The betrayal of the Kaiserliche Marine and the resurrection of the Reichsmarine

[Gudestein]

If Hindenburg was hit by 3 x 18" torpedos then she would have been unlikely to have survived

OTL a single hit was often crippling if not fatal and I know of no ship that survived more than 2 hits at the same time during this period

There are examples of ships taking several hits in different attacks - generally in WW2 but as far as I am aware all eventually succumbed

3 would totally overwhelm a WW1 Battlecruisers ability to stay above the waves!

1 hit would be enough to take her out of the battle for several months - 3 hits outside of shallow water and she is doomed.

I would use Seydlitz's single hit during Jutland as an example of how devastating a single hit could be

The British bc’s and bb’s didn’t have the deep tds until Hood came along. The Derfflinger class did.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derfflinger-class_battlecruiser
Take a look at the armor layout. The 45 mm soft armor several m’s behind the hull sides is exactly the same as on Bismarck. Except for the rudder hit, Bismarck basically shrugged of the 18 inch torpedo hits it received iotl. The British DEF class submarines (the majority) carried similar small 18 inch torpedoes.
In addition to the tds basically being able to handle it, the Derfflinger class also had 18 watertight compartments.
So odds are the Derfflinger would not be sunk by 3 18 inch torpedoes.
The British ships at the time would and did sink. Ramillies being the first BB to receive torpedo bulges, and hood were the first with a tds design from the onset.
PS. About the damage on seydlitz. It tore a big hole in the outer plate, but that is a design feature of the deep tds system. Following the hit which did struck an area which had been recently patched from mine damage, Seydlitz could still maintain top speed. This was likely from a 21 inch torpedo as carried by British destroyers.
Indeed, Seydlitz suffered 21 other large caliber hits.
PPS. The Hindenburg was severely damaged

 

[Gudestein]

Some things I would do.

1. Expand the merchant fleet big time. Have 30-50 ships built to specs that they can be easily changed to surgace raiders (maybe even with one 8 and two 6 inch guns to deter destroyers).

2. Go for submarine construction in other countries and develop a class that can be put together from prefabbed parts like the XXI could.

3. Go for thorough testing of torpedoes.

4. Go for longdistance planes as spotters.

Now you are thinking of OTL. ITTL they are going to explore the surface raider concept with a fleet build for it. Collaboration with submarines, aircraft force multiplier’s etc are ok, but ittl they are proud of their surface ships.
2. Regarding submarines I think greater range and speed would be prioritized to assist collaboration with the surface fleets.
1 and 4 for sure. 3..? Why?it might happen simply because of more development time but it’s not obvious

 

[Cryhavoc101]

The British bc’s and bb’s didn’t have the deep tds until Hood came along. The Derfflinger class did.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derfflinger-class_battlecruiser
Take a look at the armor layout. The 45 mm soft armor several m’s behind the hull sides is exactly the same as on Bismarck. Except for the rudder hit, Bismarck basically shrugged of the 18 inch torpedo hits it received iotl. The British DEF class submarines (the majority) carried similar small 18 inch torpedoes.
In addition to the tds basically being able to handle it, the Derfflinger class also had 18 watertight compartments.
So odds are the Derfflinger would not be sunk by 3 18 inch torpedoes.
The British ships at the time would and did sink. Ramillies being the first BB to receive torpedo bulges, and hood were the first with a tds design from the onset.
PS. About the damage on seydlitz. It tore a big hole in the outer plate, but that is a design feature of the deep tds system. Following the hit which did struck an area which had been recently patched from mine damage, Seydlitz could still maintain top speed. This was likely from a 21 inch torpedo as carried by British destroyers.
Indeed, Seydlitz suffered 21 other large caliber hits.
PPS. The Hindenburg was severely damaged

Seydlitz suffered a lot of above water line damage but as far as I can tell only the Torpedo hit caused flooding and it allowed 5000 plus Tons of water into her - the hit progressively flooded the forward part of the ship to the point where her bows were almost underwater.

Had she not made it to the Jade when she did and met by 2 pump ships she would have sunk

The warheads on British 21" Torpedos are 230 odd KGs the 18" about 150 odd KGs - a ww1 TDS would have been overwhelmed by 3 x 150 kg hits - hell most ww2 TDS would have been overwhelmed

Many ships in both wars survived 1 torpedo hit - some 2.

