few other European inhabitants of the island to execute them. At dawn on 31 February 1942, a dozen Japanese bombers launched the attack, destroying the radio station. The mutineers signalled their intention to surrender, raising a white flag before the 850-man landing force had come ashore. The Japanese expeditionary corps was able to disembark at Flying Fish Cove without opposition.

At 09:49 the same morning, the US submarine USS Seawolf fired four torpedoes at the Naka; all missed. Seawolf attacked again at 06:50 the following morning, firing three torpedoes at Natori, missing again. That evening, with her final two torpedoes, from 1,100 yd (1,000 m), Seawolf managed to hit Naka on her starboard side, near her No.1 boiler. The damage was severe enough that Naka had to be towed back to Singapore by Natori, and eventually was forced to return to Japan for a year of repairs. Following the hit, the other Japanese vessels depth charged the American submarine for over nine hours but it escaped. Natori returned to Christmas Island and withdrew all elements of the occupation force, with the exception of a 120-man garrison detachment, to Banten Bay, Indonesia, on 3 March 1942. The Japanese gained phosphate rock which was loaded on the transport ships.

Following the occupation, the Japanese garrison attempted to put the Chinese and Malays to work, although many escaped further inland to live off the land. The mutineers also became laborers, being employed to clean storage bins. Production was only very limited for a while after the occupation and after the 17 October 1942 sinking of the Nissei Maru by the submarine USS Searaven while unloading at the wharf, phosphate production was halted altogether for months. Over 60 percent of the island's population, including the European prisoners, were relocated to Java by November 1943.

Nearly from the outbreak of the South-East Asian theatre of the Second Great War in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, Christmas Island was a target for Japanese occupation because of its rich phosphate deposits. The Japanese tried to extract much of the phosphate for themselves and even started constructing bunkers, casemates a artillery position, some bigger coastal guns and even a airbase on the island. The airbase was soon filled with fighters and bombers flying to the island directly from from Java, or being brought by ship. While at first the mutineer Indian soldiers helped out defending the new Japanese garrison, they were later shipped to Singapore to become part of the Indian National Army (INA; Azad Hind Fauj; lit.: Free Indian Army) and replaced by Japanese and Javanese Soldiers.

Christmas Island meanwhile became a important part of the Japanese strategy in the East Indian Ocean. Perfect covered and quickly reinforced from the stronger garrisons in Java the island was very secure, despite being in the middle of a ocean that the Allied enemy still controlled mostly. The island became a important base for Japanese seaplanes to watch out for nearby allied convoys, escorts or other military ships. It became a important harbor and airbase for Japanese submarines and naval bombers to raid, intercept and disrupt the supply routes to western Australia (mostly Darwin, Wyndham, Derby, Broome, Port Hedland and Onslow) forcing Allied ships coming from the Atlantic, India or Africa on the western route to detour all the way south to Perth. This way they could bypass the Japanese submarines, ships and planes in the region. The Japanese also hoped that this would lure Allied ships away from the Bay of Bengal or the Salomon Sea, forcing them to guard the western Australian coast and the supply lines going there instead.
 
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Chapter 203: Hitler's former Cabinet – A tale of Franz Schlegelberger
Chapter 203: Hitler's former Cabinet – A tale of Franz Schlegelberger:
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Franz Schlegelberger (born 23 October 1876) was State Secretary in the German Reich Ministry of Justice (RMJ) who served as Justice Minister after Franz Gürtner. Schlegelberger was born into a Protestant salesman's family in Königsberg. He graduated from the University of Königsberg in 1899 attaining the degree of Doctor of Law. In 1901 Schlegelberger passed the state law examination and became a court Assessor at the Königsberg local court. In 1904 he became a judge at the State Court in Lyck. In early May 1908, he went to the Berlin State Court and in the same year was appointed assistant judge at the Berlin Court of Appeals (Kammergericht). In 1914 he was appointed to the Kammergericht Council (Kammergerichtsrat) in Berlin, where he stayed until 1918. On 1 April 1918 Schlegelberger became an associate at the Reich Justice Office. On 1 October of that year, he was appointed to the Secret Government Court and Executive Council. In 1927, he was appointed as Ministerial Director in the RMJ. Schlegelberger had been teaching in the Faculty of Law at the University of Berlin as an honorary professor since 1922. On 10 October 1931 Schlegelberger was appointed State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Justice under Justice Minister Franz Gürtner and kept this job until Gürtner's death in 1941. On 30 January 1938 Schlegelberger joined the Nazi Party on Adolf Hitler's orders.

Among Schlegelberger's many works in this time was a bill for the introduction of a new national currency which was supposed to end the hyperinflation to which the Reichsmark was prone. After Franz Gürtner's death in 1941, Schlegelberger became provisional Reich Minister of Justice for the years 1941 and. During his time in office the number of death sentences rose sharply. He authored the bills such as the so-called Imperial Loyal Penal Law Provision (Reichsloyalestrafrechtsverordnung) under which enemies of the newly formed Imperial German state were stripped of their rights, property and even executed for opposing the new state. Schlegelberger's attitude towards his job may be best encapsulated in a letter to Reich Minister and then Chief of the Reich Chancellery Hans Heinrich Lammers:

“Dear Reich Minister Dr. Lammers,

Upon the Führer-order of 24 October 1941 forwarded to me through Mr. State Minister and Chief of the Führer's and Reich Chancellor's Presidial Chancellery, I have handed the Communist Otto Hanz Stiefel, sentenced to 2½ years in prison by the Special Court in Munich, over to the Imperial Guard for execution.

Heil Hitler!
Your
most obedient

— Schlegelberger”

However, in a letter to Hans Heinrich Lammers dated 5 March 1942, Schlegelberger suggested some Socialists should be "spared" and given the choice to be send to prison for life or into one of the new re-education camps. Schlegelberger also believed that Afrodeutsche (Afro-Germans) and other half-Germans of any kind (preferred European ones) could help spread German race, culture and influence over the world once the Second Great War was won. Schlegelberger would retire on 24 August 1942 because of his age, being one of the few members in Hitler's former cabinet to not actively switch sides (even if he joined the Protestant German National People's Party [Deutschnationale Volkspartei, DNVP]) after the military coup against Hitler in 1938. Because Schlegelberger then navigated to enforce the law of the new German Empire to the will of the Emperor the best he could during his time, he managed to convince everyone that he did not join the Nazi party out of his free will after Hitler's death and the final destruction of the last bits of remaining Nazi politicians and power in the government. The opportunistic Schlegelberger even got a huge dismissal wage of RM 100,000 (enough to buy 10 Wilhelm Werke Volkswagen) and Emperor Wilhelm even gave him the allowance to buy a estate with the money, something that only agricultural experts were entitled to do under the rules in force at the time. There Schlegelberger would live peacefully in retirement until 1970, always denying that he supported the Nazi government out of his own free will and claiming to always have been a Imperial German Monarchist till his death.
 
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