None survived 3 torpedo hits or more (at the same time of any size) - with only those sunk in harbour ever serving again.

Now while it might be possible that a ship of this time could survive 3 such hits at the same time - it to the best of my knowledge never happened.

 

[Eternity]

Remember OTL that the Nelsons were built because the RN wanted some 16" ships too. I can't see that changing, especially with the losses in the R class and Queen Elizabeth class. So one or two G3 may well be in the cards
++Snip++

Especially as the RN ordered the 7" deck armour and the order was identified and believed to be for the side armour, which was in fact going to be an inclined, internal belt, 14" thick..... So long as the other nations still believe it is side and not deck armour, they may well think as OTL and that the G3's are battlecruisers and not full fledged fast battleships, and thereby not object too much.

 

[Gudestein]

Seydlitz suffered a lot of above water line damage but as far as I can tell only the Torpedo hit caused flooding and it allowed 5000 plus Tons of water into her - the hit progressively flooded the forward part of the ship to the point where her bows were almost underwater.

Had she not made it to the Jade when she did and met by 2 pump ships she would have sunk

The warheads on British 21" Torpedos are 230 odd KGs the 18" about 150 odd KGs - a ww1 TDS would have been overwhelmed by 3 x 150 kg hits - hell most ww2 TDS would have been overwhelmed

Many ships in both wars survived 1 torpedo hit - some 2.

None survived 3 torpedo hits or more (at the same time of any size) - with only those sunk in harbour ever serving again.

Now while it might be possible that a ship of this time could survive 3 such hits at the same time - it to the best of my knowledge never happened.

I grant it she could easily sink, I am inspired by the minimal damage on the Bismarck. However, the compromise was already written in. It was damage in the minefields outside Wilhelmshaven.
The majority of statistics is for ships without deep tds so they would suffer catastrophic damage.
Regarding the Seydlitz damage I struggled to find sources going through the individual hits and their damage, except the notion that she could maintain top speed, and no reading about requirements for further tds in subsequent ships. Maybe the torpedo hit caused a progressive number of above the waterline hits to become below waterline hits?
PS. I did find indirect references from the armor layout of the Bismarck. It maintains the long bow belt armor as splinter protection with reference to what happened to Seydlitz.

 

[Gudestein]

Especially as the RN ordered the 7" deck armour and the order was identified and believed to be for the side armour, which was in fact going to be an inclined, internal belt, 14" thick..... So long as the other nations still believe it is side and not deck armour, they may well think as OTL and that the G3's are battlecruisers and not full fledged fast battleships, and thereby not object too much.

I know they are much better ships, but why ittl. With 4 admirals far advanced in building wouldn’t they be cut back by a treaty effort to bring budgets under control. The RN ittl would if they build Rodney and Nelson be stronger than otl. Particularly in fast BB/armored BC’s.

 

[NoMommsen]

Chapter 19: Last sortie of the Kaiserliche Marine

When news of the armistice came in late 1918, it did nothing to shatter the resolve of the Kriegsmarine. Immediately following the botched breakout attempt, the writing-on-the-wall had been read clearly by the admiralty. The war was last, and now all that mattered was how to get revenge and restore the German honour. One of the first actions was the formation of a string of holding companies by the government, one of which took a controlling share in Loyd’s shipping and in the upcoming Danish shipping company Maersk. One of the first actions of Maersk was to purchase the Giant diesel engine that had been slated for the successor of the Mackensen’s, in order to have it running in a merchant ship by early 1919. One of the first actions of Loyd’s was the employment of 2/3’s of the ship designers at the Reichsmarineamt, in this decision some of the less performing and elderly members had been omitted. When the terms of the armistice shattered the beliefs of the German populace, the ex-officers of the Reichsmarineamt acted with determination: Yes, terms were harsh, but the objective was clear. The Marine had to be ready for round 2 in 20 years or more.

First ... I would like to please you to index this update as well. Makes things easier to stay tuned.

The marked part :
Did something like that happen IOTL too ??
... and, ... well ...
ITTLs actions of these companies are a somewhat ... very hindsighteeringly positiv. IF the planned and built (though not installed) battleship diesels would have been known to the 'outer world' I actually could imagine some company of the near-abroad (i.e. Denmark, Sweden) would be interested in, but I would assume rather an existing company putting its hands on, like i.e. Burmeister and Wain .

And the 'outsourcing' of designing personnel ... as said : very 'hindsighting' IMHO.
What surplus would/should the NDL (even if the german navy would haver the money and means to purchase such a share, what it IOTL did NOT have) have out of this ? ... enganging a rather high number of expensive because highly trained engeneers it had no use for. Simply out of 'patriotic' reasons ?

Sry but ... you assume an amount of 'insight' (if not hindsight) of the german navy topbrass it IOTL simply did not have. Rather the opposite.
Well into the early 20ies they were reluctant to accept the ToV verdict as a lasting one, still believing that its regulations (esp. for the navy - though I have no idea why they rendered themself so important) won't last and be lifted considerably in at least 5-6 years time (such I knew from the time post-Kapp 1920).
(Source : Reichsmarine und Landesverteidigung 1919-1928 (The Realms Navy and Defense of the State 1919-1928), Walter Rahn, 1976)

 

[NoMommsen]

Chapter 20: Post ToV, July 9th 1919

...

*A minor butterfly, IOTL Zenke would not take the office before 1924. ITTL a battlecruiser commander was a necessity

WOW, HOLD OFF !

That's a rather MAJOR butterfly you let flap here to - as it seems - 'speed things up' into a the direction you would like to see. You have taken quite some effort, respectable and nice to read effort to change the HSFs performance and reputation in the on land to be decided war.
To keep that quality I would really, REALLY recommed you to inform yourself about the formation of the Admirality and then Marineleitung in 1919/1920. Zenker was waaay down the list of officers eligible for that job.

After the last State Secretary of the Marine Office, Ernst Ritter von Mann, quit his job in Feb. 1919 not at least due to the interference of several 'revolutionary' councils of seamen, militaries and others NOONE actually wanted job. ... Hans Zenker at that time 'only' Commodore and CnC Safe-Guard North-Sea included (he became Konteradmiral on 21.January 1920 onyl).
In Feb./March 1919 it was on the initiative of marine officers at the Marine Office, pleasing/teasing him, that von Trotha took the job in revolutionary Berlin as someone at hands in revolutionary Berlin. Raeder, at that point of time only Figate captain, one rank below Captain at Sea (or "fullworthy" captain) was administering the administration (Central Department) of the german navy. After that he became well affiliated to v. Trotha. So well affiliated, that after the Kapp-Putsch he was removed/sidelined to the Marine-Archives.

After Trotha had to go there were still an awfull lot of others in front of Zenker for the job :
Scheer, Hopmann (sry no english source/wiki), Behnke, Michaelis, Löhlein (sry no wiki at all, at that time Rear-Admiral Chief of the 'Common' marine-Office as well as the Marine-Command)

 

[Deleted member 92195]

Gosh. I suppose I took too long to write and release mine. Mine is way more in-depth but what is the point of two narratives focusing on the same aim.

 

[weasel_airlift]

I grant it she could easily sink, I am inspired by the minimal damage on the Bismarck. However, the compromise was already written in. It was damage in the minefields outside Wilhelmshaven.

Have one or two of the torpedoes run shallow and impact at the waterline, therefore expending most of their energy on the belt. The third does the actual damage.

 

[Satrap]

Gosh. I suppose I took too long to write and release mine. Mine is way more in-depth but what is the point of two narratives focusing on the same aim.

Go for it.

Remember, variety is the spice of life

 

[Gudestein]

Gosh. I suppose I took too long to write and release mine. Mine is way more in-depth but what is the point of two narratives focusing on the same aim.

Go for it.

Remember, variety is the spice of life

Yes, please go for it. This is by no means the final TL on this, related or interveawed subjects.

 

[Gudestein]

WOW, HOLD OFF !

That's a rather MAJOR butterfly you let flap here to - as it seems - 'speed things up' into a the direction you would like to see. You have taken quite some effort, respectable and nice to read effort to change the HSFs performance and reputation in the on land to be decided war.
To keep that quality I would really, REALLY recommed you to inform yourself about the formation of the Admirality and then Marineleitung in 1919/1920. Zenker was waaay down the list of officers eligible for that job.

After the last State Secretary of the Marine Office, Ernst Ritter von Mann, quit his job in Feb. 1919 not at least due to the interference of several 'revolutionary' councils of seamen, militaries and others NOONE actually wanted job. ... Hans Zenker at that time 'only' Commodore and CnC Safe-Guard North-Sea included (he became Konteradmiral on 21.January 1920 onyl).
In Feb./March 1919 it was on the initiative of marine officers at the Marine Office, pleasing/teasing him, that von Trotha took the job in revolutionary Berlin as someone at hands in revolutionary Berlin. Raeder, at that point of time only Figate captain, one rank below Captain at Sea (or "fullworthy" captain) was administering the administration (Central Department) of the german navy. After that he became well affiliated to v. Trotha. So well affiliated, that after the Kapp-Putsch he was removed/sidelined to the Marine-Archives.

After Trotha had to go there were still an awfull lot of others in front of Zenker for the job :
Scheer, Hopmann (sry no english source/wiki), Behnke, Michaelis, Löhlein (sry no wiki at all, at that time Rear-Admiral Chief of the 'Common' marine-Office as well as the Marine-Command)

Not to get it in a particular direction but for simplicity. Getting to people I know about. Info is hard to come by on this and the influence of the butterflies hard to predict. Better morale will impact mutiny’s of OTL, but there is a stated drive for round 2 and BC stardust will help. Unfortunately, I cannot say who will rise and sink from the info available.
Since you know the sources in German could you help with some suggestions based upon the TTL changes?

 

[Gudestein]

First ... I would like to please you to index this update as well. Makes things easier to stay tuned.

The marked part :
Did something like that happen IOTL too ??
... and, ... well ...
ITTLs actions of these companies are a somewhat ... very hindsighteeringly positiv. IF the planned and built (though not installed) battleship diesels would have been known to the 'outer world' I actually could imagine some company of the near-abroad (i.e. Denmark, Sweden) would be interested in, but I would assume rather an existing company putting its hands on, like i.e. Burmeister and Wain .

And the 'outsourcing' of designing personnel ... as said : very 'hindsighting' IMHO.
What surplus would/should the NDL (even if the german navy would haver the money and means to purchase such a share, what it IOTL did NOT have) have out of this ? ... enganging a rather high number of expensive because highly trained engeneers it had no use for. Simply out of 'patriotic' reasons ?

Sry but ... you assume an amount of 'insight' (if not hindsight) of the german navy topbrass it IOTL simply did not have. Rather the opposite.
Well into the early 20ies they were reluctant to accept the ToV verdict as a lasting one, still believing that its regulations (esp. for the navy - though I have no idea why they rendered themself so important) won't last and be lifted considerably in at least 5-6 years time (such I knew from the time post-Kapp 1920).
(Source : Reichsmarine und Landesverteidigung 1919-1928 (The Realms Navy and Defense of the State 1919-1928), Walter Rahn, 1976)

A gradual takeover of NDL happened iotl later as the state was financing many projects with the same perspective as this (eg. High pressure turbines in the admiral class of liners) and the state was the main share holder in the late 30’s. In 1918 it’s basically broke so it would be cheap.
The Diesel belong to the navy and this is a way to keep it under control. B&W wouldn’t get the chance ittl.
In general: insight/hindsight... the pod makes them see themselves as the main protagonist and hence they think the entente is serious. Like otl they believe a time will come to rearm, and ittl they are determined to be ready for the commerce raiding type of war....
This is a stretch, to a degree depending on who gets in charge. However they would probably align around this strategy, also those who didn’t iotl.

 

[Gudestein]

WOW, HOLD OFF !

That's a rather MAJOR butterfly you let flap here to - as it seems - 'speed things up' into a the direction you would like to see. You have taken quite some effort, respectable and nice to read effort to change the HSFs performance and reputation in the on land to be decided war.
To keep that quality I would really, REALLY recommed you to inform yourself about the formation of the Admirality and then Marineleitung in 1919/1920. Zenker was waaay down the list of officers eligible for that job.

After the last State Secretary of the Marine Office, Ernst Ritter von Mann, quit his job in Feb. 1919 not at least due to the interference of several 'revolutionary' councils of seamen, militaries and others NOONE actually wanted job. ... Hans Zenker at that time 'only' Commodore and CnC Safe-Guard North-Sea included (he became Konteradmiral on 21.January 1920 onyl).
In Feb./March 1919 it was on the initiative of marine officers at the Marine Office, pleasing/teasing him, that von Trotha took the job in revolutionary Berlin as someone at hands in revolutionary Berlin. Raeder, at that point of time only Figate captain, one rank below Captain at Sea (or "fullworthy" captain) was administering the administration (Central Department) of the german navy. After that he became well affiliated to v. Trotha. So well affiliated, that after the Kapp-Putsch he was removed/sidelined to the Marine-Archives.

After Trotha had to go there were still an awfull lot of others in front of Zenker for the job :
Scheer, Hopmann (sry no english source/wiki), Behnke, Michaelis, Löhlein (sry no wiki at all, at that time Rear-Admiral Chief of the 'Common' marine-Office as well as the Marine-Command)

I edited it. The most likely in my opinion is that without the OTL mutinies Scheer continues. I have Hipper not retiring.
A butterfly is also that IF Scheer published his memoirs, it would be with the purpose of deception as to the new course taken by Germany. I dont know of the impact of his memoirs which were published in 1920 in english. Anyone want to pitch in what this might mean?
Here is the book: https://www.naval-history.net/WW1Book-Adm_Scheer-Germanys_High_Sea_Fleet.htm

 

[Eternity]

I edited it. The most likely in my opinion is that without the OTL mutinies Scheer continues. I have Hipper not retiring.
A butterfly is also that IF Scheer published his memoirs, it would be with the purpose of deception as to the new course taken by Germany. I dont know of the impact of his memoirs which were published in 1920 in english. Anyone want to pitch in what this might mean?
Here is the book: https://www.naval-history.net/WW1Book-Adm_Scheer-Germanys_High_Sea_Fleet.htm

That is an excellent book. My only regret is that I had to print a pdf scan as I can't find an original copy to buy for Love of it.

 

[Mordalfus Grea]

Now what I am interested in is the effects of these butterfly flaps on the United States Navy, this time around the USN was badly mauled and had learned a number of lessons that it did not in the OTL.

 

[Gudestein]

Now what I am interested in is the effects of these butterfly flaps on the United States Navy, this time around the USN was badly mauled and had learned a number of lessons that it did not in the OTL.

I’d offer the suggestion that in addition to the Lexington’s Laid down post ttl’s Jutland, they would be working on designs that balances speed, armor and firepower better than the Lexingtons.
If they end up with 27-28 knots BB’s or 30-31 knots BC’s is hard to guess. I’d like opinions before writing it.
Having already committed to the Lexingtons (the last ones probably as CV’s) might drive them in the BB direction. Untill TTL gets its treaties

 

[Gudestein]

Chapter 21: Conclusions and recommendations based on the sinking of Thüringen, Mauretania and Florida

Scheer and Hipper next went to the report that had been made on the circumstances in which Thüringen, Mauretania and Florida had been sunk. Mauretania had been hit repeatedly at close to maximum firing range during a stern chase, whereas Thüringen had been hit in similar circumstances to blow up, apparently as a shell penetrated deeply into a magazine. Even more remarkably, Florida had been hit at a more reasonable fighting angle resulting in water penetration, resulting in a list towards her attackers, a list that allows further deck penetrations at favorable angle and then her demise.

Scheer was in particular impressed with the sinking of Florida where an approach under excellent shooting conditions had been sought out with the intention of crippling Florida before an infight would ensue. The conclusion was clear in that hits could be repeatedly obtained in the 16-20 km range, and as this was the maximum range of most of the big guns at 20 degrees elevation – who knows, maybe longer. Also, considering the effects, it seems, which made sense from a ship design point-of-view, that such hits would more often cause critical damage than horizontal above the waterline belt penetration (BC turrets excepted from this generalization).

When guns in the future were to be designed with further elevation, this would have important consequences for the concept of immune zones and how to layout the protective armor. However, more importantly, when engagement ranges were to be further extended hits would in general be penetrating the belt of the current British, French and US battleships. Thus, optimizing guns and shells for long range penetration might offer a chance to negate part of the advantage in older ship number that the British would hold over a future rebuilding Reichsmarine.

 

[Mordalfus Grea]

Now all we need is a look at the chaos that is Congress during and after the war.